1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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3	IN RE CONVERIUM HOLDING AG SECURITIES LITIGATION 04 CV 7897 (DC)
4	New York, N.Y.
5	November 16, 2006 10:15 a.m. Before:
6	HON. DENISE COTE,
7	District Judge
8	APPEARANCES
9	SPECTOR ROSEMAN & KODROFF
10	Attorneys for Plaintiff Avalon Holdings, Class ROBERT M. ROSEMAN
11	BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMAN LLP
12	Attorneys for Plaintiff Public Employees' Retirement System of Mississippi
13	SEAN COFFEY STEVEN SINGER BEATA FARBER
14	
15	WEISS & LURIE Attorneys for Plaintiff Michael Rubin JOSEPH H. WEISS
16	JACK I. ZWICK
17	COHEN, MILSTEIN, HOVSFELD & TOLL
18	Attorneys for Plaintiff Avalon Holdings MARK WILLIS
19	WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER
20	Attorneys for Defendant Converium Holding AG and the individual defendants RICHARD MANCINO
21	JOSHUA ELLISON
22	CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE LLP
23	Attorneys for Defendant UBS AG and Merrill Lynch DOUGLAS BROADWATER
24	LeBOEUF, LAMB, GREENE & MacRAE LLP Attorneys for Defendant Zurich Financial Services
25	RALPH FERRARA JONATHAN RICHMAN

1	(Case called)
2	(In open court)
3	THE DEPUTY CLERK: Matter of Converium Holding
4	litigation. Counsel for the plaintiff, please state your name
5	for the record.
6	MR. COFFEY: Sean Coffey, Bernstein Litowitz Berger
7	and Grossman. I'm here today with my partner, Steve Singer, on
8	behalf of the lead plaintiffs in the putative class.
9	MR. ROSEMAN: Good morning, your Honor. Robert
10	Roseman from Spector Roseman & Kodroff on behalf of the
11	plaintiffs.
12	MR. WILLIS: Mark Willis from Cohen Milstein, also on
13	behalf of the plaintiffs.
14	MR. WEISS: Good morning. Joseph Weiss, and with me
15	is Jack Zwick of Weiss & Lurie on behalf of Michael Rubin.
16	MS. FARBER: Good morning, your Honor. Beata Farber
17	on behalf of the plaintiffs, Bernstein Litowitz Berger &
18	Grossman.
19	THE DEPUTY CLERK: For the defendants, please state
20	your name for the record.
21	MR. MANCINO: Good morning, your Honor. Richard
22	Mancino on behalf of Converium Holding, AG and the individual
23	defendants, and I'm joined by my colleague, Josh Ellison.
24	MR. FERRARA: Good morning, your Honor. Ralph
25	Ferrara, LeBoeuf, Lamb, on behalf of Zurich Financial Services.

I'm accompanied today by my partner, Jonathan Richman.

MR. ROSEMAN: Good morning.

 MR. BROADWATER: Good morning, your Honor. Douglas Broadwater. I'm with Cravath. We represent UBS AG and the

underwriters on the December '01 prospectus.

THE COURT: Welcome to everyone. Thank you for coming here. I know that there is a lot I have to master about this

case and I'm going to use this conference to help get me

organized. This is a transferred case. Sadly, this court has

lost Judge Mukasey, but as consolation prize, I get to preside

over this case and a few others.

I've spent some time trying to understand the lay of the land, but not an extraordinary amount of time, because I thought it would be more efficient for me to hear today from each of you what the status is, so I thought I'd start by just giving you sort of an outline of what I understand the open motions are and the issues and what remains to be done and where we are, so that you can fill in the gaps and correct any misunderstanding that I have.

I'd also like to run this as an initial conference, even though I know the litigation is at least two years old, but it's my first meeting with you, and it's a chance for me to learn factually what the case is about. I understand that Judge Mukasey chose two lead plaintiffs and appointed three law firms as lead counsel. I'm not quite sure what Mr. Rubin's

role is, so I'm sure Mr. Weiss will fill me in on where that comes in.

As I understand it, there actually hasn't been a consolidation order executed here. I have a draft which is unsigned. I think I might in executing a consolidation order perhaps use a slightly different format that I'm familiar with from cases I've supervised on my own docket before this that were securities cases, but I don't think there will be many surprises in that.

I think we have six cases that are potential candidates for consolidation. However, with respect to one of them I understand that there is an unopposed motion for remand. So let me list the six cases. They are Taylor, 04 Civ 8038 -- no, I'm sorry, let me start again.

There are seven cases that need to be consolidated.

The lead case is Meyer, 04 Civ 7897. And then the additional cases would be Taylor, 04 Civ 8038; Triden, 04 Civ 8060;

Bassin, 04 Civ 8295; Maxfield, 04 Civ 8994; Jakob, 04 Civ 9479, and then the last being Rubin, 05 Civ 3871. And it's with respect to that last case, Rubin, that I believe I have an unopposed motion for remand that has been pending since May of '05.

In terms of motions, I have a motion, I think perhaps two motions to withdraw as counsel; one for a Mark Debrowski, which I don't think has been granted, but is really just

cleaning house and needs to be so ordered by me, an attorney left a law firm and should no longer be listed as representing one of the plaintiffs.

I also have a motion by LeBeouf to withdraw as counsel for Zurich Financial Services, which I don't think has been addressed, and I see that Mr. Ferrara is here, so I don't know if I should be granting that or not.

MR. FERRARA: Well, your Honor, I certainly hope not. I think, as I understand it, there may be some confusion on the record. Sullivan & Cromwell had originally appeared on behalf of Zurich Financial Services. I believe they are withdrawing and we are replacing them, and I believe that motion was granted, your Honor. At least I'm told that.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. FERRARA: I don't have the order, but I'm told that that was granted.

THE COURT: Okay. So I'm going to check into that and if we don't find a record on the docket of a signed order --

MR. FERRARA: We'll submit a new order.

THE COURT: Great. But don't do that unless we call you. We'll check into it.

 $\ensuremath{\mathsf{MR}}.$ FERRARA: Rest assured, though, we are here to stay.

THE COURT: Good, thank you. And you were replacing who?

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But, that said, let me explain why I have this preference for a single lead plaintiff represented by a single

THE COURT: More substantively, I have a motion to dismiss, a motion to strike, a motion to file a second amended complaint. And I grouped those together, which I'll want to hear about. I assume the motion to strike is related to those other motions, but perhaps not, and you'll tell me.

I'd be interested in hearing, when we get to this part of the conference, whether or not plaintiffs are intending to file yet another amended complaint or whether the motion for leave to file a second amended class action complaint can be considered by me as the plaintiffs' complaint on which I should decide the motion to dismiss practice. So you'll let me know.

I'm also interested in understanding -- some of you have appeared before me before in other securities litigation, in particular Bernstein Litowitz, but I think several of you, and you probably know that I sort of have a presumption that there will be a single lead plaintiff represented by a single law firm. I don't probably intend to revisit that issue in this case. Judge Mukasey has made a decision and everybody has been functioning under it for two years, and I know of no reason at this point to revisit it, and I entirely trust his judgment about how to organize the case from the plaintiff's point of view.

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law firm, and that is when it comes time, should it come time ever in this case for a review of attorneys fees, I take that role extremely seriously, and even if the application is unopposed, I scrutinize it myself independently, and when there are multiple law firms I bring an extra level of attention to that issue, to make sure that there's been no unnecessary duplication or waste, such that the class, should it receive a recovery in this case, is not deprived of every single penny to which it is entitled.

Good. So you sort of know what I know, and what I don't know at this point, so let's start as if this were an initial conference, and I'll ask the plaintiffs to, before we get to the procedural framework and motion practice and all that, to just describe to me what this litigation is about from a factual point of view, and then I'll hear from defense counsel.

MR. COFFEY: Good morning, your Honor. Sean Coffey.

It's a securities class action, and it involves
Securities Act claims relating to a December 2001 initial
public offering by Converium and open market 10(b) claims for
the period of time after that from December 11, 2001 through
early September, 2001. I'll give you the precise date,
September 2, 2004.

The defendants are Converium, its parent, which was involved with the IPO, it's directors, officers and the

underwriters, the two lead underwriters for the IPO.

THE COURT: So let me look at that. So that's UBS and Merrill Lynch?

MR. COFFEY: Correct, your Honor. In the offering, Zurich sold 35 million shares of Converium to the public at a price of \$24.59, realizing gross proceeds of approximately \$2 billion. That was at the time the largest IPO for a reinsurance company in history.

In July of 2004, the company announced that it had underreserved and would have to take a charge against earnings

of 400 million to increase its North American reserves. The market reacted swiftly with a 50 percent drop in the stock

price from approximately \$25 to approximately \$12-1/2. It was

a market cap loss of about a billion and a half dollars in one day.

A number of lawsuits were filed, and as you noted earlier, your Honor, Judge Mukasey appointed two lead plaintiffs; the Public Employees Retirement System of Mississippi, which is a Bernstein Lewis client, and then Avalon Holdings, together with the other two firms, Spector and Roseman and Cohen Milstein.

The lead plaintiff's motions were made in December of '04 and decided, I believe, in August of '04 and a consolidated complaint was filed in September. Motions to dismissed were fully briefed and then the restatement came out. And so we

1	sought leave to file the second amended complaint, and that is
2	pending.
3	THE COURT: So what was the theory of the first
4	complaint if it was before the restatement?
5	MR. COFFEY: Well, they had made an announcement
6	I'm sorry, they had subsequent announcements and the amount
7	they were underreserved grew and grew. Our complaint, we ended
8	up interviewing somebody in the mix who shared with us the fact
9	that the underreserve was known within the company, was known
10	before the IPO, so there were false statements made and
11	omissions made about the adequacy of their reserves and when
12	the truth came to light the stock plummeted precipitously.
13	THE COURT: Give me the dates again of the IPO?
14	MR. COFFEY: December 11, 2001.
15	THE COURT: And then the date of the announcement of
16	the underreserve?
17	MR. COFFEY: July 20, 2004.
18	THE COURT: And the lawsuits were then filed after
19	July of '04?
20	MR. COFFEY: Correct, your Honor. They began to be
21	filed in the fall of '04 and were assigned to Judge Mukasey.
22	THE COURT: And then when was the restatement issued?
23	MR. COFFEY: The restatement was issued in March of
24	'06, your Honor. So after the first consolidated complaint had
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THE COURT: Okay. So the principal function of the second amended complaint is to fold in the restatement?

MR. COFFEY: That, your Honor, and also to address something that from a plaintiff's perspective should be wholly unnecessary, but we are who we are.

We also wanted to address the sounds in fraud argument that is so often made with regard to Securities Act claims and in light of a recent decision in the Third Circuit, Suprema, this is happening more and more, and again, why complete in the alternative everywhere else but securities cases, that's a question for another day, but the second purpose for the second amended complaint was to go through the exercise of breaking the claim into two pieces, putting the Securities Act claim first without any allegations of fraud and then the specific allegations of fraud and then the Exchange Act claims to further underscore that plaintiffs should be entitled to press Securities Act claims without having to satisfy the heightened burdens of pleading that go along with Exchange Act claims. those were the two purposes.

I could jump ahead to two issues that your Honor has already raised. I have good news to report. If you haven't read these letters, maybe that's a good thing, but there's been a lot of correspondence back and forth about the leadership of the case. I'm pleased to say that in discussions coming here today with regard to the role of Mr. Rubin, his case, whether

there were --

THE COURT: Introduce me to Mr. Rubin. Who is he?

MR. COFFEY: He's a plaintiff who filed a case and who has the unopposed motion to remand. He filed in state court, he was removed, he seeks -- wanted to be lead plaintiff in a separate case so there would be two cases side by side. Of course, there had not been a consolidation. We talked about it and have concluded it would be in the best interests of the class to consolidate those cases, so he's willing to stay in federal court and be consolidated and to serve as a named plaintiff for the Securities Act claims for which he had filed a lawsuit.

So what we would do with regard to the second amended complaint, it would be the operative complaint but for an additional named plaintiff. We have the two lead plaintiffs we've talked about, LASERS, the Louisiana State Employees Retirement System is a named plaintiff in this complaint, and we have concluded it's in the best interests of the class to have Mr. Rubin as an additional named plaintiff, and to resolve these issues about who should be the lead, whether his case is separate, whether he is remanded and we have a competing state action. We have some experience with that, and the challenges that poses, and in viewing the merits of what he has done already and how it resolves some of the issues that have been raised in the motions to dismiss, we concluded, and Mr. Rubin

ultimately agreed, that it was better to have him as a named plaintiff. So that in my opinion would have resolved some of the issues about whether he gets this case remanded, and whether there's a separate lead plaintiff. He won't be a lead plaintiff. His counsel will not be lead counsel, and that's news on that front. So the proposed second amended complaint would be amended to add him as an additional named plaintiff.

THE COURT: And we'll get to this when each of defense counsel have an opportunity to address the Court, but I'm assuming there will be no opposition to that additional amendment. Okay.

MR. COFFEY: And I'll say simply, we read you loud and clear on your admonition about duplication of efforts by the plaintiffs' attorneys. We're very mindful of that, and I believe we have a track record on that, and we intend to act consistently with that track record on being as efficient as we can on behalf of the class. That's all I have at this point, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So you're willing to have the proposed second amended complaint rise or fall on its merits.

MR. COFFEY: We are, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. WEISS: Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. WEISS: Before you get to defense counsel, if

Mr. Coffey is finished, I represent Mr. Rubin, I just wanted to take a moment, can I? Good morning, your Honor, Joseph Weiss. I represent Mr. Rubin. I just wanted to explain that we had filed the case on behalf of Mr. Rubin in state court, and the theory was that there's concurrent jurisdiction in the state court for Section 11 claims. Mr. Rubin asserted only a Section 11 and 12-2 claim, no 10(b) claims. So our position had been that there should be separate representation for the Section 11 12-2 claims, and there had been an issue with respect to that. But we've spoken to Mr. Rubin, we spoke to Mr. Coffey, and I think we all agree that it would be in the best interests of the class if in fact the plaintiffs are united in prosecuting this litigation.

There was no one else who had filed Section 11 claims, and our complaint had been filed just before the statute of limitations ran. So the defendants had raised an issue in this case here as to whether the Section 11 claim that was asserted by the other plaintiffs was timely asserted or not.

THE COURT: When you say no one else had filed a Section 11 claim, do you mean no one else -- what do you mean?

MR. WEISS: Those exact words, your Honor. No one else filed a Section 11 claim before the statute of limitations expired. Just the way you hear it. We were the only ones to do that. But the point is --

THE COURT: So these '04 cases did not have a Section

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11 claim?

MR. WEISS: That's correct, your Honor. Eventually, after we filed, and after the statute expired, it was added here and it was added based on Mr. Rubin in effect tolling the statute on behalf of everyone else.

So in order to avoid this issue, which in effect has now been raised, of Mr. Rubin becoming a plaintiff in the consolidated case if your Honor in fact consolidates them which we believe she should, that will no longer be an issue, I don't think the defendants will be able to assert it, your Honor won't have to deal with it. The one thing I guess I would add with respect to this Section 11 claim and that Mr. Coffey touched upon, everything that Mr. Coffey said was correct, that he touched upon, even when they first announced they didn't have sufficient researches before any restatement, what they announced were, and this is a quote, these are legacy issues, namely, meaning that these issues that they have about being so vastly underreserved go back prior to the public offering, which means that even then they in effect conceded that the registration statement and prospectus did not accurately reflect Converium's financial position.

So I'm pleased to report to your Honor that we have been able to resolve this. We are working together. The only comment that I may like to add to what Mr. Coffey said is because with respect to the amended complaint, the second

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amended complaint that they filed, there may be a paragraph or two which I would like to make a suggestion to him. So with your Honor's permission, we're not going to overdo it, but there might be a paragraph or two that I would like to talk to him about in addition to Mr. Rubin being named, but otherwise, I think it's clear that the second amended complaint and this addition is something we should stand on.

And I guess, your Honor, I would say that we would be withdrawing our motion to remand, if that's even necessary to say now. But I guess I want to explicitly say it, we do withdraw that.

THE COURT: Okay. I know I have counsel for Avalon I'd love to know what Avalon is. here.

MR. WILLIS: Good morning, your Honor, Mark Willis. Avalon is a Greek trust. It's a trust for a shipping company based in Athens, and they purchased Converium stock, and --

THE COURT: In their own name. Are they beneficial owner?

MR. WILLIS: Avalon is, yes. They purchased the stock and they filed lead plaintiff papers as well as Mississippi. They actually have the highest loss of any of the movants, and through our good relationship with Bernstein Litowitz and recognition of their good work and our good work with respect to Rubin, we determined it would be in the best interests of the class not to have a prolonged lead plaintiff issue, and the

clients wanted to work together on this and felt that was a positive thing to do, and so we presented that to Judge Mukasey.

THE COURT: Thank you. So, Mr. Mancino, why don't I start with you?

MR. MANCINO: Good morning, your Honor. To give you the background of the case from my perspective, and I'm sure if there's anything to fill in, my bretheren at defense counsel table will volunteer. As the plaintiffs allege in the first paragraph of their complaint, this case is about the intentional manipulation of loss reserves to manufacture profit. That's the gravamen of their case. And that becomes relevant later when you talk about the restatement allegation.

My client, Converium Holding AG, is an international reinsurance company. It was formed in 2001 out of the then reinsurance business of Zurich Financial Services, which at that time operated under the trade name of Zurich Re. It's composed of a number of separate subsidiaries. Most relevant to this action is the North American subsidiary called Converium Reinsurance North America, known previously as Zurich Re North America.

In March, 2001, your Honor, Zurich announced that it was making a strategic change in its business, such that it was going to essentially exit the reinsurance business and as a result of that it was contemplating the disposition of its

reinsurance business, and it was through that, once that decision was made, the Converium entities were formed. And then as part of that, they retained the well-known actuarial consulting firm, Tillinghast, to review the loss and loss expense of the reserves in that reinsurance business in anticipation of the disposition of it.

In September of 2001, Zurich announced that the Converium reinsurance business would be spun off in a public offering. Also in that time frame of September 2001, Tillinghast issued its final report on its review, the final report of its review of the loss reserves of the reinsurance business of Converium. The initial public offering occurred on December 11, 2004 -- 2001, excuse me, and over the next -- and in the offering documents, your Honor, Converium noted that as a result of the Tillinghast review of its loss reserves, it had strengthened its reserves by approximately 112 million in response to that, 125 million of which related to the Converium North America business, offset by some redundancies in other parts of the business. That prospectus also disclosed that in 2000, there had also been substantial increases, strengthenings of Converium's loss reserves.

Following the IPO, which was conducted via a firm commitment underwriting whereby Zurich sold its shares to the underwriting consortium and they in turn sold it to the public, in the eleven months following the IPO, Converium announced

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over a period of time additional substantial reserve strengthenings in regard primarily to its North American business, relating principally to the underwriting years of '97 through 2000. There were in this eleven-month time period immediately on the heels of the IPO approximately four additional reserve increases, totaling approximately \$160 million, substantial amount.

Converium was operating as an independent reinsurance company, and like all reinsurance companies, or insurance companies, for that matter, was constantly evaluating and reassessing its loss reserves, and from time to time changes were made in those loss reserves.

What prompted these lawsuits was the announcement in July 2004 that upon a further review of its loss reserves, Converium had concluded that they needed to be strengthened by an additional, at least an additional \$400 million, and in that announcement, they noted that an actuarial consultant had been retained to review further the loss reserves, and that the results of that review would be announced in the following months.

THE COURT: Now, was that, again, Tillinghast or someone else?

MR. MANCINO: It was Tillinghast that conducted the review in 2004 as well. There was also another independent actuarial consultant involved with the Converium reserves, and

that was the actuarial branch of Deloitte called Bacon Woodward Deloitte that did an independent evaluation of Converium reserves in 2003. I should note that in the prospectus, Converium noted that, by this reserves, following the strengthening corresponded to Tillinghast's best estimates based on the review that Tillinghast had done leading up to the IPO in 2001, and Tillinghast expertized the offering documents.

Following the announcement of the \$400 million reserve deficiency in July, 2004, there was another announcement in September, 2004 following the results of the Tillinghast review, which announced that there were going to be additional reserve strengthenings, such that the total reserve strengthenings in '04 were in excess of \$500 million.

Then in October 2004, as your Honor has noted, the series of class action complaints were filed in federal court. Each of those complaints alleged violations of Section 10B and Rule 10B-5 on account of, as the consolidated complaint mentions, an alleged manipulation of loss reserves to manufacture profit.

On December 9, 2004, Mr. Weiss on behalf of his client, Mr. Rubin, filed the Section 11 and Section 12 lawsuit in state court. That was subsequently removed to federal court, your Honor.

THE COURT: On what theory?

MR. MANCINO: Under SLUSA, your Honor.

THE COURT: Was it brought as a class action?

MR. MANCINO: Yes, it was, under the theory that it was a covered class action under SLUSA.

So we removed it to federal court. Mr. Rubin filed a motion to remand, and there's been -- let me just correct the record on that, your Honor, because there was a mention made that it was an unopposed motion to remand. It was really, that motion to remand was withdrawn pursuant to a stipulation that Converium entered into with Mr. Rubin, Mr. Rubin's lawyer, Mr. Weiss, pursuant to which he agreed to withdraw his motion to remand.

THE COURT: Was that stipulation so ordered? Should I find it in the docket sheet?

MR. MANCINO: It was not so ordered, your Honor. It was presented to Judge Mukasey, and I think that stipulation ran into the buzz saw that was presented by the debate that was ongoing between Mr. Weiss and the lawyers for the federal plaintiffs over who would be the lead plaintiff and lead law firm, and as a result of that, I believe, that stipulation was not entered by Judge Mukasey.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Coffey, I'm going to ask you to get me an order which will, among other things, address the motion for remand which is still pending on the docket.

MR. COFFEY: Will do.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. MANCINO: We had a conference before Judge

Mukasey, after which the parties agreed to a schedule by which

the now lead plaintiffs and their lawyers would file a

consolidated amended complaint and that was filed in September

of 2005, your Honor. And that complaint, unlike all of the

prior complaints that had been filed, I believe I'm correct on

this, named in addition to Converium, the individual defendants

and Zurich Financial Services, the underwriter defendants. All

of the defendants in turn filed motions to dismiss that

complaint. Our motions to dismiss were filed in early 2006.

Shortly after we filed those, Converium announced that after an internal review of the reinsurance accounting treatment of certain discrete finite risk transactions, it was going to be restating certain of its financial statements because it had concluded that reinsurance accounting treatment for certain of those transactions had been incorrectly taken, such that it should have been recorded using deposit accounting rules, not reinsurance accounting rules.

On March 1, 2006, Converium announced, formally announced the results of a restatement and sometime in the following month of April, the plaintiffs made a motion to amend their complaint to include allegations relating to the restatement in their 1933 Act claims.

THE COURT: Thank you, this is all very helpful. But just before you get too far ahead of me, here, so when you

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mention the restatement as suggesting that the company should
have used deposit accounting rules instead of reinsurance
accounting rules, that means that, wholly apart from the issue
about the size of the loss reserves, there's a second issue
about the accounting treatment? Do I understand that
correctly?
MR. MANCINO: Yes, your Honor. The restatement does
not involve the review and establishment of loss reserves. The
restatement, on the other hand, involves the accounting
treatment under FAS 113 of these discrete complex finite risk
transactions and looks at the question of whether under the

THE COURT: So that restatement was necessary even if there had been no underreserved issue?

those contracts there was sufficient risk transfer to justify

taking reinsurance accounting treatment for those contracts.

contractual language and the dealing between the parties to

MR. MANCINO: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So there are two independent issues?

MR. MANCINO: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Did the restatement also address the underreserve issue?

MR. MANCINO: It did not, your Honor.

THE COURT: That had already been accounted for in an ongoing way through 2001 and 2002, et cetera?

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MR. MANCINO: And up through 2004 and the announcement of those increased loss reserves.

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THE COURT: Okay, so you see the restatement as an

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entirely separate issue?

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MR. MANCINO: We do, your Honor.

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THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. MANCINO: So there is now a motion to amend, to amend the '33 Act claims to include some allegations relating

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to the restatement of these finite risk transactions.

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defendants have opposed that motion to amend, and indeed the

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plaintiffs have filed their opposition to our motions to

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dismiss the original consolidated and amended complaint, and

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all those motions have been fully briefed since June of this

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year, and are pending a decision.

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And we basically took the view that the pending motions should be resolved because the proposed amended complaint is futile, for a number of reasons, one of which is that it's time barred because the plaintiffs have first raised restatement allegations over four years after the date of the initial public offering, and it's therefore barred by Section 13's three years statute of repose.

In addition, in line with our view that the two sets of allegations really are independent, we have taken the position that the restatement allegations do not relate back to the plaintiff's original consolidated amended complaint,

because they involve an entirely different subject matter, because the original case is not a case about the reinsurance accounting treatment of complex finite risk transactions. It's a case about the alleged intentional manipulation of loss reserves.

And we also oppose the amended complaint on grounds of futility because there is not a '33 Act claim to which it can relate back, because the '33 Act claims alleged in the plaintiff's consolidated amended complaint are barred by the one-year statute of limitations under Section 13, because the plaintiffs were on notice of their claims from at least as early as November, 2002, because of the series of storm warnings that were emanating from Converium in the eleven months following the IPO.

THE COURT: Ah, mm-hmm.

MR. MANCINO: So, in our perfect world, at least speaking for Converium, your Honor, the pending motions to dismiss the original consolidated amended complaint should go forward, and as part of that, your Honor can address the briefing on the motions to amend because we think at the end of that process, we will have a situation where all or part of the original consolidated complaint may fall, but that in any event, the proposed amendments regarding restatement will be deemed not to have any place in this lawsuit whatsoever.

THE COURT: Your briefing, then, when you opposed the

amendment, did not restate the arguments in the briefing on the original motion to dismiss, so I do have to decide, from your point of view, two separate motions here; the motion to dismiss and the motion to amend.

MR. MANCINO: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MANCINO: And we think, given the time and effort that the parties have already devoted to that briefing and the period of time that it's been pending, that that's the best way to approach it, from an efficiency and economical perspective.

THE COURT: Don't worry, I am aware of the PSLRA. I will decide your motions.

So with respect to the motion to dismiss, you were faced with both Securities Act and Exchange Act claims.

MR. MANCINO: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And you've addressed both in your motion to dismiss?

MR. MANCINO: Yes, we have.

THE COURT: And your attack on the Securities Act claims is not failure to state a claim, but, rather, that it's untimely.

MR. MANCINO: We've attacked it from a number of perspectives. One is that it's time barred, because of the storm warnings, and also on the grounds that it does not adequately allege a misrepresentation or omission, and then

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1	from my perspective, because we also represent individual
2	defendants, we've also challenged the control person allegation
3	with respect to the '33 Act claims as well.
4	THE COURT: Well, you know that's a loser with me.
5	MR. MANCINO: I have read your Honor's decisions, yes.
6	THE COURT: Okay, good. And then your attack on the
7	10B?
8	MR. MANCINO: The attack on the 10B-5 claims is that
9	they do not adequately allege scienter, nor do they adequately
10	allege a material misrepresentation or omission.
11	THE COURT: And then when we get to the motion to
12	amend, it doesn't relate back?
13	MR. MANCINO: That's right, your Honor. As a
14	stand-alone set of allegations of restatement of client at-risk
15	transactions, it's barred by the statute imposed, but they
16	can't make it relate back, because it doesn't relate back.
17	THE COURT: This has been very helpful. Yes.
18	MR. FERRARA: Thank you, your Honor.
19	First, forgive me. I think I'm recovering from
20	terminal laryngitis, not good for a litigator. We will take
21	the Court's admonition of having a single counsel appear for
22	plaintiffs as a gentle suggestion as defense counsel not appear
23	as a gaggle and I promise not repeat everything my colleague
24	representing Converium has said.

But perhaps I can give just a bit of focus to some of

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the points that have been raised, because I think it's important at this initial conference, your Honor, that we try to separate the ministerial from the procedural from the substantive. And sometimes when we get into these long narrations, it's awfully hard to separate the three.

First, with respect to what Mr. Coffey said --

THE COURT: I want to be clear. You represent Zurich?

MR. FERRARA: Your Honor, representing Zurich Financial Services, the former parent of Converium, who Mr. Coffey said was involved in the IPO. And I'd like to pause on that description just for the moment to make it clear that my client was not the issuer for purposes of Section 11, nor were we involved, using the verb that Mr. Coffey used, in the offering in the sense that would trigger issues under 12A-2. We never sold a share of stock to the public, as he said. Indeed, we sold our stock to counsel -- sorry -- the underwriters that are represented by Cravath here today.

Now, that's just a small detail that I'd like to clarify.

Second, your Honor --

THE COURT: And what are you named in?

MR. FERRARA: Your Honor, we're named for everything, but we are told that the plaintiffs intend to drop the Section 11 case against us and continue with the 12A-2 case, although that hasn't happened yet.

Another footnote. Your Honor asked that Avalon be introduced, and we listened hard to what Avalon had to say, and when you abstract the Avalon statement here today, what you hear is that this public offering involved a perhaps significant number of shareholders, who, apparently like Avalon, were foreign purchasers of these securities in foreign accounts in foreign markets. And that, your Honor, raises for this Court and for us as defendants, the opportunity, perhaps on our part the obligation to raise with this Court a fundamental jurisdictional issue that's not been raised yet with respect to whether this Court should exercise its discretion to adjudicate claims on behalf of those foreign purchasers in this court. This is an issue that remains to be briefed and we intend to do so soon.

Third, your Honor, we focused --

THE COURT: Give me one second. Thank you.

MR. FERRARA: Your Honor, I think we have to focus on the second amended complaint issue, focus on that as, in my judgment at least, the most substantive issue facing this Court today. Indeed, even the order in which this Court described consideration of this issue is important.

The Court said a moment ago I have two motions; a motion to dismiss and a motion on the second amended complaint. Indeed, your Honor, perhaps if one is trying to prioritize these motions, it is first important to consider the motion

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with respect to the second amended complaint. There an enormously important substantive issue is being presented. complaint as originally pled that this Court heard alleges that the defendants brought some kind of undue pressure or influence on Tillinghast at the time of the IPO to understate the That was the case that was pled.

Now, when the restatement comes along, well after the period of repose, the plaintiffs would now like to seek to add to the complaint a wholly separate obligation that does not arise to the same core facts, doesn't involve the same type of transaction and certainly is out of time with that transaction. Now, what the plaintiffs are trying to say is that a statement that was precipitated by so-called faulted reinsurance agreements should be included in this case. That would be a dramatically different claim than was originally made, a dramatically different claim than has been briefed on the motion to dismiss, a claim which is time barred and would extend the scope of this case significantly. Your Honor, we have briefed that issue I think carefully in our opposition to the filing of the second amended complaint, and I'm only dwelling on it here to the extent that I am because having done, as this Court has in many cases in the past, usually in the filing of a complaint, even a second amended complaint is regarded as, if not ministerial, a procedural issue, and some how as long as it on some abstract level it, quote, relates

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back, it should be permitted.

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This case at this point turns on the distinction of whether restatement-based claims which go to faulted reinsurance contracts have anything to do with the originally pled allegation that somehow the experts at the time of the IPO were influenced. And so, your Honor, we would ask that from Zurich's point of view, perhaps the first issue the Court should consider is the wisdom of allowing the second amended complaint to go forward.

THE COURT: Okay. Tell me what the financial ramifications are of the restatement claim? If I understand correctly, the July 2004 announcement which this case was originally based on is a \$1 billion case.

MR. FERRARA: Right.

THE COURT: What was the impact on the stock of the restatement?

MR. FERRARA: Your Honor, let's stop for a moment. Recall the original announcement of underreserving goes to the claim that was pled; somehow Tillinghast was manipulated into a repose. When the restatement was first announced, I believe the stock dropped 23 cents, so it was a stock that had been significantly eroded in value because of the prior underreserving announcements by this company. By the time the restatement was announced, there was a, I wouldn't say infinitesimal, but very, very small drop in the stock, which

quite apart from the causation arguments, which we'll argue at a later point in this case, really shows the distinction, the fundamental distinction between these two types of claims.

Also, your Honor --

THE COURT: What I'm hearing, then, is the restatement becomes important to this case not because it adds to the amount of the damages the plaintiffs can recover, but instead, it would add more defendants or increase the risk, the scope of liability of certain of the defendants. Am I right?

MR. FERRARA: I think, your Honor, you are right on both points, but perhaps more right on the second point than the first. You see, my colleague from Converium said, in essence, we are, I think I heard him say, we are not making a 12B-6 attack on the allegations respecting the restatement. Perhaps I heard him wrong. Zurich's point of view is that restatement, which takes these reinsurance contracts and tries to restate them to the pre-IPO area, makes one huge difference and, your Honor, we will be in this court for a very long time seeking to persuade you and ultimately a jury if we must, that that restatement either was improvident, or if not, should have not related back to the pre-IPO period.

Those restatements arose from current period change in circumstances, and were not eligible under the applicable accounting standards, APB 20 paragraph 19 to go back to the pre-IPO state. So how this Court deals with the restatement

issue not only affects where the liability hits, but goes to the very heart of the case that we're going to be arguing about in this courtroom for a very, very long time to come.

Is it a 10B case, which is tied to underreserving and post-IPO restatement, or is it a Section 11 case that somehow sweeps in not only underreserving, but the unrelated concept and subject of restatements? It is a very important issue to decide early on in this case.

THE COURT: So Zurich doesn't feel that it has much at risk here on the original complaint, but if I let the restatement in, you're facing significantly greater liability?

MR. FERRARA: Well, your Honor, what I would like to say is that there are two separate lines of defense that we would have to engage in. The first line of defense on the case that was already pled is whether or not Tillinghast, who set the reserves at the IPO date, was somehow unduly influenced, pressured or manipulated by us. The second issue involves the fundamental question and very complicated accounting question of whether a series of reinsurance contracts, A, should have been restated at all, that is, did they shift significant risk to not require restatement, and, B, if they needed to be restated, to what period should they attach, and that is a much more complicated and detailed case to deal with than the case that was originally pled.

And, your Honor, it is not that we are incapable of

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dealing with a restatement case. We have done many of them, but when it is both time barred by the three-year statute and also barred by the one-year statute, given all the information that was out in the marketplace upon which this case could have been pled before it was, we think that in this unusual case, a statute of limitations argument and a motion to oppose the second amendment of the consolidated class action complaint arises like a phoenix to be a substantive issue, not merely ministerial or procedural.

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Ferrara, you're going to lose this argument.

MR. FERRARA: Which is that?

THE COURT: To the extent you're asking me to take the motion to amend first, I'm not going to. Because, if I understand you correctly, I can't really analyze that motion effectively until I understand the original theory in the plaintiff's case. And so you may win ultimately on no relation back, but I think I'm going to take the motion to dismiss first.

MR. FERRARA: Frankly, your Honor, if you'd like to take the motion to dismiss first and perhaps schedule oral argument on the motion to dismiss, that's fine. If we prevail on the motion to dismiss, we would love to see this Court dismiss this case with prejudice, but if it did not, it would give leave to replead, and then we would deal with this issue

as to whether or not it was really a leave to replead a dismissed complaint or whether it was really through the back door of repleading an effort to amend, and we can deal with it then and I'm happy to deal with it then, your Honor.

THE COURT: Right. Thank you so much.

MR. WEISS: Your Honor, may I call something to the Court's attention? Thank you, your Honor. Joseph Weiss.

I just want to point out that I enjoy listening to counsel, to everyone here in the Court, and I find these discussions fascinating. But what's missing, what's missing is the fact that even if your Honor were to deal with the motions to dismiss, there would still be the Rubin complaint, which has not yet been consolidated, and as against which none of these motions are addressed and the Rubin complaint reads differently than the original complaint here, than the amended complaint, then the second amended complaint. And the Rubin complaint they're not going to be able to get that dismissed, I don't believe, with all due respect.

The Rubin complaint does not allege these storm warnings. The Rubin complaint alleges that the prospectus and registration statements, the financials were false and it only cites as an example the reserve issue. I believe that the Rubin complaint does read differently, and whether the financials had to be redone or were incorrect because of issues involving reserves or issues involve financial accounting, our

relate back and all these issues about statute of limitations don't apply.

There's been no motion against the Rubin complaint, and so what I would --

THE COURT: Do we have a stay with respect to the Rubin complaint? Was there an answer?

MR. WEISS: The stay, in effect, your Honor, was that Judge Mukasey simply never ruled, for whatever reason, on any of the motions, including the initial motion of whether Rubin is going to be remaining in this court or is going back to the state court, so he couldn't deal with even that issue, and basically, we were just all waiting for Judge Mukasey to rule before we addressed the complaint.

But it just seems to me that the Court should be aware that if the Court decides the motion to dismiss, it would then presumably face another motion to dismiss with respect to the Rubin complaint. It just doesn't make any sense in terms of efficiency. It would seem to me that the first order of business is to get these cases consolidated, to decide what the complaint that the Court is going to have to deal with is going to deal with, and I do appreciate the fact that counsel have gone to the trouble of already writing the motions to dismiss, but the fact of the matter is, whatever research has been done, has been done. It's all in the word processor and they ought

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to be able to update it so the Court only needs to deal with one set of motion and not two sets of motions.

> All right, thank you. THE COURT:

MR. WEISS: If I may, your Honor, there is one thing your Honor was not aware of, which I think I should turn to the Court's attention, because it's procedural. One of the issues is the issue of the underwriters in terms of the Section 11 and 12-2 liability. Just before the statute of limitations ran, we negotiated a tolling agreement with the underwriters. When I say with the underwriters, I mean that literally, because their counsel whom we've first been dealing with told us he couldn't get anywhere, deal with my client directly, so we got that tolling agreement from the underwriters.

It was pursuant to that tolling agreement that we then filed a second case only against the underwriters in state court. It's in Supreme Court, New York County, just against the underwriters, and we named each of the underwriters individually, separately, as opposed to an underwriter class. In other words, it wasn't just Merrill and UBS, the lead underwriters, we named the other underwriters as well.

That case was timely brought. There can't be any issue on that. The tolling agreement required, we were required to give them 30 days notice. We gave them 30 days notice. We did everything by the book. So that case is pending there. They did not remove that case to federal court 1

and the time to do so has expired.

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We have no objection, if it can be done, that notwithstanding the expiration of that time for the case to come before your Honor and be consolidated as part of these, but I think in any event, your Honor should certainly be aware that there is this other case out there pending, and I wanted to call it to your Honor's attention.

THE COURT: We'll have to come back to that. Mr. Broadwater.

> MR. BROADWATER: Thank you, your Honor.

I'm here on behalf of the two lead underwriters of the December '01 prospectus. I'm not going to repeat or try to elaborate significantly on the presentations thus far. I do have some things I think were glossed over that were important for the Court to understand as to where we are now with respect to my client.

You focused, even though you weren't intending, on one of the issues, which is the names and the dates all of these cases now sought to be consolidated in the first amended and now the second amended were brought, they were brought in '04. But none of them named an underwriter. None of them made the Section 11 claim saying there were false statements in the prospectus. There was no lawsuit anywhere with respect to the underwriters. There was no claim that they had failed to live up to their obligations or that they had been parties to a

claim anywhere; state court, federal court or anywhere else, until September.

THE COURT: Of '04?

MR. BROADWATER: '05. '05. The first consolidated amended complaint. You'll see when you read the motions to dismiss, it is very clear that the reason there had not been any claims against the underwriters until September of '05 was because people fully understood our role in the prospectus and what we had done and what they said was false in the prospectus, fraudulent in the prospectus, but they had decided not to sue the underwriters and they didn't, until they had the correspondence that Mr. Coffey referred to earlier today and suggested you not read.

prospectus that contained false statements. There was no such

There was a fight going on as to who was going to get the lead counsel role, and Mr. Weiss, whose case had been removed from state court, it, too, had not named any underwriters, but it did have a Section 11 claim, and there was a fight saying I need to have a role here, because I'm the only person that's brought a timely Section 11 claim, to which the federal plaintiffs counsel said, no, you don't, we didn't need a Section 11 claim, we didn't drop the ball, we let that one go.

Now, what happens in September of '05? They've got to keep Mr. Weiss in his place, and so they add us as plaintiffs,

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They were out of time. When they first made that belatedly. motion they were barred two or three different ways as to out of time. Now, that didn't take much effort on their part to add us, since they just put our name there and said they failed to exercise proper due diligence. That's the only substantive allegation in the complaint. That's the one which we moved to dismiss. It's the one that outlines both the statute of limitations, the failure to make out a claim and to -essentially under 12B-6. We're only named on the prospectus and we're only named on claims that somehow this doubly-expertized estimate, and that's all it could be since it's an estimate of what losses will occur in the future as a result of historic periods of underwriter, that's all they said was false. It was doubly expertized, not only by PriceWaterhouseCoopers, but by the Tillinghast group. said no, we're putting you in there because that's the only way we can get rid of the problem we have here whether we can get lead plaintiff role.

So we're here to dismiss it. And we hear here today that must be a pretty good argument, because the complete lack of need, the desire to exclude Mr. Weiss and Mr. Rubin from the parties has been suddenly reversed. The reason it's been suddenly reversed is not anything you heard here today, it's reversed because in December of '04, Mr. Rubin got a tolling agreement with respect to the underwriters. And it is clear in

that tolling agreement that the only person that can invoke it and use it as a basis to claim the tolling of the statute for a period is Mr. Rubin and those Mr. Rubin represents. It's his ticket, and the plaintiffs' lawyers here have decided they want to buy that ticket.

Well, that ticket doesn't work, because Mr. Weiss was a little inaccurate in describing his two state court complaints; one removed here and sought to be remanded but maybe now it won't, and one he filed only recently. Those complaints, even with respect to Mr. Rubin, even with respect to the only person here with a tolling agreement, and all the other plaintiffs saying we don't want one, we don't need one, we know what we're doing, we don't have a Section 11 claim against the underwriter, that tolling agreement, he didn't get it until after the statute of limitations had already expired.

It is clear under Second Circuit law that the four adjustments, starting almost immediately after the IPO went out, of the amount incurred but not reported losses, the estimate, the guess as to what the future will bring, having done that four times in eleven months, whatever notice or inquiry they were under had clearly occurred.

We're now sitting here today talking about whether or not they can not only bring that complaint against us for the first time in September of '05, that is, almost four years after the prospectus as to which there's a three-year statute

of repose and a one-year after notice of inquiry, whichever comes first. It's quite clear they were barred, we were added as a strategic ploy to deal with the management or lead counsel status.

Now, I want to say one more thing about the status of where these pieces of paper are. I thought I heard just a moment ago that there was no motion to dismiss pending with respect to the Rubin complaint, and so even if you throw out the consolidated amended complaint filed first in September '05, he's still got a complaint as to which there's been no motion. Well, now, he'll either be gone or he'll be consolidated, but he doesn't have a separate complaint.

Two, the complaint he's talking about me not having moved against, didn't sue me. As I said, nobody, nobody sued the underwriters until Mr. Weiss did in state court, relying upon his tolling letter, which there's been, nothing happened in that case, we have a good motion when and if he ever -- this case ever gets straightened out and it's decided whether his case is going to go forward or not. It just sat there pursuant to a stipulation that says we'll deal with it when this case gets on track or dismissed.

The fact is that we have very, very good grounds, much better than you will normally see, when someone asserts a statute of limitations. There is no such thing as equitable tolling with respect to the three-year statute on Section 11.

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It isn't the law that you're entitled in this case now with 1 2 respect to the amendment, nearly five years after the 3 prospectus, to say, a-ha, I found another thing that I can 4 claim is false with respect to the numbers. 5 THE COURT: I didn't write down precise dates. 6 December '01 as the IPO. 7 MR. BROADWATER: Right. 8 THE COURT: And I have December '04 as the tolling 9 agreement. 10 MR. BROADWATER: With Rubin. 11 THE COURT: Right. So is that December '04 tolling agreement within the three years or not? 12 13 MR. BROADWATER: By one day. 14 THE COURT: Okay. 15 MR. BROADWATER: Right, Mr. Weiss, one day? 16 MR. WEISS: I thought you said it was one day late. 17 MR. BROADWATER: Maybe it is. 18 MR. WEISS: I think highly of myself, I quess, and I 19 have an ego, but to tell you the truth, I never thought it could be persuasive enough to get the underwriters represented 20 by Davis Polk to agree to a tolling of the statute of 21 limitations the day after the statute is run. We have a 22 23 tolling agreement. 24 MR. BROADWATER: It was about a year and a half after

the statute had run, because of the four adjustments to the

incurred but not reported loss estimates that occurred during 2002 and 2003, all of which happened between a year and two and a half years before the tolling letter was executed, and three years or thereabouts before the first actual complaint was filed.

Now, what we have is we have -- we made these arguments. These arguments are ones that the other defendants have with respect to the Section 11 claims, they have different arguments with respect to the 10B-5 claims aspects to the first consolidated amended complaint, but we had a particularly good one with respect to the statute of limitations, so they decided to bring Mr. Rubin in to try and deal with one of those problems.

Now, let me go to the next point, and that is --

THE COURT: Before you move ahead, let me just make sure I understand here. The motion to dismiss was brought against a complaint that did not have Mr. Rubin as a plaintiff, and therefore the tolling agreement argument. But essentially, that's irrelevant from your point of view, that I could decide the motion to dismiss based on the briefing that now exists, and rule in your client's favor.

MR. BROADWATER: You could, but they also sought in opposition to our motion to say they were protected by and entitled to invoke the Rubin tolling letter as if they were third party beneficiary, that tolled the agreement, tolled the

running of the one-year statute with respect to them. So you will encounter it in their opposition to our motion in the case of the federal plaintiffs.

THE COURT: So let's assume I just ignore the third party beneficiary line of arguments and treat it head-on that the plaintiffs are entitled to the benefit of the tolling agreement. Is the briefing complete?

MR. BROADWATER: Yes.

THE COURT: From your point of view?

MR. BROADWATER: Yes, on the first amended complaint. It is complete and they are out of luck. If they can't invoke and rely upon the Rubin, the personal Rubin, it's over. Over and out, it's over.

THE COURT: Even if they can rely on it --

MR. BROADWATER: We have good argument that they still have a statute of limitations argument with respect to belatedly adding us in September of '05 to any complaint of any kind with respect to that prospectus.

THE COURT: And your point of view is the briefing is complete on that issue?

MR. BROADWATER: Yes. Now, one other thing I do want to say, jumping a little off point, but I do want you to understand. As the underwriters, these were the two international components. This was an international underwriting. It's a Swiss company, it was registered and

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sold, the underwriting and the activities relating to the underwriting took place in Europe, but it's a little difficult because, of course, you don't have to buy in the U.S. or buy in Switzerland, depending upon your nationality, but the fact of the matter is that there was a prospectus on file in Switzerland under their rules and there was a prospectus on file in the U.S. and approximately a third of it was sold in the U.S. Two-thirds were sold in Switzerland.

Now, the reason I say "approximately" is American entities can buy in Switzerland if they prefer. The prices are going to be arbitraged back and forth, so the prices aren't going to vary that much. The fact is they were sold in Europe with respect to the European prospectus on file to international or non-U.S. citizens. This refers back to the approximately two-thirds. This is what Mr. Ferrara referred to in his remarks. I want to give you an idea of the fact this isn't a vestigial question, it's a question of the tail might wag the dog.

Secondly, the assertion that might be dealt with once we get Mr. Rubin in this case, the issues of the statute of limitations will be gone is wrong. Even if they manage to graft him in, not as lead plaintiff status, but to the extent of getting rid of the problem that he's not here they're not going to get rid of the problem that they thought about and decided to add us way too late. I also think it is the case if

they're going to try to do that, Mr. Weiss can't be in the position where he says, well, I got an ace in the hole, I have the old complaint that raises different issues or slightly different articulation of what's wrong about the prospectus, that I can rely upon to get around the pending motions to dismiss. I thought that was the gist of what Mr. Weiss said, and I don't think he can do that.

With respect to the other point that I wanted to make, everything that you rehearsed with respect to the procedural history, all of it happened before we were here. We weren't here when the six complaints were talked about, when the fight over who was going to be in the driver's seat, whether or not Mr. Rubin was going to be here or go home, all of those things occurred before we were here or had anything to do with it. The first time we had anything to do with any of the claims in this case was September '05 when, almost as an afterthought, we're added, no substantive allegations at all, other than the fact that we're here.

Now, with respect to whether you go with the motion for leave to amend and add the restatement issues, or you go with the fully briefed motion to dismiss the first amended complaint, consolidated amended complaint, I think, I wanted to adjust one thing about how distinct from the standpoint of the underwriters, sitting there doing their due diligence with respect to putting together a newly formed reinsurance

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subsidiary in 2001. Finite insurance or finite transaction, as to whether or not enough risk transfers under the FASB rules that allow it to be treated as a reinsurance transaction as opposed to deposit accounting, based on whether or not there was a sufficient transfer of risk, sufficient uncertainty, that is an entirely different issue and one that bears no relationship whatsoever to the claims with respect to the allegedly purposefully suppressed understated estimate of future losses that was incorporated into the financial statements and thereby incorporated into the prospectus in December '01.

The first point, and the one that was mentioned, but I think bears emphasis. When they went back and did the restatement with respect to fixing the finite transactions, accounting for them in a different method than had been done in the earlier years, nothing was done, even though they go back and say as of the end of this year, as of the end of this year, as of the end of this year, nothing was done to change what the incurred but not reported or the estimates of the losses were. The only impact there was on those loss reserves is if one of the transactions no longer to be treated as insurance but as a deposit or a contract, if that had contributed to the reserve that little piece was taken out, but with respect to whether they were too low or whether future facts would show that they were too low, that wasn't fixed. There is no restatement of

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the loss reserves. And that's what forces the plaintiffs to say in this situation, well, it all relates back, because it had an impact on the financial statements and that's what this is really about. At that level of generality, there isn't anything later decided to be false, with the benefit of three or four or five years of ad hoc information that comes to light later that wouldn't relate back, because it all has an impact on the desirability of the stock and the financials. That level of generality would essentially obliterate the statute of limitations and the statute of repose with respect to this area of law, where, yes, there is a sort of a lower standard of culpability required if there is a false material statement in the prospectus.

But I do want to add, the little fillup the defendants have with respect to that statement, it depends on what is false. In this case, the falsity that was the only falsity at the time was an estimate. By definition, it wasn't a fact, it was an estimate, and the question is whether it was a bad faith, artificially suppressed unrealistic and intentionally so an estimate, and it was an estimate. It clearly wasn't going to be exactly right, because it's a guess about what's going to happen in future years and past claims and losses on those claims that have not yet been asserted. It has to be a good faith estimate. And to make a claim that it was false, you can't just say it turned out to be wrong, you got to say it was

a bad faith estimate.

That's why with respect to estimates, particularly insurance reserves, as the cases make clear, you really have to prove, even on a Section 11 claim, that it was essentially fraudulent or bad faith. And that is clear in the cases that we cited and it is another reason that I wanted to bring it up is that I represented the underwriters. The underwriters had in December '01, not only did they have strengthened reserves that had been done, they had the fact that it was reported in the financial statements, but it had been independently verified by, or not independently, but verified by an independent actuarial firm in December '01, that the number, as adjusted and strengthened and reflected in the documents put forward in the Swiss markets and the U.S. markets in December '01, was in accord with the best estimates of Tillinghast who had undertaken that independent review.

So we're sitting here being threatened with years of discovery across Europe, in the U.S. with respect to allegedly mistaken numbers in the financial statements with respect to the loss reserves and if they get to amend their complaint with respect to the finite insurance and whether or not some small number of the large number of transactions they did should have been accounted for as deposit accounting as opposed to insurance accounting, all something that supposedly we should have figured out, ferreted out and changed back in the fall of

2001, notwithstanding the fact that they were expertized and in the case of the insurance reserves, doubly expertized, both by the outside accountants and by the actuarial.

Now, I've gone on, I said I wasn't going to go on a long time, but I did. Do you have any questions?

THE COURT: I think I asked my questions as you spoke.

Thank you very much, counsel.

Let me deal with a couple of housekeeping issues and then we'll return to some matters of substance.

Mr. Mancino, will you serve, please, as my liaison counsel for the defendants, so that if we need to get word to all the defendants, we can just do it through one call to you?

MR. MANCINO: Of course, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Coffey, are you going to be adding any defendants in this case?

MR. COFFEY: I don't believe we are, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Coffey, you've heard this interesting exchange about the impact that Mr. Rubin's presence, because of the agreements to toll, has on this case. Do you also agree that the briefing on the underlying motion to dismiss will permit me to decide that issue so that we don't need more briefing?

MR. COFFEY: Yes, your Honor, but if you could grant me the leeway to give you a summary response to what was laid

out. It's certainly our view -- the lead plaintiffs were appointed in August of '05. They then sought to file their consolidated complaint. They added the underwriters with a Section 11 claim, with their first consolidated complaint. We did so in a timely manner. We were aware that there was a tolling agreement. You can read it for yourself, but we're of the view that we're not third party beneficiaries, that Mr. Weiss and Mr. Rubin did an excellent job of protecting the entire class. It says it. That's the consideration that was given by the underwriters in return for not being sued by Mr. Rubin. However, it's for the benefit of any individual or class claim brought against the underwriters. They would like to add into that the words "by Mr. Rubin." Those words aren't there. It was timely brought.

But there are fights about that, and it's our considered view that by having Mr. Rubin as a named plaintiff, many of those fights disappear, because even if your Honor were to say, you know, I will engraft into that the words "by Mr. Rubin" and disqualify anyone else from bringing it, we will have a named plaintiff who can bring those claims on behalf of the class. We don't think we need to do that, but considering what's in the best interests of the class, it makes sense and we're doing that, and we're doing it because I'm interested in eliminating defense arguments and getting to the substance of this case.

What I heard a lot of on this table, a lot of fact issues, we have very significant disagreements about the facts. For example, the idea that -- well, I don't need to get into it. They can't even agree among themselves about the restatement. I heard some defendants are going to challenge the restatement, others are going to stand by the restatement, et cetera.

So we want to get to those issues, and I'm going to certainly enjoy more watching them quarrel than I have reviewing the record of how the plaintiffs are going to quarrel. So with regard to the tolling agreement, at the time the claims were brought on behalf of the class in this action, they were timely, for any number of reasons, but certainly because of the tolling agreement that had been secured by Mr. Rubin.

Now, we have a separate issue, of course, with regard to storm warnings. That issue involves all sorts of fact issues as well. But the short answer is yes, your Honor, we think it's fully briefed and you can decide that.

THE COURT: Are the submissions that are subject to this motion to strike part of the submissions in connection with storm warnings? I don't know what that motion to strike is.

MR. MANCINO: Your Honor, Rich Mancino. I don't think the motion to strike goes to the storm warnings issues. They

have moved to strike the final Tillinghast report, which is integral to the complaint, in our view, and a submission with the Connecticut Insurance Department related to have novations of certain insurance contracts, but I think the storm warnings are fleshed out in the complaint and are things the Court can take judicial notice of.

THE COURT: Okay. And on the plaintiffs' side, too, we need to be able to make one phone call. So, since I have three co-counsel for the plaintiffs, who is that phone call going to --

MR. WILLIS: Your Honor, we're happy to have Mr. Coffey and Bernstein Litowitz be liaison for the plaintiffs.

THE COURT: Okay, thanks.

Depending on the case, sometimes I encourage counsel to consider settlement discussions at a very early phase. My sense, given our conference today, is that I need to decide these motions before I send you to see anyone. Is there anyone that has a different view of that? No.

Let's do some housekeeping. If you have occasion to write me a letter, it should be no longer than two pages. You can't raise a dispute or controversy with me unless you've had a meet and confer process and been unable to resolve the dispute.

If there is an application to me through letter, I

deeply appreciate it if the letter reflects whether or not there's agreement or disagreement among counsel.

I'll post my orders and opinions in this case on Courtweb and so the calls, there will be two calls; one to the plaintiffs' counsel, one to defense counsel, will be just to alert you that something's been posted, and you can download it then from Courtweb.

I think that's it. Yes, Mr. Coffey.

MR. COFFEY: Your Honor, there's one other motion that hasn't been referred to. We filed a motion to lift the PSLRA stay for the limited purpose of serving document preservation subpoenas on Tillinghast and Deloitte, and I just want to note that that is outstanding as well, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Is there opposition to that motion?

MR. MANCINO: No, there isn't, your Honor. It was
just simply to, as Mr. Coffey indicated, to insure document
preservation.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Coffey, we're going to look and see if we can locate that proposed order, and if we can't, we'll call and ask for another copy.

MR. COFFEY: Very good.

MR. FERRARA: Your Honor, keeping with the theme of housekeeping, you have been very gracious in allowing all of us from the plaintiff and defense side in the course of this initial conference to take a good deal of time in touching upon

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many of the substantive issues that were raised in the motion to dismiss, but we've done it in a rather uncoordinated way.

If it would be of help to the Court, should the Court decide to move on the motion to dismiss and consider it, to have oral argument on that motion, we would be delighted to serve.

THE COURT: Thank you. My practice with respect to oral argument is to address the motions and figure out if I think oral argument would be helpful to me. Frequently, in cases like this, and in many cases, the papers are of such a quality or the issues are such that I don't feel the need for oral argument.

If I feel the need for oral argument, it will probably be with a request that identifies the specific issues that I'd like to hear the parties address, not that you would be confined to that, but to give you some heads up about what I'm focusing on as a troubling area for me, but if you don't hear from me, don't be surprised, because usually the papers are sufficient.

Well, all I can say is I'm really glad I didn't do any more work than I did to get ready for this conference, because I've learned a lot. You've been very helpful and I think I made a wise decision to let you do the heavy lifting and help get me oriented in the case. I look forward to presiding over it, and I want to thank you each for your assistance today.

(Adjourned)