#### Page 927 Page 929 1 THE COURT: Welcome back, everyone. IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 2 Thank you for being here, and thank you to the witness 3 to being ready to go. IN RE COLUMBIA PIPELINE CONSOLIDATED GROUP, INC. MERGER LITIGATION Civil Action 4 ATTORNEY OLSEN: Your Honor, one very No. 2018-0484-JTL 5 brief housekeeping matter. 6 You had asked yesterday about time. 7 We conferred last night. We have 12 hours today and 8 tomorrow. Plaintiff has almost exactly four left, and Chancery Courtroom 12A Leonard L. Williams Justice Center 500 North King Street 9 we have eight left. And we each understand that we each have what we have, and we will be done on or Wilmington, Delaware Thursday, July 21, 2022 11 before 4:45 tomorrow. 9:15 a.m 12 THE COURT: Great. I was mainly just 13 worried about the number of folks still on the witness BEFORE: HON. J. TRAVIS LASTER, Vice Chancellor 14 list rather than what we've covered. But I'm glad you 15 all have conferred and are in agreement. 16 ATTORNEY van KWAWEGEN: Your Honor, as 17 to housekeeping matters, the defendants asked to 18 switch the witness order to have Mr. Hunter today. So TRIAL TRANSCRIPT - VOLUME IV 19 after Mr. Skaggs, to accommodate Mr. Hunter's 20 schedule, he will be next, and then it will be 21 Mr. Smith. 22 CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS Leonard L. Williams Justice Center So I just wanted to make sure that 500 North King Street - Suite 11400 Wilmington, Delaware 19801 (302) 255-0526 23 everybody knew the order. 24 THE COURT: Works for me. CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS R. Skaggs - Direct Page 928 Page 930 1 1 ROBERT C. SKAGGS, JR., having APPEARANCES: 2 NED C. WEINBERGER, ESQ. BRENDAN W. SULLIVAN, ESQ. Labaton Sucharow LLP previouslyduly affirmed, was re-called and testified 2 3 further as follows: 3 -and-GREGORY V. VARALLO, ESQ. Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP 4 4 DIRECT EXAMINATION CONT'D Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP -andJEROEN Van KWAWEGEN, ESQ. CHRISTOPHER J. ORRICO, ESQ. THOMAS G. JAMES, ESQ. MARGARET SANBORN-LOWING, ESQ. of the New York Bar Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP -and-5 5 BY ATTORNEY van KWAWEGEN: 6 6 Ω. Good morning, Mr. Skaggs. 7 7 A. Good morning. 8 8 Q. As you heard yesterday, I'm on the -and-STEPHEN E. JENKINS, ESQ. MARIE M. DEGNAN, ESQ. Ashby & Geddes, P.A. for Plaintiffs clock, so I'm going to be fairly rapid. 9 9 10 10 A. Okay. 11 11 Yesterday we were discussing your MARTIN S. LESSNER, ESQ. JAMES M. YOCH, JR., ESQ. KEVIN P. RICKERT, ESQ. Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor, LLP 12 12 one-on-one meetings with directors in the run-up to 13 13 the January 28/29 board meeting. roung Condway Stargatt & -and--and-ROBERT S. HARRELL, ESQ. MICHAEL A. OLSEN, ESQ. BRIAN J. MASSENGILL, ESQ. LINDA X. SHI, ESQ. of the Illinois Bar 14 14 Do you recall that? 15 15 A. Yes, sir. 16 16 I showed you a document from Mayer Brown LLP for Defendant TC Energy Corporation 17 17 December 17, where you were planning out the meeting, 18 18 and you see it on your screen. WILLIAM M. LAFFERTY, ESQ. RYAN D. STOTTMANN, ESQ. LAUREN K. NEAL, ESQ. SARAH P. KABOLY, ESQ. Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell LLP 19 19 Do you see that? 20 20 A. Yes. -and WILLIAM SAVITT, ESQ. NOAH B. YAVITZ, ESQ. JESSICA L. ALLEN, ESQ. JONATHAN M. ACEVEDO, ESQ. of the New York Bar Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz for Robert C. Skagggs, Jr. and Stephen C. Smith 21 21 Q. That's your handwriting? 22 22 A. Yes, sir. 23 23 O If we go to the next page, there's a 24 discussion there about strategic positioning of

CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS

|  |   | R. Skaggs - Direct Page 931  |  |   | R. Skaggs - Direct Page 933   |
|--|---|--|--|---|---|
| 1  | Columbia Pipel  | line saying, "Conditions Are Historically  | 1  | dinner meeting  | , I wanted to ensure [] you had an  |
| 2  | •   | Given [these] conditions, Little room  | 2  | _   | digest my thinking on CEO Succession."  |
| 3  |   | downside (vs. upside) in [the] plan  | 3  | Do you see tha  |   |
| 4  |   | ked-in). Bias scale [vs.] strong"  | 4  | Α.  | That's correct.   |
| 5  | Α.  | I'm sorry to interrupt. It was scale   | 5  | Q.  | And attached, we'll walk through it,  |
| 6  | and strong ba   |  | 6  | is a discussion   | of the succession plan.   |
| 7  | Q.  | "Scale & strong [balance sheet].   | 7  |   | ATTORNEY van KWAWEGEN: So if we can   |
| 8  |   | rind on Plan. Mindful/Vet Inbounds.  | 8  | go to page 7 of   | this document.  |
| 9  |   | r Transaction [Point] of [Indifference]."  | 9  | Q.  | "CEO Succession: <i>Proposed Plan</i> ," and  |
| 10   | ondorotana oa   | You were discussing this during your   | 10   | there's an "App   | , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,   |
| 11   | one-on-one me   | eetings with the board, with the   | 11   | moro o an App   | Under "Approach A.1," "Glen Kettering   |
| 12   |   | e run-up to the January 28/29 meeting;   | 12   | to Chairman &   | CEO, July 1, 2016." Right?  |
| 13   | correct?  | train up to the sandary 20/20 mosting,   | 13   | A.  | That's what this says, correct.   |
| 14   | <b>A.</b>   | In a general way.  | 14   | Q.  | And if we go to page 9 of this  |
| 15   | Q.  | You were also discussing succession  | 15   |   | Approach A.2 One Modification to  |
| 16   |   | those one-on-one meetings?   | 16   |   | Glen Kettering to CEO, July 1, 2016."   |
| 17   | <b>A.</b>   | That's correct.  | 17   | Correct?  | dien Nettering to OLO, only 1, 2010.  |
| 18   | Q.  | At this time, the company had been   | 18   | A.  | That's what this says, correct.   |
| 19   | spun out for six  |  | 19   | Q.  | And "Approach B," on page 10,   |
| 20   | <b>A.</b>   | That's approximately six months,   | 20   |   | ession External Candidate Named   |
| 21   | correct.  | mat s approximately six months,  | 21   |   |   |
| 22   |   | And was as no at the same time that  | 22   |   | EO, July 1, 2016." Correct?   |
|  | Q.  | And, yes or no, at the same time that  |  | <b>A</b> .  | That's what this says, correct.   |
| 23   | -   | rectors in one-on-one meetings of  | 23   | Q.  | And then, if we go to the next page,  |
| 24   | riistorically cha   | llenging conditions and execution  | 24   | at the top there  | s's a reference to abbreviated profiles   |
|  |   | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |  |   | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |
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|  |   | R. Skaggs - Direct Page 932  |  |   | R. Skaggs - Direct Page 934   |
| 1  | risks, you discu  | R. Skaggs - Direct Page 932 uss a plan for your succession?  | 1  | of the prelimina  | R. Skaggs - Direct Page 934 ary candidates that could be considered   |
| 1 2  | risks, you discu  | Page 932   | 1 2  | of the prelimina  | ary candidates that could be considered   |
|  | -   | uss a plan for your succession?  |  |   | ary candidates that could be considered   |
| 2  | Α.  | iss a plan for your succession?  A succession plan for the team.   | 2  |   | ary candidates that could be considered anization.  |
| 2  | <b>A.</b><br>Q.   | Iss a plan for your succession?  A succession plan for the team.  Including you?   | 2  | outside the org   | ary candidates that could be considered anization.  Do you see that?  |
| 2<br>3<br>4  | <b>A.</b><br>Q.<br><b>A.</b><br>Q.  | rage 932 uss a plan for your succession?  A succession plan for the team. Including you? Including me.   | 2<br>3<br>4  | outside the organization A. Q.  | ary candidates that could be considered anization.  Do you see that?  That's essentially what this says.  |
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|  | R. Skaggs - Direct Page 935   |  | R. Skaggs - Direct Page 937   |
|--|---|--|---|
| 1  | the meltdown, pipelines were a 'valuation bubble'.]"  | 1  | you would have to believe in the future to beat an  |
| 2  | You wrote that to Mr. Cornelius on  | 2  | offer of \$26 or \$28 today."   |
| 3  | January 14; right?  | 3  | And this presentation or these  |
| 4  | A. Yes, sir.  | 4  | indifference points were prepared at your request;  |
| 5  | Q. Let me show you another document   | 5  | correct?  |
| 6  | that's the next day. It's Joint Exhibit 575. We'll  | 6  | A. My request and Mr. Cornelius's   |
| 7  | put it on your screen.  | 7  | request.  |
| 8  | Here, there's an email from Matt  | 8  | Q. Is it fair to say that Mr. Cornelius   |
| 9  | Gibson, January 15, to the team at Goldman. "Historic   | 9  | had suggested it to you and then you suggested it to  |
| 10   | ebitda multiples for the 'pipeline group'. Bob (CEO)  | 10   | Goldman?  |
| 11   | request."   | 11   | A. That's a fair representation.  |
| 12   | Underneath, "Bob's point isand  | 12   | Q. And you recall that Goldman Sachs did  |
| 13   | Marty's (Board member) point is" yeah in the past   | 13   | prepare that presentation; correct?   |
| 14   | 5 years things exploded to the upside, but longer term  | 14   | A. That's my recollection, yes.   |
| 15   | what [is] the average run rate multiple"  | 15   | Q. All right. Let me show you another   |
| 16   | You wrote that; correct?  | 16   | document. It's Joint Exhibit 594.   |
| 17   | A. I did not, no.   | 17   | ATTORNEY van KWAWEGEN: Actually,  |
| 18   | Q. You have no reason to dispute that   | 18   | going can we go back, sorry, 590. If we go to the   |
| 19   | Mr. Gibson wrote this to his team on January 15;  | 19   | next page.  |
| 20   | right?  | 20   | Q. Here is the Goldman slide deck, and on   |
| 21   | A. Yeah, that's what this would reflect.  | 21   | this page you see the "\$26 Offer Indifference  |
| 22   | Q. As Mr. Gibson is talking to his team,  | 22   | Sensitivity." If you look at year-end, at a cost of   |
| 23   | he also said underneath, "Bob has spent the past week   | 23   | equity of 8.5 percent, we're looking at 18 1/2  |
| 24   | flying around meetings with all his Directors   | 24   | multiple; right? You see the 18.5?  |
|  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |
| -  |   |  |   |
|  | R. Skaggs - Direct  |  | R. Skaggs - Direct  |
| 1  | Fage 936  | 1  | rage 936  |
| 1 2  | 1x1he's priming them for a [TransCanada] bid.   | 1 2  | A. I'm sorry. Bear with me. I have to   |
|  | Fage 936  |  | A. I'm sorry. Bear with me. I have to get oriented on this slide.   |
| 2  | 1x1he's priming them for a [TransCanada] bid.  He's getting questions from the board 'would you take  | 2  | A. I'm sorry. Bear with me. I have to get oriented on this slide.   |
| 2  | 1x1he's priming them for a [TransCanada] bid.  He's getting questions from the board 'would you take  \$26 per share' he said every day it['s] [] harder  | 2  | A. I'm sorry. Bear with me. I have to get oriented on this slide.  Q. That's all right. We'll blow it up  |
| 2<br>3<br>4  | 1x1he's priming them for a [TransCanada] bid.  He's getting questions from the board 'would you take  \$26 per share' he said every day it['s] [] harder to say no."  | 2<br>3<br>4  | A. I'm sorry. Bear with me. I have to get oriented on this slide.  Q. That's all right. We'll blow it up for you.   |
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| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22 | 1x1he's priming them for a [TransCanada] bid.  He's getting questions from the board 'would you take \$26 per share' he said every day it['s] [] harder to say no."  It's true, is it not, that there was no board meeting where the entire board was together between December 1, 2015, and the big January 28/29 board meeting that you were preparing for?  A. That's correct.  Q. Again, no basis to dispute that  Mr. Gibson wrote this to his Goldman team as he was assisting you to prepare for that big board meeting?  A. This says what it says, so I assume  Mr. Gibson did write it.  Q. I want to show you another document, Joint Exhibit 590, January 21, still before that board meeting.  It says, the Goldman this is  Mr. Christopher at Goldman to you, copying the Goldman team. "Board presentation - What Would You Have to Believe?"  Then it says, to you, "Bob, the  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22 | A. I'm sorry. Bear with me. I have to get oriented on this slide.  Q. That's all right. We'll blow it up for you.  A. Well, I'd like to see it in context, too, if I could, please.  Q. Mr. Skaggs, do you see the 18.5 multiple?  A. Yes, I certainly do.  Q. Then the next page, there's the indifference point at 28. And there, you see the 19.6 multiple by year-end 2016?  A. That's what this says.  Q. And you have no reason to doubt that you received these slides from Mr. Gibson here; right?  A. I received slides. This slide, I can't speak to. I don't know the date or whether it was a draft. So I certainly saw slides like this.  Q. All right. Well, let's look at the next page or the next document. That is Joint Exhibit 594.  Here, towards the middle of the page,  |

|  |  | R. Skaggs - Direct Page 939  |  |  | R. Skaggs - Direct   | Page 941  |
|--|--|--|--|--|--|---|
| 1  | Kettering, "Wh   | at do you think????  | 1  | gap.   |  | . ago o   |
| 2  | 3,   | "First glance the slides make a  | 2  | <b>A</b> .   | I'm not sure that's the cor  | rrect color.  |
| 3  | statement."  |  | 3  | My recollection  | on was that after we rejected  | 25.25. we   |
| 4  |  | And above, Mr. Steve Smith not to  | 4  | -  | our pens down and stop. T  | •   |
| 5  | be confused wi   | th Bob Smith responds, "Yep. We  | 5  | -  | nad with the CEO.  |   |
| 6  |  | g at 18-20 x EBITDA any time soon."  | 6  |  | My other recollection was  | s. I believe  |
| 7  |  | Did you write back and say, I  | 7  | it was over a v  | weekend or latter part of the  | •   |
| 8  | disagree?  | . <b>,</b>   | 8  |  | n talking to one another. An   |   |
| 9  | A.   | I don't know what's I don't know.  | 9  | _  | s, is there something that we  | -   |
| 10   | Q.   | Okay. Yes or no, at this time, you   | 10   |  | is during that discussion tha  | =   |
| 11   |  | g the board and you're priming them for  | 11   | surfaced.  | g  |   |
| 12   | an offer from T  |  | 12   | Q.   | Okay. Let's look at a docur  | ment.   |
| 13   | Α.   | No.  | 13   |  | here, there's an email from  | ,   |
| 14   | Q.   | Goldman Sachs, we just saw the email,  | 14   |  | o you and Steve Smith.   |   |
| 15   | right, where Mr  | . Gibson was talking about that with   | 15   | Α.   | Sorry. The dates?  |   |
| 16   | =  | in advance of preparing these slides?  | 16   | Q.   | March 6, over the weekend  | l. on a   |
| 17   | A.   | Correct.   | 17   | Sunday.  |  | ,,  |
| 18   | Q.   | Okay. And it's fair to say that  | 18   | Α.   | Okay.  |   |
| 19   |  | resent a version of this slide during the  | 19   | Q.   | Mr. Ingrassia reports back   | on a call   |
| 20   | •  | board meeting?   | 20   |  | ic Fornell. Says, "Very short ca   |   |
| 21   | A.   | That's my recollection. Yes.   | 21   |  | three, "Bottom line, they'll do 2  |   |
| 22   | Q.   | And that's the same board meeting  | 22   |  | ss. Straight from Board.   | •   |
| 23   |  | ussed TransCanada's indication of  | 23   | ,  | "My tone was pretty straigh  | tforward  |
| 24   | interest of 25 to  |  | 24   | but no equivoc   | cation at all on the messaging:  |   |
|  |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |  |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   | -1-1  |
|  |  | CHANCERI COOKI REFORIERS   |  |  | CHANCERI COURT REFORTERS   |   |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |   |
|  |  | R. Skaggs - Direct Page 940  |  |  | R. Skaggs - Direct   | Page 942  |
| 1  | А.   | That's correct.  | 1  | []26 period.   |  | -   |
| 2  | Q.   | That's correct.  All right. Let's move forward a   | 2  | - '  | "I didn't explain, justify, defe   | end, or   |
| 2  | Q.<br>little bit, early N  | That's correct.  All right. Let's move forward a  March 2016 before the leak.  | 2  | review history.  | "I didn't explain, justify, defe   | end, or   |
| 2<br>3<br>4  | Q.<br>little bit, early N<br>Columbia rejec  | That's correct.  All right. Let's move forward a March 2016 before the leak. tted a TransCanada proposal at \$24 a   | 2<br>3<br>4  | - '  | "I didn't explain, justify, defe<br>Just 'management took direct<br>pottom line."  | end, or<br>tion from  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5   | Q. little bit, early N Columbia reject share; correct?   | That's correct.  All right. Let's move forward a  March 2016 before the leak.  Ited a TransCanada proposal at \$24 a   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5   | review history.<br>Board, this is b  | "I didn't explain, justify, defe<br>Just 'management took direct<br>pottom line."<br>You have no reason to disp  | end, or<br>tion from<br>oute that   |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6  | Q. little bit, early N Columbia reject share; correct? A.  | That's correct.  All right. Let's move forward a March 2016 before the leak. sted a TransCanada proposal at \$24 a  I hesitate only because Mr. Girling  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6  | review history. Board, this is b   | "I didn't explain, justify, defe<br>Just 'management took direct<br>pottom line."  | end, or<br>tion from<br>oute that   |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7   | Q. little bit, early M. Columbia reject share; correct? A. never mention   | That's correct.  All right. Let's move forward a March 2016 before the leak. sted a TransCanada proposal at \$24 a  I hesitate only because Mr. Girling med to me 24.  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7   | review history.<br>Board, this is b<br>Mr. Ingrassia c<br>on March 6?  | "I didn't explain, justify, defe<br>Just 'management took direct<br>pottom line."<br>You have no reason to disp<br>delivered this message to Eric  | end, or<br>tion from<br>oute that<br>Fornell  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8  | Q. little bit, early N Columbia reject share; correct? A. never mention Q.   | That's correct.  All right. Let's move forward a March 2016 before the leak. sted a TransCanada proposal at \$24 a  I hesitate only because Mr. Girling  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8  | review history. Board, this is b Mr. Ingrassia c on March 6? A.  | "I didn't explain, justify, defe<br>Just 'management took direct<br>bottom line.""  You have no reason to disp<br>delivered this message to Eric   | end, or tion from oute that Fornell what this   |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9   | Q. little bit, early M. Columbia reject share; correct? A. never mention Q. early March?   | That's correct.  All right. Let's move forward a March 2016 before the leak. Sted a TransCanada proposal at \$24 a I hesitate only because Mr. Girling med to me 24.  Mr. Skaggs, you heard the number 24 in   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9   | review history. Board, this is b Mr. Ingrassia c on March 6? A. says, but I do   | "I didn't explain, justify, defe<br>Just 'management took direct<br>bottom line.""  You have no reason to disp<br>delivered this message to Eric<br>I just don't know. I know<br>n't know that because the bo  | end, or tion from oute that Fornell what this   |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9   | Q. little bit, early M. Columbia reject share; correct? A. never mention Q. early March? A.  | That's correct.  All right. Let's move forward a March 2016 before the leak. sted a TransCanada proposal at \$24 a  I hesitate only because Mr. Girling med to me 24.  Mr. Skaggs, you heard the number 24 in  I did.  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9   | review history. Board, this is b Mr. Ingrassia c on March 6? A. says, but I do talked about 2  | "I didn't explain, justify, defe<br>Just 'management took direct<br>pottom line."  You have no reason to disp<br>delivered this message to Eric<br>I just don't know. I know<br>n't know that because the bo   | end, or tion from  oute that Fornell  what this pard never  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10   | Q. little bit, early M. Columbia reject share; correct? A. never mention Q. early March? A. Q.   | That's correct.  All right. Let's move forward a March 2016 before the leak. sted a TransCanada proposal at \$24 a I hesitate only because Mr. Girling ned to me 24.  Mr. Skaggs, you heard the number 24 in I did.  And it was rejected?  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10   | review history. Board, this is b Mr. Ingrassia o on March 6? A. says, but I do talked about 2  | "I didn't explain, justify, defe<br>Just 'management took direct<br>oottom line."<br>You have no reason to disp<br>delivered this message to Eric<br>I just don't know. I know<br>n't know that because the bo<br>26 on or about March 6.<br>Listen to my question, pleas  | end, or tion from  oute that Fornell  what this pard never  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12   | Q. little bit, early M. Columbia reject share; correct? A. never mention Q. early March? A. Q. A.  | That's correct.  All right. Let's move forward a March 2016 before the leak. Ited a TransCanada proposal at \$24 a I hesitate only because Mr. Girling and to me 24.  Mr. Skaggs, you heard the number 24 in I did.  And it was rejected?  We strongly suggested that that number  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11   | review history. Board, this is b Mr. Ingrassia c on March 6? A. says, but I do talked about 2 Q. A.  | "I didn't explain, justify, defe<br>Just 'management took direct<br>bottom line."<br>You have no reason to disp<br>delivered this message to Eric<br>I just don't know. I know<br>n't know that because the bo<br>26 on or about March 6.<br>Listen to my question, pleas<br>Uh-huh.   | end, or tion from  bute that Fornell  what this bard never  se, sir.  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13   | Q. little bit, early M. Columbia reject share; correct? A. never mention Q. early March? A. Q. A. not come up i  | That's correct.  All right. Let's move forward a March 2016 before the leak. Sted a TransCanada proposal at \$24 a I hesitate only because Mr. Girling ned to me 24.  Mr. Skaggs, you heard the number 24 in I did.  And it was rejected?  We strongly suggested that that number n a conversation because it would be   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13   | review history. Board, this is b  Mr. Ingrassia o on March 6?  A. says, but I do talked about 2 Q. A. Q.   | "I didn't explain, justify, defe<br>Just 'management took direct<br>bottom line."<br>You have no reason to disp<br>delivered this message to Eric<br>I just don't know. I know<br>n't know that because the bo<br>26 on or about March 6.<br>Listen to my question, pleas<br>Uh-huh.<br>Sitting here today, you have   | end, or tion from  bute that Fornell  what this bard never  se, sir. e no basis   |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14   | Q. little bit, early M. Columbia reject share; correct? A. never mention Q. early March? A. Q. A. not come up i roundly reject   | That's correct.  All right. Let's move forward a March 2016 before the leak. All ted a TransCanada proposal at \$24 a March 2016 before the leak.  I hesitate only because Mr. Girling and to me 24.  Mr. Skaggs, you heard the number 24 in I did.  And it was rejected?  We strongly suggested that that number a conversation because it would be ed.   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14   | review history. Board, this is book Mr. Ingrassia of on March 6? A. says, but I do talked about 2 Q. A. Q. to dispute that   | "I didn't explain, justify, defe<br>Just 'management took direct<br>pottom line."  You have no reason to disp<br>delivered this message to Eric  I just don't know. I know<br>n't know that because the boat<br>26 on or about March 6.  Listen to my question, please<br>Uh-huh.  Sitting here today, you have  | end, or tion from  bute that Fornell  what this bard never  se, sir. e no basis   |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14   | Q. little bit, early M. Columbia reject share; correct? A. never mention Q. early March? A. Q. A. not come up i roundly reject Q.  | That's correct.  All right. Let's move forward a March 2016 before the leak. Ited a TransCanada proposal at \$24 a I hesitate only because Mr. Girling and to me 24.  Mr. Skaggs, you heard the number 24 in I did.  And it was rejected?  We strongly suggested that that number a conversation because it would be ed.  Okay. And then TransCanada came back,  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15   | review history. Board, this is boom March 6?  A. says, but I do talked about 2 Q. A. Q. to dispute that to Eric Fornell  | "I didn't explain, justify, defe<br>Just 'management took direct<br>pottom line."<br>You have no reason to disp<br>delivered this message to Eric<br>I just don't know. I know<br>n't know that because the bo<br>26 on or about March 6.<br>Listen to my question, pleas<br>Uh-huh.<br>Sitting here today, you have<br>Mr. Ingrassia delivered this me<br>on March 6?   | end, or tion from  bute that Fornell  what this bard never  se, sir.  e no basis essage   |
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| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23 | Q. little bit, early M. Columbia rejects A. never mention Q. early March? A. Q. A. not come up i roundly reject Q. and they propo A. conditional of Q. rejected that pr A. Q. said: Look, we       | That's correct.  All right. Let's move forward a March 2016 before the leak. Ited a TransCanada proposal at \$24 a I hesitate only because Mr. Girling and to me 24.  Mr. Skaggs, you heard the number 24 in I did.  And it was rejected?  We strongly suggested that that number a conversation because it would be ed.  Okay. And then TransCanada came back, used \$25.25 per share?  Mr. Girling did extend that fer.  And after a board meeting, Columbia roposal?  That's correct.  And then TransCanada came back and don't want to negotiate against | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23 | review history. Board, this is board, this is board, this is board, this is board.  Mr. Ingrassia con March 6?  A.  says, but I do talked about 2  Q.  A.  Q.  to dispute that to Eric Fornell  A.  Ingrassia to team. He's rethat's all I can  Q.  delivered that in A.  Q.   | "I didn't explain, justify, defe Just 'management took direct pottom line."  You have no reason to displedivered this message to Eric I just don't know. I know in't know that because the boat on or about March 6.  Listen to my question, please Uh-huh.  Sitting here today, you have Mr. Ingrassia delivered this me on March 6?  Right. This is an email from well, I guess the email is to becounting a call he had with I in testify to.  Right. No basis to dispute message to Eric Fornell on March 1 that's certainly what he sale to the potential is to the counting a call he had with I in testify to.  Right. No basis to dispute message to Eric Fornell on March's certainly what he sale to the potential is to the counting a call he had with I in testify to.  | end, or tion from  bute that Fornell  what this bard never  se, sir.  e no basis essage  om our Eric. So  that he arch 6? says here. nent, 893. |
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|  | R. Skaggs - Direct Page 94  | .3  | R. Skaggs - Direct Page 945   |
|--|---|---|---|
| 1  | Sunday "I've pasted a note below from Tim Ingrassia   | 1   | However, I would like to reinstate this evening's   |
| 2  | [] that recounts his latest phone discussion with   | 2   | Board Teleconference"   |
| 3  | Wells Fargo (Eric Fornell)."  | 3   | The purpose is to talk about  |
| 4  | And if we look at the message from  | 4   | TransCanada's efforts "to resuscitate [the] []  |
| 5  | Mr. Ingrassia, he says, "Eric just phoned back.   | 5   | transaction" Correct?   |
| 6  | "They are convening [an] 'all hands   | 6   | What you say there is   |
| 7  | meeting'"   | 7   | A. Excuse me. "[R]esuscitate a  |
| 8  | Right? Talk about TransCanada.  | 8   | potential" Okay. I see it.  |
| 9  | And then he says, "In essence, I said,  | 9   | Q. What you say there is, "In particular,   |
| 10   | ok, we've been clear, come back with yes or no when   | 10  |   |
| 11   | you can.  | 11  | at \$26 [per] share.  |
| 12   | "But implication of my answer is  | 12  |   |
| 13   | presumably if they say yes tomorrow at 3pm, that we'd   | 13  | •   |
| 14   | scramble to sign by <u>Tuesday at 4pm</u> ."  | 14  | • • • •   |
| 15   | At that time you didn't have board  | 15  | -   |
| 16   | authorization yet to accept a \$26 per share offer;   | 16  |   |
| 17   | correct?  | 17  | Q. Is it fair to say it was management's  |
| 18   | A. Certainly not.   | 18  | ,   |
| 19   | Q. If we look above, the same email,  | 19  | A. I'm not sure we were of a mind to draw   |
| 20   | Mr. Cornelius responds, maybe we should have "a call  | 20  | lines at that point.  |
| 21   | tonight to bring [everybody] up to speed [] give  | 21  | -   |
| 22   | them a chance to comment. Also if the full board sees   | 22  |   |
| 23   | \$26 as a number they won't support the sooner you  | 23  | fair  |
| 24   | could feed that back to [Wells Fargo] the better."  | 24  | Q. Sir, the email certainly says, "[W]e   |
|  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |   | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |
|  |   |   |   |
|  |   |   |   |
|  | R. Skaggs - Direct Page 94  | .4  | R. Skaggs - Direct Page 946   |
| 1  | R. Skaggs - Direct Page 94 Right?   | 4 1   | R. Skaggs - Direct Page 946 want to discuss our bias toward a line-in-the-sand at   |
| 1 2  | Page 92   |   | Page 946  |
|  | Right?  | 1   | want to discuss our bias toward a line-in-the-sand at   |
| 2  | Right?  A. That's what this note says.  | 1 2   | want to discuss our bias toward a line-in-the-sand at \$26 [] share." Correct?  |
| 2  | Right?  A. That's what this note says.  Q. At this time at least one board member   | 1<br>2<br>3   | want to discuss our bias toward a line-in-the-sand at \$26 [] share." Correct?  A. That's what this note reflects.  |
| 2<br>3<br>4  | Right?  A. That's what this note says.  Q. At this time at least one board member was stuck at \$26.50 a share; correct?  | 1<br>2<br>3<br>4  | want to discuss our bias toward a line-in-the-sand at \$26 [] share." Correct?  A. That's what this note reflects.  Q. And you are confident, are you not,  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5   | Right?  A. That's what this note says. Q. At this time at least one board member was stuck at \$26.50 a share; correct?  A. I have no recollection of that.   | 1<br>2<br>3<br>4<br>5   | want to discuss our bias toward a line-in-the-sand at \$26 [] share." Correct?  A. That's what this note reflects.  Q. And you are confident, are you not, that you wanted to come to a collective judgment on  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6  | Right?  A. That's what this note says. Q. At this time at least one board member was stuck at \$26.50 a share; correct?  A. I have no recollection of that. Q. I'll show you a document, 889, Joint   | 1<br>2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6  | want to discuss our bias toward a line-in-the-sand at \$26 [] share." Correct?  A. That's what this note reflects.  Q. And you are confident, are you not, that you wanted to come to a collective judgment on whether it made sense or not to have a deal at \$26 a  |
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|  | R. Skaggs - Direct Page 947   |  | R. Skaggs - Direct Page 949  |
|--|---|--|--|
| 1  | Q. March 6, sir. Look at these notes.   | 1  | ATTORNEY van KWAWEGEN: Can we put up   |
| 2  | There, you say in your notes, "After  | 2  | PTO, paragraph 368.  |
| 3  | taking stock, deliberating with [Goldman Sachs], []   | 3  | Q. Do you see that, sir?   |
| 4  | [confirming] with Sig, we authorized [Goldman Sachs]  | 4  | A. I do.   |
| 5  | to tell Wells that we would take an offer of no less  | 5  | Q. "At 11:59 p.m., Central Time, on  |
| 6  | than \$26 [per] share to our Board for its  | 6  | March 8, 2016, the exclusivity period under the  |
| 7  | consideration. We made it absolutely clear that (a)   | 7  | Exclusivity Agreement, as extended on March 2, 2016,   |
| 8  | the CPG board had not signed-off on the number and (b)  | 8  | expired."  |
| 9  | we would not even ask the CPG board to consider a   | 9  | A. That's what this says. I'm sure it's  |
| 10   | number less than \$26 [per] share."   | 10   | correct.   |
| 11   | Do you see that?  | 11   | Q. So on March 9 when TransCanada came   |
| 12   | A. Yes.   | 12   | back with \$26 per share, 90 percent cash, 10 percent  |
| 13   | Q. And if you look above  | 13   | equity, countering at 26, exclusivity had expired?   |
| 14   | ATTORNEY van KWAWEGEN: Just zoom out.   | 14   | A. Yes.  |
| 15   | Joe, on the left. Right.  | 15   | Q. You also knew that there was a  |
| 16   | Q. There, you say in your email on  | 16   | possibility of a leak of the deal discussions with   |
| 17   | March 6 that these are notes you plan to use during   | 17   | TransCanada?   |
| 18   | the meeting with the board in the evening.  | 18   | A. On or about that date, we became aware  |
| 19   | Do you see that?  | 19   | that that was a possibility.   |
| 20   | A. I do see that.   | 20   | Q. Okay. I want to look at the board   |
| 21   | Q. And when you wrote these notes,  | 21   | meetings.  |
| 22   | preparing for the board meeting, you knew that  | 22   | A. I'm sorry?  |
| 23   | Goldman's message was not conditioned on board  | 23   | Q. I want to look at the board minutes.  |
| 24   | approval.   | 24   | We put them on your screen. That's Joint Exhibit 191,  |
|  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |
|  |   |  |  |
|  |   |  |  |
|  | R. Skaggs - Direct Page 948   |  | R. Skaggs - Direct Page 950  |
| 1  | A. Again, I don't follow you. Every deal  | 1  | page 13.   |
| 1 2  | A. Again, I don't follow you. Every deal was conditioned on board approval.   | 2  | page 13.  See it's a March 10th board meeting?   |
|  | A. Again, I don't follow you. Every deal  |  | page 13.   |
| 2  | A. Again, I don't follow you. Every deal was conditioned on board approval.  Q. Well, let's look at 889, JTX 889. At the bottom, you see that email that we just looked at  | 2  | page 13.  See it's a March 10th board meeting?   |
| 3  | A. Again, I don't follow you. Every deal was conditioned on board approval.  Q. Well, let's look at 889, JTX 889. At the bottom, you see that email that we just looked at where Mr. Ingrassia was reporting back to you.   | 2  | page 13.  See it's a March 10th board meeting?  ATTORNEY van KWAWEGEN: And if you scroll down, Joe.  Q. There's a discussion about   |
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|  | R. Skaggs - Direct Page 951   |   | R. Skaggs - Direct Page 953  |
| 1  | would be unacceptable, but took comfort in the fact   | 1   | A. But we can read the minutes. The  |
| 2  | that Mr. Girling had indicated to Mr. Skaggs that   | 2   | minutes say what the minutes say.  |
| 3  | TransCanada was willing to negotiate on that point."  | 3   | Q. And they say it was a basis for moving  |
| 4  | Ultimately, it was Mr. Kettering who  | 4   | forward; correct?  |
| 5  | was tasked with negotiating the termination fee;  | 5   | A. Correct.  |
| 6  | correct?  | 6   | Q. You did not tell Mr. Girling that   |
| 7  | A. That's correct.  | 7   | Columbia rejected TransCanada's proposal, did you?   |
| 8  | Q. Board minutes continue: "[T]he board   | 8   | A. No.   |
| 9  | concluded that TransCanada's indicative offer was a   | 9   | Q. Let's take a look at the text messages  |
| 10   | basis for moving forward with discussions and   | 10  | between you, Steve Smith and Glen Kettering and Bob  |
| 11   | authorized management to continue working toward a  | 11  | Smith on March 10th, same day as this board meeting.   |
| 12   | potential transaction, including revising the merger  | 12  | It's Joint Exhibit 1778. March 10th, same day.   |
| 13   | agreement to reflect the new structure and commencing   | 13  | ATTORNEY van KWAWEGEN: Joe, if you   |
| 14   | more in-depth due diligence on TransCanada's  | 14  | can blow it up so we can also see who it's from.   |
| 15   | business."  | 15  | Thank you.   |
| 16   | Sir, that does not state that   | 16  | Q. So here, Bob Smith on March 10th is   |
| 17   | TransCanada was willing to negotiate on the point that  | 17  | reporting back about his call he just had "with  |
| 18   | the deal would be at \$26, including 10 percent equity;   | 18  | Christine Johnston at Taurus," talked about "the stock   |
| 19   | correct?  | 19  | exchange events for the day," "calls quieted down as   |
| 20   | A. That's not written in the minutes.   | 20  | the day progressed."   |
| 21   | Q. And, to your knowledge, the board did  | 21  | Does this help orient you in time that   |
| 22   | not instruct management to reject TransCanada's offer   | 22  | the leak had come out?   |
| 23   | at \$26, including 10 percent equity?   | 23  | A. I just need to digest what this said  |
| 24   | A. At this point it was an indicative   | 24  | and think about the timing here.   |
|  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |   | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |
|  |   |   |  |
|  | R. Skaggs - Direct  | ,   | R. Skaggs - Direct   |
| 1  | R. Skaggs - Direct Page 952 offer.  | 1   | Page 954   |
| 1 2  | offer.  |   | Q. Well, it's March 10th. Okay.  |
|  | offer.  Q. We saw with the \$25.25 offer, that the  | 1   | Q. Well, it's March 10th. Okay.  A. I see that, but  |
| 2  | offer.  Q. We saw with the \$25.25 offer, that the board instructed you to reject it. Here, they did not  | 1 2   | Q. Well, it's March 10th. Okay.  A. I see that, but Q. Here, they say here, Mr. Smith,   |
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|  | R. Skaggs - Direct Page 955   |  | R. Skaggs - Direct Page 957   |
|--|---|--|---|
| 1  | Q. All right. Well, let's look at your  | 1  | A. No clue.   |
| 2  | email.  | 2  | Q. Let me show you. Joint Exhibit 956.  |
| 3  | A. Sorry. My email or text?   | 3  | Email from Hugh Babowal to his team at Wells Fargo on   |
| 4  | Q. The next document will be your email,  | 4  | March 10th. "So they accepted \$26 with 10% stock but   |
| 5  | Joint Exhibit 958. This, at the top, you'll see is a  | 5  | are trying to negotiate down the break fee. Russ is   |
| 6  | March 11th email from you to Sig Cornelius, but you're  | 6  | now getting cold feet. Unbelievable."   |
| 7  | forwarding an email from you to the board.  | 7  | No basis to dispute that Mr. Babowal  |
| 8  | A. Okay. Again, bear with me. This is   | 8  | wrote that to his Wells Fargo team, do you?   |
| 9  | what I'm writing to Sig?  | 9  | A. No.  |
| 10   |   | 10   | -   |
|  | •   | 11   | •   |
| 11   | forwarded on March 11. But on March 10th, you email   | 12   | is a senior Wells Fargo banker?  A. I'm not sure he's a senior, but he's  |
| 12<br>13   | the Columbia Pipeline board.  |  | •   |
|  | A. Okay.  | 13   | part of the Wells team at this point.   |
| 14   | Q. "Project Constellation Day In  | 14   | Q. Let's go to another Wells Fargo  |
| 15   | Review."  | 15   | document. I showed you an earlier version of this at  |
| 16   | A. I see that.  | 16   | your deposition, but it's Joint Exhibit 1120.   |
| 17   | Q. Let's go to the last page of this  | 17   | You see this is a March 16th memo from  |
| 18   | document. "Today's Follow-Up With Taurus.   | 18   | Eric Fornell and Hugh Babowal and many, many other  |
| 19   | "In conversations that Steve had with   | 19   | people at Wells Fargo to the fairness opinion   |
| 20   | Taurus' deal lea[d] (Francois), I had with Taurus' CEO  | 20   | committee at Wells Fargo.   |
| 21   | and Bob Smith had with Taurus' legal counsel, we  | 21   | A. That's what this seems to reflect,   |
| 22   | confirmed that Capricorn will continue to engage in   | 22   | yes.  |
| 23   | the Project Constellation process with the clear  | 23   | Q. If you scroll down, you'll see there's   |
| 24   | understanding that, among other considerations, (a)   | 24   | a discussion about the background of the transaction.   |
|  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |
|  |   |  |   |
|  | R. Skaggs - Direct Page 956   |  | R. Skaggs - Direct Page 958   |
| 1  | R. Skaggs - Direct Page 956 the break fee was subject to negotiation; (b) ASAP, we  | 1  | R. Skaggs - Direct Page 958 And there, these many Wells Fargo bankers are telling   |
| 1 2  | Page 956  | 1 2  | Page 956  |
|  | the break fee was subject to negotiation; (b) ASAP, we  |  | And there, these many Wells Fargo bankers are telling   |
| 2  | the break fee was subject to negotiation; (b) ASAP, we must diligence Taurus' equity (financial plan); and  | 2  | And there, these many Wells Fargo bankers are telling the Wells Fargo fairness committee the following:   |
| 2  | the break fee was subject to negotiation; (b) ASAP, we must diligence Taurus' equity (financial plan); and (c) in short order we must agree on a critical path to   | 2  | And there, these many Wells Fargo bankers are telling the Wells Fargo fairness committee the following:  "The Taurus board met in the days following and, on  |
| 2<br>3<br>4  | the break fee was subject to negotiation; (b) ASAP, we must diligence Taurus' equity (financial plan); and (c) in short order we must agree on a critical path to bring this process to closure."   | 2<br>3<br>4  | And there, these many Wells Fargo bankers are telling the Wells Fargo fairness committee the following:  "The Taurus board met in the days following and, on March 9, [], approved the submission of a verbal offer   |
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| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10   | the break fee was subject to negotiation; (b) ASAP, we must diligence Taurus' equity (financial plan); and (c) in short order we must agree on a critical path to bring this process to closure."  You wrote this on March 10th; correct?  A. Yes, sir.  Q. And it continues, "By late afternoon, indications were that Taurus' outside legal counsel was re-engaging, and Francois committed to provide a critical path for diligence and completion of the Merger Agreement by [close of business] tomorrow   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10   | And there, these many Wells Fargo bankers are telling the Wells Fargo fairness committee the following: "The Taurus board met in the days following and, on March 9, [], approved the submission of a verbal offer of \$26.00 per share, consisting of 90% cash and 10% stock. The Capricorn board accepted this preliminary offer on the morning of March 10, 2016."  You have no basis to dispute that this in the final memo to Wells Fargo's fairness committee assessing this transaction?  A. No, sir, no basis to dispute that   |
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| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22 | the break fee was subject to negotiation; (b) ASAP, we must diligence Taurus' equity (financial plan); and (c) in short order we must agree on a critical path to bring this process to closure."  You wrote this on March 10th; correct?  A. Yes, sir.  Q. And it continues, "By late afternoon, indications were that Taurus' outside legal counsel was re-engaging, and Francois committed to provide a critical path for diligence and completion of the Merger Agreement by [close of business] tomorrow (Friday)."  You were truthful and accurate when you were informing the board about this?  A. Yes, sir.  Q. No discussion here that you expressed any disagreement with the counteroffer at \$26 per share, including 10 percent equity?  A. It's certainly not reflected in these two paragraphs.  Q. Okay. Did you know that Wells Fargo understood that Columbia accepted the counterproposal | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22 | And there, these many Wells Fargo bankers are telling the Wells Fargo fairness committee the following: "The Taurus board met in the days following and, on March 9, [], approved the submission of a verbal offer of \$26.00 per share, consisting of 90% cash and 10% stock. The Capricorn board accepted this preliminary offer on the morning of March 10, 2016."  You have no basis to dispute that this in the final memo to Wells Fargo's fairness committee assessing this transaction?  A. No, sir, no basis to dispute that that's reflected in this.  Q. Were you aware that senior executives at TransCanada also understood that Columbia accepted their counteroffer at \$26, including 10 percent equity?  A. I'd be shocked.  Q. Let me show you a document. Joint Exhibit 1779.  These are text messages between Alex Pourbaix and Karl Johannson. You knew that Mr. Pourbaix was the chief operating officer of |

|  |  | R. Skaggs - Direct   |  |  | R. Skaggs - Direct  |
|--|--|--|--|--|---|
| 1  | Q.   | Page 959 Alex Pourbaix.  | 1  | problems."   | Page 961  |
| 2  | д.<br><b>А.</b>  | I knew he was a senior leader, not   | 2  | problems.  | No reason to think that Mr. Pourbaix  |
| 3  | sure what the  |  | 3  | didn't write that  |   |
| 4  | Q.   | And you also understood that Karl  | 4  | A.   | No reason to believe that he didn't.  |
| 5  |  | a senior executive?  | 5  | Q.   | All right. And at this time, you were   |
| 6  | A.   | Yes.   | 6  | the CEO of Col   | -   |
| 7  | Q.   | Well, look. Look at 8:17.  | 7  | <b>A.</b>  | Yes.  |
| 8  | A.   | 8:17? I'm sorry.   | 8  | Q.   | Okay. March 10th, he's writing this,  |
| 9  | Q.   | P.m.; right?   | 9  |  | call to you and Russ.   |
| 10   | A.   | I'm sorry.   | 10   | talking about a  | Let me show you another document.   |
| 11   | Q.   | It says, "YeahI just talked"   | 11   | Joint Exhibit 95   |   |
| 12   | it's the third ent   | -  | 12   | COME EXHIBIT CO  | Mr. Fornell, the banker at Wells  |
| 13   | A.   | Okay, gotcha.  | 13   | Fargo talking to   | o his team. March 10th, he's writing,   |
| 14   | Q.   | "YeahI just talked to Francois and   | 14   | -  | board is freaking out and told the  |
| 15   |  | they will do it." This is March on   | 15   | · ·  | eam to get a deal done with 'whatever it  |
| 16   |  | ve called a Board meeting for tomorrow   | 16   |  | the Capricorn team has relayed this   |
| 17   |  | We went from killing it to a done deal   | 17   | info to Taurus."   |   |
| 18   | _  | rill not let you down. We will make it   | 18   | ino to radius.   | You have no reason, no basis to   |
| 19   | work and get th  |  | 19   | dispute that you   | u spoke with Mr. Girling the morning of   |
| 20   | work and get in  | Then, scrolling down, there's a text   | 20   | March 10th?  | a spoke with wir. diffiling the morning of  |
| 21   | mossago from l   | Mr. Pourbaix to Karl Johannson, the  | 21   | <b>A.</b>  | That's correct.   |
|  | _  |  | 22   | <b>Q.</b>  |   |
| 22   | lollowing morni  | ng at March 10th, 10:30 a.m.   | 23   | Mr. Fornell is a   | You have no basis to dispute that   |
| 24   | doal as offered  | "Just landing in Toronto. We had a but now it['s] all [blank]"   | 24   | <b>A.</b>  | That's correct.   |
| 24   | deal as offered  | טענ ווטש ונן אן מוו [טומווג]   | 24   | A.   | mai's conect.   |
|  |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |  |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |
|  |  |  |  |  |   |
|  |  | R. Skaggs - Direct Page 960  |  |  | R. Skaggs - Direct Page 962   |
| 1  | A.   | R. Skaggs - Direct Page 960 Yeah.  | 1  | Q.   | R. Skaggs - Direct Page 962 Or that he's talking to his team?   |
| 1 2  | <b>A.</b><br>Q.  | rage 900   | 1 2  | Q.<br><b>A</b> .   | Page 902  |
|  | Q.   | Yeah.  |  |  | Or that he's talking to his team?   |
| 2  | Q.   | Yeah "with the leak that we are in   | 2  | A.   | Or that he's talking to his team?  Apparently, that's correct.  |
| 2  | Q.   | Yeah "with the leak that we are in hat a cluster[blank]."  | 2  | <b>A.</b><br>Q.  | Or that he's talking to his team?  Apparently, that's correct.  Or that he would invent this?   |
| 2<br>3<br>4  | Q.<br>discussions. W   | Yeah "with the leak that we are in hat a cluster[blank]."  Do you see that?  | 2<br>3<br>4  | <b>A.</b><br>Q.<br><b>A.</b>   | Or that he's talking to his team?  Apparently, that's correct.  Or that he would invent this?   |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5   | Q.<br>discussions. W<br>A.<br>Q.   | Yeah "with the leak that we are in that a cluster[blank]." Do you see that? I see that.  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5   | A.<br>Q.<br>A.<br>it's not<br>Q.   | Or that he's talking to his team?  Apparently, that's correct.  Or that he would invent this?  Well, he must have invented it because   |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6  | Q.<br>discussions. W<br>A.<br>Q.   | Yeah "with the leak that we are in 'hat a cluster[blank]." Do you see that? I see that. Here, Mr. Pourbaix, TransCanada's officer told his colleague that they   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6  | A.<br>Q.<br>A.<br>it's not<br>Q.   | Or that he's talking to his team?  Apparently, that's correct.  Or that he would invent this?  Well, he must have invented it because  Right. But you have no reason to   |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7   | Q. discussions. W  A. Q. chief operating   | Yeah "with the leak that we are in 'hat a cluster[blank]." Do you see that? I see that. Here, Mr. Pourbaix, TransCanada's officer told his colleague that they   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7   | A. Q. A. it's not Q. think that he wo  | Or that he's talking to his team?  Apparently, that's correct. Or that he would invent this?  Well, he must have invented it because  Right. But you have no reason to buld have a reason to invent it?   |
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| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9   | Q. discussions. W  A. Q. chief operating "had a deal as of   | Yeah "with the leak that we are in that a cluster[blank]." Do you see that? I see that. Here, Mr. Pourbaix, TransCanada's officer told his colleague that they offered." Do you see that?  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9   | A. Q. A. it's not Q. think that he wo  | Or that he's talking to his team?  Apparently, that's correct. Or that he would invent this?  Well, he must have invented it because  Right. But you have no reason to ould have a reason to invent it?  He could have reasons to have done   |
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#### R. Skaggs - Direct

|    | R. Skaggs - Direct Page 963                            |          | R. Skaggs - Direct Page 965                             |
|----|--|----------|---|
| 1  | that's certainly within the time frame.                | 1        | were working towards completing finalizing the merger   |
| 2  | Q. I'll show you in a minute. But before               | 2        | agreement, Mr. Steve Smith was going on vacation with   |
| 3  | we get there, at this time, March 10th, March 11 we    | 3        | his family?   |
| 4  | just saw your email you were working towards           | 4        | A. Doesn't help refresh my recollection.                |
| 5  | completing in a timeline for completing the merger     | 5        | I see what this says, and I don't doubt it. I just      |
| 6  | agreement; correct?                                    | 6        | don't have a recollection of that.                      |
| 7  | A. Correct.  | 7        | Q. You were in the middle of finalizing a               |
| 8  | Q. And as you were working on this                     | 8        | \$14 billion transaction, Glen Kettering is tasked with |
| 9  | timeline towards completing the merger agreement,      | 9        | negotiating the breakup fee, and Steve Smith is going   |
| 10 | Spectra reached out to discuss a potential             | 10       | on vacation; correct?                                   |
| 11 | transaction.   | 11       | A. Again, I have no recollection of that.               |
| 12 | Do you recall that?                                    | 12       | I'm not disputing it. I just don't, sitting here        |
| 13 | A. They reached out; that's correct.                   | 13       | today, remember that.                                   |
| 14 | Q. Let's take a look at Joint                          | 14       | Q. Meanwhile, Spectra continued to try to               |
| 15 | Exhibit 986. At the bottom, March 11, 2016, Mr. Ebel   | 15       | engage with you, is it not true?                        |
| 16 | from Spectra is reaching out directly to you; correct? | 16       | A. They indicated they would like to                    |
| 17 | A. That's correct.                                     | 17       | engage, but they did not follow up on an engagement.    |
| 18 | Q. And he's emailing you to express                    | 18       | ATTORNEY van KWAWEGEN: Joe, can you                     |
| 19 | interest in discussing a potential transaction;        | 19       | pull up PTO, paragraph 401, please.                     |
| 20 | correct?   | 20       | Q. This is March 12, the same day that                  |
| 21 | A. That's correct.                                     | 21       | Mr. Steve Smith was on his way to the hotel with his    |
| 22 | Q. It is true, is it not, that Steve was               | 22       | family.   |
| 23 | about to go on vacation with his family at this time?  | 23       | Stipulated fact: "On March 12, 2016,                    |
| 24 | A. I'm sorry, but who?                                 | 24       | Spectra's Chief Development Officer contacted Goldman.  |
|    | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS                               |          | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS                                |
|    | R. Skaggs - Direct Page 964                            |          | R. Skaggs - Direct                                      |
| 1  | Q. It's true, is it not, that at this                  | 1        | Goldman then stated to Skaggs, Smith, and Kettering     |
| 2  | time, Steve Smith was about to go on vacation with his | 2        | that 'When [Spectra] gets serious about MA [the Chief   |
| 3  | family?  | 3        | Development Officer] tends to drive' and Spectra's      |
| 4  | A. I can't recall.                                     | 4        | contact 'can be interpreted as a sign that they are     |
| 5  | Q. We'll get there.                                    | 5        | doing real work over there."                            |
| 6  | If you scroll up, there Mr. Kettering                  | 6        | A. That's exactly what this says.                       |
| 7  | is telling Bob Smith sorry Bob Skaggs, you,            | 7        | Q. Sitting here today, you're not aware                 |
| 8  | Steve Smith, Bob Smith: "Steve, get on the plane       | 8        | of any attempt to use the Spectra inbound to increase   |
| 9  | fast."   | 9        | the price for TransCanada?                              |
| 10 | Does that help you refresh your memory                 | 10       | A. TransCanada was aware that there was                 |
| 11 | that Mr. Smith, Steve Smith, was about to go on        | 11       | an inbound.   |
| 12 | vacation with his family at the time?                  | 12       | Q. Listen to my question. You're not                    |
| 13 | A. I just don't recall during this                     | 13       | aware of any attempt to use the Spectra inbound to      |
| 14 | period. I'm not saying it's not true. I just can't     | 14       | increase the price for TransCanada?                     |
| 15 | recall.  | 15       | A. Well, in what fashion? I'm not sure I                |
| 16 | Q. That's okay.  | 16       | follow the question. TransCanada was aware there was    |
| 17 | Let's take a look at a document, 1777.                 | 17       | an inbound.   |
| 18 | These are text messages between Mr. Smith and          | 18       | ATTORNEY van KWAWEGEN: Joe, can you                     |
| 19 | Mr. Poirier. And let's look at the entry for           | 19       | just pull up the appraisal trial transcript, Joint      |
| 20 | March 12. March 12, he's telling Francois, "On my way  | 20       | Exhibit 1496, at 1023, line 23, through 1024, line 3.   |
| 21 | to hotel with family. I will call you when we get      | 21       | Q. "Question: My question is, your                      |
| 22 | settled."  | 22       | personal knowledge, sitting here today, are you aware   |
| 23 | Does this help refresh your memory                     | 23       | of any attempt to use the Spectra inbound to increase   |
| 24 | that at this time, as Spectra was reaching out, as you | 24       | the price with TransCanada?                             |
|    | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS                               |          | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS                                |
|    | CHANCEDY COL   | <u> </u> | PEDODTEDS (10) Dagge 062 066                            |

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|  | R. Skaggs - Direct Page 967  |  | R. Skaggs - Direct Page 969  |
| 1  | "Answer: [I'm] not aware."   | 1  | large shareholder of Columbia Pipeline had asked you   |
| 2  | You were asked that question and you   | 2  | to run a process?  |
| 3  | gave that answer during trial; correct?  | 3  | A. I don't know. I don't recall.   |
| 4  | A. That's what this would say.   | 4  | Q. You don't recall telling the  |
| 5  | Q. And you did not communicate to  | 5  | TransCanada board the Columbia Pipeline board that   |
| 6  | TransCanada that, in light of the inbound, it should   | 6  | a large holder had suggested that they would not be  |
| 7  | commit to the \$26 transaction, including 10 percent   | 7  | averse to owning TransCanada stock?  |
| 8  | equity?  | 8  | A. I don't recall.   |
| 9  | A. That's correct.   | 9  | Q. Or the stock of any other large   |
| 10   | Q. Nor did you respond to Spectra with   | 10   | midstream management companies; correct?   |
| 11   | anything other than the script that you ran by   | 11   | A. I don't recall.   |
| 12   | TransCanada before using it?   | 12   | Q. All right. I'm going to talk about  |
| 13   | A. Yes, that's correct. That was the   | 13   | March 14 when TransCanada reached out to talk about a  |
| 14   | communiqué to Spectra.   | 14   | revised deal. I'm going to show you some text  |
| 15   |  |  |  |
|  |  | 15   | messages. Got these after Mr. Kettering and you had  |
| 16   | to Spectra with anything other than that script?   | 16   | new counsel.   |
| 17   | A. That's correct.   | 17   | This is X5. You see it in front of   |
| 18   | Q. Now, as you were working towards  | 18   | you. There's a March 14 text from Steve Smith to you,  |
| 19   | finalizing a deal at 26, including 10 percent equity,  | 19   | Glen Kettering, March 14: "Francois wants to give me   |
| 20   | a large Columbia stockholder contacted you to talk   | 20   | or Glen a thorough update call on where they stand   |
| 21   | about the potential transaction.   | 21   | with things at 2 to 2:30. I'm on the Golf course at  |
| 22   | Do you recall that?  | 22   | that time, Glen, can you do it?"   |
| 23   | A. No.   | 23   | Mr. Smith is on vacation, right?   |
| 24   | Q. Let me show you a document, Joint   | 24   | So Mr. Kettering responds, "Sure   |
|  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |
|  |  |  |  |
|  | R. Skaggs - Direct   |  | R. Skaggs - Direct   |
| 1  | raye 900   | 1  | Page 970   |
| 1  | Exhibit 1064. And here, at the top, there's a  | 1  | thing. 2:00 p.m. preferred as we have RMC at 3:00 but  |
| 2  | Exhibit 1064. And here, at the top, there's a reference from Glen Kettering to you talking about how   | 2  | thing. 2:00 p.m. preferred as we have RMC at 3:00 but either works. Any messages you guys want me to   |
| 2  | Exhibit 1064. And here, at the top, there's a reference from Glen Kettering to you talking about how a large holder is suggesting a process. March 13. If  | 2  | thing. 2:00 p.m. preferred as we have RMC at 3:00 but either works. Any messages you guys want me to deliver?"   |
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| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22 | Exhibit 1064. And here, at the top, there's a reference from Glen Kettering to you talking about how a large holder is suggesting a process. March 13. If we scroll down, there's an email on March 13 talking about a communication with Adam Ward, with a request to have a call with Bob.  At the bottom it says, "We feel strongly that given the bid from TransCanada you should start a strategic review and test the market. We are on the same page that the company is worth more than the current stock price but at a minimum we should see if the long-term value of the firm can be realized more rapidly. Further given the likely rebound in the market we are not averse to owning stock in [TransCanada], [Enbridge], [Spectra], [NextEra], [et cetera]. We are large shareholders of those firms as a group already."  After you received this message, you did not reach out to Enbridge, Spectra, NextEra, or any potential bidder to talk about a potential transaction; correct?  A. That's correct.   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22       | thing. 2:00 p.m. preferred as we have RMC at 3:00 but either works. Any messages you guys want me to deliver?"  You respond, "Gotta keep pushing. We wouldn't be surprised to see more inbounds."  That is you saying: Keep pushing towards finalizing a deal at 26, including 10 percent equity; right?  A. I don't know specifically. But I would assume, given the timing, that that's what that's intended to mean.  Q. So Steve Smith responds, "Not sure, I asked him what he wanted" meaning Francois "and he said [that] they wanted to provide an update of where they were with things. You might point out that the leak has attracted a lot of attention. We need to get this signed up."  At this point in time there is no revised offer from TransCanada at \$25.50 per share?  A. We were still working on their provisional offer.  Q. Let's take a look at your email to the   |

|  |  | R. Skaggs - Direct   | Page 971  |   |  | R. Skaggs - Direct   | Page 973  |
|--|--|--|---|---|--|--|---|
| 1  | thank you for i  | making time on very short notice to  |   |   | Q.   | No? Let me show you some   | =   |
| 2  | participate in t   | his evening's Board Teleconference."   | 2   | Mr.   | Poirier test   | tified in the appraisal trial. I war   | nt  |
| 3  |  | You talk about the fast and furious  | 3   | to sl   | now you hi   | s testimony.   |   |
| 4  | developments   | in Project Constellation.  | 4   | Ļ   |  | ATTORNEY van KWAWEG  | EN: Joe, please   |
| 5  | •  | And then you say, based on certain   | n t   | j put   | up JTX 14  | 39 at 420, lines 17 through 421,   | line 7.   |
| 6  | considerations   | , "[TransCanada] has 'revised its  |   | -   | А.   | I'm sorry. This is when?   |   |
| 7  | offer.'"   | , .  | -   | ,   | Q.   | This was the appraisal trial.  |   |
| 8  |  | Doesn't say "best and final" anywh   | ere 8   | 3   | Α.   | Okay.  |   |
| 9  | in vour email t  | o the board, does it?  | 9   | )   | Q.   | Same trial that you testified i  | n   |
| 10   | <b>A.</b>  | It does not in the email.  | 1   | 0 befo  |  |  |   |
| 11   | Q.   | And, actually, when Mr. Girling car  |   |   |  | "Question: So is it your posi  | tion  |
| 12   |  | 25 in cash, he told you that it was best   |   |   | TransCan   | ada was still interested in acquir   |   |
| 13   | and final; corre   | •  | 1   |   |  | 626 per share on March 14th of   | -   |
| 14   | <b>A.</b>  | Correct.   | 1   |   | πιοια τοι φ  | "Answer: We had put pencil   |   |
| 15   | Q.   | And then it wasn't; correct?   | 1   |   | altornative  | e, but we hadn't put it to bed, yes  |   |
| 16   | <b>А.</b>  | Correct.   | 1   |   | anemanve   | "The Court: What is that dis   |   |
| 17   | Q.   |  |   |   | at does tha  |  | unction:  |
|  |  | Now, after having these conversat  |   |   | at does the  |  | w bod   |
| 18   |  | hen you received the revised offer, you  | -   | _   | to no to 0   | "Answer: It means that if the  | y nau   |
| 19   |  | ything to determine how TransCanada  |   |   |  | 5.50 all cash, we would have   |   |
| 20   | stock price pe   |  | 2   |   |  | peing prepared to take the risk o  |   |
| 21   | A.   | Excuse me? I didn't hear your  | 2   |   | -  | as consideration along with the c  | asn   |
| 22   | question.  | 0 1/ 1 1/ 1/ 1/  | . 2   |   | ponent of  | the transaction. []"   |   |
| 23   | Q.   | Sure. You don't recall doing anyth   | -   |   |  | And you know that Mr. Poirie   |   |
| 24   | to determine r   | ow TransCanada's stock price perforr   | ned 2   | 4 inve  | stment ba  | nker before he joined TransCan   | ada?  |
|  |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |   |   |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |   |
|  |  | R. Skaggs - Direct   |   |   |  | D Ckeans Divest  |   |
|  |  | n. Skaggs - Direct   | Page 972  |   |  | R. Skaggs - Direct   | Page 974  |
| 1  | between Marc   | h 14 and March 17 of 2016?   | Page 972  |   | A.   | I was aware of that.   | Page 974  |
| 1  | between Marc   | h 14 and March 17 of 2016?   |   |   | <b>A.</b><br>Q.  | I was aware of that.   | •   |
| 2  | Α.   | h 14 and March 17 of 2016?  Our advisors and our team were   |   | 2   | Q.   | I was aware of that. I want to show you somethin   | g else.   |
| 2  | A.<br>at their stock   | h 14 and March 17 of 2016?  Our advisors and our team were price on an hourly basis.   | looking 2   | e<br>B Pag  | Q.   | I was aware of that. I want to show you somethins 1 through 4. Here he testifies   | g else.<br>:  |
| 2<br>3<br>4  | A.<br>at their stock<br>Q.   | h 14 and March 17 of 2016?  Our advisors and our team were price on an hourly basis.  Isn't it fair to say that you don't  | looking 2   | Pag   | Q.<br>e 422, line  | I was aware of that. I want to show you somethins 1 through 4. Here he testifies "Question: You didn't tell Co   | g else.<br>:<br>olumbia   |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5   | A. at their stock Q. recall asking y   | h 14 and March 17 of 2016?  Our advisors and our team were price on an hourly basis.  Isn't it fair to say that you don't our advisors to provide an analysis of   | looking 2   | Pag<br>H<br>that  | Q.<br>e 422, line<br>you were  | I was aware of that.  I want to show you somethin s 1 through 4. Here he testifies "Question: You didn't tell Cointerested in considering a trans  | g else.<br>:<br>olumbia<br>eaction  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6  | A. at their stock Q. recall asking y TransCanada   | h 14 and March 17 of 2016?  Our advisors and our team were price on an hourly basis.  Isn't it fair to say that you don't  | looking 2   | Pag<br>H<br>h that<br>at 2  | Q.<br>e 422, line<br>you were  | I was aware of that.  I want to show you somethin s 1 through 4. Here he testifies "Question: You didn't tell Cointerested in considering a trans ad said no to 25.50 all cash, did  | g else.<br>:<br>olumbia<br>:action  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7   | A. at their stock Q. recall asking y TransCanada' that?  | Our advisors and our team were price on an hourly basis.  Isn't it fair to say that you don't our advisors to provide an analysis of s stock price? You don't recall doing   | looking 2   | Pag<br>Hothat<br>So that  | Q.<br>e 422, line<br>you were  | I was aware of that.  I want to show you somethin s 1 through 4. Here he testifies "Question: You didn't tell Cointerested in considering a transed said no to 25.50 all cash, did "Answer: That's correct."   | g else.<br>:<br>olumbia<br>:action<br>you?                                  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8  | A. at their stock Q. recall asking y TransCanada' that? A.   | h 14 and March 17 of 2016?  Our advisors and our team were price on an hourly basis.  Isn't it fair to say that you don't our advisors to provide an analysis of s stock price? You don't recall doing  They were doing that that  | looking 2   | Pag H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H   | Q.<br>e 422, line<br>you were i<br>6 if they ha  | I was aware of that.  I want to show you somethin s 1 through 4. Here he testifies "Question: You didn't tell Cointerested in considering a trans ad said no to 25.50 all cash, did  | g else.<br>:<br>olumbia<br>:action<br>you?                                  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8  | A. at their stock Q. recall asking y TransCanada that? A. throughout the   | Our advisors and our team were price on an hourly basis.  Isn't it fair to say that you don't our advisors to provide an analysis of a stock price? You don't recall doing  They were doing that that his process because the stock, the   | looking 2   | Pag that at 2   | Q. e 422, line you were it is if they ha   | I was aware of that.  I want to show you somethin s 1 through 4. Here he testifies "Question: You didn't tell Cointerested in considering a trans ad said no to 25.50 all cash, did "Answer: That's correct."  No basis to dispute this testi  | g else. : clumbia :action you? mony, do                                     |
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|  | R. Skaggs - Direct   |  | R. Skaggs - Direct   |
|--|--|--|--|
|  | Page 975   |  | Fage 977   |
| 1  | Q. To you.   | 1  | proxy. You understood that the purposes of the proxy   |
| 2  | A. That's what this says. Consistent   | 2  | was to inform shareholders about the process that you  |
| 3  | with we were watching their stock price constantly.  | 3  | went through so they could make an informed decision   |
| 4  | Q. March 15. Bob Skaggs, "Yeah. So,  | 4  | as to whether to approve or not approve the  |
| 5  | what does that say to us \$.25/share."   | 5  | transaction?   |
| 6  | Response from Glen Kettering, "That's  | 6  | A. That's correct.   |
| 7  | what the math would suggest. Only \$1 off what   | 7  | Q. You also understood that shareholders   |
| 8  | Francois quoted as the pre leak level. If it closes  | 8  | would rely on information in the proxy when they   |
| 9  | like this tomorrow, we may want to pursue."  | 9  | decided to vote to approve or disapprove the   |
| 10   | Does that help refresh your memory   | 10   |  |
| 11   | that you were talking about TransCanada stock price  | 11   | A. That's correct.   |
| 12   | around March 15, 2016?   | 12   | and processing approximation and process   |
| 13   | A. Generally. I mean, again, we were   | 13   |  |
| 14   | looking at that stock price constantly. But I just   | 14   |  |
| 15   | can't recall the specifics in and around this date   | 15   |  |
| 16   | other than we're watching it.  | 16   | , ,  |
| 17   | Q. Let's go down. On March 16, next day.   | 17   |  |
| 18   | Bob Skaggs, March 16, "Marty believes the deal is a  | 18   |  |
| 19   | straight-forward yes."   | 19   | 1 1 3 1 3/3 1 31   |
| 20   | That's Marty Kittrell; right?  | 20   | , ,  |
| 21   | A. That would be, yes.   | 21   | A. That's correct.   |
| 22   | Q. Steve Smith, "Are you going to pop  | 22   |  |
| 23   | Russ in the nose and demand \$25.75?"  | 23   | , ,  |
| 24   | A. That's what this says.  | 24   | Columbia?  |
|  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |
|  |  | _  |  |
|  | R. Skaggs - Direct   |  | R. Skaggs - Direct   |
| 1  | Fage 976   | 1  | Fage 976   |
| 1 2  | Q. Glen responds, "I told Your best buddy  | 1 2  | A. That was my job at that point,  |
| 2  | Q. Glen responds, "I told Your best buddy they're master TFers."   | 2  | A. That was my job at that point, correct.   |
| 3  | Q. Glen responds, "I told Your best buddy they're master TFers."  A. That's what   | 2  | A. That was my job at that point, correct.  Q. And in front of you, there's a  |
| 2<br>3<br>4  | Q. Glen responds, "I told Your best buddy they're master TFers."  A. That's what Q. Sitting here today, yes or no, you did   | 2<br>3<br>4  | A. That was my job at that point, correct.  Q. And in front of you, there's a document in the spiral book. It's JTX 1291.  |
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|----|--|---------|--|
|    | R. Skaggs - Direct Page 979                            |         | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 981                             |
| 1  | A. Excuse me?  | 1       | I was president of the group of gas regulated gas      |
| 2  | Q. Do you know one way or the other                    | 2       | utilities that were under the Columbia umbrella and    |
| 3  | whether the proxy discloses that the parties were      | 3       | brand.   |
| 4  | working together towards a deal at \$26, including     | 4       | Q. Okay. And we all know that when                     |
| 5  | 10 percent equity, in March of 2016?                   | 5       | Columbia was spun off, you became the CEO and the      |
| 6  | A. I don't know. I'd have to look at the               | 6       | chair of Columbia; right?                              |
| 7  | proxy to make that determination.                      | 7       | A. Of the Columbia Pipeline Group. The                 |
| 8  | Q. Do you know one way or the other                    | 8       | Columbia utilities remained with NiSource.             |
| 9  | whether the proxy discloses that based on              | 9       | Q. Let's talk a minute about what you've               |
| 10 | TransCanada's stock price on March 15, March 16, you   | 10      | done since you left Columbia.                          |
| 11 | could have demanded \$25.75 a share?                   | 11      | A. Okay.   |
| 12 | A. I don't know that.                                  | 12      | Q. Have you continued to work?                         |
| 13 | ATTORNEY van KWAWEGEN: Your Honor                      | 13      | A. I've continued to work.                             |
| 14 | Exhibit X5 is a demonstrative that was a               | 14      | Q. What have you done?                                 |
| 15 | cross-demonstrative. We move it into evidence under    | 15      | A. I've done board work and a limited                  |
| 16 | Delaware Rule 1006 as a compilation or a summary that  | 16      | amount of advisory work. So I've served on several     |
| 17 | is helpful to the Court.                               | 17      | public company New York Stock Exchange company         |
| 18 | ATTORNEY OLSEN: Your Honor, I'd just                   | 18      | boards. And, again, I've done a little bit of          |
| 19 | make the same objection as I did yesterday. I have no  | 19      | advisory work.   |
| 20 | problem with adding them to the record, but I don't    | 20      | Q. Give us just a real quick statement of              |
| 21 | think we should be cribbing exhibits to introduce into | 21      | what boards you've served on.                          |
| 22 | evidence.  | 22      | A. I've served on Cloud Peak Energy.                   |
| 23 | THE COURT: I'm going to accept it on                   | 23      | I've served on Team, Inc. Most recently I've been a    |
| 24 | the same basis.  | 24      | board member with DTE Energy, which is the largest     |
|    | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS                               |         | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS                               |
|    | R. Skaggs - Cross                                      |         | R. Skaggs - Cross                                      |
| 1  | ATTORNEY van KWAWEGEN: Sure. Your                      | 1       | regulated gas and electric utility in Michigan.        |
| 2  | Honor.   | 2       | And while working with DTE Energy,                     |
| 3  | And so that the record is clear, the                   | 3       | they made the decision to spin off their group of      |
| 4  | way we prepared the demonstrative, we had put the      | 4       | pipeline gathering assets, their gas infrastructure.   |
| 5  | excerpt in the front, but then there's a slip sheet    | 5       | And that board asked me to take the lead on that       |
| 6  | and then the full document is behind it.               | 6       | spinoff and ultimately to serve as the executive       |
| 7  | THE COURT: Understood.                                 | 7       | chairman of the new company, DT Midstream.             |
| 8  | ATTORNEY van KWAWEGEN: Thank you ver                   | 8       | So I sit on the DTE board, the DTM                     |
| 9  | much, Your Honor.                                      | 9       | board, and serve as executive chair of that board.     |
| 10 | CROSS-EXAMINATION                                      | 10      | Q. In an average week, how many hours do               |
| 11 | BY ATTORNEY HARRELL:                                   | 11      | you work?  |
| 12 | Q. Mr. Skaggs, good morning.                           | 12      | A. Oh, wow. It fluctuates, as you can                  |
| 13 | A. Good morning.                                       | 13      | appreciate, depending on board meetings, disclosure    |
| 14 | Q. Let's start out by giving a little                  | 14      | points, and activity.                                  |
| 15 | bit, very quickly, some of your background.            | 15      | I'd say today the annual average would                 |
| 16 | You worked at NiSource; right?                         | 16      | be about 30 hours a week. A large portion of that is   |
| 17 | A. Yes, sir.   | 17      | related to DTM because of the executive chairman role. |
| 18 | Q. What was your position at NiSource?                 | 18      | I would also just observe that prior to the spin of    |
| 19 | A. When NiSource purchased Columbia, I                 | 19      | DTM and the first year of this spin, I could have been |
| 20 | was the president of our regulated gas utilities at    | 20      | spending as much as 60 hours a week doing that work.   |
| 21 | Columbia, the date of the purchase by NiSource.        | 21      | Q. Do you consider yourself fully                      |
| 22 | Q. Okay. Did you continue in some                      | 22      | retired?   |
| 23 | capacity with Columbia while it was owned by NiSource? | 23      | A. No, sir.  |
| 24 | A. I did. Initially, that was my role.                 | 24      | Q. I want to talk about what retirement                |

CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS

Page 983

R. Skaggs - Cross

Page 985

| 1  | discussions you had prior to the spin-off. Did you   | 1  | And the reason that was a key to us is   |
|--|--|--|--|
| 2  | have plans to retire prior to the spin?  | 2  | because all of the growth that I mentioned, we were  |
| 3  | A. No plans whatsoever to retire prior to  | 3  | going to have to finance that with equity, either MLP  |
| 4  |  | 4  |  |
|  | the spin.  |  | equity or common equity. And the cost of capital just  |
| 5  | Q. After the spin-off, did you have plans  | 5  | shot out of the roof. And so that was a new, if you  |
| 6  | to retire?   | 6  | will, dynamic or variable that came to the fore.   |
| 7  | A. I had no plans to retire.   | 7  | Q. So just to summarize, you were going  |
| 8  | Q. And tell me what your thinking was at   | 8  | to need to finance with equity expenditures that were  |
| 9  | that time.   | 9  | coming up, and you knew that there were going to be  |
| 10   | A. Well, once I became 60 years old, that  | 10   | inbounds that you had to deal with.  |
| 11   | was the age I was as we were contemplating the spin.   | 11   | A. Simplified, yes. Those were the two   |
| 12   | And as the spin was executed I think I turned 61,  | 12   | key dynamics that we knew were there.  |
| 13   | in fact, when the spin occurred.   | 13   | Q. Let's talk about the document that you  |
| 14   | And my thinking was, I'm all in and  | 14   | talked about earlier, which is the succession planning   |
| 15   | making sure that the spun company was successful, and  | 15   | document. Let's look at Joint Exhibit 571, please.   |
| 16   | I anticipate I was going to work a number of years.  | 16   | And at the top, we see it's an email   |
| 17   | Having said that, I was 60. And I  | 17   | from you to Marty, and then below that there's an  |
| 18   | knew and I think the board knew that my shelf life was   | 18   | email to Marty.  |
| 19   | quickly dwindling, my track was quickly dwindling,   | 19   | And by the way, who was Marty?   |
| 20   | because typically CEOs don't serve deep into their   | 20   | A. Marty Kittrell was one of our board   |
| 21   | 60s.   | 21   | members at Columbia Pipeline Group.  |
| 22   | So at that point, I'm aware of it.   | 22   | Q. And what was his background?  |
| 23   | I'm considering that and understanding that that's   | 23   | A. He was deeply financial transactional   |
| 24   | going to have to be a transition item that I'm going   | 24   | person. I'd tend to say smartest financial person  |
|  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |
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|  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 984   |  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 986   |
| 1  | to have to take up with the board.   | 1  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 986 I've probably met. But he was deeply experienced in   |
| 1 2  | Page 984   | 1 2  | rage 900   |
|  | to have to take up with the board.   | -  | I've probably met. But he was deeply experienced in  |
| 2  | to have to take up with the board.  But that was the extent of my thinking   | 2  | I've probably met. But he was deeply experienced in the finance accounting disclosure world and  |
| 2  | to have to take up with the board.  But that was the extent of my thinking at that point. I'm focused on running the company.  | 2  | I've probably met. But he was deeply experienced in the finance accounting disclosure world and large-scale transactions.  |
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|  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 987   |  | R. Skaggs - Cross   |
|--|--|--|---|
| 1  | professional, so he spent and continues to spend his   | 1  | plan, succession plan.  |
| 2  | career in the energy arena. The bulk of his career   | 2  | ATTORNEY HARRELL: Let's go to the   |
| 3  | was at Conoco Phillips where he had operational roles  | 3  | second page of this exhibit, please. I'm sorry.   |
| 4  | domestically, internationally, finance roles,  | 4  | Let's go to page 2 of this exhibit.   |
| 5  | including being the CFO of the corporation, working on   | 5  | Q. Page 2 has a handwritten chart that  |
| 6  | partnerships that Conoco Phillips operated. And he   | 6  | you prepared. I assume you prepared this. Is this   |
| 7  | also served on other energy infrastructure boards  | 7  | your chart?   |
| 8  | after he left Conoco Phillips.   | 8  | A. That's my writing. I apologize. It   |
| 9  | Now he is the COO of a large LNG   | 9  | is.   |
| 10   | export operation that we have in the U.S not that  | 10   | Q. And just real quickly, why did you   |
|  |  | 11   |   |
| 11<br>12   | we have, but this company has.   | 12   | prepare this  |
|  | Q. Fair to say that, as CEO and chair,   |  | A. Well, this was   |
| 13   | that you relied on him a lot?  | 13   | Q this chart?   |
| 14   | A. Absolutely. We had a partnership, and   | 14   | A really the point of the discussion,   |
| 15   | I certainly deferred to his counsel and advice.  | 15   | that in any sort of transition, be it myself,   |
| 16   | ATTORNEY HARRELL: Let's go to the  | 16   | Mr. Kettering, the senior team, we had to be vigilant,  |
| 17   | next page, please. Okay. And then let's go one more  | 17   | in my view, of maintaining stability, continuity, and   |
| 18   | page. We'll come back to this one.   | 18   | we also had to be keenly, keenly aware of what was  |
| 19   | A. Okay.   | 19   | going on at the business.   |
| 20   | Q. Let's go to plan A and plan B. I  | 20   | And I mentioned we had this historic  |
| 21   | believe you were asked some questions about this   | 21   | growth initiative underway that was going to span four  |
| 22   | earlier today.   | 22   | or five years. And it was a huge, huge undertaking.   |
| 23   | Very quickly, your email included  | 23   | So we needed to make sure that we understood the  |
| 24   | several different approaches to succession; right?   | 24   | timing and the magnitude. Closely, closely tied to  |
|  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |
|  |  |  |   |
|  | R. Skaggs - Cross  |  | R. Skaggs - Cross   |
| 1  | Page 900   | 1  | Page 990  |
| 1 2  | A. That's I wanted to lay out options  | 1 2  | that was the equity raises to support those growth  |
| 2  | A. That's I wanted to lay out options to begin these sorts of discussions and  | 2  | that was the equity raises to support those growth projects.  |
| 2  | A. That's I wanted to lay out options to begin these sorts of discussions and considerations.  | 2  | that was the equity raises to support those growth projects.  And you can see that I indicated  |
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| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22       | A. That's I wanted to lay out options to begin these sorts of discussions and considerations.  Q. And you did this at the request of Mr. Cornelius; right?  A. I did. In fact, I suggested to Mr. Cornelius when he raised the issue that this wasn't ripe, given the volatile circumstances we were dealing with at Columbia Pipeline, and that this should be deferred. But he felt strongly that we needed to begin the process.  Q. Okay. So very quickly, I think you've already testified, Approach A.1, "Glen Kettering to Chairman & CEO Sig remains Lead Director Steve Smith is elected to the [] Board"  Let's go to A.2, which you were not asked about. Is A.2 another approach?  A. This is another approach.  Q. And tell us very briefly, what was the plan for A.2?  A. That at some point Glen could transition Glen Kettering could transition to the   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22       | that was the equity raises to support those growth projects.  And you can see that I indicated Q. Let me just ask you another question, please.  A. Uh-huh. Q. If you look at the bottom part of this, it says, "CEO Sequencing." Then your name handwritten below that, and there is a line to the right of your name.  A. Yeah. Q. Part of it's filled in; part of it's got lines in it. And then at the end of it, there's a question mark.  A. Correct. Q. Could you tell us what that meant? A. Well, again, the point of all of this was there were only certain times of any given year you can begin making a transition because of the projects and when you might sell equity. And that's what I was indicating here.  And I was also indicating that my  |

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|----|-----------------------|--------------------------------------|----|--------------------|---|
|    |                       | Fage 991                             |    |                    | rage 993  |
| 1  |                       | of this time frame, first quarter    | 1  | Q.                 | So you did meet with him from time to                         |
| 2  | · ·                   | sense of how long you intended to    | 2  | time; right?       |   |
| 3  | remain as CEO?        |                                      | 3  | Α.                 | Correct.  |
| 4  |                       | that point, my belief was that I     | 4  | Q.                 | How often?  |
| 5  |                       | e CEO for the next two to three      | 5  | Α.                 | Three to four times a year.                                   |
| 6  | -                     | allenges that we were facing. That   | 6  | Q.                 | Did you discuss specific retirement                           |
| 7  |                       | d not have a sense of where the      | 7  | dates with him?    |   |
| 8  | board was.            |                                      | 8  | A.                 | I don't recall discussing the specific                        |
| 9  |                       | as the succession plan shared with   | 9  | retirement date    |   |
| 10 | the board?            |                                      | 10 | Q.                 | Did you discuss, in general,                                  |
| 11 | A. It v               | was shared during the one-on-one     | 11 | retirement?        |   |
| 12 | meetings, but there   | e was not any collective board       | 12 | A.                 | Our discussions centered on the                               |
| 13 | _                     | this. It was tabled because of the   | 13 | portfolio tax pla  | anning and estate planning. So in                             |
| 14 | intervening events.   |                                      | 14 | that broad sens    | se, I guess the answer would be yes, but                      |
| 15 | Q. Ok                 | ay. So did the board ever formally   | 15 | not specifically   | about retirement.   |
| 16 | adopt any of these C  | EO succession plans?                 | 16 | Q.                 | Okay. So I want to refer you to a                             |
| 17 | A. Lit                | erally, the one-on-one meetings, 15  | 17 | line that counsel  | brought up in your direct a few                               |
| 18 | or 20 minutes was     | the discussion we had about this     | 18 | minutes ago, wh    | ere Rivera notes, "He sees himself only                       |
| 19 | individually. This v  | vas just a pure introduction of      | 19 | staying on throug  | gh July of 2016."   |
| 20 | the notion. And we    | e never had a collective discussion  | 20 |                    | You've seen this memo before in                               |
| 21 | about it.             |                                      | 21 | litigation; right? |   |
| 22 | Q. Dio                | d you tell anyone at TransCanada     | 22 | A.                 | I have, yes, sir.   |
| 23 | about any plans to re | etire?                               | 23 | Q.                 | And you've seen this line; right?                             |
| 24 | A. Ab                 | solutely not.                        | 24 | A.                 | I have.   |
|    | CHAN                  | NCERY COURT REPORTERS                |    |                    | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS                                      |
|    |                       |                                      |    |                    |   |
|    |                       | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 992           |    |                    | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 994                                    |
| 1  | Q. Dio                | d you tell that to any of Columbia's | 1  | Q.                 | Did you tell him that?  |
| 2  | advisors?             |                                      | 2  | A.                 | I have no recollection of ever telling                        |
| 3  | A. Ab                 | solutely not.                        | 3  | him that, partic   | ularly the matter of a month before                           |
| 4  | Q. Dio                | d you tell that to TransCanada's     | 4  | spinning off the   | e company, it would be hard to see                            |
| 5  | advisors?             |                                      | 5  | where I would h    | nave that view. Just doesn't make                             |
| 6  | A. Ab                 | solutely not. Again, I had not had   | 6  | sense.             |   |
| 7  | a discussion with r   | ny board.                            | 7  | Q.                 | Why would he say something like that?                         |
| 8  | Q. Le                 | t's go to Exhibit 114, please. You   | 8  | A.                 | He might say that because he was                              |
| 9  | were asked question   | is about this exhibit by counsel.    | 9  | running scenar     | ios on my financial situation. And at                         |
| 10 | Th                    | is is a memorandum to the file dated | 10 | this point, June   | e, we were quickly approaching the                            |
| 11 | June 4, 2015.         |                                      | 11 | first time that w  | ve would have an opportunity to                               |
| 12 | A. Th                 | at's correct.                        | 12 | potentially dive   | rsify my portfolio. So that's one                             |
| 13 | Q. Fro                | om Rick Rivera to you; right?        | 13 | thing that he m    | ay have been considering.                                     |
| 14 |                       | ell, I never received this document. | 14 |                    | The second thing was that he was well                         |
| 15 | I think this I have   | no recollection of ever seeing       | 15 | aware that we v    | vere spinning off a company, and this                         |
| 16 | this document. I be   | elieve this was, from what it says,  | 16 |                    | t be an acquisition target post-spin.                         |
| 17 | a memorandum to       |                                      | 17 | Q.                 | Did any retirement discussions or                             |
| 18 | Q. Ok                 | ay. We see that it's from Rick       | 18 | considerations o   | r thoughts have any impact on your                            |
| 19 | Rivera?               |                                      | 19 |                    | ne subsequent merger proposals that                           |
| 20 |                       | at's correct.                        | 20 | Columbia receiv    |   |
| 21 | Q. An                 | d who was he?                        | 21 | Α.                 | Absolutely, positively no.                                    |
| 22 |                       | was an AYCO financial planner that   | 22 | Q.                 | Let's talk a little bit now about just                        |
| 23 |                       | ner members of the executive team at | 23 | the company and    | -   |
|    |                       |                                      | 24 |                    |   |
| 24 | both NiSource and     | Columbia.                            | 24 |                    | ATTORNET HARRELL. Let's go to Joint                           |
| 24 |                       | ICERY COURT REPORTERS                | 24 |                    | ATTORNEY HARRELL: Let's go to Joint  CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS |

|  | R. Skaggs - Cross  |  | R. Skaggs - Cross   |
|--|--|--|---|
| 1  | Exhibit 183, please.   | 1  | please. It is entitled "Key Path Forward Milestones."   |
| 2  | Q. This is a document entitled "Corporate  | 2  | And we see here in the first column, "Board Meetings,"  |
| 3  | Preparedness Update," and it's got your name and Steve   | 3  | and does that just indicate when board meetings would   |
| 4  | Smith's on it, dated August 4, 2015; right?  | 4  | be scheduled?   |
| 5  | A. That's correct.   | 5  | A. That was the official board calendar   |
| 6  | ATTORNEY HARRELL: Let's go to page 5,  | 6  | of formal meetings. Again, all things being equal.  |
| 7  | please.  | 7  | But those are on the calendar.  |
| 8  | Q. And this is entitled at the top   | 8  | Q. And then below it, "Intrinsic Value  |
| 9  | "Intrinsic Value Plan, Key Work Streams." And then   | 9  | Updates." Now, we just saw that this August memo had  |
| 10   | there's four bullet points. Tell us, first, just   | 10   | such an update; right?  |
| 11   | generally, what's going on here in August at the time  | 11   | A. Correct.   |
| 12   | that this was prepared?  | 12   | Q. And did you have other updates   |
| 13   | A. Well, as I mentioned, we were   | 13   | scheduled for the future?   |
| 14   | preparing the board that we could receive indications  | 14   | A. That's correct. The bottom line  |
| 15   | of interest in the company from outside parties. And,  | 15   | refers to our internal financial planning efforts. So   |
| 16   | in fact, in July, we had received an indication of   | 16   | we update that, not quarterly, but three times a year.  |
| 17   | interest.  | 17   | So the "7&5" is just simply referring to a financial  |
| 18   | And so with that in mind, and, again,  | 18   | plan update. We would do that, prepare it. We then  |
| 19   | the macro view that we were going to have to deal  | 19   | give it to the financial advisors and they would  |
| 20   | potentially with inbounds, we had charged two banks,   | 20   | update their intrinsic plan or intrinsic value  |
| 21   | Lazard and Goldman, to conduct an intrinsic value  | 21   | analysis. So 7&5, and then you'll see the star and so   |
| 22   | study, a study looking at the fundamental values of  | 22   | on and so on.   |
| 23   | the company based on our financial plans, based on a   | 23   | Q. And the stars show that there was  |
| 24   | grounds-up look at opportunities, risks, and the like,   | 24   | going to be an update in October and then another one   |
|  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |
|  |  |  |   |
|  | D Champa Cross   |  |   |
|  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 996   |  | R. Skaggs - Cross   |
| 1  | Page 996 and develop points of view on what the true value   | 1  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 998 in March?  |
| 1 2  | Page 996   | 1 2  | Page 998  |
|  | and develop points of view on what the true value  |  | in March?   |
| 2  | and develop points of view on what the true value not what the stock price is saying, but what the true  | 2  | in March?  A. That's correct. Again, following our  |
| 2  | and develop points of view on what the true value not what the stock price is saying, but what the true value of the company would be.   | 2  | in March?  A. That's correct. Again, following our budget process and also anticipating when we might be  |
| 2<br>3<br>4  | and develop points of view on what the true value not what the stock price is saying, but what the true value of the company would be.  Because, we wanted the board to thoroughly understand what the value was in comparison to alternatives, be it strategic alternatives,  | 2<br>3<br>4  | in March?  A. That's correct. Again, following our budget process and also anticipating when we might be in the market to issue equity. That's the reference  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5   | and develop points of view on what the true value not what the stock price is saying, but what the true value of the company would be.  Because, we wanted the board to thoroughly understand what the value was in comparison   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5   | in March?  A. That's correct. Again, following our budget process and also anticipating when we might be in the market to issue equity. That's the reference to "MLP Equity Raises."  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6  | and develop points of view on what the true value not what the stock price is saying, but what the true value of the company would be.  Because, we wanted the board to thoroughly understand what the value was in comparison to alternatives, be it strategic alternatives,  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6  | in March?  A. That's correct. Again, following our budget process and also anticipating when we might be in the market to issue equity. That's the reference to "MLP Equity Raises."  Q. Okay. I'd like to talk about the   |
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| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22       | and develop points of view on what the true value not what the stock price is saying, but what the true value of the company would be.  Because, we wanted the board to thoroughly understand what the value was in comparison to alternatives, be it strategic alternatives, financing alternatives, including the issuance of equity.  So it was the touchstone, if you will, keystone for all of our considerations. And that's what this work streams is intended to address and provide the board.  Q. If we look at this page, it's entitled under "Intrinsic Value Plan, Key Work Streams," first two bullet points are "Lazard Assessment" and "Goldman Sachs Assessment."  Are those the two assessments that you just mentioned that you had asked to be prepared at this time?  A. That's correct. We wanted the board to have the benefit of different points of view so that they could reach an understanding that they felt                   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22       | in March?  A. That's correct. Again, following our budget process and also anticipating when we might be in the market to issue equity. That's the reference to "MLP Equity Raises."  Q. Okay. I'd like to talk about the inbound overtures that you got starting in July.  And so when was the spin finished?  A. We, when effective, became a public company on July 1st of 2015.  Q. And did you receive an actual reach-out in July?  A. I did.  Q. Who was it from?  A. The CEO of Dominion Energy reached out to me by phone and indicated that his company had an interest in discussing with us the potential for an acquisition.  Q. Okay. So did you also receive a reach-out from Spectra?  A. I received a call from their CEO in a very brief and I referred to it, I believe it's in                              |

|  |   | R. Skaggs - Cross   |  |   | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1001   |
|--|---|---|--|---|---|
| 1  | and then we'll  | get into Dominion. And why do you call  | 1  | inbound calls?  | and a second  |
| 2  |   | m Spectra a casual pass?  | 2  | A.  | It was.   |
| 3  | A.  | It was a strange call. He calls me,   | 3  | Q.  | And was this the type of communication  |
| 4  | congratulates   | me on the spin, talk about industry   | 4  | that you would  | have fairly often with Sig Cornelius?   |
| 5  | _   | s and activities and that sort of thing.  | 5  | Α.  | Quite often. I would reach out to Sig   |
| 6  | =   | eays, "At some point we should probably   | 6  | on any develo   | pments and either by this or by phone.  |
| 7  | sit down and  | talk about whether there aren't any   | 7  | And, typically,   | , I would send a note before I called,  |
| 8  | mutual oppor  | tunities."  | 8  | so I wouldn't I   | be blindsiding him.   |
| 9  |   | It was literally a two-minute call.   | 9  | Q.  | Did you meet later in July of 2015  |
| 10   | And it just did   | In't have any substance. It was just  | 10   | with Mr. Farrell  | of Dominion?  |
| 11   | literally what  | l've said.  | 11   | A.  | l did.  |
| 12   | Q.  | Okay. And then you mentioned  | 12   | Q.  | And was that a call or  |
| 13   | Dominion. We  | ere you contacted by Dominion?  | 13   | A.  | No, it was  |
| 14   | A.  | Yes.  | 14   | Q.  | over the phone or an actual   |
| 15   | Q.  | Before you've answered my question.   | 15   | meeting?  |   |
| 16   |   | But before we get into Dominion, at   | 16   | A.  | It was a sitdown meeting. In fact, he   |
| 17   | this point had  | you actually shopped the company and  | 17   | flew to Chicag  | go to sit down with me.   |
| 18   | let the market  | know that you were on sale?   | 18   | Q.  | And at that time, did he give you a   |
| 19   | A.  | Absolutely, no, no form or fashion.   | 19   | pretty detailed   | presentation?   |
| 20   | Q.  | And did you ever do that?   | 20   | A.  | A very detailed presentation on I   |
| 21   | A.  | We never shopped the company, as one  | 21   | call it a pitch l   | book, a detailed presentation on his  |
| 22   | might say.  |   | 22   | company. An   | d with that, he provided commentary on how  |
| 23   | Q.  | Okay. Let's talk about Dominion.  | 23   | Columbia Pipe   | eline might fit in with that portfolio of   |
| 24   |   | You said that you got an early  | 24   | his.  |   |
|  |   | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |  |   | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |
|  |   |   |  |   |   |
|  |   | R. Skaggs - Cross   |  |   | R. Skaggs - Cross   |
| 1  | reach-out from  | Page 1000   | 1  | 0   | Page 1002   |
| 1 2  |   | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1000  Dominion. Was that with Tom Farrell,   | 1 2  | Q.  | And did that presentation exist in the  |
| 2  | the CEO?  | Dominion. Was that with Tom Farrell,  | 2  | form of a hand  | And did that presentation exist in the out?   |
| 2  | the CEO?  | Dominion. Was that with Tom Farrell,  He was the CEO, yes.  | 2  | form of a hando   | And did that presentation exist in the out?  It did. It was what I would call a   |
| 2<br>3<br>4  | the CEO? A. Q.  | Dominion. Was that with Tom Farrell,  | 2<br>3<br>4  | form of a hand  | And did that presentation exist in the out?  It did. It was what I would call a eck.  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5   | the CEO?  A. Q. entailed.   | Dominion. Was that with Tom Farrell,  He was the CEO, yes.  And tell us what that discussion  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5   | form of a hande A. PowerPoint de  | And did that presentation exist in the out?  It did. It was what I would call a eck.  ATTORNEY HARRELL: Let's look at Joint   |
| 2<br>3<br>4  | the CEO? A. Q. entailed. A.   | Dominion. Was that with Tom Farrell,  He was the CEO, yes. And tell us what that discussion  Well, the initial contact, I think it  | 2<br>3<br>4  | form of a hando   | And did that presentation exist in the out?  It did. It was what I would call a eck.  ATTORNEY HARRELL: Let's look at Joint   |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6  | the CEO?  A. Q. entailed. A. occurred mid   | He was the CEO, yes. And tell us what that discussion  Well, the initial contact, I think it -month. He calls me up which is  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6  | form of a hande A.  PowerPoint de  Exhibit 154, ple Q.  | And did that presentation exist in the out?  It did. It was what I would call a eck.  ATTORNEY HARRELL: Let's look at Joint ease.  And this is an email from Bob Smith to   |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7   | the CEO?  A. Q. entailed. A. occurred mid unusual and   | Dominion. Was that with Tom Farrell,  He was the CEO, yes. And tell us what that discussion  Well, the initial contact, I think it  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7   | form of a hande A.  PowerPoint de  Exhibit 154, ple Q.  | And did that presentation exist in the out?  It did. It was what I would call a eck.  ATTORNEY HARRELL: Let's look at Joint ease.   |
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|  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1003   |  | R. Skaggs - Cross  |
|--|---|--|--|
| 1  | A. Well, during this meeting, I was in  | 1  | Is that what we talked about earlier?  |
| 2  | listen mode. My as I was digesting this, I thought  | 2  | A. That's a reference to the document,   |
| 3  | this was a serious legitimate indication. I had not   | 3  | yes.   |
| 4  | yet concluded whether it was a basis to engage, but it  | 4  | Q. And then you see three bullets at the   |
| 5  | certainly was a significant overture.   | 5  | bottom. Were these enclosures that you sent to the   |
| 6  | Q. Let's look at Exhibit 182, please.   | 6  | board at the same time?  |
| 7  | THE COURT: Before we do that, we've   | 7  | A. Yes. Yes.   |
| 8  | reached the time for our morning break, so we'll  | 8  | Q. And just very quickly, please, tell us  |
| 9  | recess until 11:00. We'll return then.  | 9  | what those three bullets were.   |
| 10   | (Recess taken at 10:45 a.m.)  | 10   | A. How we're performing again, one   |
| 11   | ( ,   | 11   | month removed from the spin, how we're performing in   |
| 12   |   | 12   | the market, our work to develop the fundamental  |
| 13   |   | 13   | analysis, and how we would respond to inbounds and our   |
| 14   |   | 14   | path forward.  |
| 15   |   | 15   | Q. Let's look at the minutes of that   |
| 16   |   | 16   | August 7th meeting, please, which is Joint Exhibit   |
| 17   |   | 17   | 191, page 1.   |
| 18   |   | 18   | And at the top, you see the minutes of   |
| 19   |   | 19   | August 7 meeting?  |
| 20   |   | 20   | A. Yes, sir.   |
| 21   |   | 21   | Q. And at that meeting, did you talk   |
| 22   |   | 22   | about the discussions that you had had with Spectra  |
| 23   |   | 23   | and Dominion?  |
| 24   |   | 24   | A. Full discussion of those topics, those  |
|  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |
|  | 002.1.2.00.12.00  |  | 0.00.02.00.02.00.02.00.00.00.00.00.00.00   |
|  | R. Skaggs - Cross   |  | R. Skaggs - Cross  |
|  | Fage 1004   |  | Page 1006  |
| 1  | (Resumed at 11:00 a.m.)   | 1  | proposals.   |
| 1 2  | Fage 1004   | 1 2  | proposals.  Q. Did you execute an NDA with Dominion  |
|  | (Resumed at 11:00 a.m.)   |  | proposals.  Q. Did you execute an NDA with Dominion after that meeting?  |
| 2  | (Resumed at 11:00 a.m.) THE COURT: Thank you, everyone.   | 2  | proposals.  Q. Did you execute an NDA with Dominion  |
| 2  | (Resumed at 11:00 a.m.)  THE COURT: Thank you, everyone.  Please be seated.  Let's resume.  BY ATTORNEY HARRELL:  | 2  | proposals.  Q. Did you execute an NDA with Dominion after that meeting?  A. The board authorized us to go forward with Dominion and to execute an NDA and to begin   |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6  | (Resumed at 11:00 a.m.)  THE COURT: Thank you, everyone.  Please be seated.  Let's resume.  BY ATTORNEY HARRELL:  Q. Mr. Skaggs, let's look at Joint  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6  | proposals.  Q. Did you execute an NDA with Dominion after that meeting?  A. The board authorized us to go forward with Dominion and to execute an NDA and to begin sharing confidential info.  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5   | (Resumed at 11:00 a.m.)  THE COURT: Thank you, everyone.  Please be seated.  Let's resume.  BY ATTORNEY HARRELL:  Q. Mr. Skaggs, let's look at Joint  Exhibit 0182, please.   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5   | proposals.  Q. Did you execute an NDA with Dominion after that meeting?  A. The board authorized us to go forward with Dominion and to execute an NDA and to begin sharing confidential info.  Q. After that, Columbia ultimately  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6  | (Resumed at 11:00 a.m.)  THE COURT: Thank you, everyone.  Please be seated.  Let's resume.  BY ATTORNEY HARRELL:  Q. Mr. Skaggs, let's look at Joint  Exhibit 0182, please.  What is this?  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6  | proposals.  Q. Did you execute an NDA with Dominion after that meeting?  A. The board authorized us to go forward with Dominion and to execute an NDA and to begin sharing confidential info.  Q. After that, Columbia ultimately entered into NDAs with several potential   |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8  | (Resumed at 11:00 a.m.)  THE COURT: Thank you, everyone.  Please be seated.  Let's resume.  BY ATTORNEY HARRELL:  Q. Mr. Skaggs, let's look at Joint  Exhibit 0182, please.  What is this?  A. This is a board communiqué. It's a   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9   | proposals.  Q. Did you execute an NDA with Dominion after that meeting?  A. The board authorized us to go forward with Dominion and to execute an NDA and to begin sharing confidential info.  Q. After that, Columbia ultimately entered into NDAs with several potential counterparties, including TransCanada. Right?   |
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|--|--|---|--|--|--|
|  |  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1007   |  |  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1009  |
| 1  | Q.   | Soon after entering into the NDA, did   | 1  | Columbia at th   | at time send what we know now to be a  |
| 2  | Dominion begin   | due diligence?  | 2  | return and des   | troy letter to Dominion?   |
| 3  | A.   | They did. Yes.  | 3  | A.   | Yes, sir.  |
| 4  | Q.   | How did the discussions with Dominion   | 4  | Q.   | So at that point, discussions with   |
| 5  | evolve from the  | re?   | 5  | Dominion were  | e closed?  |
| 6  | A.   | Again, we began exchange of   | 6  | A.   | Completely terminated. That's  |
| 7  | information in   | early to mid-August. They met with  | 7  | correct.   |  |
| 8  | selected memb  | ers of our management team. So the  | 8  | Q.   | All right. So let's jump ahead from  |
| 9  | information flo  | ws were straightforward.  | 9  | September to I   | ate October. Looking at Exhibit 253,   |
| 10   | Q.   | So let's look at another exhibit,   | 10   | please. Is this  | a note that you sent to the board  |
| 11   | Joint Exhibit 219  | 9, please. Is this another email  | 11   | dated October  | 16, 2015? You see the date at the  |
| 12   | exchange between   | en you and Mr. Cornelius?   | 12   | bottom.  |  |
| 13   |  | Do you see at the top?  | 13   | A.   | Correct.   |
| 14   | A.   | Yes.  | 14   | Q.   | Let's turn to page 6 of this exhibit,  |
| 15   | Q.   | And it's dated August 31. Right?  | 15   | please. And a  | t the bottom of the page, we see, "We  |
| 16   | A.   | End of the month.   | 16   | have delineate   | ed two near-term, parallel tracks of work  |
| 17   | Q.   | And I want to refer you to an email at  | 17   | to 'bracket' our   | equity challenge"  |
| 18   | the very bottom.   | And what were you informing   | 18   |  | Tell us what those two tracks were,  |
| 19   | Mr. Cornelius at   | pout with respect to your discussions   | 19   | please.  |  |
| 20   | with Dominion?   |   | 20   | A.   | Track one was that we would be a   |
| 21   | A.   | Although I hadn't yet spoken with   | 21   | full-blown sta   | nd-alone company, but we would issue   |
| 22   | Dominion's CE  | O, I fully anticipated that we were going   | 22   | Q.   | I'm sorry. Can you speak up just a   |
| 23   | to end our disc  | ussions with them because this was in   | 23   | little bit or mov  | e the mic a little closer.   |
| 24   | the midst of thi   | s market meltdown that I've referred  | 24   | A.   | Sorry about that.  |
|  |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |  |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |
|  |  | R. Skaggs - Cross   |  |  | R. Skaggs - Cross  |
| 1  | to several time  | s. And given the market was in  | 1  | Q.   | That's better. Thank you.  |
| 2  |  | ption, dislocation, my anticipation was   | 2  | A.   | So given that the market disruption, I   |
| _  |  | priority arrivolation in ac   |  |  |  |
| 3  | =  | o sav: We just can't go forward. There  | 3  |  |  |
| 3<br>4   | he was going to  | o say: We just can't go forward. There  | 3  | had develope   | d a recommendation to go down two tracks.  |
| 4  | he was going to  | can do anything in this environment.  | 4  | had develope<br>The first track  | d a recommendation to go down two tracks.  |
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|  | H. Skagg   | J3 - OI  |  |
|--|--|--|--|
|  | R. Skaggs - Cross  |  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1013  |
| 1  | weeks ago, you had cut off, basically, your  | 1  | recommence discussions about potential acquisition?  |
| 2  | discussions with Dominion. What's going on now that  | 2  | A. No. There was no advice or suggestion   |
| 3  | we see "Consider how to include Dominion in this   | 3  | whatsoever that we needed to take that step. And if  |
| 4  | process"?  | 4  | we had been advised, we certainly would have done  |
| 5  | A. The market dislocation had gotten even  | 5  | that.  |
| 6  | worse. And the equity markets in particular had  | 6  | Q. Let's go to Joint Exhibit 272, please.  |
| 7  | gotten even worse. The MLP market had seized up. Our   | 7  | And this, at the top, is an email from Mr. Cornelius   |
| 8  | stock had dropped 30 percent.  | 8  | to you dated October 26. Right?  |
| 9  | So at this point, looking at track   | 9  | A. That's correct.   |
| 10   | two, thinking about who we might engage, Dominion was  | 10   | Q. And then below that, if you look if   |
| 11   | still at the top of our list because they had an   | 11   | you look at the first item, in your update, which is   |
| 12   | A-rated balance sheet. They had besides Berkshire  | 12   | right below that, what were you telling Mr. Cornelius?   |
| 13   | Hathaway, they had the strongest balance sheet in the  | 13   | A. I was recounting a conversation I just  |
| 14   | industry. And because of our equity needs, we needed   | 14   | mentioned, that I reached out to the Dominion CEO. He  |
| 15   | someone with a balance sheet if we're going to look at   | 15   | heard my messages. He needed to confer with his  |
| 16   | that sort of alternative.  | 16   | board, and he would come back to me.   |
| 17   | Q. So did you reach out to Dominion  | 17   | And then I go on and, again, provide   |
| 18   | again?   | 18   | Mr. Cornelius my point of view on what a response from   |
| 19   | A. We did reach out to Dominion.   | 19   | Dominion might look like.  |
| 20   | Q. And tell us how that happened.  | 20   | Q. Okay. And it says here, "I'm  |
| 21   | A. I believe I initiated with a phone  | 21   | expecting a response that would be in the 20-25%   |
| 22   | call to Mr. Farrell.   | 22   | premium zip code (\$24-\$25)." Right?  |
| 23   | Q. Okay. And what did you tell him this  | 23   | A. That's correct. And I said that   |
| 24   | time?  | 24   | because of where our price was. It had dropped   |
|  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |
|  |  |  |  |
|  | R. Skaggs - Cross  |  | R. Skaggs - Cross  |
| 1  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1012  A. Told him Mr. Farrell and I talked  | 1  | Page 1014  |
| 1 2  | A. Told him Mr. Farrell and I talked   | 1 2  | precipitously.   |
|  | Page 1012  |  | precipitously.  Q. All right. Now, at this time, had   |
| 2  | A. Told him Mr. Farrell and I talked about the historically bad conditions in the  | 2  | precipitously.   |
| 2  | A. Told him Mr. Farrell and I talked about the historically bad conditions in the marketplace.  And I was candid with him. I said,   | 2  | precipitously.  Q. All right. Now, at this time, had  Columbia heard from other potential acquirers out in   |
| 2<br>3<br>4  | A. Told him Mr. Farrell and I talked about the historically bad conditions in the marketplace.   | 2<br>3<br>4  | precipitously.  Q. All right. Now, at this time, had Columbia heard from other potential acquirers out in the market?  |
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CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS

Page 1015

R. Skaggs - Cross

Page 1017

|  | Page 1015   |  | Page 1017  |
|--|---|--|--|
| 1  | slow play or put TransCanada on hold in order to find   | 1  | Q. Did he did you want to say  |
| 2  | out where Dominion would be.  | 2  | something else?  |
| 3  | Q. So the board decided let's push on   | 3  | A. Well, he went on.   |
| 4  | Dominion first?   | 4  | Q. Okay. And what else did he say?   |
| 5  | A. Let's they were the, from our  | 5  | A. He said, well, I knew you would be  |
| 6  | analysis, the best prepared potential acquirer next to  | 6  | disappointed with that. I knew that wouldn't provide   |
| 7  | Berkshire Hathaway, and we just needed to find out  | 7  | any traction. I've been noodling two different ideas.  |
| 8  | where they were.  | 8  | One was we might be able to invest in projects; so, in   |
| 9  | Q. And what was the board consensus that  | 9  | other words, give cash or equity or whatever in  |
| 10   | a counterparty proposal would need to be?   | 10   | discrete projects. That was one notion.  |
| 11   | A. Again, we were looking at two tracks.  | 11   | And then he said, I've got another   |
| 12   | And we knew that equity was a likely track.   | 12   | notion that I've been noodling around, and that is   |
| 13   | The bar was at about \$28 per share   | 13   | somehow partnering up with NextEra another big,  |
| 14   | from a credible counterparty. That was the bar that   | 14   | big, big electric utility that we could cobble   |
| 15   | the board had decided on.   | 15   | together some sort of three-way merger of equals, no   |
| 16   | Q. Did you have a view of whether cash  | 16   | cash.  |
| 17   | consideration was preferable to stock consideration?  | 17   | And that's the proposition he laid out   |
| 18   | A. I did have a view. And I say that,   | 18   | to me propositions he laid out to me when he   |
| 19   | all things being considered, because you have to look   | 19   | couldn't come up with a stock price number.  |
| 20   | at every transaction and every currency and every   | 20   | Q. Okay. So this email with Mr. Hort is  |
| 21   | proposition, so case by case.   | 21   | November the 2nd. It says "your meeting with   |
| 22   | But at this point, given that these   | 22   | [Dominion]'s CEO tomorrow," which would be November  |
| 23   | markets were so dislocated and stressed, and I thought  | 23   | the 3rd.   |
| 24   | they would continue to be stressed because all these  | 24   | ATTORNEY HARRELL: Let's go to the  |
|  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |
|  |   |  |  |
|  | R. Skaggs - Cross   |  | R. Skaggs - Cross  |
| 1  | rage 1016   | 1  | Page 1016  |
| 1 2  | companies needed enormous amounts of equity, my   | 1 2  | next exhibit, which is JTX 327, please.  |
| 2  | companies needed enormous amounts of equity, my feeling was cash again, all things being considered   | 1 2 3  | Page 1016  |
|  | companies needed enormous amounts of equity, my feeling was cash again, all things being considered and not knowing whose currency we might be dealing  | 2  | next exhibit, which is JTX 327, please.  Q. And this is an email on the first page from Mr. Steve Smith to the investment advisors dated   |
| 2<br>3   | companies needed enormous amounts of equity, my feeling was cash again, all things being considered and not knowing whose currency we might be dealing with was preferable. Because so much risk was  | 2  | next exhibit, which is JTX 327, please.  Q. And this is an email on the first page from Mr. Steve Smith to the investment advisors dated November 13, which is about ten days later. Right?  |
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| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5   | companies needed enormous amounts of equity, my feeling was cash again, all things being considered and not knowing whose currency we might be dealing with was preferable. Because so much risk was circling around these entities.  Q. Let's look at Joint Exhibit 283,   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5   | next exhibit, which is JTX 327, please.  Q. And this is an email on the first page from Mr. Steve Smith to the investment advisors dated November 13, which is about ten days later. Right?  A. That's right. That's correct.  Q. And then underneath it, you see an   |
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### R. Skaggs - Cross

|  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1019   |  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1021  |
|--|---|--|--|
| 1  | Q. Okay. Could you tell us what you   | 1  | reach out and congratulating us on a good strong   |
| 2  | learned from this regarding what they wanted to do?   | 2  | financial quarter, talking a little bit about industry   |
| 3  | A. Well, when Mr. Farrell initially   | 3  | conditions, expressing interest in having discussions  |
| 4  | outlined this, I was highly, highly skeptical. And I  | 4  | at some point about general industry conditions. And   |
| 5  | had this sense, just based on my experience, that his   | 5  | I did telephone him back, call him back.   |
| 6  | thoughts had not been fleshed out and fully thought   | 6  | Q. And did that discussion net any fruit?  |
| 7  | out.  | 7  | A. It did not. But I communicated with   |
| 8  | And when I saw this document,   | 8  | him in just a very similar vein that I did with  |
| 9  | potential illustrative, and the complexity that was   | 9  | Mr. Farrell. That conditions were rocky. No secret   |
| 10   | inherent in this, my impression was that this just was  | 10   | that all of us needed equity. And said if you had  |
| 11   | not feasible or reasonable and certainly could not be   | 11   | anything to say, you needed to say it with definition,   |
| 12   | acted upon any time soon. It just wasn't fully baked.   | 12   | and you needed to say it with dispatch.  |
| 13   | Q. And at that point, did Columbia then   | 13   | Q. Did you make it clear that the door   |
| 14   | turn to discussions with others?  | 14   | was open for further discussions if he wanted to have  |
| 15   | A. We did.  | 15   | them?  |
| 16   | Q. So I already mentioned the inquiry you   | 16   | A. I was explicit. Again, it was if you  |
| 17   | received from TransCanada. Right?   | 17   | have something explicitly to say, please say it,   |
| 18   | A. Yes, sir.  | 18   | because we're on the verge of potentially doing  |
| 19   | Q. Did you have discussions with  | 19   | something in the equity markets. And so I said, give   |
| 20   | Berkshire also?   | 20   | us something specific, give us something timely.   |
| 21   | A. Yes. We made a soft outreach to  | 21   | Q. Fair to say the ball was in his court   |
| 22   | Berkshire; again, balance sheet, financial strength,  | 22   | at that point?   |
| 23   | something that could be feasible. So we reached out   | 23   | A. Absolutely in his court.  |
| 24   | to them.  | 24   | Q. And during this period in November,   |
|  |   |  |  |
|  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |
|  |   |  |  |
|  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1020   |  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1022  |
| 1  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1020 Q. Did Columbia enter into NDAs with  | 1  | did you keep the board informed of these discussions   |
| 1 2  | Fage 1020   | 1 2  | Page 1022  |
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|  | D. Cleanna Crass   |   | D Charma Crass   |
|--|--|---|--|
|  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 102   | 3   | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1025  |
| 1  | A. Yes. This is consistent with the  | 1   | the board at that time?  |
| 2  | discussion we had about my conversation and what I   | 2   | •  |
| 3  | urged their CEO to consider.   | 3   | doing what we needed to do to issue equity over the  |
| 4  | Q. Let's go to Joint Exhibit 363, please.  | 4   |  |
| 5  | Now, this is an email from you to Mr. Cornelius dated  | 5   | •  |
| 6  | November 20. Right?  | 6   | ,  |
| 7  | A. Correct.  | 7   | recommendation and authorized management to terminate  |
| 8  | Q. And is this an example of another   | 8   | discussions regarding a potential purchase   |
| 9  | status update that you had to Mr. Cornelius about  | 9   | transaction."  |
| 10   | indicative offers from TransCanada and Berkshire   | 10  | Is that what happened at that time?  |
| 11   | Hathaway?  | 11  | A. That's exactly what happened.   |
| 12   | A. This was a typical update that I was  | 12  |  |
| 13   | providing him on the process and the like.   | 13  | 3 tipped the scale for you and for the board that you  |
| 14   | Q. Okay. We see Berkshire Hathaway is  | 14  | needed to start focusing on the equity raise?  |
| 15   | BH. Right?   | 15  | A. That we just didn't have a basis to   |
| 16   | A. Yes. That was just my shorthand.  | 16  | defer the equity. These proposals were well below the  |
| 17   | Q. And did Columbia receive indicative   | 17  | bar of \$28. They all would require an enormous amount   |
| 18   | offers from TransCanada and Berkshire?   | 18  | •  |
| 19   | A. We did.   | 19  | finish line. And we just couldn't take that risk,  |
| 20   | Q. Let's look at Joint Exhibit 191,  | 20  | given the pressure on our stock price on the market.   |
| 21   | please, and go to page 3. And I refer you to the   | 21  | So to me it was a clear-cut decision.  |
| 22   | board meeting of November 25, 2015.  | 22  | We needed to move equity to try to stabilize the price   |
| 23   | At that board meeting, did you bring   | 23  | of the company and take some pressure off of us. And   |
| 24   | the board up to date with the indicative offers from   | 24  | all other courses of action just seemed too risky.   |
|  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |   | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |
|  |  |   |  |
|  | R. Skaggs - Cross  |   | R. Skaggs - Cross  |
| 1  | rage 102   |   | Page 1026  |
| 1 2  | Berkshire and TransCanada?   | 1   | Q. And   |
| 2  | Berkshire and TransCanada?  A. Yes, sir, I certainly did.  | 1 2   | Q. And A. And the other thing I would say  |
| 2  | Berkshire and TransCanada?  A. Yes, sir, I certainly did.  Q. And if we could just look at the   | 1 2 3   | Q. And  A. And the other thing I would say Q. Go ahead.  |
| 2<br>3<br>4  | Berkshire and TransCanada?  A. Yes, sir, I certainly did.  Q. And if we could just look at the second sentence there, what was that discussion about?  | 1<br>2<br>3<br>4  | Q. And  A. And the other thing I would say Q. Go ahead.  A the reason there was some urgency   |
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|    | R. Skagg   | 15 - C | 1055   |
|----|--|--------|--|
|    | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1027                            |        | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1029                            |
| 1  | transact with you because of the dilution and the      | 1      | and I attached zero likelihood to that. I just didn't  |
| 2  | price that they were anticipating the equity being     | 2      | think it was legit or credible.                        |
| 3  | issued at. So they were clear, unequivocal, as they    | 3      | Later, though, in the month and                        |
| 4  | tend to be.  | 4      | again, I can't recall the date Mr. Poirier did         |
| 5  | Q. I guess when you have that much money,              | 5      | reach out to Steve Smith requesting a meeting          |
| 6  | right?   | 6      | Q. Okay.   |
| 7  | A. Exactly.  | 7      | A subject unidentified.                                |
| 8  | Q. And what about TransCanada? What was                | 8      | Q. And that's the January 7 meeting that               |
| 9  | the reaction you got from them?                        | 9      | we've heard about. Right?                              |
| 10 | A. I think they expected that reaction,                | 10     | A. Well, that was the request from                     |
| 11 | but I also thought they were disappointed. I can't     | 11     | Mr. Poirier, yes, to meet on January 7th.              |
| 12 | recall whether it was the day that I spoke to them and | 12     | Q. How did Columbia prepare for this                   |
| 13 | told them that we were going forward with equity or    | 13     | meeting?   |
| 14 | shortly thereafter, their CEO indicated, well, we      | 14     | A. You know, we talked through scenarios               |
| 15 | still have interest. We still might be able to do      | 15     | of what might be broached during that discussion, be   |
| 16 | something.   | 16     | it an acquisition, joint venture, or whatever. We had  |
| 17 | So in a soft way, he was trying to                     | 17     | no idea with any precision. So we kind of went         |
| 18 | convince me to rethink and potentially defer. But,     | 18     | through that scenario of thinking.                     |
| 19 | again, my recollection was when he offered 25 to 26,   | 19     | Ultimately, with the help of advisors,                 |
| 20 | he didn't even have his board authorization in line    | 20     | legal, financial, and others, a script was prepared,   |
| 21 | for that, much less a higher price.                    | 21     | as we typically do, to take to the meeting.            |
| 22 | Q. And "he" means Russ Girling. Right?                 | 22     | Q. And so this is happening, and the                   |
| 23 | A. Yes, sir. And he was the CEO of                     | 23     | script gets prepared in early January, is that right,  |
| 24 | TransCanada.   | 24     | before the meeting?                                    |
|    | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS                               |        | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS                               |
|    |  |        |  |
|    | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1028                            | _      | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1030                            |
| 1  | Q. So what did you do at this point?                   | 1      | A. That would be correct.                              |
| 2  | A. We fast-forward on the process of                   | 2      | Q. And in the meantime, how is the board               |
| 3  | issuing equity.  | 3      | informed?  |
| 4  | Q. At that time, what did you think the                | 4      | A. Well, it just was right on top of my                |
| 5  | impact of the equity offering would be on these deal   | 5      | one-on-one discussions that I do annually with the     |
| 6  | discussions?   | 6      | board members. So my recollection is I alerted Sig     |
| 7  | A. Absolutely positively kill all deal                 | 7      | Cornelius, our lead director. I ultimately had a       |
| 8  | discussions. I just couldn't reasonably conceive of    | 8      | sit-down with Sig mid-month. And I followed that up    |
| 9  | someone wanting to purchase the company after we had   | 9      | with   |
| 10 | diluted it by 20 percent at a price of 17.50. I        | 10     | Q. Excuse me. Mid what month?                          |
| 11 | just particularly in the environment we were in.       | 11     | A. Mid-December. I was working on my                   |
| 12 | The dislocation continued. But to me, it was a poison  | 12     | one-on-ones through the middle of December through the |
| 13 | pill, basically.                                       | 13     | first two weeks of January. That was the cycle and     |
| 14 | Q. I want to talk about the reengagement               | 14     | the circuit.   |
| 15 | with TransCanada. So after the December 2015 equity    | 15     | And so, again, I think I had three                     |
| 16 | offering, we've heard testimony from you already from  | 16     | one-on-one meetings prior to the January 7th. My       |
| 17 | counsel's questions that in early December, there were | 17     | recollection was shortly thereafter, I had three       |
| 18 | discussions between TransCanada and Columbia, right,   | 18     | additional meetings, six total.                        |
| 19 | or there was a reach-out?                              | 19     | Q. Okay.   |
| 20 | A. My recollection was that there were                 | 20     | A. And during each of the meetings, this               |
| 21 | still rumblings, primarily from bankers, that          | 21     | TransCanada outreach was noted and we discussed it.    |
| 22 | TransCanada might still be interested. And maybe even  | 22     | Q. And so did you have a prediction of                 |
| 23 | Mr. Girling suggested at some point they might still   | 23     | what was going to happen at that meeting?              |
| 24 | be interested. But it was so general at that point,    | 24     | A. I just didn't think this meeting was                |
|    |  | 1      |  |

CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS

|  | R. Skaggs - Cross  |  | R. Skaggs - Cross   |
|--|--|--|---|
| 1  | going to be productive. And I think I've stated  | 1  | topics that you discussed with the directors at these   |
| 2  | before, the market conditions and the equity issuance,   | 2  | meetings.   |
| 3  | I just didn't see how somebody could go forward. That  | 3  | A. Well, for these specific meetings, we  |
| 4  | was my point of view.  | 4  | were going to I was going to continue to have   |
| 5  | Q. So you didn't have a board meeting  | 5  | discussion around strategic considerations for the  |
| 6  | during this period of time in late December, early   | 6  | obvious reason that we still had enormous equity  |
| 7  | January?   | 7  | needs, and the equity markets weren't favorable. So   |
| 8  | A. We did not. We did not.   | 8  | we needed to continue to have that ongoing discussion.  |
| 9  | Q. Why not?  | 9  | It was just the reality of where we were.   |
| 10   | A. Well, the strategic planning meeting  | 10   | Mr. Cornelius felt strongly we ought  |
| 11   | was slated for the end of the month. And we weren't  | 11   | to begin discussing succession planning. So that was  |
| 12   | in transaction mode. We had just issued the equity.  | 12   | an agenda item. I had project updates. And I kept   |
| 13   | Now was the time to work one-on-one and do our other   | 13   | mentioning these huge projects, wanted to touch base  |
| 14   | preparatory work for that meeting.   | 14   | on those. A couple of operating issues. And then a  |
| 15   | Q. Okay. And did you really expect much  | 15   | few other issues. And then just completely open.  |
| 16   | to come out of that meeting?   | 16   | I wanted to hear from the board what  |
| 17   | A. With TransCanada?   | 17   | they thought about conditions, my performance, the  |
| 18   | Q. Yeah.   | 18   | team's performance.   |
| 19   | A. No. I expected it to be a nonevent.   | 19   | Q. So this is leading up to your annual   |
| 20   | Q. Did Columbia's lawyers also know that   | 20   | planning meeting at the end of January?   |
|  | ,  | 21   | A. That's correct.  |
| 21<br>22   | this January 7 meeting was going to happen?  | 22   |   |
|  | A. Everybody that had been working on  |  | Q. And was this something you did once a  |
| 23<br>24   | strategic alternatives, or the teams working on that,  | 23<br>24   | year with the board?  A. Once a year, if not more. I think I  |
| 24   | Goldman, Lazard, Sullivan & Cromwell, internal legal   | 24   | A. Once a year, if not more. I think I  |
|  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |
|  |  |  |   |
|  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1032  |  | R. Skaggs - Cross   |
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|--|---|--|--|
| 1  | you a document earlier about a meeting that you had   | 1  | TransCanada.   |
| 2  | with Mr. Cornelius.   | 2  | Q. I'm sorry. I interrupted you. Would   |
| 3  | A. Or it may have been with   | 3  | you say that again, please.  |
| 4  | Mr. Kittrell.   | 4  | A. Yes. At this point, mid-December,   |
| 5  | Q. Thank you.   | 5  | early January, the only inbound if you will,   |
| 6  | A. It was the same sort of document. It   | 6  | inbound touch had been from TransCanada.   |
| 7  | was just a discussion outline, agenda, that I had   | 7  | Q. Let's look at Joint Exhibit 521,  |
| 8  | suggested and wanted him to have in advance of the  | 8  | please.  |
| 9  | meeting.  | 9  | Is this an email exchange between you  |
| 10   | Q. And so was it your practice before   | 10   | and the Goldman people on January 5, 2016?   |
| 11   | each of these one-on-one meetings to prepare an agenda  | 11   | A. I'm sorry. Could you say that again?  |
| 12   | and pull some materials together?   | 12   | Q. Yes. If you look at the very top  |
| 13   | A. Sure. I wanted to make sure that they  | 13   | A. Yes.  |
| 14   | were well prepared for the discussion. It wasn't  | 14   | Q there is an email from you to  |
| 15   | meant to be exclusive, but it was at least a starting   | 15   | actually, this, at the top I misspoke.   |
| 16   | point for deliberations.  | 16   | A. Yeah. That's what kind of confused  |
| 17   | Q. So I think you've already hit on this,   | 17   | me.  |
| 18   | but you see item 1 is strategic considerations? Did   | 18   | Q. Yeah. It's the Stephen Smith with a   |
| 19   | that refer to why don't you just tell us. What did  | 19   | cc to the Goldman people. Right?   |
| 20   | that refer to?  | 20   | A. Correct.  |
| 21   | A. Again, it went to that micro   | 21   | Q. And then if we look down below that,  |
| 22   | consideration I was talking about. We had issued  | 22   | are these the talking points that Goldman drafted for  |
| 23   | equity, and it had stopped the bleeding that's my   | 23   | the January 7 meeting?   |
| 24   | kind of vernacular and bought us some time. But   | 24   | A. That's correct.   |
|  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |
|  | CHANGERI COURT REFOREERO  |  | CHANGERT COURT REPORTERS   |
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|  | R. Skaggs - Cross   |  | R. Skaggs - Cross  |
| 1  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1036 having said that, we still had 3, 4, \$5 billion of   | 1  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1038 Q. And why did you ask to have these   |
| 1 2  | Page 1036   | 1 2  | Fage 1036  |
|  | having said that, we still had 3, 4, \$5 billion of   |  | Q. And why did you ask to have these   |
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|  | R. Skagg  | is - Ci  | OSS  |
|--|---|--|--|
|  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1039   |  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1041  |
| 1  | So this wasn't the first time that  | 1  | A. That's right. Again, work to prepare  |
| 2  | Columbia had prepared talking points before an  | 2  | the board. And it included fiduciary duties, if we   |
| 3  | important meeting. Right?   | 3  | were presented with an offer.  |
| 4  | A. Again, that's a typical practice.  | 4  | Q. Did you keep the board informed of  |
| 5  | Q. And in your view of things, was there  | 5  | material developments of the discussions with  |
| 6  | anything secret in these talking points?  | 6  | TransCanada?   |
| 7  | A. No. This was just straightforward  | 7  | A. At all junctures of the process.  |
| 8  | language, the way you would use in virtually any  | 8  | Q. Let's look at Joint Exhibit 564,  |
| 9  | context, public, private, or otherwise. It was just   | 9  | please. This is an email that you sent on January 11   |
| 10   | straightforward.  | 10   | to three of the directors: Teresa Taylor, Les  |
| 11   | Q. After the January 7 meeting, did due   | 11   | Silverman and Sig Cornelius. Right?  |
| 12   | diligence and negotiations with TransCanada proceed?  | 12   | A. That's correct.   |
| 13   | A. Well, to be precise, we provided some  | 13   | Q. And, generally, was this an update of   |
| 14   | updated due diligence, obviously, had gone through an   | 14   | what was happening?  |
| 15   | extensive diligence process before, but we provided   | 15   | A. It was an update and an alert, and it   |
| 16   | diligence, which our understanding was they were going  | 16   | was a follow-up to the one-on-one discussions I had  |
| 17   | to use with their CEO and, ultimately, with their   | 17   | with those three individuals. And I think you'll see   |
| 18   | board to make a decision on whether they were going to  | 18   | that those are the folks that I had my one-on-ones   |
| 19   | make a proposal that could lead into negotiations   | 19   | with prior to the January 7th meeting. And then I  |
| 20   | after that, if our board agreed.  | 20   | think I add a P.S., I'm going to share the same info   |
| 21   | Q. And was that largely what you had  | 21   | with the remaining three directors that I had  |
| 22   | already provided them and they destroyed earlier?   | 22   | one-on-ones scheduled with, that week, actually, it  |
| 23   | A. It was almost identical. Just only a   | 23   | says.  |
| 24   | matter of weeks had passed.   | 24   | Q. Okay. In the second paragraph it  |
|  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |
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|  | D Skongo Cross  |  | R Skanne - Crose   |
| 1  |   | 1  | R. Skaggs - Cross  |
| 1 2  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1040 Q. Let's look at Joint Exhibit 554,   | 1 2  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1042 says, "Since our recent discussions," and so   |
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CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS

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|  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1043  |  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1045  |
| 1  | board meeting, I would revert to him.  | 1  | an extended period of give and take and negotiation  |
| 2  | Q. And so did you consider that a firm   | 2  | and wheel-spinning. We needed to try to get to a   |
| 3  | offer that you could accept?   | 3  | conclusion up or down as soon as we possibly could,  |
| 4  | A. I mean, that was just as I said,  | 4  | practically could, reasonably could.   |
| 5  | that was just an indication of interest to determine   | 5  | Q. Fair to say that exclusivity was  |
| 6  | whether we could even begin negotiations and begin a   | 6  | thoroughly discussed at this meeting?  |
| 7  | process of trying to iron something out.   | 7  | A. To say the least.   |
| 8  | Q. Let's look at Exhibit 191 again, which  | 8  | Q. Let's go to Joint Exhibit 492. This   |
| 9  | is the minutes on pages 4 through 5, starts at the   | 9  | is a December 17 email that you sent to the advisors.  |
| 10   | bottom of page 4.  | 10   | And go to the next page, please.   |
| 11   | And it says, "January 28"  | 11   | I believe counsel referred to these  |
| 12   | A. I'm sorry. We're not we're synched  | 12   | handwritten notes that you prepared in preparation for   |
| 13   | up now.  | 13   | the late January planning meeting. Right?  |
| 14   | Q. Yeah. It's a little bit confusing   | 14   | A. Yes, sir.   |
| 15   | because it starts at the bottom of page 4,   | 15   | Q. By the way, is there anything in these  |
| 16   | "January 28-29, [] Executive Session," and then it   | 16   | notes or was it your intention in preparing them to  |
| 17   | goes to the next page.   | 17   | prime the board for a TransCanada bid?   |
| 18   | A. Yes, sir.   | 18   | A. Absolutely not. Again, this was   |
| 19   | Q. You see that?   | 19   | dealing with our strategic position in the marketplace   |
| 20   | A. Yes, sir.   | 20   | and the fact that we had 3 to \$4 billion of equity  |
| 21   | Q. And this is a long paragraph. I just  | 21   | looming, how best to skin that cat.  |
| 22   | want to point you to two highlighted parts of it. One  | 22   | Q. Let's look at page 3, please, titled  |
| 23   | is about six lines down, beginning, "He recounted his  | 23   | "CPG Strategic Positioning."   |
| 24   | January 25, 2016 conversation with Russ Girling"   | 24   | Do you see that?   |
|  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |
|  |  |  |  |
|  | R. Skaggs - Cross  |  | R. Skaggs - Cross  |
| 1  | Page 1044  | 1  | Page 1046  |
| 1 2  | So tell us what was happening there  | 1 2  | A. Yes, sir.   |
| 2  | So tell us what was happening there with respect to this board meeting.  | 2  | A. Yes, sir. Q. And I don't want to spend any time on  |
| 3  | So tell us what was happening there with respect to this board meeting.  A. I'm relaying the conversation that I   | 2  | A. Yes, sir.  Q. And I don't want to spend any time on this, but have you laid out here the considerations   |
| 2<br>3<br>4  | So tell us what was happening there with respect to this board meeting.  A. I'm relaying the conversation that I had with Mr. Girling and his presentation of an   | 2<br>3<br>4  | A. Yes, sir.  Q. And I don't want to spend any time on this, but have you laid out here the considerations that we've been discussing in our examination about   |
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|  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1047   |  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1049  |
|--|---|--|--|
| 1  | Q. Let's go to page 5, please. And at   | 1  | A. Yes, after much discussion. It went   |
| 2  | the bottom, you see that says, "At What Price (Range)   | 2  | through the same sort of analytical bases, and   |
| 3  | Would It Be Compelling To Transact."  | 3  | obviously, they heard from the lawyers and from the  |
| 4  | And so was that an issue that you   | 4  | financial advisors. And again, it was going to be a  |
| 5  | wanted to talk to the board about at this planning  | 5  | relatively abbreviated period they were willing to do  |
| 6  | session?  | 6  | that.  |
| 7  | A. I wouldn't say it was an issue. It   | 7  | Q. I want to turn to February now. We're   |
| 8  | was, again, we received inbounds. We were considering   | 8  | after that strategic planning meeting. And I want to   |
| 9  | options. We needed to have what I would call a  | 9  | read you a sentence out of the plaintiffs' pretrial  |
| 10   | dynamic point of view on what prices might be worth   | 10   | brief. "On February 9, 2016, Skaggs and Smith had a  |
| 11   | engaging, be it a strategic, a PE, or anyone. So it   | 11   | secret one-on-one meeting with Fornell to discuss the  |
| 12   | was just that's what this is attempting to do, is   | 12   | merger. Through this meeting, TransCanada confirmed  |
| 13   | to continue to develop points of view around value,   | 13   | that Skaggs and Smith wanted to exit regardless of   |
| 14   | prices, and the like.   | 14   | price and would dare the board to decline a lowball  |
| 15   | Q. Okay. So   | 15   | offer."  |
| 16   | A. And Goldman was going to present this  | 16   | Okay. Did you hear that?   |
| 17   | sort of analysis.   | 17   | A. I heard that.   |
| 18   | Q. Did these points end up getting, like,   | 18   | Q. Okay. Now, this is the February 9,  |
| 19   | rolled into part of the agenda for this meeting?  | 19   | 2016, meeting. And I believe you testified in your   |
| 20   | A. It certainly did. I believe not only   | 20   | deposition that you didn't even recall the meeting.  |
| 21   | Goldman, but I believe Goldman Sachs sorry  | 21   | A. I did not I have no recollection of   |
| 22   | Goldman but also Lazard tried in their packages to  | 22   | having that meeting.   |
| 23   | address these sorts of considerations.  | 23   | Q. But realizing that let me ask you   |
| 24   | Q. I haven't asked you this. This is  | 24   | this question: Did you ever tell Wells Fargo that you  |
|  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |
|  | ommobil dook! kgrokibko   |  |  |
|  |   |  |  |
|  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1048   |  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1050  |
| 1  | R. Skaggs - Cross  before that late January meeting. We saw in the  | 1  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1050 wanted an exit regardless of price?  |
| 1 2  | Page 1046   | 1 2  | Page 1050  |
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| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22       | before that late January meeting. We saw in the minutes that you discussed exclusivity at that meeting.  A. That's correct.  Q. And so why did you believe it would be in the company's best interest to agree to exclusivity?  A. My point of view was that it seemed that TransCanada had strong intent at this point to explore, try to reach a deal. This is the second time they had come back. And that they were willing to invest the resources in doing this. And so I thought that would be worth the exercise if we could do it on a truncated basis.  And I was sensitive and understood that they might not want to do that with exclusivity. And so back and forth, on balance, it seemed the best way to proceed to follow what could be a legitimate option and not kill that off at this point by insisting on nonexclusivity talks. So it was that balancing.  Q. And then after that discussion at that  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22       | wanted an exit regardless of price?  A. Absolutely, positively not. I mean, that's not I would never say that to anybody, much less a Wells Fargo person.  Q. Did you ever tell Wells Fargo or anyone else that you would dare the board to decline a lowball offer?  A. Again, I apologize. I mean, it's just completely nuts and incredible. I would never, ever say that. And I would never, ever put my board in that sort of position, nor could I put my board in that sort of position.  Q. Did you tell anyone at TransCanada this?  A. Again, absolutely, positively no.  Q. And to your knowledge, did Steve Smith ever do that?  A. No. I just can't imagine him ever doing that.  Q. You've worked with Steve Smith for a long time or you worked with him a long time. Right? You know him probably better than anybody.                  |

|  | R. Skaggs - Cross   |  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1053  |
|--|---|--|--|
| 1  | saying that?  | 1  | And Mr. Smith said to me, I think  |
| 2  | A. Never. Most conservative,  | 2  | they're considering 24. That's what my Mr. Poirier   |
| 3  | down-the-middle person. And he just it's just not   | 3  | has indicated. And I absolutely lost it. I was   |
| 4  | what he would do.   | 4  | angry, disappointed, frustrated. I reacted strongly,   |
| 5  | Q. Let's go to Joint Exhibit 707, please.   | 5  | let's say.   |
| 6  | So, Mr. Skaggs, you were not copied on  | 6  | And I think Mr. Smith understood I was   |
| 7  | this document. Realizing that you don't have a  | 7  | extraordinarily unhappy. And he communicated back to   |
| 8  | recollection of that February 9 meeting, would you  | 8  | TransCanada, my observation is, if you even broach   |
| 9  | look at these bullet points, just very quickly, and   | 9  | that with Mr. Skaggs, the reaction is just going to be   |
| 10   | tell us and realizing you didn't prepare this and   | 10   | negative, counterproductive, and you shouldn't do  |
| 11   | you don't remember the meeting, but are these the   | 11   | that.  |
| 12   | types of things that would have been discussed around   | 12   | Q. And did TransCanada come back with a  |
| 13   | that time in early February regarding a potential deal  | 13   | bigger number?   |
| 14   | with TransCanada?   | 14   | A. Well, the only number, then, that   |
| 15   | A. The question is?   | 15   | Mr. Girling presented with me he didn't talk about   |
| 16   | Q. Are these, these bullet points, are  | 16   | 24 or any other number. He just went right to and  |
| 17   | these the types of things that, logically, could have   | 17   | said 25.25, all cash. And then just call it it was   |
| 18   | been discussed at that meeting?   | 18   | a tense conversation because I was still very unhappy  |
| 19   | A. Those are the sorts of things that   | 19   | about the positioning, this notion of 24.  |
| 20   | would be reasonable and logical if I had that sort of   | 20   | Q. And at this board meeting and we  |
| 21   | -   | 21   | see this on the screen March 5, down near the  |
| 22   | meeting. This would be what I would expect.  Q. In this summary, does it say that you   | 22   |  |
| 23   |   | 23   | bottom, was that discussed with the board, the \$25.25?  A. We did discuss this with the board.  |
| 24   | said or Steve Smith said that you wanted an exit  | 24   | Q. And what did the board decide to do?  |
| 24   | regardless of price?  | 24   |  |
|  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |
|  |   |  |  |
|  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1052   |  | R. Skaggs - Cross  |
| 1  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1052  A. It does not say that.   | 1  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1054  A. The board decided that that offer  |
| 1 2  | Page 1052   | 1 2  | Page 1054  |
|  | A. It does not say that.  |  | A. The board decided that that offer   |
| 2  | A. It does not say that.  Q. And does it say that you all would   | 2  | A. The board decided that that offer should be rejected, straight out.   |
| 2  | A. It does not say that. Q. And does it say that you all would dare the board to decline a lowball offer?   | 2  | A. The board decided that that offer should be rejected, straight out.  Q. And did you convey that rejection to  |
| 2<br>3<br>4  | A. It does not say that.  Q. And does it say that you all would dare the board to decline a lowball offer?  A. It certainly doesn't say that.   | 2<br>3<br>4  | A. The board decided that that offer should be rejected, straight out.  Q. And did you convey that rejection to Mr. Girling?   |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5   | A. It does not say that.  Q. And does it say that you all would dare the board to decline a lowball offer?  A. It certainly doesn't say that.  Q. Let's look at Joint Exhibit 191,  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5   | A. The board decided that that offer should be rejected, straight out. Q. And did you convey that rejection to Mr. Girling? A. I did.  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6  | A. It does not say that. Q. And does it say that you all would dare the board to decline a lowball offer? A. It certainly doesn't say that. Q. Let's look at Joint Exhibit 191, please. And go to the March 5 minutes, which is on  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6  | A. The board decided that that offer should be rejected, straight out.  Q. And did you convey that rejection to Mr. Girling?  A. I did.  Q. How did he respond?  |
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|  | R. Skaggs - Cross  |  | R. Skaggs - Cross  |
| 1  | attempting to find if there was any opportunity to   | 1  | that it was provisional; that they had to get through  |
| 2  | revive discussions. And during those discussions,  | 2  | credit rating agencies, equity considerations. He  |
| 3  | this notion of, well, would people reengage around 26,   | 3  | needed to make sure he had a financing plan to be able   |
| 4  | potentially, and see whether there was a basis to move   | 4  | to execute on a \$26 price.  |
| 5  | forward and attempt to strike a deal at that sort of   | 5  | Q. So did you consider that when it was  |
| 6  | number.  | 6  | presented to you as a firm offer that you could just   |
| 7  | Q. Okay. And we saw a number of  | 7  | accept at that time?   |
| 8  | documents from counsel on your direct about these  | 8  | A. No. It was absolutely provisional. I  |
| 9  | discussions happening with the bankers and with you  | 9  | do recall putting in writing to the board, this is a   |
| 10   | and others during this period of time.   | 10   | highly provisional, risky sort of proposition.   |
| 11   | A. That's correct.   | 11   | Q. Let's look at Joint Exhibit 960,  |
| 12   | Q. Was there any effort on your part to  | 12   | please. This is an email that you sent to the board  |
| 13   | keep the \$26 number somehow hidden from the board?  | 13   | from March the 10th that laid out this indicative  |
| 14   | A. No. Absolutely not. I spoke directly  | 14   | proposal from Mr. Girling.   |
| 15   | to Mr. Cornelius about the possibility of receiving  | 15   | A. The best this is the document I was   |
| 16   | that sort of number and asking his thoughts on that  | 16   | referring to or alluding to.   |
| 17   | and how we might proceed if we received that. In   | 17   | Q. And if you look down below that   |
| 18   | other words, do we take that to the board? Do we   | 18   | horizontal line, it says "Taurus' Indicative/  |
| 19   | that sort of give and take with Mr. Cornelius.   | 19   | Provisional Proposition." Your words. Right?   |
| 20   | Q. Did you end up communicating that to  | 20   | A. Absolutely my words.  |
| 21   | TransCanada? And I'm saying "you"  | 21   | Q. And is that what you believed it was?   |
| 22   | A. Communicating?  | 22   | A. That's exactly what it was. And I   |
| 23   | <ul> <li>Q. So let me ask a better question.</li> </ul>  | 23   | believe I also outlined what the risks and the   |
| 24   | A. Yeah.   | 24   | provisions and the tentativeness was all about.  |
|  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |
|  | CHANCERI COURT REPORTERS   |  |  |
|  | R Skanne - Crose   |  | R Skanne - Cross   |
| 1  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1056  | 1  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1058  |
| 1 2  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1056 Q. Did the \$26 end up being communicated  | 1 2  | R. Skaggs - Cross  Q. So plaintiffs, in their pretrial   |
|  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1056  |  | R. Skaggs - Cross  Q. So plaintiffs, in their pretrial brief, say the following on page 36: "Skaggs and  |
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CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS

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|--|---|--|---|
| 1  | at that meeting?  | 1  | equity they were going to have to do to finance this  |
| 2  | A. Well, that certainly was discussed at  | 2  | deal. And the stock price was a very key indicator,   |
| 3  | length at that meeting. And, again, it reflects the   | 3  | because, obviously, when the stock price goes down,   |
| 4  | note that I sent to the board that this was highly  | 4  | more and more dilution, and it's a risk to the ability  |
| 5  | conditional and, at this point, highly risky.   | 5  | to do this.   |
| 6  | Q. Let's go to Joint Exhibit 997, please.   | 6  | And it's not only dilution but also   |
| 7  | And this is an email from you to the board the next   | 7  | how much equity they could reasonably raise in the  |
| 8  | day, March 11.  | 8  | Canadian market. So, again, financing this  |
| 9  | THE COURT: Before we move off that,   | 9  | transaction was a huge risk. It wasn't just the   |
| 10   | what's your understanding of the reference to   | 10   | equity, but it was the credit rating agencies, and it   |
| 11   | "approximately two weeks later"? I'm not tracking   | 11   | was selling assets. But at this point, we were really   |
| 12   | that.   | 12   | focusing on that price and what it might imply about  |
| 13   | THE WITNESS: My understanding was   | 13   | their ability to sustain an offer to us.  |
| 14   | that to try to firm up that sorry to firm up  | 14   | Q. During this critical period of time,   |
| 15   | that proposal, that they were going to have to meet,  | 15   | were you monitoring TransCanada's stock price?  |
| 16   | obviously, with their board, with the credit rating   | 16   | -   |
|  | •   | 17   | • •   |
| 17   | agencies, and that they were going to have to assess the financial markets.   | 18   | Q. And were you keeping people abreast of it?   |
| 18   |   |  |   |
| 19   | And, fourth, my recollection was there  | 19   | A. Virtually every day.   |
| 20   | was I'll call it a banking holiday in Canada where  | 20   | Q. Let's go to Exhibit 952, please. This  |
| 21   | they were not going to have, for whatever reason, good  | 21   | is an internal Wells Fargo email, and it's been   |
| 22   | insight into the equity markets in Canada. That's my  | 22   | discussed a lot in this case. What you will see in  |
| 23   | general understanding.  | 23   | the middle of the page, Eric Fornell and by the   |
| 24   | They still had quite a bit of work to   | 24   | way, you didn't get a copy of this, but I'm going to  |
|  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |
|  |   |  |   |
|  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1060   |  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1062   |
| 1  | R. Skaggs - Cross  Page 1060 do on this provision this offer.   | 1  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1062 ask you about it.   |
| 1 2  | Page 1060   | 1 2  | Fage 1062   |
|  | do on this provision this offer.  |  | ask you about it.   |
| 2  | do on this provision this offer.  BY ATTORNEY HARRELL:  | 2  | ask you about it.  Eric Fornell says, "They think they  |
| 2  | do on this provision this offer.  BY ATTORNEY HARRELL:  Q. Let's look at Joint Exhibit 997, which   | 2  | ask you about it.  Eric Fornell says, "They think they now have an opportunity to hear what their investors   |
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CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS

|  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1063  |  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1065   |
|--|--|--|---|
| 1  | say why Eric Fornell might have said something like  | 1  | board about the inbound script.   |
| 2  | this. Why don't you go ahead and complete your answer  | 2  | Do you recall that?   |
| 3  | and tell us. You obviously have an opinion on that.  | 3  | A. Yes, sir.  |
| 4  | A. Again, I don't know Mr. Fornell, but I  | 4  | Q. Was this fully vetted with all of the  |
| 5  | do realize that he might have a very, very strong  | 5  | advisors, that is, Sullivan & Cromwell, legal   |
| 6  | incentive to see the transaction completed and to see  | 6  | department, Goldman, everybody internally?  |
| 7  | the process continue.  | 7  | A. Fully, fully developed, times three.   |
| 8  | Q. Let's go to Exhibit 986, please. And  | 8  | Q. I'm going to ask you just one  |
| 9  | in the interest of time, I'm just going to move pretty   | 9  | question. If we just scroll down, under "Recommended  |
| 10   | fast through this.   | 10   | Approach," circa mid-day Saturday, was there a  |
| 11   | Did you get an email from Spectra  | 11   | protocol that you guys came up with on how to convey  |
| 12   | shortly after the leak of the negotiations in <i>The Wall</i>  | 12   | this with Bob Smith and Steve Smith both taking a part  |
| 13   | Street Journal?  | 13   | in that?  |
| 14   | A. I did.  | 14   | A. That's right. That's what the team   |
| 15   | Q. And do you see at the bottom, this is   | 15   | recommended, how to proceed with this.  |
| 16   | the email that you got from Spectra?   | 16   | Q. Let's go to Joint Exhibit 1028,  |
| 17   | A. That's correct.   | 17   | please.   |
| 18   | Q. And I would like to highlight just  | 18   | And before I go to that, was there a  |
| 19   | one moment. In the second paragraph, the second  | 19   | discussion to make sure that the script did not   |
| 20   | line I'm sorry, the third paragraph, the second  | 20   | violate any exclusivity agreement that might be   |
| 21   | line, middle, "offering SE shares in exchange"   | 21   | entered into with TransCanada?  |
| 22   | A. Correct. I see that.  | 22   | A. Again, that was one of the key   |
| 23   | Q. So what did you take what did you   | 23   | considerations as we were developing this.  |
| 24   | take from this when you got this email from Spectra  | 24   | Q. Let's look at 1028, which, at the top,   |
|  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |
|  |  |  |   |
|  |  |  |   |
|  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1064  |  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1066   |
| 1  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1064 saying, look, we might still be interested in a deal   | 1  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1066 is an email from Mr. Poirier to a number of people,   |
| 1 2  | saying, look, we might still be interested in a deal offering our shares in exchange?  | 1 2  | is an email from Mr. Poirier to a number of people, dated March 12. And if you go down to the very  |
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|--|--|---|--|---|-----|
| 4  | had baan pro   | Page 1007   | 1  | Page 10   | )69 |
| 1  | -  | viding that all along, all through the  | 1  | AFTERNOON SESSION   |     |
| 2  | process.   | Lasta Lasta as Labas Folkikis 4407  | 2  | , ,   |     |
| 3  | Q.   | Let's look at Joint Exhibit 1107,   | 3  | ,   |     |
| 4  | please. And g  | · -   | 4  |   |     |
| 5  | tala antica te stance  | By the way, I guess we ought to   | 5  | 5 5   |     |
| 6  | -  | Let's stay on page 1 for one  | 6  | of folks in front of me as an endorsement of your   |     |
| 7  | moment, pleas  |   | 7  | litigation skills. We started with my two clerks,   |     |
| 8  | Manala 40 Dia  | This was the board meeting agenda for   | 8  | , ,   |     |
| 9  | March 16. Rig  |   | 9  | , ,   |     |
| 10   | <b>A</b> .   | That's correct.   | 10   | . ,   |     |
| 11   | Q.   | All right. And March 16 was the day   | 11   |   | 14  |
| 12   |  | had the vote on whether to accept the   | 12   | , ,   | nτ  |
| 13   | \$25.50 offer.   |   | 13   | • •   |     |
| 14   | Α.   | That's correct.   | 14   |   |     |
| 15   | Q.   | Quickly, let's go to page 20, please.   | 15   |   |     |
| 16   | 0  | Is this Goldman's analysis of   | 16   |   |     |
| 17   | Spectra's abili  |   | 17   |   |     |
| 18   | Α.   | Yes, it is.   | 18   | ,   |     |
| 19   | Q.   | And so at that meeting, was Spectra   | 19   | 1 1   |     |
| 20   | discussed?   |   | 20   |   |     |
| 21   | Α.   | Spectra was discussed, yes, sir.  | 21   | 9   |     |
| 22   | Q.   | It wasn't just a meeting to   | 22   | · •   |     |
| 23   | rubber-stamp   |   | 23   |   |     |
| 24   | A.   | It was not. We were talking about   | 24   | document that was very similar but was prepared by  |     |
|  |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |     |
|  |  | D. Oliverno   |  | <b>5</b> 01 0   |     |
|  |  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1068   |  | R. Skaggs - Cross   | 070 |
| 1  | Spectra, and   | we were looking at fairness opinions. We  | 1  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 10 Lazard.   | )70 |
| 1 2  | -  | Page 1006   | 1 2  | Lazard.   |     |
|  | -  | we were looking at fairness opinions. We g input of all of our advisors during  |  | Lazard.  ATTORNEY HARRELL: Let's pull up Joir   |     |
| 2  | were solicitin   | we were looking at fairness opinions. We g input of all of our advisors during  | 2  | Lazard.  ATTORNEY HARRELL: Let's pull up Joir   |     |
| 3  | were solicitin<br>that discussion<br>Q.  | we were looking at fairness opinions. We g input of all of our advisors during on. And so what does this show? Without  | 2  | Lazard.  ATTORNEY HARRELL: Let's pull up Joir Exhibit 1114, please.   |     |
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# R. Skaggs - Cross

|  | R. Skaggs  | - Cross Page 1071  |  | R. Skaggs - Cross  | Page 1073   |
|--|--|--|--|--|---|
| 1  | board at the March 16 meeting?   | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·  | 1  | Q. And actually, the board, according  | =   |
| 2  | A. Yes, sir.   |  | 2  | this, "concluded that pursuing discussions with  |   |
| 3  | Q. One other doo   | cument I want to look at   | 3  | Spectra would not be worth the risk of losing the  |   |
| 4  | regarding Spectra, and that's Ex   | khibit 1057. This is a   | 4  | potential transaction with TransCanada"  |   |
| 5  | Goldman document. If we go to  | the next page, please.   | 5  | Right?   |   |
| 6  | We see here from Goldman   |  | 6  | A. That's what this reflects, yes.   |   |
| 7  | They had read  | ched out, by the way to  | 7  | Q. All right.  |   |
| 8  | Spectra, correct, and had given  | Spectra the script?  | 8  | A. I think, though, in the interest  | of  |
| 9  | A. That's correct  | t. Yes.  | 9  | completeness, it doesn't say that we would no  | t   |
| 10   | Q. Okay. And th  | is is Goldman coming back  | 10   | evaluate a proposal if one was submitted to  |   |
| 11   | with what they had learned from  | Spectra?   | 11   | TransCanada or submitted by Spectra becau  | ise the   |
| 12   | A. Yes. That's t   | he essence of the letter   | 12   | board was concerned deeply about their fiduc   | iary  |
| 13   | or the note.   |  | 13   | duties.  |   |
| 14   | Q. Pardon me. S  | So about two-thirds of the   | 14   | Q. Okay. This is talking about actu  | ally  |
| 15   | way down, we see, "He wanted   | us to know we should   | 15   | pursuing or chasing after Spectra?   |   |
| 16   | expect a formal letter."   |  | 16   | A. That's correct.   |   |
| 17   | And then he g  | oes on to make a couple  | 17   | Q. All right. And then, if we look at  |   |
| 18   | of other statements.   |  | 18   | the next page, 17, which is the board minutes of   |   |
| 19   | Do you remer   | nber being informed that   | 19   | March 14th. First full paragraph, it says, "Spectra  |   |
| 20   | there might be a formal letter co  | =  | 20   | was preparing to make a formal proposal to the Co  | ompany  |
| 21   |  | swer is yes, to that.  | 21   | in the next few days"  |   |
| 22   |  | Il letter ever arrive?   | 22   | That's what we just saw in the G   | oldman  |
| 23   | =  | arrived. It was radio  | 23   | email; right?  |   |
| 24   | silent from Spectra.   |  | 24   | A. That's correct. It was reported   | d to  |
|  | CHANCERY COURT   | REPORTERS  |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |   |
|  |  |  |  |  |   |
|  | R. Skaggs  | - Cross Page 1072  |  | R. Skaggs - Cross  | Page 1074   |
| 1  |  | - Cross Page 1072 ar back from Spectra at  | 1  | R. Skaggs - Cross the board that, based on that information, that  | •   |
| 1 2  |  | Page 1072  | 1 2  |  | •   |
|  | Q. You didn't hea  | rage 1072<br>ar back from Spectra at   |  | the board that, based on that information, that  | we  |
| 2<br>3<br>4  | Q. You didn't heat all?  A. That's correct Q. So that's March  | rage 1072 ar back from Spectra at  t. ch 12; right?  | 2  | the board that, based on that information, that could expect something.  Q. And it says, "[T]he Company wo potentially be entering into the merger agreement   | we uld  |
| 2  | Q. You didn't heat all?  A. That's correct Q. So that's March  | rage 1072 ar back from Spectra at  | 2  | the board that, based on that information, that could expect something.  Q. And it says, "[T]he Company wo potentially be entering into the merger agreement without having the opportunity to consider such for   | we uld  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6  | Q. You didn't hear all?  A. That's correct Q. So that's Marc A. Yes, sir. That note.   | rage 1072 ar back from Spectra at  t. ch 12; right? t's the date on this   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6  | the board that, based on that information, that could expect something.  Q. And it says, "[T]he Company wo potentially be entering into the merger agreement without having the opportunity to consider such fo proposal from Spectra."  | we uld  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7   | Q. You didn't hear all?  A. That's correct Q. So that's Marc A. Yes, sir. That note.  Q. So very quick   | rage 1072 ar back from Spectra at  t. ch 12; right?  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7   | the board that, based on that information, that could expect something.  Q. And it says, "[T]he Company wo potentially be entering into the merger agreement without having the opportunity to consider such fo proposal from Spectra."  Right? Do you see that in the manner of the country of the | we uld  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8  | Q. You didn't hear all?  A. That's correct Q. So that's Marco A. Yes, sir. That note.  Q. So very quick couple more board minutes.   | rage 10/2 ar back from Spectra at  it. ch 12; right? t's the date on this  ly, I want to look at a   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8  | the board that, based on that information, that could expect something.  Q. And it says, "[T]he Company wo potentially be entering into the merger agreement without having the opportunity to consider such fo proposal from Spectra."  Right? Do you see that in the mof the paragraph?  | we uld  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8  | Q. You didn't hear all?  A. That's correct Q. So that's Marc A. Yes, sir. That note.  Q. So very quick couple more board minutes.  Let's look at the second couple more board minutes.   | rage 10/2 ar back from Spectra at  t. ch 12; right? t's the date on this  ly, I want to look at a  ne minutes of March 12,   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9   | the board that, based on that information, that could expect something.  Q. And it says, "[T]he Company wo potentially be entering into the merger agreement without having the opportunity to consider such fo proposal from Spectra."  Right? Do you see that in the most the paragraph?  A. Yes. Yes. Yes, sir. I see it.   | we uld  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9   | Q. You didn't hear all?  A. That's correct Q. So that's Marc A. Yes, sir. That note.  Q. So very quick couple more board minutes.  Let's look at the which is Exhibit 191. It starts or  | rage 10/2 ar back from Spectra at  t. ch 12; right? t's the date on this  ly, I want to look at a  ne minutes of March 12,   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9   | the board that, based on that information, that could expect something.  Q. And it says, "[T]he Company wo potentially be entering into the merger agreement without having the opportunity to consider such fo proposal from Spectra."  Right? Do you see that in the most the paragraph?  A. Yes. Yes. Yes, sir. I see it.  Q. And so was that a risk that was   | we uld  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10   | Q. You didn't heat all?  A. That's correct Q. So that's Marce A. Yes, sir. That note.  Q. So very quick couple more board minutes.  Let's look at the which is Exhibit 191. It starts on going to look at what's on 16.  | rage 10/2 ar back from Spectra at  at. ch 12; right? t's the date on this  ly, I want to look at a  ne minutes of March 12, in page 15, but we're  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10   | the board that, based on that information, that could expect something.  Q. And it says, "[T]he Company wo potentially be entering into the merger agreement without having the opportunity to consider such for proposal from Spectra."  Right? Do you see that in the most the paragraph?  A. Yes. Yes. Yes, sir. I see it.  Q. And so was that a risk that was debated and discussed within the board?  | we uld rmal iddle   |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12   | Q. You didn't heat all?  A. That's correct Q. So that's Marco A. Yes, sir. That note.  Q. So very quick couple more board minutes.  Let's look at the which is Exhibit 191. It starts or going to look at what's on 16.  And in the first  | rage 10/2 ar back from Spectra at  t. ch 12; right? t's the date on this  y, I want to look at a  ne minutes of March 12, n page 15, but we're  t full paragraph, you  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11   | the board that, based on that information, that could expect something.  Q. And it says, "[T]he Company wo potentially be entering into the merger agreement without having the opportunity to consider such fo proposal from Spectra."  Right? Do you see that in the most the paragraph?  A. Yes. Yes. Yes, sir. I see it. Q. And so was that a risk that was debated and discussed within the board?  A. Fully vetted, that consideration   | we uld rmal iddle   |
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| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16   | Q. You didn't heat all?  A. That's correct Q. So that's Marce A. Yes, sir. That note.  Q. So very quick couple more board minutes.  Let's look at the which is Exhibit 191. It starts or going to look at what's on 16.  And in the first see at the first part of the parage then discussed with management from Goldman Sachs and Sulliv applicable to potentially engaging  | rage 10/2 ar back from Spectra at  at. ch 12; right? t's the date on this  by, I want to look at a  the minutes of March 12, the page 15, but we're  t full paragraph, you traph, "The board thand representatives an considerations the gwith Spectra"  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16   | the board that, based on that information, that could expect something.  Q. And it says, "[T]he Company wo potentially be entering into the merger agreement without having the opportunity to consider such for proposal from Spectra."  Right? Do you see that in the most the paragraph?  A. Yes. Yes. Yes, sir. I see it.  Q. And so was that a risk that was debated and discussed within the board?  A. Fully vetted, that consideration fully vetted by the board and our legal advisors others.  Q. Okay. And then I go to March the 16th, which starts at the bottom of page 17, and go   | we uld rmal iiddle n was s and                            |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17                                     | Q. You didn't heat all?  A. That's correct Q. So that's March A. Yes, sir. That note.  Q. So very quick couple more board minutes. Let's look at the which is Exhibit 191. It starts or going to look at what's on 16. And in the first part of the parage then discussed with management from Goldman Sachs and Sullive applicable to potentially engaging.   | rage 10/2 ar back from Spectra at  it. ch 12; right? t's the date on this  ly, I want to look at a  ne minutes of March 12, n page 15, but we're  It full paragraph, you raph, "The board nt and representatives an considerations ng with Spectra" that to yourself about   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15   | the board that, based on that information, that could expect something.  Q. And it says, "[T]he Company we potentially be entering into the merger agreement without having the opportunity to consider such for proposal from Spectra."  Right? Do you see that in the most the paragraph?  A. Yes. Yes. Yes, sir. I see it.  Q. And so was that a risk that was debated and discussed within the board?  A. Fully vetted, that consideration fully vetted by the board and our legal advisors others.  Q. Okay. And then I go to March the 16th, which starts at the bottom of page 17, and go the next page, which is near the middle of page 18.   | we uld rmal iiddle n was s and                            |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18                               | Q. You didn't heat all?  A. That's correct Q. So that's March A. Yes, sir. That note.  Q. So very quick couple more board minutes. Let's look at the which is Exhibit 191. It starts or going to look at what's on 16. And in the first see at the first part of the parage then discussed with management from Goldman Sachs and Sulliv applicable to potentially engagineral And just read halfway through that paragraph.   | rage 10/2 ar back from Spectra at  at. ch 12; right? t's the date on this  y, I want to look at a  ne minutes of March 12, n page 15, but we're  t full paragraph, you raph, "The board nt and representatives an considerations ng with Spectra" that to yourself about   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17                                     | the board that, based on that information, that could expect something.  Q. And it says, "[T]he Company wo potentially be entering into the merger agreement without having the opportunity to consider such for proposal from Spectra."  Right? Do you see that in the most the paragraph?  A. Yes. Yes. Yes, sir. I see it.  Q. And so was that a risk that was debated and discussed within the board?  A. Fully vetted, that consideration fully vetted by the board and our legal advisors others.  Q. Okay. And then I go to March the 16th, which starts at the bottom of page 17, and go   | we uld rmal iiddle n was s and ne o to 3,                 |
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| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21             | Q. You didn't heat all?  A. That's correct Q. So that's March A. Yes, sir. That note.  Q. So very quick couple more board minutes. Let's look at the which is Exhibit 191. It starts or going to look at what's on 16. And in the first see at the first part of the parage then discussed with management from Goldman Sachs and Sulliv applicable to potentially engagin And just read halfway through that paragraph My question is your recollection that the Spectal discussed thoroughly with the board of the paragraph who was a possible to potentially engaging that the spectal discussed thoroughly with the board of the paragraph who was a possible to potentially engaging that the spectal discussed thoroughly with the board of the paragraph who was a possible to potentially engaging that the spectal discussed thoroughly with the board of the paragraph was a possible to potentially engaging that the spectal discussed thoroughly with the board of the paragraph was a possible to potentially engaging that the paragraph was a possible to potentially engaging that the paragraph was a possible to potentially engaging that the paragraph was a possible to potentially engaging that the paragraph was a possible to potentially engaging that the paragraph was a possible to potentially engaging that the paragraph was a possible to potentially engage that the paragraph was a possible to potentially engaging that the paragraph was a possible to potentially engage that the paragraph was a possible to potentially engage that the paragraph was a possible to potentially engage that the paragraph was a possible to potentially engage that the paragraph was a possible to potentially engage that the paragraph was a possible to potentially engage that the paragraph was a possible to potentially engage that the paragraph was a possible to potentially engage that the paragraph was a possible to potentially engage that the paragraph was a possible to potentially engage that the paragraph was a possible to potentially engage that the paragraph was a pos | rage 10/2 ar back from Spectra at  at. ch 12; right? t's the date on this  by, I want to look at a  the minutes of March 12, the page 15, but we're  at full paragraph, you traph, "The board and representatives an considerations and with Spectra" that to yourself about as: Does that refresh as situation was oard on March the 12th?  in. It was a key topic                  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21             | the board that, based on that information, that could expect something.  Q. And it says, "[T]he Company wo potentially be entering into the merger agreement without having the opportunity to consider such for proposal from Spectra."  Right? Do you see that in the most the paragraph?  A. Yes. Yes. Yes, sir. I see it.  Q. And so was that a risk that was debated and discussed within the board?  A. Fully vetted, that consideration fully vetted by the board and our legal advisors others.  Q. Okay. And then I go to March that 16th, which starts at the bottom of page 17, and go the next page, which is near the middle of page 18 the middle paragraph.  And there's a statement, "The B concluded, after discussions with management and   | we uld rmal iiddle n was s and ne o to 3, oard id the     |
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# R. Skaggs - Cross

|  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 107  | 5   | R. Skaggs - Cross   |
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| 1  | would make a formal written proposal in a timely  | 1   | we could avoid it.  |
| 2  | matter or at all"   | 2   | Q. And so at some point in this process,  |
| 3  | My question to you is: Did the board  | 3   | did TransCanada make an offer of \$25.50 per share all  |
| 4  | fully, over these few days, discuss in every way all  | 4   | cash?   |
| 5  | of the issues, the good and the bad, with Spectra?  | 5   | A. Yes, sir.  |
| 6  | A. Oh, absolutely, thoroughly ventilated  | 6   | Q. And tell us, did TransCanada signal  |
| 7  | all the considerations around that. And, of course,   | 7   | that they would be open to further negotiations on  |
| 8  | they were conferring with experts, market experts   | 8   | this \$25.50 offer?   |
| 9  | throughout this period. So yes.   | 9   | A. To the contrary. They indicated that   |
| 10   | Q. And what was the board's decision with   | 10  | they were out. This was it, they had no flexibility   |
| 11   | respect to Spectra?   | 11  | left.   |
| 12   | A. It reflected in the minutes that it  | 12  | Q. Did Columbia's legal team ever advise  |
| 13   | was highly, highly unlikely, highly risky. Did not  | 13  | you that a public announcement would breach the   |
| 14   | see a reasonable scenario where they would come in  | 14  | standstill?   |
| 15   | with an offer that could compete, if at all come in   | 15  | A. Not sure I understand the question.  |
| 16   | with an offer, which, of course, they did not.  | 16  | Q. Let me just move on.   |
| 17   | Q. Let's go back to TransCanada for a   | 17  | At that time, did you think the \$26  |
| 18   | moment.   | 18  | indicative offer was still available?   |
| 19   | A. Okay.  | 19  | A. Oh, absolutely not. It had never been  |
| 20   | Q. Did TransCanada let me ask you this  | 20  | proposed, and we knew that it was falling apart   |
| 21   | first. So we talked about the \$26 mixed cash stock   | 21  | because of their financing concerns.  |
| 22   | consideration; right?   | 22  | Q. Okay. So leading up to the March 16  |
| 23   | A. Yeah, the conditional proposition.   | 23  | meeting, let's look briefly at Exhibit No. 1081,  |
| 24   | Q. Was that ever made into a binding  | 24  | please. And that's a March 14 email.  |
|  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |   | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |
|  |   |   |   |
|  | R Skanne - Crose  |   | R Skanne - Crose  |
|  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 107  |   | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1078   |
| 1  | offer?  | 1   | ATTORNEY HARRELL: And if we go to the   |
| 2  | offer?  A. It was never formalized. It was never  | 1 2   | ATTORNEY HARRELL: And if we go to the next page, please.  |
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# R. Skaggs - Cross

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|--|---|--|---|
| 1  | let's call it 20.85, 22.23, different points of view.   | 1  | very frequent basis?  |
| 2  | And then it reflects what sort of premium we were   | 2  | A. A very frequent basis with the entire  |
| 3  | looking at. So it reflects an offer of 25.50 as way   | 3  | board, and also communicating via phone with  |
| 4  | above our intrinsic value.  | 4  | Mr. Cornelius throughout this entire period.  |
| 5  | Q. At the March 16 meeting, the 25.50   | 5  | Q. So was that almost a full-time process   |
| 6  | offer was accepted; right?  | 6  | for that two weeks?   |
| 7  | A. After much discussion and debate, it   | 7  | A. Full-time plus, yes.   |
| 8  | was accepted.   | 8  | ATTORNEY HARRELL: We offer  |
| 9  | Q. Okay. And so just tell us very   | 9  | Demonstrative Exhibit 1 as a demonstrative exhibit.   |
| 10   | briefly because we're running out of time how   | 10   | ATTORNEY van KWAWEGEN: Your Honor,  |
| 11   | would you describe that debate on whether to accept   | 11   | it's fine as a demonstrative, not a substantive   |
| 12   | it?   | 12   | exhibit.  |
| 13   | A. Well, management felt like it was a  | 13   | THE COURT: We'll accept it on that  |
| 14   | relatively close call. Obviously, these numbers say   | 14   | basis.  |
| 15   | it wasn't a close call. But we had emotional ties to  | 15   | BY ATTORNEY HARRELL:  |
| 16   | the company. Our experts felt like it was certainly a   | 16   | Q. Did you read the complaint that was  |
| 17   | good price. The board wanted to discuss counter and   | 17   | filed against you, Mr. Smith and TC Energy?   |
| 18   | the risks that might go to a counteroffer.  | 18   | A. Yes, sir, I certainly did.   |
| 19   | So we had a good debate/vetting, if   | 19   | Q. So just to sum it up in one sentence,  |
| 20   | you will, of what our options were and the quality of   | 20   | you and Mr. Smith were accused of working together to   |
| 21   | this price.   | 21   | breach your fiduciary duties in multiple ways.  |
| 22   | Q. And so, did you press the board to   | 22   | If I could summarize all of the   |
| 23   | accept it? I mean, was there any coercion to try to   | 23   | charges against you, it would be the following: "You  |
| 24   | get the board to try to accept it?  | 24   | tilted the playing field towards TransCanada in   |
|  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |
|  |   |  |   |
|  | R Skanne - Crose  |  | P. Skanns - Padiract  |
|  | R. Skaggs - Cross Page 1080   |  | R. Skaggs - Redirect Page 1082  |
| 1  | A. Absolutely not. I don't believe I  | 1  | pursuit of a cash deal that would maximize the value  |
| 2  | A. Absolutely not. I don't believe I could ever coerce the board to do anything. But, no,   | 2  | pursuit of a cash deal that would maximize the value of your retirement benefits." True or false?   |
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| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22       | A. Absolutely not. I don't believe I could ever coerce the board to do anything. But, no, this was throughout the entire process, it was a fulsome discussion and debate and vetting.  Q. And I think from your earlier examination by counsel, Mr. Smith was not even in town at that time; right?  A. That's the one, I just cannot recall.  Q. Okay. So he wasn't at that board meeting trying to convince the board to take that offer, was he?  A. Oh, certainly not, certainly not.  Q. Last exhibit. Let's look at our  Demonstrative Exhibit No. 1. And there is a lot on this exhibit.  ATTORNEY HARRELL: It's in the binder, Your Honor.  Q. It is a summary of your communications with the board between March 4 and March 17. And we've put the board meeting entries in black. What you see in blue are emails and board updates. I counted 43 contacts between March 4 and March 17.                                 | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22       | pursuit of a cash deal that would maximize the value of your retirement benefits." True or false?  A. False. Q. And, again, we don't have much time, but give me a really short answer of why that's false. A. Because I had no intention or plan to do that. I was going to work and labor to make this company successful and then ultimately to run a process that was best in class, credible, fair and honest. Q. And looking back, do you believe that the board made the right decision? A. Oh, absolutely. When I look back and when the market looks back, it was an outstanding outcome for the shareholders.  ATTORNEY HARRELL: Pass the witness, Your Honor.  ATTORNEY van KWAWEGEN: Thank you, Your Honor.  REDIRECT EXAMINATION  BY ATTORNEY van KWAWEGEN: Q. Mr. Skaggs, did I hear you testify  |

# R. Skaggs - Redirect

|   |  | R. Skaggs - Redirect   | age 1083   |   | R. Skaggs - Redirect   | ge 1085             |
|---|--|--|--|---|--|---------------------|
| 1   | was \$28 per s   |  | age 1003   | minutes ago   | I think you talked about this. Do you  | y <del>c</del> 1003 |
| 2   | Α.   | That's correct, when we were look  |  | •   |  |                     |
| 3   | at the issuan  |  | 3  |   | Yes.   |                     |
| 4   | Q.   | And did I also hear you say that the   | 4  |   | You have no basis to believe that this   |                     |
| 5   |  | was somewhat like a poison pill? Did   | 5  |   | ctually went to the board, do you?   |                     |
| 6   | I hear you say   |  | 6  |   | I just don't know.   |                     |
| 7   | A.   | Somewhat like that, in my estimat  | _  |   | Right. And if you look at the first  |                     |
| 8   | Q.   | And you went to law school; right?   | 8  |   | document, it's just an email from Matt   |                     |
| 9   | α.<br><b>A.</b>  | I did.   | 9  |   | ou dated March 14.   |                     |
|   | Q.   |  |  | -   |  |                     |
| 10  |  | Okay. And did I also hear you say  | 1(   | -   | That's true. But the information ma  | ıy                  |
| 11  | -  | n't see anyone after this equity   | . 11   |   | conveyed to the board. In fact, I would  |                     |
| 12  | -  | dn't see anyone be interested in making  |  | =   | ted it to be conveyed to the board.  |                     |
| 13  | a proposal?  |  | 13   |   | But sitting here today, you don't know   |                     |
| 14  | Α.   | That's exactly right.  | 14   |   |  |                     |
| 15  | Q.   | Let me show you a document, and it   |  |   | Don't know one way or the other.   |                     |
| 16  |  | d at the top there's an email from Steve   | 16   |   | Let's go back to the second page.  |                     |
| 17  | -  | and others talking about the proxy and   | 17   |   | s comparing the various stock price,   |                     |
| 18  | macro factors  | affecting value.   | 18   |   | s, right, the implied revised offer per  |                     |
| 19  |  | Then at the end he says, "We also g  | got 19   | 9 Capricorn sl  | nare, is as of March 14, 2016; right?  |                     |
| 20  | bonus depreci  | ation, if you recall which completely  | 20   | ) <b>A.</b>   | Well   |                     |
| 21  | mitigated the  | equity raise on a per share DCF basis."  | 21   | 1 Q.  | Date of the document?  |                     |
| 22  |  | That's the same Mr. Smith, Steve   | 22   | 2 <b>A</b> .  | Yes, but I'm not sure it's various   |                     |
| 23  | Smith, that yo   | u refer to as a cautious person?   | 23   | 3 prices unle   | ss I'm missing something here. I think   |                     |
| 24  | A.   | Correct.   | 24   | 4 it's one prio   | e but different assumptions  |                     |
|   |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |  |   | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |                     |
|   |  | R. Skaggs - Redirect   | age 1084   |   | R. Skaggs - Redirect   | ge 1086             |
| 1   | Q.   | Down the middle, conservative?   | 1  | Q.  | All right.   | •                   |
| 2   | A.   | Correct.   | 2  | Α.  | I think.   |                     |
| 3   | Q.   | Okay. You also talked about Spectr   | ra. 3  | Q.  | And that's as of March 14, 2016?   |                     |
| 4   |  | Now, it's true, is it not, that when   | 4  |   | Again, subject to check, I'll agree  |                     |
| 5   | Spectra showe  |  | _  |   | s what it is, it's what it is.   |                     |
|   |  | ed up, you were not in exclusivity with  | 5  | that it that's  |  |                     |
| 6   | TransCanada  | ed up, you were not in exclusivity with  | 5  |   |  |                     |
| 6<br>7  | TransCanada  | ?  | 6  | Q.  | Right. And if you see above, you see   |                     |
| 7   | A.   | ? When Spectra showed up? I belie  | 6 <b>eve</b> 7   | Q.<br>where it say  | Right. And if you see above, you see s, "Equity Consideration (per Capricorn   |                     |
| 7<br>8  | A.<br>that's right. \  | ? When Spectra showed up? I belie When the note was written to me, and   | 6 7 1 8  | Q. where it say Share) [of] \$  | Right. And if you see above, you see s, "Equity Consideration (per Capricorn 2.60"?  |                     |
| 7<br>8<br>9   | A.<br>that's right. \<br>our response  | ? When Spectra showed up? I belie  | 6 <b>eve</b> 7 8 9   | Q. where it say Share) [of] \$ A.   | Right. And if you see above, you see s, "Equity Consideration (per Capricorn 2.60"?  Yes.  |                     |
| 7<br>8<br>9<br>10   | A.<br>that's right. V<br>our response<br>correct.  | When Spectra showed up? I beliew when the note was written to me, and was provided to them, I think that is  | 6 6 7 8 8 9 10   | Q. where it say Share) [of] \$ A. Q.  | Right. And if you see above, you see s, "Equity Consideration (per Capricorn 2.60"?  Yes.  If that equity consideration had been   |                     |
| 7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11   | A. that's right. Vour response correct.  | When Spectra showed up? I beliew when the note was written to me, and was provided to them, I think that is  And you were not required to renew  | 6 7 8 8 9 10 11  | Q. where it say Share) [of] \$ A. Compared Q. If fixed as of the  | Right. And if you see above, you see s, "Equity Consideration (per Capricorn 2.60"?  Yes.  If that equity consideration had been he date of the signing, right, it could   |                     |
| 7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12   | A. that's right. Vour response correct. Q. exclusivity with  | When Spectra showed up? I belie When the note was written to me, and was provided to them, I think that is  And you were not required to renew TransCanada?  | 6 6 7 8 8 9 10 11 12   | Q. where it say Share) [of] \$ A. Q. I fixed as of the say of the s | Right. And if you see above, you see s, "Equity Consideration (per Capricorn 2.60"?  Yes.  If that equity consideration had been the date of the signing, right, it could up if TransCanada stock price increased  |                     |
| 7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13   | A. that's right. Vour response correct. Q. exclusivity with A.   | When Spectra showed up? I belie When the note was written to me, and was provided to them, I think that is  And you were not required to renew TransCanada? Certainly not.   | 6 6 7 8 8 9 10 11 12 13  | where it say Share) [of] \$ A. Q. fixed as of the say t | Right. And if you see above, you see s, "Equity Consideration (per Capricorn 2.60"?  Yes.  If that equity consideration had been he date of the signing, right, it could   |                     |
| 7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14   | A. that's right. Vour response correct. Q. exclusivity with A. Q.  | When Spectra showed up? I belie When the note was written to me, and was provided to them, I think that is  And you were not required to renew TransCanada? Certainly not. Okay. So just to be clear, when   | 6 eve 7 1 8 9 10 11 12 13 14   | where it say Share) [of] \$ A.  Q. fixed as of the say o | Right. And if you see above, you see s, "Equity Consideration (per Capricorn 2.60"?  Yes.  If that equity consideration had been the date of the signing, right, it could up if TransCanada stock price increased date of the signing and the date of the  |                     |
| 7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15   | A. that's right. Vour response correct. Q. exclusivity with A. Q. Spectra's CEC  | When Spectra showed up? I belie When the note was written to me, and was provided to them, I think that is  And you were not required to renew TransCanada? Certainly not. Okay. So just to be clear, when   | 6 6 7 8 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15  | where it say Share) [of] \$ A. O Q. fixed as of the have gone to between the close? A. A. County of the close of the close? A. County of the close? A.  | Right. And if you see above, you see s, "Equity Consideration (per Capricorn 2.60"?  Yes.  If that equity consideration had been he date of the signing, right, it could up if TransCanada stock price increased date of the signing and the date of the Yes, and the converse is true.  |                     |
| 7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16   | A. that's right. Vour response correct. Q. exclusivity with A. Q. Spectra's CEC  | When Spectra showed up? I belief When the note was written to me, and was provided to them, I think that is  And you were not required to renew TransCanada? Certainly not. Okay. So just to be clear, when Contacted you and the head of corpora was reaching out to Goldman Sachs, no  | 6 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 15 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16  | where it say Share) [of] \$ A. Q. fixed as of the have gone to between the close? A.  A. A. A. A. A. A. A. A. A. A. A. A.   | Right. And if you see above, you see s, "Equity Consideration (per Capricorn 2.60"?  Yes.  If that equity consideration had been the date of the signing, right, it could up if TransCanada stock price increased date of the signing and the date of the  Yes, and the converse is true.  ATTORNEY van KWAWEGEN: Tha  | ınk you.            |
| 7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17                                     | A. that's right. Vour response correct. Q. exclusivity with A. Q. Spectra's CEC development vexclusivity; right.   | When Spectra showed up? I belie When the note was written to me, and was provided to them, I think that is  And you were not required to renew TransCanada? Certainly not. Okay. So just to be clear, when contacted you and the head of corpora was reaching out to Goldman Sachs, no   | 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 15 16 16 17 16 17 17 17 18 17 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18   | Q. where it say Share) [of] \$\frac{A}{A}\$.  Q. fixed as of the have gone to between the close?  A. A  | Right. And if you see above, you see s, "Equity Consideration (per Capricorn 2.60"?  Yes.  If that equity consideration had been the date of the signing, right, it could up if TransCanada stock price increased date of the signing and the date of the  Yes, and the converse is true.  ATTORNEY van KWAWEGEN: Tha No further questions, Your Honor.  | •                   |
| 7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18                               | A. that's right. Vour response correct. Q. exclusivity with A. Q. Spectra's CEC development vexclusivity; right.   | When Spectra showed up? I belie When the note was written to me, and was provided to them, I think that is  And you were not required to renew TransCanada? Certainly not. Okay. So just to be clear, when Contacted you and the head of corpora was reaching out to Goldman Sachs, no ht? Again, subject to check, that would   | 6 6 7 8 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 be 18   | where it say Share) [of] \$ A. Q. fixed as of the close? A.   | Right. And if you see above, you see s, "Equity Consideration (per Capricorn 2.60"?  Yes.  If that equity consideration had been the date of the signing, right, it could up if TransCanada stock price increased date of the signing and the date of the  Yes, and the converse is true.  ATTORNEY van KWAWEGEN: That No further questions, Your Honor.  ATTORNEY HARRELL: Nothing furti  | •                   |
| 7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18                               | A. that's right. Vour response correct. Q. exclusivity with A. Q. Spectra's CEC development vexclusivity; right A. my recollection                                 | When Spectra showed up? I belie When the note was written to me, and was provided to them, I think that is And you were not required to renew TransCanada? Certainly not. Okay. So just to be clear, when O contacted you and the head of corpora was reaching out to Goldman Sachs, no ht? Again, subject to check, that would  | 6 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 15 16 16 16 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18   | where it say Share) [of] \$ A. O Q. If ixed as of the have gone to between the close? A. A. A. A. B. C.   | Right. And if you see above, you see s, "Equity Consideration (per Capricorn 2.60"?  Yes.  If that equity consideration had been he date of the signing, right, it could up if TransCanada stock price increased date of the signing and the date of the  Yes, and the converse is true.  ATTORNEY van KWAWEGEN: That No further questions, Your Honor.  ATTORNEY HARRELL: Nothing further see the converse is true.   | ther,               |
| 7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20                   | A. that's right. Vour response correct. Q. exclusivity with A. Q. Spectra's CEC development vexclusivity; rig A. my recollection Q.                                | When Spectra showed up? I belie When the note was written to me, and was provided to them, I think that is  And you were not required to renew TransCanada? Certainly not. Okay. So just to be clear, when Contacted you and the head of corpora was reaching out to Goldman Sachs, no ht? Again, subject to check, that would on. Now, your counsel moving on to the  | 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 16 18 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19  | where it say Share) [of] \$ A. Q. fixed as of the close? A. Comparison of the close of the close? A. Comparison of the close of the close of the close? A. Comparison of the close o | Right. And if you see above, you see s, "Equity Consideration (per Capricorn 2.60"?  Yes.  If that equity consideration had been the date of the signing, right, it could up if TransCanada stock price increased date of the signing and the date of the  Yes, and the converse is true.  ATTORNEY van KWAWEGEN: That No further questions, Your Honor.  ATTORNEY HARRELL: Nothing furtions the country of  | ther,               |
| 7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21             | A. that's right. Vour response correct. Q. exclusivity with A. Q. Spectra's CEC development vexclusivity; right A. my recollection Q. next topic, you              | When Spectra showed up? I belie When the note was written to me, and was provided to them, I think that is  And you were not required to renew TransCanada? Certainly not. Okay. So just to be clear, when Contacted you and the head of corpora was reaching out to Goldman Sachs, no ht? Again, subject to check, that would on. Now, your counsel moving on to the counsel showed you a document that   | 6 6 7 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 15 16 be 18 19 16 16 17 16 16 17 16 16 17 16 16 17 16 16 17 16 16 17 16 16 17 16 16 17 16 16 17 16 16 17 16 16 17 16 16 17 16 16 17 16 16 17 16 16 17 16 16 16 17 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 | where it say Share) [of] \$ A. Q. fixed as of the say between the close? A. G.  | Right. And if you see above, you see s, "Equity Consideration (per Capricorn 2.60"?  Yes.  If that equity consideration had been needate of the signing, right, it could up if TransCanada stock price increased date of the signing and the date of the  Yes, and the converse is true.  ATTORNEY van KWAWEGEN: That No further questions, Your Honor.  ATTORNEY HARRELL: Nothing furtions the country of t | ther,               |
| 7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22       | A. that's right. Vour response correct. Q. exclusivity with A. Q. Spectra's CEC development vexclusivity; right A. my recollection Q. next topic, you              | When Spectra showed up? I belie When the note was written to me, and was provided to them, I think that is  And you were not required to renew TransCanada? Certainly not. Okay. So just to be clear, when Contacted you and the head of corpora was reaching out to Goldman Sachs, no ht? Again, subject to check, that would on. Now, your counsel moving on to the counsel showed you a document that all ybe we can show you that.                                       | 6 6 7 8 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 15 16 be 18 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19   | where it say Share) [of] \$ A. Q. fixed as of the close? A. Share as of the close as of the close? A. Share as of the close as of the close? A. Share as of the close as of t | Right. And if you see above, you see s, "Equity Consideration (per Capricorn 2.60"?  Yes.  If that equity consideration had been the date of the signing, right, it could up if TransCanada stock price increased date of the signing and the date of the  Yes, and the converse is true.  ATTORNEY van KWAWEGEN: That No further questions, Your Honor.  ATTORNEY HARRELL: Nothing furtions the country of  | ther,               |
| 7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21             | A. that's right. Vour response correct. Q. exclusivity with A. Q. Spectra's CEC development vexclusivity; right A. my recollection Q. next topic, you JTX 1081. Ma | When Spectra showed up? I belie When the note was written to me, and was provided to them, I think that is  And you were not required to renew TransCanada? Certainly not. Okay. So just to be clear, when O contacted you and the head of corpora was reaching out to Goldman Sachs, no ht? Again, subject to check, that woul on. Now, your counsel moving on to the or counsel showed you a document that aybe we can show you that. And on the second page, there's this | 1 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16   | where it say Share) [of] \$ A. O Q. If ixed as of the close? A. O A. O between the close? A. O   | Right. And if you see above, you see s, "Equity Consideration (per Capricorn 2.60"?  Yes.  If that equity consideration had been he date of the signing, right, it could up if TransCanada stock price increased date of the signing and the date of the  Yes, and the converse is true.  ATTORNEY van KWAWEGEN: That No further questions, Your Honor.  ATTORNEY HARRELL: Nothing furtion the COURT: Thank you, Mr. Skaggou being here.  THE WITNESS: Thank you.  (Witness excused.)  | ther,               |
| 7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22       | A. that's right. Vour response correct. Q. exclusivity with A. Q. Spectra's CEC development vexclusivity; right A. my recollection Q. next topic, you JTX 1081. Ma | When Spectra showed up? I belie When the note was written to me, and was provided to them, I think that is  And you were not required to renew TransCanada? Certainly not. Okay. So just to be clear, when Contacted you and the head of corpora was reaching out to Goldman Sachs, no ht? Again, subject to check, that would on. Now, your counsel moving on to the counsel showed you a document that all ybe we can show you that.                                       | 6 6 7 8 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 15 16 be 18 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19   | where it say Share) [of] \$ A. O Q. If ixed as of the close? A. O A. O between the close? A. O   | Right. And if you see above, you see s, "Equity Consideration (per Capricorn 2.60"?  Yes.  If that equity consideration had been ne date of the signing, right, it could p if TransCanada stock price increased date of the signing and the date of the  Yes, and the converse is true.  ATTORNEY van KWAWEGEN: Than No further questions, Your Honor.  ATTORNEY HARRELL: Nothing furtions the course of the country of the | ther,               |
| 7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23 | A. that's right. Vour response correct. Q. exclusivity with A. Q. Spectra's CEC development vexclusivity; right A. my recollection Q. next topic, you JTX 1081. Ma | When Spectra showed up? I belie When the note was written to me, and was provided to them, I think that is  And you were not required to renew TransCanada? Certainly not. Okay. So just to be clear, when O contacted you and the head of corpora was reaching out to Goldman Sachs, no ht? Again, subject to check, that woul on. Now, your counsel moving on to the or counsel showed you a document that aybe we can show you that. And on the second page, there's this | 1 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16   | where it say Share) [of] \$ A. O Q. If ixed as of the close? A. O A. O between the close? A. O   | Right. And if you see above, you see s, "Equity Consideration (per Capricorn 2.60"?  Yes.  If that equity consideration had been he date of the signing, right, it could up if TransCanada stock price increased date of the signing and the date of the  Yes, and the converse is true.  ATTORNEY van KWAWEGEN: That No further questions, Your Honor.  ATTORNEY HARRELL: Nothing furtion the COURT: Thank you, Mr. Skaggou being here.  THE WITNESS: Thank you.  (Witness excused.)  | ther,               |

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|--|--|---|---|
|  | J. Hunter - Direct Page 1087   | ,   | J. Hunter - Direct Page 1089  |
| 1  | going to call Joel Hunter to the stand. We're just   | 1   | finance, responsibilities are long-term financing for   |
| 2  | going to get him.  | 2   | the company, working with the credit agencies, and  |
| 3  | JOEL EDWARD HUNTER, having first been  | 3   | being responsible for our long-term planning and  |
| 4  | duly affirmed, was examined and testified as follows:  | 4   | forecasting.  |
| 5  | DIRECT EXAMINATION   | 5   | Q. Now, before the July 1st, 2016,  |
| 6  | BY ATTORNEY YOCH:  | 6   | acquisition of Columbia by TransCanada, did you have a  |
| 7  | Q. Hello, Mr. Hunter. For the record, my   | 7   | close relationship with anyone in management at   |
| 8  | name is James Yoch on behalf of TransCanada.   | 8   | Columbia?   |
| 9  | Can you please briefly describe for  | 9   | A. No.  |
| 10   | the Court your educational background?   | 10  | Q. As the then-vice president of finance  |
| 11   | A. Yes. I have a bachelor of arts in   | 11  | and treasurer at TransCanada, did your role include   |
| 12   | economics from the University of Regina. I have a  | 12  | modeling from a corporate planning perspective?   |
| 13   | bachelor of commerce, majoring in accounting, from the   | 13  | A. Yes.   |
| 14   | University of Calgary. And I'm a charter financial   | 14  | Q. What specifically did that involve?  |
| 15   | analyst, commonly known as a CFA charterholder.  | 15  |   |
|  |  |   | , ,,  |
| 16   | Q. Could you please briefly describe your  | 16  | transaction that we do in the company. We looked for  |
| 17   | work history now.  | 17  | the corporate impacts. So we put the model and  |
| 18   | A. Started with TransCanada back in 1997.  | 18  | valuation model into our corporate model, determine   |
| 19   | Started as an analyst in the accounting group. I went  | 19  | the impact on our earnings per share, cash flow per   |
| 20   | into the finance group around 2000. I became the   | 20  | share, or EBITDA, or cash flow, and the finance plans   |
| 21   | director of finance in 2008. I became the vice   | 21  | associated with it.   |
| 22   | president of finance in 2010. I became the vice  | 22  | Q. What was your role in connection with  |
| 23   | president of finance and treasurer in 2015. Senior   | 23  | evaluating the acquisition of Columbia?   |
| 24   | vice president, capital markets in 2019. Then I moved  | 24  | A. So my role our group's role was to   |
|  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |   | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |
|  |  |   |   |
|  | J. Hunter - Direct Page 1088   | 1   | J. Hunter - Direct Page 1090  |
| 1  | J. Hunter - Direct Page 1088   | 1   | J. Hunter - Direct Page 1090 evaluate the corporate impacts. So, again, we would  |
| 1 2  | Page 1088  |   | Page 1090   |
|  | into my current role on August 1st of last year as   | 1   | evaluate the corporate impacts. So, again, we would   |
| 2  | into my current role on August 1st of last year as executive vice president and chief financial officer.   | 1 2   | evaluate the corporate impacts. So, again, we would take an evaluation model, put it into our corporate   |
| 2  | into my current role on August 1st of last year as executive vice president and chief financial officer.  Q. And your predecessor and CFO was  | 1<br>2<br>3   | evaluate the corporate impacts. So, again, we would take an evaluation model, put it into our corporate model to determine the impact it would have on our  |
| 2<br>3<br>4  | into my current role on August 1st of last year as executive vice president and chief financial officer.  Q. And your predecessor and CFO was Don Marchand; right?   | 1<br>2<br>3<br>4  | evaluate the corporate impacts. So, again, we would take an evaluation model, put it into our corporate model to determine the impact it would have on our earnings cash flow and, again, work through a finance  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5   | into my current role on August 1st of last year as executive vice president and chief financial officer.  Q. And your predecessor and CFO was Don Marchand; right?  A. Yes.  | 1<br>2<br>3<br>4<br>5   | evaluate the corporate impacts. So, again, we would take an evaluation model, put it into our corporate model to determine the impact it would have on our earnings cash flow and, again, work through a finance plan associated with that as well.   |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6  | into my current role on August 1st of last year as executive vice president and chief financial officer.  Q. And your predecessor and CFO was Don Marchand; right?  A. Yes. Q. What are your responsibilities as CFO   | 1<br>2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6  | evaluate the corporate impacts. So, again, we would take an evaluation model, put it into our corporate model to determine the impact it would have on our earnings cash flow and, again, work through a finance plan associated with that as well.  Q. Did that include engaging with the  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7   | into my current role on August 1st of last year as executive vice president and chief financial officer.  Q. And your predecessor and CFO was Don Marchand; right?  A. Yes.  Q. What are your responsibilities as CFO of TransCanada?  | 1<br>2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7                                   | evaluate the corporate impacts. So, again, we would take an evaluation model, put it into our corporate model to determine the impact it would have on our earnings cash flow and, again, work through a finance plan associated with that as well.  Q. Did that include engaging with the rating agencies?   |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8  | into my current role on August 1st of last year as executive vice president and chief financial officer.  Q. And your predecessor and CFO was Don Marchand; right?  A. Yes. Q. What are your responsibilities as CFO of TransCanada?  A. My responsibilities range from  | 1<br>2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8                              | evaluate the corporate impacts. So, again, we would take an evaluation model, put it into our corporate model to determine the impact it would have on our earnings cash flow and, again, work through a finance plan associated with that as well.  Q. Did that include engaging with the rating agencies?  A. It did.   |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9   | into my current role on August 1st of last year as executive vice president and chief financial officer.  Q. And your predecessor and CFO was  Don Marchand; right?  A. Yes.  Q. What are your responsibilities as CFO of TransCanada?  A. My responsibilities range from accounting, tax, treasury, finance, risk management,   | 1<br>2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8                              | evaluate the corporate impacts. So, again, we would take an evaluation model, put it into our corporate model to determine the impact it would have on our earnings cash flow and, again, work through a finance plan associated with that as well.  Q. Did that include engaging with the rating agencies?  A. It did.  Q. And what specifically did that entail,  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9   | into my current role on August 1st of last year as executive vice president and chief financial officer.  Q. And your predecessor and CFO was  Don Marchand; right?  A. Yes.  Q. What are your responsibilities as CFO of TransCanada?  A. My responsibilities range from accounting, tax, treasury, finance, risk management, investor relations.   | 1<br>2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9                         | evaluate the corporate impacts. So, again, we would take an evaluation model, put it into our corporate model to determine the impact it would have on our earnings cash flow and, again, work through a finance plan associated with that as well.  Q. Did that include engaging with the rating agencies?  A. It did. Q. And what specifically did that entail, engaging with the rating agencies?  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10   | into my current role on August 1st of last year as executive vice president and chief financial officer.  Q. And your predecessor and CFO was  Don Marchand; right?  A. Yes.  Q. What are your responsibilities as CFO of TransCanada?  A. My responsibilities range from accounting, tax, treasury, finance, risk management, investor relations.  Q. What was your position at TransCanada   | 1<br>2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10                   | evaluate the corporate impacts. So, again, we would take an evaluation model, put it into our corporate model to determine the impact it would have on our earnings cash flow and, again, work through a finance plan associated with that as well.  Q. Did that include engaging with the rating agencies?  A. It did. Q. And what specifically did that entail, engaging with the rating agencies?  A. So what it entailed is it's called a   |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11   | into my current role on August 1st of last year as executive vice president and chief financial officer.  Q. And your predecessor and CFO was  Don Marchand; right?  A. Yes.  Q. What are your responsibilities as CFO of TransCanada?  A. My responsibilities range from accounting, tax, treasury, finance, risk management, investor relations.  Q. What was your position at TransCanada during the 2015 to 2016 process that led to   | 1<br>2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11             | evaluate the corporate impacts. So, again, we would take an evaluation model, put it into our corporate model to determine the impact it would have on our earnings cash flow and, again, work through a finance plan associated with that as well.  Q. Did that include engaging with the rating agencies?  A. It did. Q. And what specifically did that entail, engaging with the rating agencies?  A. So what it entailed is it's called a rating advisory service where we provide them our   |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14   | into my current role on August 1st of last year as executive vice president and chief financial officer.  Q. And your predecessor and CFO was  Don Marchand; right?  A. Yes.  Q. What are your responsibilities as CFO of TransCanada?  A. My responsibilities range from accounting, tax, treasury, finance, risk management, investor relations.  Q. What was your position at TransCanada during the 2015 to 2016 process that led to TransCanada's acquisition of Columbia?  | 1<br>2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13 | evaluate the corporate impacts. So, again, we would take an evaluation model, put it into our corporate model to determine the impact it would have on our earnings cash flow and, again, work through a finance plan associated with that as well.  Q. Did that include engaging with the rating agencies?  A. It did. Q. And what specifically did that entail, engaging with the rating agencies?  A. So what it entailed is it's called a rating advisory service where we provide them our model with the acquisition and associated finance plan. And what they do is they opine on that model to   |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15   | into my current role on August 1st of last year as executive vice president and chief financial officer.  Q. And your predecessor and CFO was  Don Marchand; right?  A. Yes.  Q. What are your responsibilities as CFO of TransCanada?  A. My responsibilities range from accounting, tax, treasury, finance, risk management, investor relations.  Q. What was your position at TransCanada during the 2015 to 2016 process that led to TransCanada's acquisition of Columbia?  A. I was vice president of finance and treasurer.   | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14                                  | evaluate the corporate impacts. So, again, we would take an evaluation model, put it into our corporate model to determine the impact it would have on our earnings cash flow and, again, work through a finance plan associated with that as well.  Q. Did that include engaging with the rating agencies?  A. It did. Q. And what specifically did that entail, engaging with the rating agencies?  A. So what it entailed is it's called a rating advisory service where we provide them our model with the acquisition and associated finance plan. And what they do is they opine on that model to determine whether or not it has any impact on our   |
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CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS

|  | J. Hunter - Direct   |  | J. Hunter - Direct  |
|--|--|--|---|
| 1  | Page 1091 maintain those ratings?  | 1  | Q. You see this is a February 5th, 2016,  |
| 2  | A. Yes, it was.  | 2  | email exchange from Linda Leslie to Don Marchand and  |
| 3  | Q. Why?  | 3  | others, and you're copied on this email. There's an   |
| 4  | A. Credit ratings are really important to  | 4  | attachment.   |
| 5  | a company of our size, and especially the capital  | 5  | ATTORNEY YOCH: Can we turn to   |
| 6  | program that we have where we're really relying on the   | 6  | JTX 694.003, the first page of that attachment.   |
| 7  | capital markets.   | 7  | Q. What is this attachment?   |
| 8  | Generally, the higher the rating, the  | 8  | A. So this attachment is the ratings  |
| 9  | lower the cost of capital. And by that, I mean you   | 9  | presentation that was provided to all three rating  |
| 10   | keep your debt costs as low as can, the higher the   | 10   | agencies as part of their rating advisory service.  |
| 11   | credit rating, along with keeping a premium valuation  | 11   | ATTORNEY YOCH: Okay. Could you  |
| 12   | for your shares.   | 12   | please turn, Kentaro, to JTX 694.010. And if you're   |
| 13   | Q. Did TransCanada approach any rating   | 13   | using the hard copy, it's the internally numbered   |
| 14   | agencies in connection with a potential acquisition of   | 14   | Slide 8.  |
| 15   | Columbia?  | 15   | Q. What is this slide showing?  |
| 16   | A. We did.   | 16   | A. So this slide shows two scenarios that   |
| 17   | Q. And what were those rating agencies?  | 17   | represent the agencies. On the left-hand side is an   |
| 18   | A. So it was Moody's, Standard & Poor's,   | 18   | assumed acquisition price of \$25 per share. The first  |
| 19   | DBRS, all three agencies that were covering us at the  | 19   | scenario contemplates us issuing debt, which is shown   |
| 20   | time.  | 20   | in the purple box, along with some equity. And then   |
| 21   | Q. When did approach those rating  | 21   | the gray box being asset sales, hence the title "Asset  |
| 22   | agencies in connection with a potential acquisition of   | 22   | Sale" for scenario number one.  |
| 23   | Columbia?  | 23   | The second scenario does not  |
| 24   | A. We approached them in early February  | 24   | contemplate asset sales. It's purely debt and equity.   |
|  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |
|  |  |  | ***************************************   |
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|  | J. Hunter - Direct Page 1092   |  | J. Hunter - Direct Page 1094  |
| 1  | J. Hunter - Direct Page 1092 of 2016.  | 1  | J. Hunter - Direct Page 1094 So the key in both of these scenarios is that TC   |
| 1 2  | Page 1092  | 1 2  | Page 1094   |
|  | of 2016.   |  | So the key in both of these scenarios is that TC  |
| 2  | of 2016.  Q. Why did you why did TransCanada   | 2  | So the key in both of these scenarios is that TC Energy is assuming to issue debt for the transaction.  |
| 2  | of 2016.  Q. Why did you why did TransCanada approach the rating agencies?   | 2  | So the key in both of these scenarios is that TC  Energy is assuming to issue debt for the transaction.  Q. And how did the rating agencies react   |
| 2<br>3<br>4  | of 2016.  Q. Why did you why did TransCanada approach the rating agencies?  A. Our ratings are really important to   | 2<br>3<br>4  | So the key in both of these scenarios is that TC  Energy is assuming to issue debt for the transaction.  Q. And how did the rating agencies react to these scenarios that TransCanada presented to them?  |
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| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23 | of 2016.  Q. Why did you why did TransCanada approach the rating agencies?  A. Our ratings are really important to us. As I mentioned earlier, we're at A- with a stable outlook with all three agencies, which we found really important for us, again, from a cost-of-capital standpoint. It was important for our management team, it was important for our board of directors that we maintain those credit ratings.  So given the size of this transaction and the finance plan that's associated with it, we felt it was important for us to go to the rating agencies for them to provide what's called an indicative rating, that if the transaction were to go ahead, based on the information they received from us through our model, that the rating would apply at that point in time.  Q. I'd like for you to take a look at the binder. The document will also come up on your screen. But if you'd like to take a look at the hard copy of the document, there's binder in front of you.  Would you turn to JTX 694, please. | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23 | So the key in both of these scenarios is that TC  Energy is assuming to issue debt for the transaction.  Q. And how did the rating agencies react to these scenarios that TransCanada presented to them?  A. They came back to us and with  Moody's, they said we'd be downgraded to BBB+ with a negative outlook. Standard & Poor's came back and said we'd be downgraded to BBB+ with a negative outlook. And DBRS came back and said we'd be downgraded to BBB+ with a stable outlook.  Q. Could you take a look at JTX 778 now,  Mr. Hunter. This is the minutes of the February 24,  2016  THE COURT: Can I just ask you something? Is that basically one level? I don't have the different rating agencies' stacks in my head. But basically, each one of them was telling you you'd be downgraded one level with negative outlook, or was it more than one level?  THE WITNESS: It was one level.  THE COURT: It was one level. Okay.  BY ATTORNEY YOCH:  Q. So I think on your screen is JTX 778. |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22       | of 2016.  Q. Why did you why did TransCanada approach the rating agencies?  A. Our ratings are really important to us. As I mentioned earlier, we're at A- with a stable outlook with all three agencies, which we found really important for us, again, from a cost-of-capital standpoint. It was important for our management team, it was important for our board of directors that we maintain those credit ratings.  So given the size of this transaction and the finance plan that's associated with it, we felt it was important for us to go to the rating agencies for them to provide what's called an indicative rating, that if the transaction were to go ahead, based on the information they received from us through our model, that the rating would apply at that point in time.  Q. I'd like for you to take a look at the binder. The document will also come up on your screen. But if you'd like to take a look at the hard copy of the document, there's binder in front of you.                                     | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22       | So the key in both of these scenarios is that TC  Energy is assuming to issue debt for the transaction.  Q. And how did the rating agencies react to these scenarios that TransCanada presented to them?  A. They came back to us and with  Moody's, they said we'd be downgraded to BBB+ with a negative outlook. Standard & Poor's came back and said we'd be downgraded to BBB+ with a negative outlook. And DBRS came back and said we'd be downgraded to BBB+ with a stable outlook.  Q. Could you take a look at JTX 778 now,  Mr. Hunter. This is the minutes of the February 24,  2016  THE COURT: Can I just ask you something? Is that basically one level? I don't have the different rating agencies' stacks in my head. But basically, each one of them was telling you you'd be downgraded one level with negative outlook, or was it more than one level?  THE WITNESS: It was one level.  THE COURT: It was one level. Okay.  BY ATTORNEY YOCH:   |

|  | J. Hui  | ter - Di   | rect  |
|--|---|--|---|
|  | J. Hunter - Direct Page 1095  |  | J. Hunter - Direct Page 1097  |
| 1  | the TransCanada board meeting. Did you attend this  | 1  | what we heard back from the credit rating agencies.   |
| 2  | meeting?  | 2  | You can see here, as mentioned earlier, a one notch   |
| 3  | A. Yes.   | 3  | downgrade to BBB+ from all three agencies if we were  |
| 4  | Q. I'd like you to take a look at the   | 4  | to pursue the two scenarios that we presented to them.  |
| 5  | underlined heading "Project Constellation" towards the  | 5  | And it highlights here that Moody's and S&P, the  |
| 6  | bottom of the page. And the first paragraph   | 6  | negative outlook, and DBRS with a stable outlook.   |
| 7  | underneath that says, "The key issues included the  | 7  | Further on, just an assessment or   |
| 8  | funding plan, the adverse outcome of the credit rating  | 8  | overview just what came from reports back from each of  |
| 9  | advisory services discussions and potential   | 9  | the agencies are summarized in these two slides here.   |
| 10   | alternative financing scenarios which could be  | 10   | Q. The fourth bullet down says, "Would  |
| 11   | explored in order to continue pursuit of the Capricorn  | 11   | lose ability to issue commercial paper in Canada."  |
| 12   | acquisition."   | 12   | Why is that important?  |
| 13   | Do you see that?  | 13   | A. It's really important at the time for  |
| 14   | A. I do.  | 14   | a company like us. We only had a commercial paper   |
| 15   | Q. Where it says, "[T]he adverse outcome  | 15   | program in Canada; we did not have one in the United  |
| 16   | of the credit rating advisory services  | 16   | States. And the importance of having the DBRS rating  |
| 17   | discussions," what were those discussions? And  | 17   | is you need a rating from DBRS to access the  |
| 18   | how did they take place?  | 18   | commercial paper market in Canada.  |
| 19   | A. They took place through a call that  | 19   | And the way it works is it's you get a  |
| 20   | was on February 19, I believe, a Friday. We had   | 20   | different rating. And with our A- rating with a   |
| 21   | received calls with we had calls with Moody's and   | 21   | stable outlook, we had what was called an R-1(low)  |
| 22   | Standard & Poor's. We were supposed to have a   | 22   | rating on commercial paper, which allowed us to access  |
| 23   | scheduled call that day with DBRS, but they needed the  | 23   | the commercial paper market basically at any point in   |
| 24   | weekend. And they came back to us the following   | 24   | time. This is important from a treasury standpoint  |
|  | weekend. And they came back to us the following   |  | time. This is important from a treasury standpoint  |
|  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |
|  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |
|  | J. Hunter - Direct Page 1096  |  | J. Hunter - Direct Page 1098  |
| 1  | J. Hunter - Direct Page 1096 Tuesday.   | 1  | J. Hunter - Direct Page 1098 for liquidity of a company. It's short-term warrants,  |
| 1 2  | J. Hunter - Direct Page 1096  Tuesday. Q. And you were on those calls and heard   | 1 2  | J. Hunter - Direct Page 1098 for liquidity of a company. It's short-term warrants, you can do from one day right up to 364 days.  |
| 1 2 3  | J. Hunter - Direct Page 1096  Tuesday. Q. And you were on those calls and heard directly from the rating agencies?  | 1<br>2<br>3  | J. Hunter - Direct Page 1098  for liquidity of a company. It's short-term warrants, you can do from one day right up to 364 days.  If we went down to BBB+ with a stable  |
| 1<br>2<br>3<br>4                                   | J. Hunter - Direct Page 1096  Tuesday. Q. And you were on those calls and heard directly from the rating agencies? A. I was.  | 1<br>2<br>3<br>4                                   | J. Hunter - Direct Page 1098  for liquidity of a company. It's short-term warrants, you can do from one day right up to 364 days.  If we went down to BBB+ with a stable outlook, we would go to what's called R-2(high). And   |
| 1<br>2<br>3<br>4<br>5                              | J. Hunter - Direct Page 1096  Tuesday. Q. And you were on those calls and heard directly from the rating agencies? A. I was. Q. Okay. And that's the same sort of   | 1<br>2<br>3<br>4<br>5                              | J. Hunter - Direct Page 1098  for liquidity of a company. It's short-term warrants, you can do from one day right up to 364 days.  If we went down to BBB+ with a stable outlook, we would go to what's called R-2(high). And that would lock us out of the commercial paper market.  |
| 1<br>2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6                         | J. Hunter - Direct Page 1096  Tuesday. Q. And you were on those calls and heard directly from the rating agencies? A. I was. Q. Okay. And that's the same sort of feedback that you had just been talking about   | 1<br>2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6                         | J. Hunter - Direct Page 1098  for liquidity of a company. It's short-term warrants, you can do from one day right up to 364 days.  If we went down to BBB+ with a stable outlook, we would go to what's called R-2(high). And that would lock us out of the commercial paper market. So we would no longer have access to this cheap,   |
| 1<br>2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7                    | J. Hunter - Direct Page 1096  Tuesday. Q. And you were on those calls and heard directly from the rating agencies? A. I was. Q. Okay. And that's the same sort of feedback that you had just been talking about A. Yes.   | 1<br>2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7                    | J. Hunter - Direct Page 1098  for liquidity of a company. It's short-term warrants, you can do from one day right up to 364 days.  If we went down to BBB+ with a stable outlook, we would go to what's called R-2(high). And that would lock us out of the commercial paper market. So we would no longer have access to this cheap, accessible form of capital to fund our day-to-day cash  |
| 1<br>2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8               | J. Hunter - Direct Page 1096  Tuesday. Q. And you were on those calls and heard directly from the rating agencies? A. I was. Q. Okay. And that's the same sort of feedback that you had just been talking about A. Yes. Q that you had received?  | 1<br>2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8               | J. Hunter - Direct Page 1098  for liquidity of a company. It's short-term warrants, you can do from one day right up to 364 days.  If we went down to BBB+ with a stable outlook, we would go to what's called R-2(high). And that would lock us out of the commercial paper market. So we would no longer have access to this cheap, accessible form of capital to fund our day-to-day cash needs, so we'd be more reliant on the bank market.   |
| 1<br>2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9          | J. Hunter - Direct  Q. And you were on those calls and heard directly from the rating agencies?  A. I was.  Q. Okay. And that's the same sort of feedback that you had just been talking about  A. Yes.  Q that you had received?  A. Yes.  | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9                                  | J. Hunter - Direct Page 1098  for liquidity of a company. It's short-term warrants, you can do from one day right up to 364 days.  If we went down to BBB+ with a stable outlook, we would go to what's called R-2(high). And that would lock us out of the commercial paper market. So we would no longer have access to this cheap, accessible form of capital to fund our day-to-day cash needs, so we'd be more reliant on the bank market.  Q. I want to flip back to Slide 15 of the  |
| 1<br>2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9          | J. Hunter - Direct  Q. And you were on those calls and heard directly from the rating agencies?  A. I was.  Q. Okay. And that's the same sort of feedback that you had just been talking about  A. Yes.  Q that you had received?  A. Yes.  Q. Could you turn to JTX 768, please.   | 1<br>2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9          | J. Hunter - Direct Page 1098  for liquidity of a company. It's short-term warrants, you can do from one day right up to 364 days.  If we went down to BBB+ with a stable outlook, we would go to what's called R-2(high). And that would lock us out of the commercial paper market. So we would no longer have access to this cheap, accessible form of capital to fund our day-to-day cash needs, so we'd be more reliant on the bank market.  Q. I want to flip back to Slide 15 of the deck, which is 768.019. It's titled "Implications of   |
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24

Yeah. This slide is just overviewing

CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS

23 showing?

A.

24

23 higher rated or an A- rated entity that we were.

"Refinancing risk" and "term

#### J. Hunter - Direct J. Hunter - Direct Page 1099 Page 1101 1 constraints" goes up. Again, with a lower rating, you 1 would be negligible. So this we would just -- as a 2 don't necessarily have the option to issue debt for 2 credit downgrade, we may have to post additional 3 longer terms, 20, 30, 40 years. And, as a result, 3 letters of credit, depending on the contracts. But 4 you're going to, over time, kind of truncate your 4 here it's an equal sign. 5 5 maturity profile, which increases the refinancing risk So overall, the trend here is down, 6 for the company because you're having more debt 6 it's not good if we were to be downgraded to BBB+. 7 maturities come due on a very regular basis because 7 And especially with the negative outlook, that's the 8 you can't issue debt for longer periods of time. 8 part that would really concern me is that this wasn't 9 "Reliance on the bank market," as I 9 going to stop at BBB+. This had the potential to go 10 mentioned earlier, with losing the commercial paper to mid-BBB, which puts you two notches above junk in 11 market, we'd have to go to the bank market through our 11 the bond market, as it's referred to. 12 12 credit facilities, which is more expensive than the And as a result of the feedback you commercial paper market and it's not as efficient for 13 13 received from the rating agencies, did your team put 14 your day-to-day cash needs. 14 together a new financing plan for the transaction? 15 15 The "Regulatory cost recovery risk," A. Yes. 16 we have the ability in Canada to pass through interest 16 Q. Did you send that new rate case to 17 costs in our tolls as part of our regulated cost of 17 Moody's, S&P, and DBRS for their feedback? service. With a lower rating, there's the risk that 18 A. Yes. 18 19 19 the company will not be able to transfer over all of O. Let's take a look then at JTX 799. 20 its interests cost to its shippers. That would be a 20 It's a March 1st, 2016, email from Terry Hook, and 21 then below that it's forwarding a February 26, 2016, risk to the company. 21 22 22 email from Terry Hook to individuals at Moody's. "Reputation/counterparty of choice." 23 Reputation, at the time we had around \$30 billion in 23 Who is Terry Hook? 24 debt outstanding. When you get downgraded, you have a 24 A. Terry Hook was the manager of finance CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS J. Hunter - Direct J. Hunter - Direct Page 1100 Page 1102 who reported to my director of finance at the time. 1 lot of unhappy bondholders. Some would be forced to 2 2 One of his key responsibilities was working with the sell your bonds because now you're out of the A bucket. It's referred to when you're going into a 3 3 rating agencies. 4 different bucket called the EEE bucket. So there 4 O. Now, the scenarios here, are they the 5 certainly would be some impact on the price of their 5 new rate case or the new financing plan that we just 6 6 bonds. discussed? 7 7 The "counterparty of choice," when we A. They are. 8 look to build long linear infrastructure for 20, 30, 8 Q. And this was sent to Moody's in this 9 40 years, one of the things that we hear back when 9 email, but was this also sent to S&P and DBRS? 10 we're signing these long-term contracts with entitles 10 A. It was 11 like Shell, for example, is that having a strong 11 O. So in the second bullet under finance credit rating is really important because if they're plan, do you see that? 12 12 13 going to be in business for 40 years, they want to 13 A. I do. 14 make sure that their shipper, their pipeline company, 14 Q. It says, "Issue US\$3.0 billion 15 is going to be in business. So it's very important 15 subscription receipts ...." 16 for us. 16 What is the importance of that 17 "Currency mismatch," we like to issue 17 notation of the subscription receipts here? most of our debt in the U.S. markets because we are 18 A couple things. So, first of all, 18 A. 19 functionally long in U.S. dollars, meaning we generate 19 100 percent equity credit. So what we learned from a lot of our revenue in the United States. As a 20 the first two cases that we ran, that we could not 20 21 result of a downgrade, we'd probably be more beholden 21 incur any additional debt. So as a result, we went 22 to the Canadian markets and we'd have a bit of a 22 back. And as you can see on this finance plan, we did 23 currency mismatch there. 23 revise the purchase price. But what you'll notice

Then "Collateral requirements," this

CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS

24

here is that we're not incurring any incremental debt.

#### J. Hunter - Direct J. Hunter - Direct Page 1105 Page 1103 1 We have asset sales along with subscription receipts. 1 A. So what I meant by that is when I looked at Columbia and I looked at the price that we 2 Subscription receipts are unique to 2 3 the Canadian market. The best way to think of it is, 3 were offering at 25.25 that they rejected, I looked at 4 like, contingent financing. We issue the subscription 4 their financial condition at that point in time. 5 5 receipts; and so long as certain conditions precedents And they had this very large capital 6 are met to close a transaction when the transaction 6 program for a company their size. And they were 7 closes, the subscription receipts convert into common 7 heavily reliant on the master limited partnership 8 8 market for their financing of this capital program. shares of the company. 9 So in the event that a transaction 9 And during this time, the master 10 doesn't close, the investors get their money back. 10 limited partnership market wasn't doing well. It was 11 The money is held in escrow until all the conditions 11 effectively melting down. And I know that they had to are met to close the transaction. raise equity, they had to raise common equity in 12 12 13 Q. 13 December of 2015. And the assumptions and changes that 14 14 are noted here, if you look right above "Finance So my view was, given the constraints 15 Plan," what was the reaction of the rating agencies to for their access to equity capital through their 15 16 this new case? master limited partnership, that I felt by making 16 17 A. So Moody's came back and said that we 17 this -- I made this comment because I felt that their would maintain our A- rating with a stable outlook. 18 price was going to go down. They had no way of really 18 DBRS came back and said we'd maintain our A (low) 19 19 efficiently funding their company, at least in the 20 rating with a stable outlook. And S&P came back and 20 near term, from what I was seeing. 21 said we'd maintain our A- rating with a negative 21 So I thought being patient and wait 22 outlook. 22 would be the best thing to do, in my opinion. 23 ATTORNEY YOCH: Can we now turn to 23 Q. Do you recall that after Columbia 24 JTX 1922, please. rejected TransCanada's \$25.25 offer, whether CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS J. Hunter - Direct J. Hunter - Direct Page 1104 Page 1106 Q. So if you take a look at the -- it's 1 TransCanada considered whether to make an offer at \$26 2 2 per share? an email chain. If you take a look at the bottom of 3 the first page, there's a March 5th, 2016, email from 3 A. Yes. 4 Russ Girling and many other recipients. 4 Q. And what was your view of TransCanada 5 And it says -- it begins, "I am very 5 offering to acquire Columbia at that price? 6 6 disappointed to let you know that we were unable to I thought it was very rich. I 7 come to terms with Capricorn this afternoon." 7 struggled even at 25.25. Every 25 cents means a lot, 8 Do you see that? 8 especially from where I sit in finance, as I'm looking 9 A. 9 at our credit metrics, that if the price goes up, it Q. 10 Is he referring to Columbia's 10 means that we're probably going to have to raise more 11 rejection of TransCanada's \$25.25 per share offer? 11 equity, which is -- ultimately can be dilutive to the 12 A. 12 shareholder. 13 Q. Now, moving up, so later in time, 13 So I was very concerned in just 14 there's an email exchange between you and Gillian 14 looking at the premium that would be applied relative 15 Garrett. Who's Gillian Garret? to the market at the time that I was concerned --16 A. Gillian Garrett was an analyst in my 16 again, from where I sat -- that it was a rich premium 17 planning and forecasting group. 17 at \$26. 18 Q. And she writes to you on March 5th, Q. 18 I'd like you to take a look now at 19 "I'm checking my email like a lunatic today. Think 19 JTX 882. Again, the bottom of the first page, it's 20 the doors shut? I really hope not." 20 going to continue onto the second page. 21 21 There's an email from Francois Poirier And then you respond in the early hours of March 6, "Shut for now. We should wait 3 22 dated March 6th. It starts, "This is killing me..." 22 23 23 months then see. Interesting day to say the least." What is Mr. Poirier outlining in this

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email?

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What did you mean by that?

CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS

J. Hunter - Direct J. Hunter - Direct Page 1107 Page 1109 So he's outlining a following case 1 A. 1 Do you see that? 2 here at \$26, ramping up our synergies, which were 2 A. I do. 3 already very high, to \$200 million. Upping the sub 3 Q. So is it fair to say at this board 4 receipts to \$4 billion plus what's called a greenshoe, 4 meeting, TransCanada's board was discussing a 5 so an over-allotment option, which is, at that time, 5 potential \$26 per share offer? 6 very high for the Canadian market, so very aggressive. 6 A. Yes. 7 7 And the question is: Do we need to go Q. If you take a look at the last full 8 back to -- for the rating advisory services, to all 8 paragraph, it reads: "After further deliberation, the 9 the agencies if we put in another \$500 million in 9 Board authorized management to make a counter offer to 10 equity. So he's asking us to think about running a Capricorn at US\$26.00 per share but which would 11 new plan here to consider a new option. include TransCanada common shares as a portion 12 Q. Then it looks like Mr. Marchand 12 (10 percent) of the consideration." 13 13 responds to that above on the first page, on March 6, What was the purpose of the mixed 14 2016. You can take a look at that if you'd like. 14 consideration? 15 15 Then you respond to Mr. Marchand, A. Again, with a higher price, that we 16 "Great response - absolutely spot on. While I applaud were constrained -- at the time we thought we would be 16 17 Francois' determination, this case is fatal." 17 constrained with the amount of subscription receipts 18 What did you mean by writing, "[T]his 18 that we would be able to issue in the market. We knew 19 case is fatal"? 19 that we couldn't incur any additional debt. 20 A. Looking at the purchase price of \$26, 20 So this was put forward here to see if 21 the finance plan that's associated with it, you see 21 they would be receptive to 10 percent of our shares in all the comments that Mr. Marchand makes. I concurred 22 consideration. However, it was nonbinding. There 22 23 with all of them from the premium that would be paid 23 were certain conditions that had to be met in order 24 at that price, to us being able to access that amount for us to go ahead with this consideration. CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS J. Hunter - Direct J. Hunter - Direct Page 1108 Page 1110 1 of equity in the capital markets, the \$4 billion, and 1 Q. Just above that, at the end of the 2 in the synergies that we wanted to assume at 2 prior paragraph, it reads: "Management was asked to 3 \$200 million, we felt that that was a very high amount 3 include representation from the lead financing banks 4 to achieve. 4 at the next meeting." 5 5 So I just concurred with all of his Do you see that? 6 A. 6 comments, hence why I said, "[A]bsolutely spot on." I I do. 7 couldn't have answered it any better. 7 Q. Why did the board ask for 8 Again, I applauded Francois' 8 representation from the lead financing banks to attend 9 determination here to get the deal done or at least 9 the next board meeting? 10 pursue it. But from where I sat, it was getting to be 10 A. So the board wanted to hear the views 11 a bit of a white-knuckle ride. 11 of the bank. Just given the size of the contemplated 12 ATTORNEY YOCH: Can we turn to transaction, they want to get their views on how they 12 13 JTX 944, please. think the market would receive the transaction if it 14 This is a copy of the minutes from the 14 were to go ahead. They wanted to get their views on O. 15 March 9, 2016, meeting of the TransCanada board of the finance plan and, in particular, the subscription 16 directors. Were you present at this meeting? receipts, that the size that we were contemplating, if 17 A. 17 that was something that would be achievable in the Q. 18 18 market. Okay. I'd like to direct your 19 19 attention to the second page of the minutes. It's the And at this point, had you worked 20 second paragraph on that page. 20 through this price with the underwriters? 21 21 A. It reads: "Management reviewed a We had, yes. slide at both the US\$25.25 per share as well as the 22 Q. 22 Okay. Do you recall if 23 representatives from the lead financing banks attended US\$26 per share which outlined the sources of funds at 24 those pricing levels." the next meeting?

CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS

|  |   | J. Hunter - Direct   | Page 1111  |   | <b>J. Hunter - Direct</b> Page 1  | 1113 |
|--|---|--|--|---|---|------|
| 1  | A.  | Yes.   | 1  | 1   | remaining at or above []\$49 [Canadian] per share with  |      |
| 2  | Q.  | And what were those banks?   | 2  | 2   | no adverse credit rating agency implications as well  |      |
| 3  | A.  | RBC and TD Securities were t   | he lead  | 3   | as certain other factors, including underwriters'   |      |
| 4  | banks on the s  | subscription receipts offering.  | 4  | 4   | willingness to offer a bought deal on the subscription  |      |
| 5  |   | MR. YOCH: Can we turn to JT  | X 1092, 5  | 5   | receipts."  |      |
| 6  | please.   |  | 6  | 6   | Was this the reason for your  |      |
| 7  | Q.  | This is a copy of the minutes of   | the 7  | 7   | discussion with the underwriters before the March 14  |      |
| 8  | March 14, 2016  | s, meeting of the TransCanada boa  | ard of 8   | 8   | meeting?  |      |
| 9  | directors. Were   | e you present at this meeting?   | 9  | 9   | A. Yes.   |      |
| 10   | A.  | Yes.   | 1  | 0   | Q. Staying on this page, the last   |      |
| 11   | Q.  | The minutes also indicate that T   | revor 1  | 1   | paragraph, it continues on in the second page. It   |      |
| 12   | Gardner from R  | BC and Alec Clark from TD Secur  | ities 1  | 2   | says, "The meeting discussed the impact of the media  |      |
| 13   | attended this m   | eeting.  | 1  | 3   | story on TransCanada's most recent offer, ability to  |      |
| 14   | A.  | Yes.   | 1  | 4   | pay and execution risk. In light of these   |      |
| 15   | Q.  | Do you recall that they were at t  | he 1   | 5   | developments, management indicated that it would  |      |
| 16   | meeting?  |  | 1  | 6   | communicate to Capricorn that its latest offer could  |      |
| 17   | A.  | Yes.   | 1  | 7   | no longer be supported as the conditions of [the]   |      |
| 18   | Q.  | Were they the representatives f  |  | 8   | offer were no longer met. Management reviewed the   |      |
| 19   | _   | panks that were discussed and bei  | ng 1   | 9   | challenges of a proposed share-for-share exchange with  |      |
| 20   | invited to this m   | -  | 2  |   | the Board members including valuation and execution   |      |
| 21   | Α.  | They were.   | 2  |   | risk."  |      |
| 22   | Q.  | Did you have any discussions w   |  | 22  | What is the proposed share-for-share  |      |
| 23   |   | . Gardner before the March 14 me   | -  |   | exchange referred to in this second sentence I just   |      |
| 24   | A.  | l did.   | 2  | 24  | read?   |      |
|  |   | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |  |   | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |      |
|  |   |  |  |   |   |      |
|  |   | J. Hunter - Direct   | Page 1112  |   | J. Hunter - Direct Page 1   | 1114 |
| 1  | Q.  | J. Hunter - Direct  Did you talk to them together or   | Page 1112  | 1   | J. Hunter - Direct Page 1  A. So that's the 10 percent share  | 1114 |
| 1 2  | Q.<br>separately?   |  | 1  | 1   | Page 1  | 1114 |
|  |   |  | 1 2  |   | A. So that's the 10 percent share   | 1114 |
| 2  | separately?   | Did you talk to them together or   | ir. 3  | 2   | A. So that's the 10 percent share exchange that was in the previous paragraph.  | 1114 |
| 2  | separately? <b>A.</b>   | Did you talk to them together or Both. Separately and together   | r. 3   | 2<br>3  | A. So that's the 10 percent share exchange that was in the previous paragraph.  Q. Okay. And can you describe the   | 1114 |
| 2<br>3<br>4  | separately? A. Q. A.  | Did you talk to them together or  Both. Separately and togethe  And what did you discuss?  | r. 3<br>2<br>n, their 5  | 2<br>3<br>4   | A. So that's the 10 percent share exchange that was in the previous paragraph.  Q. Okay. And can you describe the valuation and execution risk challenges referred to   | 1114 |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5   | separately? A. Q. A. role here aga  | Did you talk to them together or  Both. Separately and togethe And what did you discuss?  We discussed the finance pla   | r. 3<br>n, their 5<br>me 6   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5  | A. So that's the 10 percent share exchange that was in the previous paragraph.  Q. Okay. And can you describe the valuation and execution risk challenges referred to here?   | 1114 |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6  | separately? A. Q. A. role here againput in how you  | Did you talk to them together or  Both. Separately and togethe And what did you discuss?  We discussed the finance pla ain, two things. One, give us so  | r. 3<br>n, their 5<br>me 6<br>to the 7   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6   | A. So that's the 10 percent share exchange that was in the previous paragraph.  Q. Okay. And can you describe the valuation and execution risk challenges referred to here?  A. Yeah. With the subscription receipts  | 1114 |
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J. Hunter - Direct J. Hunter - Direct Page 1115 Page 1117 1 a linkage between our share price and Columbia's share 1 on all that risk. We're guaranteed at least a minimum 2 price that could influence, ultimately, our price and, 2 of the 4.2 billion. And if they ultimately exercise 3 ultimately, increase the risk for them as they try to 3 their greenshoe option, which they ultimately did for 4 sell the shares. 4 5 percent, then that took that number up to 5 5 So that's where we come from here with 4.4 billion, which was the largest sub receipts 6 the execution and valuation. Ultimately, if a bank is 6 offering in Canadian history and the largest common 7 going to take on more risk, that means for us that we 7 equity offering. 8 would be paying a higher discount. And we're trying 8 THE COURT: And did they want more 9 to do it as cheaply as possible, issue as few shares 9 than a 6 percent discount, or were they happy with the 10 as possible for our transaction so that we don't 10 6 percent discount? 11 reduce the dilution that we otherwise had to our 11 THE WITNESS: They were happy with -shareholder. 12 they were comfortable with a 6 percent discount that 12 Q. 13 13 was offered to us that we ultimately signed. And this portion of the meeting, this 14 is where management is reporting to the board; isn't 14 BY ATTORNEY YOCH: 15 15 that right? Q. A little lower, there's a portion of the minutes where it indicates that Mr. Clark and 16 A. 16 Yes. ATTORNEY OLSEN: Can we turn to the 17 17 Mr. Gardner then joined the meeting. See that 18 second page of this document, please. 18 notation in parentheses? 19 19 A. Q. And the second full paragraph, starts, Yes. 20 "The Board heard ...." 20 Q. That paragraph says in the last 21 21 sentence, "It was conveyed that the two lead banks The second sentence reads: 22 "Management relayed that based on subsequent 22 stood by their commitment to execute on the 23 discussions with its lead underwriters, it appeared 23 underwritten offering in light of their comfort with 24 that a larger bought deal with a smaller the contemplated acquisition." CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS J. Hunter - Direct J. Hunter - Direct Page 1116 Page 1118 1 over-allotment option would be supported by the 1 What contemplated acquisition were 2 markets." 2 Mr. Gardner and Mr. Clark discussing with the board? 3 3 A. It was -- the contemplated transaction Is this referring -- is "subsequent 4 discussions" referring to the discussions with the 4 was in that range of 25.50 -- or 25.25 to 25.50 and 5 underwriters that you had after the March 9 meeting 5 their ability to execute on the sub receipts offering. and before the March 14 meeting? 6 6 They stood by it because those two banks were the ones 7 A. Yes. 7 that were going to underwrite the whole deal, and then 8 Q. And is what is described here, is that 8 they would get subsequently, then, syndicate it out to 9 consistent with the feedback you received from 9 banks. 10 10 Mr. Clark and Mr. Gardner before the meeting? So they were willing to take on the 11 A. 11 entire risk, both banks, of the \$4.2 billion, subject 12 THE COURT: Why don't you just tell me to syndication. So they were just conveying here that 13 what they said. their confidence, they stood behind what they told us; 14 THE WITNESS: So what they said was 14 that if we went ahead, that we could execute as we 15 that they had increasing confidence in our ability to 15 opined. 16 raise the base offering. We were actually -- they had 16 THE COURT: This was at 25.50. This 17 confidence in us doing up to \$4.2 billion Canadian, 17 was not the 26 with 10 percent equity? 18 but they would reduce the over-allotment or greenshoe THE WITNESS: That's correct. 18 19 19 option, typically on transactions that are anywhere THE COURT: So I know you explained to 20 from zero to 15 percent. In this case, it would be 20 me the flow-back issue, and I appreciate it. Did they 21 5 percent. 21 say that they would do the 26 with 10 percent equity, 22 22 or they would just want a bigger discount? Or did So what it meant for us is that they 23 had a high degree of confidence that they could 23 they say: We're just not even going to do it? 24 THE WITNESS: They were saying that,

24

support an offering for \$4.2 billion. They're taking

CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS

|  | J. Hunter - Direct Page 1119  |  | J. Hunter - Cross Page 1121  |
|--|---|--|--|
| 1  | due to the sub receipts at the with the 6 percent   | 1  | were comfortable up to 25.50?  |
| 2  | discount, that that would be enough to fund the entire  | 2  | THE WITNESS: Based on the number, the  |
| 3  | transaction. We were just making sure that we had   | 3  | 4.2 billion with the 5 percent allotment, that more  |
| 4  | enough equity to fund the entire transaction.   | 4  | fit into the 25.50 that we ultimately did.   |
| 5  | And so they came back and said: We  | 5  | THE COURT: All right. Thanks.  |
| 6  | have confidence to do this. We can do it higher than  | 6  | BY ATTORNEY YOCH:  |
| 7  | we thought we could do it, and we can do it at a  | 7  | Q. And just to confirm, the commitment to  |
| 8  | discount of 6 percent. And then we wouldn't need to   | 8  | execute on the underwritten offering with a  |
| 9  | go ahead with the share exchange. It wasn't   | 9  | contemplated acquisition was not with an equity  |
| 10   | necessary.  | 10   | component?   |
| 11   | THE COURT: All right. So I may not  | 11   | A. Correct.  |
| 12   | be following. Since you were there, you're going to   | 12   | ATTORNEY YOCH: No further questions  |
| 13   | be able to hopefully clear this up for me. So my sort   | 13   | at this time, Your Honor.  |
| 14   | of simplistic understanding was you started out at a  | 14   | THE COURT: Thank you.  |
| 15   | price of 26 bucks. And of that 26 bucks, 10 percent   | 15   | CROSS-EXAMINATION  |
| 16   | of that value, roughly \$2.50, was going to be  | 16   | BY ATTORNEY SULLIVAN:  |
| 17   | TransCanada equity.   | 17   | Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Hunter. I'm   |
| 18   | That was going to be, like, a stock   | 18   | Brendon Sullivan from Labaton Sucharow. I was at your  |
| 19   | component issued directly to the Columbia stockholders  | 19   | deposition. It's good to see you in person.  |
| 20   | as part of the exchange?  | 20   | ATTORNEY SULLIVAN: My assistants   |
| 21   | THE WITNESS: Yes.   | 21   | my colleagues are going to hand out some binders here  |
| 22   | THE COURT: So far okay. And what  | 22   | that will hopefully be helpful. There's a little bit   |
| 23   | I understood you to be saying is that or what I was   | 23   | of overlap.  |
| 24   | curious about is, what was the feedback that the lead   | 24   | Q. Mr. Hunter, you believe that  |
|  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |
|  |   |  |  |
|  | J. Hunter - Direct Page 1120  |  | J. Hunter - Cross  |
| 1  | J. Hunter - Direct Page 1120 banks gave you on that transaction and whether that  | 1  | J. Hunter - Cross Page 1122 TransCanada had the ability to pay more than 25.50 per   |
| 1 2  | Page 1120   | 1 2  | Page 1122  |
|  | banks gave you on that transaction and whether that   |  | TransCanada had the ability to pay more than 25.50 per   |
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## J. Hunter - Cross

|  |   | J. Hunter - Cross Page 1123  |  | J. Hunter - Cross   | Page 1125                              |
|--|---|--|--|---|--|
| 1  | obviously, of I   | nindsight here and the market reaction.  | 1  | share price, I'm sorry.   | · ·                                    |
| 2  | So what we're   | doing here is just running some  | 2  | Q. And in the next slide, if we turn to   |  |
| 3  | scenarios at 2  | 5.50 up to \$28. And what you see here   | 3  | it, which ends in .32, this slide assesses  |  |
| 4  | is actually dilu  | ition from it, a nickel, on the EPS as   | 4  | TransCanada's ability to pay based on various cred  | lit                                    |
| 5  | an example.   |  | 5  | metrics; right?   |  |
| 6  | •   | But what it says is, yes, that we  | 6  | A. It does.   |  |
| 7  | could afford to   | increase the offer but, again, with  | 7  | Q. Okay. And the primary credit met   | ric                                    |
| 8  |   | hindsight and just how well the  | 8  | that the ratings agencies considered when rating  |  |
| 9  |   | eceipts offering had gone and how well   | 9  | TransCanada was its FFO-to-debt ratio?  |  |
| 10   | =   | n was received by the marketplace back   | 10   | A. At that point in time, yes.  |  |
| 11   | in March.   | ,  | 11   | Q. And TransCanada targeted a   |  |
| 12   | Q.  | Okay. Let's turn to the page ending  | 12   | 15.4 percent FFO-to-debt ratio through the credit   |  |
| 13   |   | And what this slide shows is \$27 and  | 13   | agencies?   |  |
| 14   | =   | cases which could be funded through  | 14   | A. Yes.   |  |
| 15   | additional asse   | _  | 15   | Q. And that was to maintain its credit  | +                                      |
| 16   | A.  | Yes.   | 16   | rating?   | L                                      |
| 17   | Q.  |  | 17   | A. Yes.   |  |
|  |   | And below that you see there are   |  |   |  |
| 18   |   | ions for these assets; right?  | 18   | Q. And the dotted line there in the   |  |
| 19   | <b>A</b> .  | Yes.   | 19   | quadrant up at the top, that represents TC's  |  |
| 20   | Q.  | And they were your best estimates of   | 20   | sorry TransCanada's 15 percent target for its   |  |
| 21   | value at the tim  |  | 21   | long-term FFO-to-debt ratio; right?   |  |
| 22   | Α.  | Yes.   | 22   | A. Correct.   |  |
| 23   | Q.  | And they were accurate valuations?   | 23   | Q. And what this chart shows, doesn   | •                                      |
| 24   | Α.  | Based on the information we had at the   | 24   | is that TransCanada would achieve that long-term F  | FFO                                    |
|  |   | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |  |
|  |   |  |  |   |  |
|  |   | J. Hunter - Cross  |  | J. Hunter - Cross   | D 4400                                 |
| 4  | time they be a  | J. Hunter - Cross Page 1124  |  | J. Hunter - Cross   | Page 1126                              |
| 1  | -   | n estimate. Yes.   | 1  | to debt ratio, regardless of whether it paid 25.50,   | J                                      |
| 2  | Q.  | n estimate. Yes.  And the third bullet point,  | 2  | to debt ratio, regardless of whether it paid 25.50,<br>\$27, or \$28 per share under these cash cases; righ   | J                                      |
| 2  | Q.<br>TransCanada is  | n estimate. Yes.  And the third bullet point, s valuing its Coolidge asset at 450 to   | 2  | to debt ratio, regardless of whether it paid 25.50,<br>\$27, or \$28 per share under these cash cases; righ<br>A. I see it differently, that we are   | t?                                     |
| 2<br>3<br>4  | Q.<br>TransCanada i<br>\$520 million; riç   | n estimate. Yes.  And the third bullet point, s valuing its Coolidge asset at 450 to ght?  | 2<br>3<br>4  | to debt ratio, regardless of whether it paid 25.50,<br>\$27, or \$28 per share under these cash cases; righ<br>A. I see it differently, that we are<br>under that 15 percent threshold in 2015 and 201  | t?<br><b>8. You</b>                    |
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| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6  | Q. TransCanada is \$520 million; rig  A. Q.   | Page 1124  n estimate. Yes.  And the third bullet point, s valuing its Coolidge asset at 450 to ght?  Yes.  And that's using a 30-year DCF?  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6  | to debt ratio, regardless of whether it paid 25.50, \$27, or \$28 per share under these cash cases; righ  A. I see it differently, that we are under that 15 percent threshold in 2015 and 201 can see in the green bar, 25.50, it's slightly high And when you look at FFO to debt, every decimal  | t?<br>8. You<br>er.<br>al point        |
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| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23 | Q. TransCanada is \$520 million; rig A. Q. A. Q. Coolidge for ap right? A. Q. the merger, righ A. Q. which ends in .: "TransCanada TransCanada is over there. | Page 1124  n estimate. Yes.  And the third bullet point, s valuing its Coolidge asset at 450 to ght?  Yes.  And that's using a 30-year DCF? Yes.  And TransCanada did, in fact, sell sproximately \$500 million in 2018,  Yes.  And that transaction was unrelated to nt?  That's correct.  Okay. Can you turn to the next page, 31. And the title of this slide is Ability to Pay." And it says In this slide is sorry, let me start  So the title of this slide is Ability to Pay." And in it, s assessing its ability to pay based on all metrics; right?   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23 | to debt ratio, regardless of whether it paid 25.50, \$27, or \$28 per share under these cash cases; right.  A. I see it differently, that we are under that 15 percent threshold in 2015 and 201 can see in the green bar, 25.50, it's slightly high.  And when you look at FFO to debt, every decime matters, especially when you're below your state target. So even though it doesn't look like much.  Q. I understand, Mr. Hunter. I'm some to cut you off. But in 2019, none of these let me start again.  You would agree that under any of these scenarios, whether it be 25.50 cash, \$27 cash \$28 cash, the FFO-to-debt ratio does not exceed 15 percent until 2019; right?  A. Yes.  Q. And the green bar there, the 25.50 cash, is the actual case that TransCanada was using for its acquisition of Columbia; right?  A. Yes.  Q. Okay. I want to go back in time a little bit to March 9, 2016. And that's the date that TransCanada made its \$26 per share mixed consider.  | t?  8. You er. al point ed h ry  of h, |

## J. Hunter - Cross

|  | J. Hunter - Cross Page 1   | 127                         |  | J. Hunter - Cross Page 1129  |
|--|--|-----------------------------|--|--|
| 1  | A. Yes.  |                             | 1  | Q. Can you turn to the last page of this   |
| 2  | Q. Prior to TransCanada making its \$26  |                             | 2  | slide, of this deck?   |
| 3  | per share mixed consideration offer to Columbia, you   |                             | 3  | ATTORNEY SULLIVAN: Should be .013.   |
| 4  | and other managers sorry. Let me start that again.   |                             | 4  | Sorry. There we go.  |
| 5  | Prior to TransCanada making that \$26  |                             | 5  | Q. So, again, the presentation we're   |
| 6  | per share mixed consideration offer, you and other   |                             | 6  | discussing was given on March 9, which is the same day   |
| 7  | members of management advised the board concerning a   |                             | 7  | that the board eventually approved TransCanada making  |
| 8  | potential \$26 all-cash offer, right?  |                             | 8  | a \$26 mixed consideration offer to Columbia; right?   |
| 9  | A. Yes.  |                             | 9  | A. Yes.  |
| 10   | Q. Can you turn to JTX 0915 in your  | 1                           | 10   | Q. And here, the presentation identifies   |
| 11   | binder.  | 1                           | 11   | a risk of "Over-allotment not exercised"; right?   |
| 12   | ATTORNEY SULLIVAN: And if you can  | 1                           | 12   | A. Yes.  |
| 13   | scroll to the attachment. Sorry.   | 1                           | 13   | Q. And to mitigate that risk, it says,   |
| 14   | Q. This is a copy of the presentation  | 1                           | 14   | "Equity forms part of the consideration;" right?   |
| 15   | that was presented at the board; right?  | 1                           | 15   | A. Yes.  |
| 16   | A. Yes.  | 1                           | 16   | Q. And the purpose of the TransCanada  |
| 17   | Q. Okay. We discussed this at your   | 1                           | 17   | equity forming part of the merger consideration was to   |
| 18   | deposition?  | 1                           | 18   | mitigate a perceived risk that the over-allotment  |
| 19   | A. Yes, I believe we did, yes.   | 1                           | 19   | option on a bought deal wouldn't be exercised; right?  |
| 20   | Q. Okay. Can you flip to the page ending   | 2                           | 20   | A. That along with the, just overall   |
| 21   | in .007. And what this page is showing is how  | 2                           | 21   | funding shortfall, yeah, that we went through in the   |
| 22   | TransCanada could fund a \$26 per share cash offer   | 2                           | 22   | model there, particularly with the asset sales, the  |
| 23   | versus the 25.25 per share cash offer that TransCanada   | 2                           | 23   | 500 million. You're right. It's the funding  |
| 24   | had previously made to Columbia; right?  | 2                           | 24   | shortfall.   |
|  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |                             |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |
|  |  |                             |  |  |
|  | J. Hunter - Cross  | 128                         |  | J. Hunter - Cross Page 1130  |
| 1  | J. Hunter - Cross Page 1 A. Yes.   |                             | 1  | J. Hunter - Cross Page 1130 Q. Okay. And management advised the  |
| 1 2  | Page 1   |                             | 1<br>2   | Page 1130  |
|  | A. Yes.  | :                           |  | Q. Okay. And management advised the  |
| 2  | A. Yes. Q. Okay. In either scenario, TransCanada   |                             | 2  | Q. Okay. And management advised the board on March 9 that introducing TransCanada's stock  |
| 2  | A. Yes. Q. Okay. In either scenario, TransCanada would have raised \$3.1 billion through an equity   | :                           | 2<br>3   | Q. Okay. And management advised the board on March 9 that introducing TransCanada's stock would reduce the size of the bought deal and decrease  |
| 2<br>3<br>4  | A. Yes. Q. Okay. In either scenario, TransCanada would have raised \$3.1 billion through an equity offering with an over-allotment, right?   |                             | 2<br>3<br>4  | Q. Okay. And management advised the board on March 9 that introducing TransCanada's stock would reduce the size of the bought deal and decrease execution risk; right?   |
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| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23 | A. Yes. Q. Okay. In either scenario, TransCanada would have raised \$3.1 billion through an equity offering with an over-allotment, right?  A. Yes. Q. So here, TransCanada was considering bridging the gap between 25.25 cash and \$26 cash with the sale of additional assets; right?  A. Yes, I believe that it says that, additional assets at \$26. "Other" was it's too small to be asset sales. It would have come from other proceeds. But, yes. Q. You would agree in the \$26 cash case, that they would be funding the difference in the purchase price with \$500 million in additional asset sales; right?  A. Yes. Q. Okay. And the additional asset that TransCanada considered selling in this case, this scenario, was the Coolidge asset; right?  A. Yes. Q. And, again, that Coolidge asset was sold for approximately \$500 million in 2018; right? | 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>11<br>11<br>11<br>11<br>11<br>11<br>11<br>11<br>11<br>11<br>11 | Q. Okay. And management advised the board on March 9 that introducing TransCanada's stock would reduce the size of the bought deal and decrease execution risk; right?  A. Yes. Q. Okay. With that said, there were members of management who believed there was not much incremental execution risk of going to \$26 per share in cash; right?  A. Yes. Q. Do you know who Mr. Johannson is? A. Yes. Q. He was amongst them? A. Pardon me? Q. He didn't believe that going to \$26 all cash would appreciably increase execution risk; right?  A. Yes. Q. And you did not believe that there was much incremental risk with going to \$26 in cash; right?  A. From where I sat from getting the money, yes. Felt differently about the valuation. |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22       | A. Yes. Q. Okay. In either scenario, TransCanada would have raised \$3.1 billion through an equity offering with an over-allotment, right?  A. Yes. Q. So here, TransCanada was considering bridging the gap between 25.25 cash and \$26 cash with the sale of additional assets; right?  A. Yes, I believe that it says that, additional assets at \$26. "Other" was it's too small to be asset sales. It would have come from other proceeds. But, yes. Q. You would agree in the \$26 cash case, that they would be funding the difference in the purchase price with \$500 million in additional asset sales; right?  A. Yes. Q. Okay. And the additional asset that TransCanada considered selling in this case, this scenario, was the Coolidge asset; right?  A. Yes. Q. And, again, that Coolidge asset was  | 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>11<br>11<br>11<br>11<br>11<br>11<br>11<br>11<br>11<br>11<br>11 | Q. Okay. And management advised the board on March 9 that introducing TransCanada's stock would reduce the size of the bought deal and decrease execution risk; right?  A. Yes. Q. Okay. With that said, there were members of management who believed there was not much incremental execution risk of going to \$26 per share in cash; right?  A. Yes. Q. Do you know who Mr. Johannson is? A. Yes. Q. He was amongst them? A. Pardon me? Q. He didn't believe that going to \$26 all cash would appreciably increase execution risk; right?  A. Yes. Q. And you did not believe that there was much incremental risk with going to \$26 in cash; right?  A. From where I sat from getting the   |

## J. Hunter - Cross

|  | J. Hunter - Cross  | - 1101   | J. Hunter - Cross  |
|--|--|--|--|
| 4  | March 14 board meeting for a minute.   | e 1131   | Page 1133  |
| 1  | ATTORNEY SULLIVAN: That's JTX  | 1000   | 3  |
| 2  |  | ,  | 2 10 percent consideration.  |
| 3  | sorry.   |  | 3 Q. My question is just whether any of the  |
| 4  | Q. I think you testified that the  |  | 4 underwriters told you that it would be impossible for  |
| 5  | underwriters were at that meeting; right?  |  | 5 them to support the mixed consideration offer.   |
| 6  | A. Yes.  |  | 6 A. I don't recall.   |
| 7  | Q. And I just want to clarify. If you go   |  | 7 ATTORNEY SULLIVAN: Okay. No further  |
| 8  | to the second page there. They were only there for a   | 8  | 8 questions.   |
| 9  | portion of the meeting; right?   | 9  | 9 ATTORNEY YOCH: No further questions,   |
| 10   | A. Yes.  | 10   | 10 Your Honor.   |
| 11   | <ul> <li>Q. And that portion of the meeting was</li> </ul>   | 11   | THE COURT: Thank you for being here.   |
| 12   | not when management highlighted the challenges with a  | . 12   | 12 I appreciate your time.   |
| 13   | stock-for-stock exchange; right?   | 13   | 13 (Witness excused.)  |
| 14   | A. No.   | 14   | 14 ATTORNEY van KWAWEGEN: Your Honor,  |
| 15   | Q. The discussions that you referred to  | 15   | 15 the next witness will be Mr. Steve Smith. We'll set   |
| 16   | with the underwriters between March 9 and March 14,  | 16   | 16 up.   |
| 17   | can you point me to any written correspondence   | 17   | ·  |
| 18   | reflecting those discussions?  | 18   | 18 hand out the binders.   |
| 19   | A. No.   | 19   | 19 STEPHEN PAUL SMITH, having first been   |
| 20   | Q. Okay. At the end of the March 14th  | 20   | 20 duly affirmed, was examined and testified as follows:   |
| 21   | board meeting, the board authorized Russ Girling to  | 21   |  |
| 22   | engage in discussions with Columbia management   | 22   | 22 THE WITNESS: Thank you.   |
| 23   | regarding an all-cash offer of 25.50 per share; right?   | 23   | 23 ATTORNEY van KWAWEGEN: So many  |
| 24   | A. Yes.  | 24   | •  |
|  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |
|  | CHANCERI COURT REPORTERS   |  | CHANCERT COURT REFORTERS   |
|  |  |  |  |
|  | J. Hunter - Cross  | e 1132   | S. Smith - Direct Page 1134  |
| 1  | J. Hunter - Cross Pag Q. And that was not a best and final   |  | S. Smith - Direct Page 1134  DIRECT EXAMINATION  |
| 1 2  | Pag  | 1  | Page 1134  |
|  | Q. And that was not a best and final   | 1 2  | Page 1134  1 DIRECT EXAMINATION  |
| 2  | Q. And that was not a best and final offer; right?   | 1 2 3  | Page 1134  1 DIRECT EXAMINATION  2 BY ATTORNEY van KWAWEGEN:   |
| 2  | Q. And that was not a best and final offer; right?  A. It says here in the 25.50 range.  | 1<br>2<br>3<br>4   | Page 1134  1 DIRECT EXAMINATION  2 BY ATTORNEY van KWAWEGEN:  3 Q. Hello, Mr. Smith.   |
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| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20                   | Q. And that was not a best and final offer; right?  A. It says here in the 25.50 range. Q. It says A. Oh, I'm sorry. Q. At the very end. A. Yeah. It says, "[R]egarding an all-cash offer at []25.50" Q. So the words "best and final" do not appear there, right? A. They do not. Q. Are you aware of any underwriter ever telling anyone at TransCanada that it could not fund the transaction, the mixed \$26 sorry. Let me start over.  Are you aware of any underwriter ever telling anyone at TransCanada that TransCanada could not fund a transaction with the \$26 mixed consideration offer?  A. Their preference because at the   | 1 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 idn't 21  | Page 1134  DIRECT EXAMINATION  BY ATTORNEY van KWAWEGEN:  Q. Hello, Mr. Smith.  A. Hello. How are you?  Q. Nice to see you.  You were handed some binders. One  binder has prior testimony, and the smaller binder has  some documents I may refer to, but they will also be  on the screen. Okay?  A. Okay.  Q. And the Court knows who you are, so  I'm not going to go through all of your background.  You were the CFO of Columbia Pipeline, correct?  A. Yes.  Q. And you received \$10.8 million,  including change-in-control payments, when you left  Columbia Pipeline following the transaction?  A. Yes.  Q. It's fair to say, thinking about your  retirement, that in a way, you've been thinking about  |
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| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22       | Q. And that was not a best and final offer; right?  A. It says here in the 25.50 range. Q. It says A. Oh, I'm sorry. Q. At the very end. A. Yeah. It says, "[R]egarding an all-cash offer at []25.50" Q. So the words "best and final" do not appear there, right? A. They do not. Q. Are you aware of any underwriter ever telling anyone at TransCanada that it could not fund the transaction, the mixed \$26 sorry. Let me start over.  Are you aware of any underwriter ever telling anyone at TransCanada that TransCanada could not fund a transaction with the \$26 mixed consideration offer?  A. Their preference because at the March 9th meeting when we went to the board, we dehave the advice of the underwriters at that point in  | 1 1 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 9 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 19 10 11 12 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11                 | BY ATTORNEY van KWAWEGEN:  Q. Hello, Mr. Smith.  A. Hello. How are you?  Q. Nice to see you.  You were handed some binders. One binder has prior testimony, and the smaller binder has some documents I may refer to, but they will also be on the screen. Okay?  A. Okay.  Q. And the Court knows who you are, so I'm not going to go through all of your background. You were the CFO of Columbia Pipeline, correct?  A. Yes.  Q. And you received \$10.8 million, including change-in-control payments, when you left Columbia Pipeline following the transaction?  A. Yes.  Q. It's fair to say, thinking about your retirement, that in a way, you've been thinking about your retirement all your life?  A. Yes.   |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23 | Q. And that was not a best and final offer; right?  A. It says here in the 25.50 range. Q. It says A. Oh, I'm sorry. Q. At the very end. A. Yeah. It says, "[R]egarding an all-cash offer at []25.50" Q. So the words "best and final" do not appear there, right? A. They do not. Q. Are you aware of any underwriter ever telling anyone at TransCanada that it could not fund the transaction, the mixed \$26 sorry. Let me start over.  Are you aware of any underwriter ever telling anyone at TransCanada that TransCanada could not fund a transaction with the \$26 mixed consideration offer?  A. Their preference because at the March 9th meeting when we went to the board, we do have the advice of the underwriters at that point in time. We had subsequent discussions leading into  | 1 1 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 9 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 19 10 11 12 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11                 | BY ATTORNEY van KWAWEGEN:  Q. Hello, Mr. Smith.  A. Hello. How are you?  Q. Nice to see you.  You were handed some binders. One binder has prior testimony, and the smaller binder has some documents I may refer to, but they will also be on the screen. Okay?  A. Okay.  Q. And the Court knows who you are, so I'm not going to go through all of your background. You were the CFO of Columbia Pipeline, correct?  A. Yes.  Q. And you received \$10.8 million, including change-in-control payments, when you left Columbia Pipeline following the transaction?  A. Yes.  Q. It's fair to say, thinking about your retirement, that in a way, you've been thinking about your retirement all your life?  A. Yes.  Q. From the age of 30, you thought that                                  |

|  |  | S. Smith - Direct Page 1135   |  | S. Smith - Direct Page 1137   |
|--|--|---|--|---|
| 1  | A.   | Yes.  | 1  | the time and who would debrief. And they are at   |
| 2  | Q.   | And you turned 55 on March 1st, 2016?   | 2  | JTX 599.  |
| 3  | A.   | That's correct.   | 3  | A. I'm going to rely on the screen  |
| 4  | Q.   | Okay. I want to talk about the  | 4  | because I don't know.   |
| 5  | January 7 mee  | ting. You've heard about that before;   | 5  | Q. That's fine.   |
| 6  | correct?   |   | 6  | If you go to the bottom page, it's  |
| 7  | A.   | Yes, I have.  | 7  | 009. At the top right, you see there's a reference to   |
| 8  | Q.   | All right. Building up to that, in  | 8  | January '16 January 7, 2016?  |
| 9  | the middle of D  | ecember 2015, Francois Poirier called   | 9  | A. Yes.   |
| 10   | you to congratu  | late you on the equity offering. And  | 10   | Q. And in the middle of page, there's a   |
| 11   | during that call   | he said to you that he still really   | 11   | reference to, "Gap [between] board [and] management?  |
| 12   | liked the compa  | any and wanted to continue talking.   | 12   | Not a unanimous view but consensus that at the right  |
| 13   | Α.   | Yeah, thereabouts. I know he called   | 13   | price."   |
| 14   | and it was Dec   | cember 2nd, 8, something. It was in that  | 14   | Do you see that?  |
| 15   | time frame.  | -   | 15   | A. I do.  |
| 16   | Q.   | And do you recall during that   | 16   | Q. And when you had your discussion with  |
| 17   | conversation th  | at he told you that he still really   | 17   | Francois on January 7, it was your view that there was  |
| 18   |  | any and wanted to continue talking?   | 18   | no consensus was within the board at what the right   |
| 19   | <b>A</b> .   | Yes.  | 19   | price would be to sell the company.   |
| 20   | Q.   | You agreed to meet in January?  | 20   | A. I don't I don't recall what the,   |
| 21   | A.   | Yes.  | 21   | what I don't know what you're asking me exactly.  |
| 22   | Q.   | And to the best of your knowledge,  | 22   | Q. Isn't it fair to say that while you  |
| 23   |  | nis call with Francois in December, no  | 23   | were having that meeting with Francois Poirier, you   |
| 24   | •  | nbia reached out to Dominion or Spectra   | 24   | knew there was no unanimous view on the board what the  |
|  |  |   |  |   |
|  |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |
|  |  |   |  |   |
|  |  | S. Smith - Direct Page 1136   |  | S. Smith - Direct Page 1138   |
| 1  | or Berkshire to  | S. Smith - Direct Page 1136 see if they also wanted to continue to  | 1  | S. Smith - Direct Page 1138 right price would be to sell the company at?  |
| 1 2  | or Berkshire to talk; correct?   | Page 1136   | 1 2  | Page 1138   |
|  |  | Page 1136   |  | right price would be to sell the company at?  |
| 2  | talk; correct?   | see if they also wanted to continue to  | 2  | right price would be to sell the company at?  A. I hadn't thought about it.   |
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|  | S. Smith - Direct  |  | S. Smith - Direct  |
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|  | Page 1139  |  | Page 1141  |
| 1  | in selling the company than others?  | 1  | up to the plate.   |
| 2  | Answer: No.  | 2  | And, you know, there was a window  |
| 3  | Question: You just knew and had an   | 3  | there, which was reality, in my mind. I mean, it   |
| 4  | understanding that they were not unanimous?  | 4  | was it was, you know, a tough situation.   |
| 5  | Answer: Yeah. I mean, that they  | 5  | Q. And so the tenor of the conversation  |
| 6  | it was a discussion. It was, like, what's the  | 6  | was: Francois, TransCanada doesn't really have   |
| 7  | appropriate price to enter into a transaction or not?  | 7  | competition because the likely competition is  |
| 8  | So I don't know where each one of the board members  | 8  | struggling, so you should do something?  |
| 9  | were. I really didn't.   | 9  | A. I didn't say that. I didn't say they  |
| 10   | (End of video clip.)   | 10   | didn't have competition.   |
| 11   | BY ATTORNEY van KWAWEGEN:  | 11   | Q. No. I'm talking about the tenor of  |
| 12   | Q. Did I ask you those questions and did   | 12   | the conversation, right? You're talking about  |
| 13   | you give those answers a number of years ago at your   | 13   | potential, other potential bidders who could make a  |
| 14   | deposition?  | 14   | bid for Columbia Pipeline during the January 7   |
| 15   | A. Indeed I did.   | 15   | meeting; right?  |
| 16   | Q. I want to go back to the notes from   | 16   | A. Can you can you repeat the  |
| 17   | the debrief in Exhibit 599. And this please turn   | 17   | question? Are you saying am I saying what?   |
| 18   | to 011 at the bottom. And there's a reference there  | 18   | Q. During the January 7 meeting  |
| 19   | that says, "[T]hey've 'eliminated' the competition.  | 19   | A. Yes.  |
| 20   | "[Enbridge] - complex structure.   | 20   | Q there's a discussion about the   |
| 21   | "Dominion - capital, HSR.  | 21   | potential bidders for Columbia Pipeline; correct?  |
| 22   | "Transfer - over extended.   | 22   | A. Well, there was a discussion about  |
| 23   | "KMI - out of the market."   | 23   | other market participants in the energy market. That   |
| 24   | And it's fair to say that when you had   | 24   | would possibly be, you know, a bidder perhaps.   |
|  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |
|  |  |  |  |
|  | S. Smith - Direct Page 1140  |  | S. Smith - Direct Page 1142  |
| 1  | Page 1140  | 1  | Page 1142  |
| 1 2  | your conversation with Francois Poirier on January 7,  | 1 2  | Q. Right. And as part of that  |
|  | your conversation with Francois Poirier on January 7,<br>you were telling him that TransCanada had an  |  | Q. Right. And as part of that conversation, when you talk about those other market   |
| 2  | your conversation with Francois Poirier on January 7, you were telling him that TransCanada had an opportunity here and that this was there was a  | 2  | Q. Right. And as part of that  |
| 2  | your conversation with Francois Poirier on January 7, you were telling him that TransCanada had an opportunity here and that this was there was a window for TransCanada to act.   | 2  | Q. Right. And as part of that conversation, when you talk about those other market participants who could be potential bidders, right, you talked about with Francois how those other  |
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| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8  | your conversation with Francois Poirier on January 7, you were telling him that TransCanada had an opportunity here and that this was there was a window for TransCanada to act.  A. It was clear what was going on in the market, right. I mean, you couldn't you couldn't deny reality. I mean, there were a lot of companies that were struggling. So that was the intent of the  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8  | Q. Right. And as part of that conversation, when you talk about those other market participants who could be potential bidders, right, you talked about with Francois how those other participants were struggling and potentially would not be able to make an offer in the near term.  A. It would be more difficult for them, yes.  |
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|  | S. Smith - Direct  |   | S. Smith - Direct  |
|--|--|---|--|
| 4  | Page 1143  |   | Page 1145  |
| 1  | difficult situation.   | 1   | (Resumed at 3:15 p.m.)   |
| 2  | Q. And in this case, the opportunity                               | 2   | THE COURT: Please be seated.   |
| 3  | would be for TransCanada?  | 3   | Please resume.   |
| 4  | A. Yes.  | 4   | ATTORNEY van KWAWEGEN: Your Honor,   |
| 5  | Q. Let's look at the talking points. So                            | 5   | with your permission, Jeroen van Kwawegen on behalf of   |
| 6  | it's the final page. We can blow it up a little.                   | 6   | plaintiffs.  |
| 7  | Again, these are the talking points that you gave to               | 7   | THE COURT: I'm sorry?  ATTORNEY van KWAWEGEN: I was saying   |
| 8  | Mr. Poirier on January 7th; right?                                 | 8   | , ,  |
| 9  | Mr. Smith?   | 9   | my name.   |
| 10   | A. Yes. I was just reading. I'm sorry.                             | 10  |  |
| 11   | Q. And one of the talking points you gave                          | 11  | BY ATTORNEY van KWAWEGEN:  |
| 12   | him was, "If Taurus is serious, Bob and Russ should                |   | 3 3 3 3  |
| 13   | discuss terms in advance of our Board Meetings in                  | 13  | ,  |
| 14<br>15   | January."  And Taurus was the deal term for                        | 14  | 3  |
|  |  |   | •  |
| 16   | TransCanada; correct?  | 16  |  |
| 17   | A. Yes.  | 17  | leaning in on price and then, "This is particularly  |
| 18   | Q. And to the best of your knowledge, Bob                          | 18  | true if you hope to avoid putting Capricorn 'in  |
| 19   | and Russ did discuss at least a 25 to \$28 range in                | 19  | • •  |
| 20   | advance of the board meetings at the end of January?               | 20  | ,  |
| 21   | A. Yes, that's my recollection.  Q. And a little bit below         | 21  | A. Well, then you you don't want an  |
| 23   |  | 22  |  |
| 24   | THE COURT: I'm sorry. I'm slow on                                  | 23<br>24  | happening if you're not definitive enough on your level of interest or the amount of your bid. It could  |
| 24   | the job. It's two minutes late. We need to take our                | 24  |  |
|  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |   | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |
|  |  |   |  |
|  | S. Smith - Direct Page 1144  |   | S. Smith - Direct Page 1146  |
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|  | S. Smith - Direct   |  | S. Smith - Direct Page 1149   |
|--|---|--|---|
| 1  | from the company?   | 1  | your birthday was March 1, 2016.  |
| 2  | A. Can you say that again? I'm sorry. I   | 2  | A. Yes.   |
| 3  | apologize.  | 3  | Q. And I want to show you a document.   |
| 4  | Q. No. no.  | 4  | It's Joint Exhibit 1777. And these are text messages  |
| 5  |   | 5  | between you and Francois Poirier. And I want to focus   |
|  | 3   | 6  |   |
| 6  | Q. No. Is it fair to say that, to the best of our knowledge, TransCanada never made any   | 7  | on March 12th, so 11 days after your birthday.  You say, "On my way to hotel with   |
| 7  |   |  |   |
| 8  | offer, indicative or otherwise, any offer to acquire  | 8  | family. I will call you when we get settled."   |
| 9  | the company without first getting due diligence,  |  | Do you recall where you went?   |
| 10   | confidential company information?   | 10   | A. Los Angeles.   |
| 11   | A. Yes.   | 11   | Q. Okay. And was this partially to  |
| 12   | Q. I want to show you another document.  And it's 688, Joint Exhibit 688. And I want to focus   | 12   | celebrate your birthday?  |
| 13   |   | 13   | A. No.  |
| 14   | on an email from Tim Ingrassia to you and Bob Skaggs  | 14   | Q. And is it fair to say that you're here   |
| 15   | on February 2nd.  | 15   | with your family, going to hotel, so it's a family  |
| 16   | Tim Ingrassia was the senior banker at  | 16   | vacation?   |
| 17   | Goldman. Right?   | 17   | A. It's a family visit. I have a sister   |
| 18   | A. Yes.   | 18   | that lives in Los Angeles and a daughter that went to   |
| 19   | Q. And here, he's telling you and Bob   | 19   | Occidental College in Los Angeles.  |
| 20   | Skaggs the following: "Our strongest card here is to  | 20   | Q. Okay. And that same day, March 12th,   |
| 21   | maintain confidence in long term plan versus short  | 21   | Bob Smith sent over a proposed scripted response to   |
| 22   | term market. We've got a hockey stick that unlike   | 22   | any inbound's expressions of interest.  |
| 23   | most hockey sticks is slam dunk bankable. If the  | 23   | Do you recall that?   |
| 24   | right deal isn't here now, it will be later. No   | 24   | A. I recall the script, yes.  |
|  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |
|  |   |  |   |
|  | S. Smith - Direct Page 1148   |  | S. Smith - Direct Page 1150   |
| 1  | S. Smith - Direct Page 1148 threats, no anger, just literally hold onto the   | 1  | S. Smith - Direct Page 1150 ATTORNEY van KWAWEGEN: And let's put  |
| 1 2  | Page 1148   | 1 2  | Page 1150   |
|  | threats, no anger, just literally hold onto the   |  | ATTORNEY van KWAWEGEN: And let's put  |
| 2  | threats, no anger, just literally hold onto the indifference to selling."   | 2  | ATTORNEY van KWAWEGEN: And let's put it on the screen for a second. It's JTX 1029. And go   |
| 2  | threats, no anger, just literally hold onto the indifference to selling."  And when Mr. Ingrassia is talking  | 2  | ATTORNEY van KWAWEGEN: And let's put it on the screen for a second. It's JTX 1029. And go to the last page.   |
| 2<br>3<br>4  | threats, no anger, just literally hold onto the indifference to selling."  And when Mr. Ingrassia is talking about a slam-dunk, bankable hockey stick, what he's  | 2<br>3<br>4  | ATTORNEY van KWAWEGEN: And let's put it on the screen for a second. It's JTX 1029. And go to the last page.  Q. And at the top, in the italics, that's  |
| 2 3 4 5  | threats, no anger, just literally hold onto the indifference to selling."  And when Mr. Ingrassia is talking about a slam-dunk, bankable hockey stick, what he's referring to is that Columbia Pipeline already had   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5   | ATTORNEY van KWAWEGEN: And let's put it on the screen for a second. It's JTX 1029. And go to the last page.  Q. And at the top, in the italics, that's the script that you were working on around March 12th.   |
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| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21       | threats, no anger, just literally hold onto the indifference to selling."  And when Mr. Ingrassia is talking about a slam-dunk, bankable hockey stick, what he's referring to is that Columbia Pipeline already had contracts in place with shippers for its massive capital investments that it had planned for the next couple of years. Correct?  A. Yes.  Q. And above, Mr. Gibson responds, "I totally agree."  A little bit later: "If they know we are confident and don't need to sell that's our point of strength."  You understood this as of February 2, 2016. Right?  A. I recall these emails, yes.  Q. And you relied on Mr. Ingrassia to provide this type of information?  A. Yes.  Q. That's why you hired him. Correct?  A. Yes. | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21       | ATTORNEY van KWAWEGEN: And let's put it on the screen for a second. It's JTX 1029. And go to the last page.  Q. And at the top, in the italics, that's the script that you were working on around March 12th.  Correct?  A. Yes.  Q. And at this time, you understood that you were not in exclusivity.  A. Exclusivity ran out when we were not in exclusivity with TransCanada as of March 12th.  Q. That's my question. You understood as of March 12th, you were not in exclusivity with TransCanada. Correct?  A. Yes.  Q. And it's fair to say that TransCanada had an opportunity to review the script while there was no exclusivity agreement in effect?  A. Yes.  Q. Now, if you scroll up the same email chain, after it's sent over, Francois Poirier forwards the email to Hugh Babowal at Wells Fargo. And Hugh |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22 | threats, no anger, just literally hold onto the indifference to selling."  And when Mr. Ingrassia is talking about a slam-dunk, bankable hockey stick, what he's referring to is that Columbia Pipeline already had contracts in place with shippers for its massive capital investments that it had planned for the next couple of years. Correct?  A. Yes.  Q. And above, Mr. Gibson responds, "I totally agree."  A little bit later: "If they know we are confident and don't need to sell that's our point of strength."  You understood this as of February 2, 2016. Right?  A. I recall these emails, yes.  Q. And you relied on Mr. Ingrassia to provide this type of information?  A. Yes.  Q. That's why you hired him. Correct?  A. Yes. | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22 | ATTORNEY van KWAWEGEN: And let's put it on the screen for a second. It's JTX 1029. And go to the last page.  Q. And at the top, in the italics, that's the script that you were working on around March 12th.  Correct?  A. Yes.  Q. And at this time, you understood that you were not in exclusivity.  A. Exclusivity ran out when we were not in exclusivity with TransCanada as of March 12th.  Q. That's my question. You understood as of March 12th, you were not in exclusivity with TransCanada. Correct?  A. Yes.  Q. And it's fair to say that TransCanada had an opportunity to review the script while there was no exclusivity agreement in effect?  A. Yes.  Q. Now, if you scroll up the same email chain, after it's sent over, Francois Poirier forwards  |

|  |   | S. Smith - Direct  | Page 1151  |  |  | S. Smith - Direct  | Page 1153  |
|--|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| 1  | exclusivity now   | that the deal leaked and this  | · ·  | 1  | to Francois?"  | Still on March 12th.   |  |
| 2  | compromise th   | ney came up with. The proble   | m is   | 2  |  | And your response is on th   | ne next page.  |
| 3  | 'serious' is in tl  | he eye of the beholder. Does   | that   | 3  | You say, "I thin   | ık we are done. Francois wan   | nted to  |
| 4  | mean a financ   | ed [bid] subject only to confirn   | natory   | 4  | know the ration  | nale - I explained it and pointe   | d out  |
| 5  | [due diligence]   | ? Or can someone write a pe  | er share   | 5  | how important  | the Fiduciary protections were   | e for our  |
| 6  |   | ktail napkin? If they're giving  |  | 6  | · ·  | m we wanted to get this deal   |  |
| 7  | ="  | nent that it is the former I wou   |  | 7  |  | would help us achieve that go  |  |
| 8  | with this. Thin   | k we need to talk to them."  |  | 8  | were circling th   | e wagons one last time and F   | rancois  |
| 9  |   | And it's your understanding  | g that Wells   | 9  | _  | have Chris reach out to Bob to   |  |
| 10   | Fargo did spea  | ak with Goldman on March 12  | _  | 10   |  | e their meeting was concluded  | =  |
| 11   | Α.  | I don't recall if they did o   |  | 11   | 0 1  | You have no reason to bel  |  |
| 12   | Q.  | I'll show you some text me   |  | 12   | didn't send that   | t text that I just read to you on  |  |
| 13   | A.  | Okay.  |  | 13   |  | ound 7:00 p.m.?  |  |
| 14   | Q.  | It's Joint Exhibit 1778. Let   | me make  | 14   | Α.   | I do not.  |  |
| 15   | sure I've got ve  | ou the right exhibit. Oh, I do.  |  | 15   | Q.   | And this was before you re   | enewed the   |
| 16   | • •   | March 12 at 4:00 p.m.  |  | 16   |  | eement. Correct?   |  |
| 17   | 20.0  | So this is March 12th. You   | ı saw the  | 17   | <b>A.</b>  | Yes.   |  |
| 18   | email And the   | ere is an email from Bob Smith   |  | 18   | Q.   | And as you were talking wi   | ith François   |
| 19   |   | , and Bob Skaggs. He says, '   |  | 19   |  | talking about was what is the  |  |
| 20   | with Matt Gibs  |  | odot opono   | 20   | =  | proposal." Correct?  | mouning or   |
| 21   | With Matt alba  | Matt Gibson was at Goldm   | an Right?  | 21   | A.   | When I was talking to Fra  | ancois or  |
| 22   | Α.  | Yes.   | ian. rugin.  | 22   | texting with F   |  |  |
| 23   | Q.  | And he says, "Wells has a  | sked for a   | 23   | Q.   | Well, here, you're reporting   | n hack that  |
| 24   |   | nem to discuss the scripted re   |  | 24   | you spoke with   |  | g back triat   |
|  | can between ti  |  | Sporise  |  | you spoke with   |  |  |
|  |   | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |  |  |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |  |
|  |   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |   | S. Smith - Direct  | Page 1152  |  |  | S. Smith - Direct  | Page 1154  |
| 1  | language. He  |  | Page 1152<br>on as   | 1  | A.   |  | Page 1154  |
| 1 2  |   | will circle back [with] us as so   | on as  | 1 2  | <b>A.</b><br>Q.  | Right.   | Page 1154  |
|  | the call is com   | will circle back [with] us as so<br>pleted. We have no indication  | on as<br>n as to   |  |  | <b>Right.</b><br>Right.  | -  |
| 2  | the call is com   | will circle back [with] us as so   | on as<br>n as to   | 2  | Q.<br><b>A.</b>  | Right.<br>Right.<br>There is nothing in here t   | -  |
| 2  | the call is com<br>the tone of the  | will circle back [with] us as so<br>pleted. We have no indication<br>call at this point. Never a dul   | on as<br>n as to   | 2  | Q.<br><b>A.</b><br>"serious writte   | Right. Right. There is nothing in here the proposal."  | that says  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5   | the call is com<br>the tone of the<br>moment!"  | will circle back [with] us as so<br>pleted. We have no indication  | on as<br>n as to   | 2<br>3<br>4  | Q. A. "serious writte  | Right. Right. There is nothing in here the proposal." I'm asking you: Did you tal  | <b>that says</b><br>Ik with  |
| 2<br>3<br>4  | the call is com<br>the tone of the  | will circle back [with] us as so<br>pleted. We have no indication<br>call at this point. Never a dul<br>Bob Skaggs says, "Okay.  | on as<br>n as to<br>II   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5   | Q. A. "serious writte  | Right. Right. There is nothing in here the proposal."  | <b>that says</b><br>Ik with  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6  | the call is com<br>the tone of the<br>moment!"<br>standby."   | will circle back [with] us as so pleted. We have no indication call at this point. Never a dul Bob Skaggs says, "Okay.  And you then ask, at 6:05  | on as n as to II I'II p.m.:  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6  | Q. A. "serious writte Q. Francois about  | Right. Right. There is nothing in here the proposal." I'm asking you: Did you tall the what "serious written proposal." No.  | that says<br>Ik with<br>al" meant?   |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7   | the call is com<br>the tone of the<br>moment!"<br>standby."   | will circle back [with] us as so<br>pleted. We have no indication<br>call at this point. Never a dul<br>Bob Skaggs says, "Okay.  | on as n as to II I'II p.m.: pkay?"   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7   | Q. A. "serious writte Q. Francois about A. Q.  | Right. Right. There is nothing in here the proposal." I'm asking you: Did you tall the what "serious written proposal." No? You just told him, dor   | that says  Ik with al" meant?  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8  | the call is com<br>the tone of the<br>moment!"<br>standby."   | will circle back [with] us as so pleted. We have no indication call at this point. Never a dul Bob Skaggs says, "Okay.  And you then ask, at 6:05 ed me to chat - everything [] compared to the source of the source | on as n as to II I'II p.m.: pkay?"   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8  | Q. A. "serious writte Q. Francois about A. Q.  | Right. Right. There is nothing in here then proposal." I'm asking you: Did you tall the what "serious written proposal." No. No? You just told him, dor at want to get this deal done we   | that says  Ik with al" meant?  n't worry ith you?  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9   | the call is com<br>the tone of the<br>moment!"<br>standby."   | will circle back [with] us as so pleted. We have no indication call at this point. Never a dul Bob Skaggs says, "Okay.  And you then ask, at 6:05 ed me to chat - everything [] compared to the source of the source | on as n as to II I'II p.m.: pkay?"   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9   | Q. A. "serious writte Q. Francois about A. Q. about it; we jus   | Right. Right. There is nothing in here the proposal." I'm asking you: Did you take what "serious written proposation. No? You just told him, dore the want to get this deal done we I was communicating I  | that says  Ik with al" meant?  n't worry ith you?  mean, it was  |
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| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17                                     | the call is com the tone of the moment!"  standby."  "Francois ping  Los Angeles.  A.  Q. back-and-forth you. He spoke Said they seen   | will circle back [with] us as so pleted. We have no indication call at this point. Never a dult at this point. Nev | on as n as to ll l'II p.m.: okay?" n "Just texted y to update went fine. e. He said  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15   | Q. A. "serious writte Q. Francois about A. Q. about it; we jus A. stating the ob exclusivity wit yeah, it was p board's mind transaction to was the deal g   | Right. Right. There is nothing in here is en proposal." I'm asking you: Did you tall what "serious written proposal." No? You just told him, done want to get this deal done was communicating I vious. The board wanted to the TransCanada for another retty clear in my mind and I that we wanted to at least positioned to be done or not. I mean, when you wrote   | that says  Ik with al" meant?  It worry with you? mean, it was be extend week. So, think the bursue the in, either  told him,                        |
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| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21             | the call is com the tone of the moment!"  standby."  "Francois ping  Los Angeles.  A.  Q. back-and-forth you. He spoke Said they seer it felt like Franc issues, none w  proposed the s  A.  Q.               | will circle back [with] us as so pleted. We have no indication call at this point. Never a dul Bob Skaggs says, "Okay.  And you then ask, at 6:05 ed me to chat - everything [] construction of the says of the same day the same down to 6:49 because   | on as n as to ll l'II p.m.: okay?" n "Just texted y to update went fine. e. He said hat you had orrect?                    | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21             | Q. A. "serious writte Q. Francois about A. Q. about it; we jus A. stating the ob exclusivity wit yeah, it was p board's mind transaction to was the deal g Q. Francois, "[W]e them," you w A. us to do       | Right. Right. There is nothing in here is en proposal." I'm asking you: Did you tall what "serious written proposal." No? You just told him, done was communicating I wious. The board wanted to the TransCanada for another retty clear in my mind and I that we wanted to at least position to be done or not. I mean, when you wrote wanted to get this deal done were being accurate and truthful with respect to what the   | that says  Ik with al" meant?  It worry with you? mean, it was be extend week. So, think the bursue the an, either  told him, with ful?              |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22       | the call is com the tone of the moment!"  standby."  "Francois ping  Los Angeles.  A.  Q. back-and-forth you. He spoke Said they seer it felt like Franc issues, none w  proposed the s  A.                   | will circle back [with] us as so pleted. We have no indication call at this point. Never a dult at this point. Nev | on as n as to ll l'II p.m.: okay?" n "Just texted y to update went fine. e. He said hat you had orrect? actually,          | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22       | Q. A. "serious writte Q. Francois about A. Q. about it; we jus A. stating the ob exclusivity wit yeah, it was p board's mind transaction to was the deal g Q. Francois, "[W]e them," you w A. us to do Q.    | Right. Right. There is nothing in here to the proposal." I'm asking you: Did you talk to what "serious written proposate No. No? You just told him, done to want to get this deal done we I was communicating I vious. The board wanted to the TransCanada for another retty clear in my mind and I that we wanted to at least positioned its logical conclusion going to be done or not. I mean, when you wrote to wanted to get this deal done were being accurate and truthfor With respect to what the Okay.   | that says  Ik with al" meant?  It worry with you? mean, it was be extend week. So, think the bursue the an, either  told him, with ful?              |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23 | the call is com the tone of the moment!"  standby."  "Francois ping  Los Angeles.  A.  Q. back-and-forth you. He spoke Said they seer it felt like Franc issues, none w  proposed the s  A.  Q. go back up. S | will circle back [with] us as so pleted. We have no indication call at this point. Never a dult at this point. Nev | on as n as to ll l'II p.m.: bkay?" n "Just texted y to update went fine. e. He said hat you had orrect? actually, previous | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23 | Q. A. "serious writte Q. Francois about A. Q. about it; we jus A. stating the ob exclusivity wit yeah, it was p board's mind transaction to was the deal g Q. Francois, "[W]e them," you w A. us to do Q. A. | Right. Right. There is nothing in here is en proposal." I'm asking you: Did you talk what "serious written proposal." No? You just told him, done were want to get this deal done were being accurate and truthf With respect to what the end of the color o | that says  Ik with al" meant?  It worry with you? mean, it was be extend week. So, think the bursue the in, either  told him, with ful? board wanted |
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|  | S. Smith - Direct Page 1155   |  | S. Smith - Direct Page 1157  |
|--|---|--|--|
| 1  | transaction for Columbia Pipeline done with   | 1  | A. Yes. The script said what it said.  |
| 2  | TransCanada.  | 2  | Yeah.  |
| 3  | A. Either done or not done, but just to   | 3  | Q. Well, no. What I'm asking you is, the   |
| 4  | move forward to its logical end. Either it's going to   | 4  | interpretation that we just discussed that you had of  |
| 5  | get done or it's not going to get done. I would like  | 5  | the script, right, that was your interpretation of the   |
| 6  | it to get done. Right? But if it doesn't, it  | 6  | script that was being used. Correct?   |
| 7  | doesn't.  | 7  | A. I think if you asked me at that time,   |
| 8  | Q. Okay. What did you mean when you   | 8  | it very well could have been a different answer. I   |
| 9  | said, "Told him we wanted to get this deal done with  | 9  | don't know. When you asked me I forget when the  |
| 10   | them" Because I'm getting confused.   | 10   | deposition was, but that was my feeling at the time  |
| 11   | A. Well, so the board was supportive of   | 11   | Q. Okay.   |
| 12   | extending exclusivity, granting them exclusivity,   | 12   | A when you asked me that at my   |
| 13   | again, for another week or so. And so they wanted to  | 13   | deposition. I don't know what I was feeling at the   |
| 14   | engage in exclusivity. And obviously, they wanted to  | 14   | time the script was being written.   |
| 15   | move forward with TransCanada one way or the other.   | 15   | Q. Now, Columbia prepared this script  |
| 16   | Either we're going to get the deal done or we're not.   | 16   | after TransCanada had just done at least two months of   |
| 17   | Q. And here, you say, "Told him we wanted   | 17   | due diligence. Correct?  |
| 18   | to get this deal done with them" Correct?   | 18   | A. Yes.  |
| 19   | A. Right.   | 19   | Q. And in your view, Spectra could not   |
| 20   | Q. Doesn't say "one way or the other."  | 20   | have gotten such a serious written proposal done in  |
| 21   | Correct?  | 21   | two weeks.   |
| 22   | A. It does not, no.   | 22   | A. In my deposition, I recall saying   |
| 23   | Q. Now, I wanted to talk a little bit   | 23   | that, yeah, that it would be difficult for them. But   |
| 24   | about your understanding of what "serious written   | 24   | I think at the end of the day, if they were serious,   |
|  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |
|  |   |  |  |
|  |   |  |  |
|  | S. Smith - Direct Page 1156   |  | S. Smith - Direct Page 1158  |
| 1  | proposal" meant.  | 1  | they could provide something that would, you know, be  |
| 2  | proposal" meant.  In your mind, when you're thinking  | 2  | they could provide something that would, you know, be enough for the board and management to pause and   |
| 2  | proposal" meant.  In your mind, when you're thinking about a serious written proposal, that was a <i>bona fide</i>  | 2  | they could provide something that would, you know, be enough for the board and management to pause and look at.  |
| 2<br>3<br>4  | proposal" meant.  In your mind, when you're thinking about a serious written proposal, that was a <i>bona fide</i> proposal that says, I will pay you X for your company,   | 2<br>3<br>4  | they could provide something that would, you know, be enough for the board and management to pause and look at.  Q. Well, let's look at your appraisal,  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5   | proposal" meant.  In your mind, when you're thinking about a serious written proposal, that was a <i>bona fide</i> proposal that says, I will pay you X for your company, hard and fast, no outs, no anything, no way to wiggle   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5   | they could provide something that would, you know, be enough for the board and management to pause and look at.  Q. Well, let's look at your appraisal, then, in your deposition. And let's pull it up. It's   |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6  | proposal" meant.  In your mind, when you're thinking about a serious written proposal, that was a <i>bona fide</i> proposal that says, I will pay you X for your company, hard and fast, no outs, no anything, no way to wiggle out of anything. This is going to happen. You're  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6  | they could provide something that would, you know, be enough for the board and management to pause and look at.  Q. Well, let's look at your appraisal, then, in your deposition. And let's pull it up. It's page 243, line 16, through 244, line 11.  |
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CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS

|  |  | S. Smith - Direct Page 1159   |  |   | S. Smith - Cross Page 1161   |
|--|--|---|--|---|--|
| 1  | going to sign th   | nat agreement and we're done. I don't   | 1  | A.  | I was treasurer of American Electric   |
| 2  |  | mpany that could do that in that short a  | 2  | Power, and he   | was the relationship manager for the   |
| 3  | time frame.  | • ,   | 3  |   | anking activities that supported AEP's   |
| 4  |  | (End of video clip.)  | 4  | treasury funct  |  |
| 5  | BY ATTORNE   | Y van KWAWEGEN:   | 5  | Q.  | And was he with JPMorgan at the time?  |
| 6  | Q.   | I asked you those questions, and that   | 6  | Α.  | Yes.   |
| 7  |  | er at your deposition?  | 7  | Q.  | Did you strike up a relationship with  |
| 8  | <b>A.</b>  | Yeah, it was. Yes, it was.  | 8  | Mr. Poirier?  | ,  |
| 9  | Q.   | I want to talk a little bit about the   | 9  | <b>A</b> .  | We had a professional relationship.  |
| 10   | proxy.   |   | 10   | Yes.  |  |
| 11   | <b>A.</b>  | Okay.   | 11   | Q.  | And so about how many times a year   |
| 12   | Q.   | You understood that the purpose of the  | 12   |   | him in connection with your professional   |
| 13   |  | dvise shareholders of the potential   | 13   | relationship?   | min in connection with your professional   |
| 14   | transaction. R   | •   | 14   | <b>A.</b>   | I would say a handful of times.  |
| 15   | <b>A.</b>  | Yes.  | 15   | Q.  | So at some point, you left AEP.  |
| 16   | Q.   | To give the background of how the deal  | 16   | Right?  | Go at some point, you left ALI .   |
| 17   |  | d what the information is that would be   | 17   | A.  | Yes.   |
| 18   |  | nem as shareholders?  | 18   | Q.  | And did you keep in touch with him   |
| 19   | A.   |   |  | when you left?  | And did you keep in toddir with him  |
|  | Q.   | Yes. You understood that shareholders would   | 19   | •   | No. I did not  |
| 20   |  |   |  | <b>A</b> .  | No, I did not.   |
| 21   | =  | tion in the proxy when they decided to  | 21   | Q.  | When did you first meet Eric Fornell?  |
| 22   |  | e or disapprove the transaction?  | 22   | <b>A</b> .  | At some point in 2004 as well.   |
| 23   | <b>A</b> .   | Yes.  | 23   | Q.  | And what was his position with he  |
| 24   | Q.   | You had a chance to review and comment  | 24   | was with JPMo   | rgan also?   |
|  |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |  |   | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |
|  |  |   |  |   |  |
|  |  | S. Smith - Cross Page 1160  |  |   | S. Smith - Cross Page 1162   |
| 1  | on the proxy be  | S. Smith - Cross Page 1160 efore it was finalized?  | 1  | A.  | S. Smith - Cross Page 1162 Yes. He was a senior or vice chairman   |
| 1 2  | on the proxy be  | Page 1160   | 1 2  |   | Page 1162  |
|  | · · · · · ·  | efore it was finalized?   |  | for JPMorgan.   | Yes. He was a senior or vice chairman  |
| 2  | <b>A.</b><br>Q.  | Page 1160 Pfore it was finalized?  Yes.   | 2  | for JPMorgan.   | Yes. He was a senior or vice chairman  He was on the investment banking side,  |
| 2  | A.<br>Q.<br>whether the pro  | Page 1160 efore it was finalized?  Yes.  Do you know one way or the other   | 2  | for JPMorgan.<br>so he was a re   | Yes. He was a senior or vice chairman  He was on the investment banking side, elationship banker.  |
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|  | S. Smith - Cross Page 1163  |  | S. Smith - Cross Page 1165  |
|--|---|--|---|
| 1  | Q. Billion?   | 1  | on the bring-down due diligence call. So the due  |
| 2  | A. Yes, that's correct.   | 2  | diligence is done by the book running managers prior  |
| 3  | Q. It's hard to think in terms that big,  | 3  | to launching the transaction. The transaction gets  |
| 4  | but 1.4 billion. Right?   | 4  | launched, marketed. And then when it comes time to  |
| 5  | A. Yes.   | 5  | close the transaction, there is a bring-down due  |
| 6  | Q. Let's turn to the second page of the   | 6  | diligence call in which the entirety of the syndicate   |
| 7  | document, please.   | 7  | is on that. And the bring-down due diligence call   |
| 8  | We see Goldman Sachs and Credit Suisse  | 8  | just guarantees that nothing happened from the time of  |
| 9  | at the top. Are their names there because they were   | 9  | going public with the prospectus and closing the  |
| 10   | lead book running managers?   | 10   | transaction.  |
| 11   | A. Yes.   | 11   | Q. Okay. So fair to say the passive   |
| 12   | Q. What are lead book runners responsible   | 12   | underwriters come in at a later time, after the due   |
| 13   | for?  | 13   | diligence is done?  |
| 14   | A. We refer to them as book runners.  | 14   | A. Yes.   |
| 15   | They were responsible for managing a  | 15   | Q. And we see Wells Fargo there.  |
| 16   | transaction from beginning to end. They control all   | 16   | Do you see that?  |
| 17   | the documents. They control how it works, the   | 17   | A. I do.  |
| 18   | marketing of the deal. And they also control the  | 18   | Q. And what does that tell you about  |
| 19   | syndicate that is added on to help sell the deal. So  | 19   | Wells Fargo's role in that equity offering?   |
| 20   | they get the majority of the economics of this  | 20   | A. That they were a passive book runner   |
| 21   | offering.   | 21   | and they were going to be allocated 4.8 million   |
| 22   | Q. So in a word, they did the due   | 22   | shares, and those were their shares to sell through   |
| 23   | diligence?  | 23   | their system.   |
| 24   | A. They did.  | 24   | Q. To your knowledge, was Mr. Fornell   |
|  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |
|  | CHANCERI COURT REFORTERS  |  | CHANCERT COURT REPORTERS  |
|  |   |  |   |
|  | S. Smith - Cross Page 1164  |  | S. Smith - Cross Page 1166  |
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|  | S. Smith - Cross Page 1167  |  | S. Smith - Cross  |
|--|---|--|---|
| 1  | done. For all intents and purposes, it was pencils  | 1  | conference, the energy conference?  |
| 2  | down on that. All the due diligence was just  | 2  | A. I recall yes.  |
| 3  | confirmatory, bring-down due diligence. There was   | 3  | Q. And it mentions here that, not only  |
| 4  | nothing really going on there.  | 4  | would you be there, but if you look at the second   |
| 5  | And, you know, most large financial   | 5  | email down, it says, "Skaggs, Kettering, Smith and two  |
| 6  | institutions have commercial banking that does debt   | 6  | IR guys"  |
| 7  | raises and equity raises and the investment banking,  | 7  | Do you see that?  |
| 8  | and they have pretty thorough policies around how   | 8  | A. Yes, I do.   |
| 9  | information is shared and how people are treated in   | 9  | Q. And what does "IR guys" mean?  |
| 10   | terms of being walled off or not. So I didn't have  | 10   | A. Investor relations.  |
| 11   | worries about that.   | 11   | Q. Okay. So, now, going back to that  |
| 12   | Q. And, by the way, was Wells Fargo   | 12   | investor conference, did you have any discussions   |
| 13   | involved in some way with a revolver for lending to   | 13   | there about the TransCanada possible transaction?   |
| 14   | Columbia?   | 14   | A. No.  |
| 15   | A. Yes, Wells Fargo was. A lot of these   | 15   | Q. And what does the presence of two IR   |
| 16   | J.P. Morgan Securities were. A lot of them were   | 16   | guys there signify to you?  |
| 17   | involved in our working capital facilities.   | 17   | A. Well, it's an annual securities  |
| 18   | Q. And did Eric Fornell have anything to  | 18   | conference that's hosted by Wells Fargo, and a number   |
| 19   | do with that side of the house, that is, the lending  | 19   |   |
|  | -   |  | of securities analysts come. And there is a day or  |
| 20   | side?   | 20   | two worth of meetings every 45 minutes for the balance  |
| 21   | A. No. He was more the relationship   | 21   | of the day, and you meet with them and talk about the   |
| 22   | banker. And then we had more operational bankers that   | 22   | company.  |
| 23   | would come and you would see more often.  | 23   | And Wells Fargo is the sponsor of   |
| 24   | Q. Once discussions began between   | 24   | that. And so Wells Fargo's relationship person will   |
|  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |
|  |   |  |   |
|  | S. Smith - Cross  |  | S. Smith - Cross  |
| 1  | Page 1168   | 1  | Page 11/0   |
| 1 2  | TransCanada and Columbia, did you ever use Eric   | 1 2  | make a point to come and say hi to whoever their  |
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|    | S. Smith - Cross Page 1171                                  |         | S. Smith - Cross Page 1173                                   |
| 1  | A. Absolutely not.  | 1       | money?   |
| 2  | <ul> <li>Q. And are you aware of anybody else at</li> </ul> | 2       | <ul> <li>A. The MLP market effectively shut down.</li> </ul> |
| 3  | Columbia having discussed that or said that?                | 3       | So it was a difficult time in the MLP marketing.             |
| 4  | A. No, I am not.  | 4       | Nobody could raise any money through that market. So         |
| 5  | Q. Let's talk about Columbia's business                     | 5       | it was that was closed off from us.                          |
| 6  | plan. I want to go back briefly to July 1, 2015, at         | 6       | Q. And so what did that leave you as the                     |
| 7  | the time of the spin.                                       | 7       | only way that Columbia could raise the money to build        |
| 8  | At that time, what was the primary                          | 8       | these pipelines?   |
| 9  | driver of Columbia's business plan?                         | 9       | A. The only other alternative was C Corp.                    |
| 10 | A. \$7 billion worth of growth projects.                    | 10      | equity. So Columbia Pipeline group was offering              |
| 11 | Q. And growth projects was, to a                            | 11      | would offer C Corp. equity. So                               |
| 12 | layperson   | 12      | <ul> <li>Q. And is that what Columbia ended up</li> </ul>    |
| 13 | A. Pipeline projects.                                       | 13      | doing in December, December 1 of 2015?                       |
| 14 | So there's a lot of gas in your                             | 14      | A. Yes, it is.   |
| 15 | service territory, and you've got to figure out a way       | 15      | Q. By the way, did the MLP market turn                       |
| 16 | to get that gas to market. And so these were projects       | 16      | around the next spring, like in 2016?                        |
| 17 | that basically took the Marcellus and Utica shale gas       | 17      | A. No, it did not.   |
| 18 | and moved it to markets across the system.                  | 18      | Q. Or even in the summer of 2016?                            |
| 19 | Q. Was this building pipelines?                             | 19      | A. No, it did not. In fact, it, I think,                     |
| 20 | A. Yes, it was.   | 20      | still hasn't recovered, and a lot of the MLPs have           |
| 21 | Q. Did Columbia have any recent                             | 21      | gotten rolled up.  |
| 22 | experience in building projects of this scale?              | 22      | Q. And just one other question on this.                      |
| 23 | A. We had built a number of I would call                    | 23      | How did that, just this whole financing thing, affect        |
| 24 | them singles and doubles, so \$30 million, \$60 million,    | 24      | the cash flow of Columbia and the budget and trying to       |
|    | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS                                    |         | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS                                     |
|    | S. Smith - Cross Page 1172                                  |         | S. Smith - Cross Page 1174                                   |
| 1  | that sort of thing, projects, recently.                     | 1       | meet the budget and operational issues?                      |
| 2  | Q. You just said that it was going to                       | 2       | A. Well, the \$7 billion of growth                           |
| 3  | cost a lot of money. How was Columbia going to pay          | 3       | projects had to be funded, at least with 3 or                |
| 4  | for all of this?  | 4       | \$4 billion of equity. So to the extent you had any          |
| 5  | A. Columbia was going to use the MLP that                   | 5       | operational problems that overran budgets or to the          |
| 6  | was IPO'd in February of 2015. So that was the              | 6       | extent you had any capital expenditure problems, i.e.,       |
| 7  | financing vehicle that was going to be used to raise        | 7       | delays in the pipeline or cost overruns or something         |
| 8  | the funds to pay for the growth projects.                   | 8       | like that that drove your capex budget up, any               |
| 9  | Q. Okay. And so did that happen?                            | 9       | every marginal dollar, whether it was O&M or capital,        |
| 10 | A. It did. The MLP IPO happened in                          | 10      | it would have to be funded by equity.                        |
| 11 | February of 2015. And when we spun, it was a C Corp.        | 11      | You couldn't go borrow the money. You                        |
| 12 | company.  | 12      | had to find the money in the equity markets. And so          |
| 13 | Q. We're talking about after the spinoff,                   | 13      | you would have created a situation where, you know,          |
| 14 | how was it going to finance all of these projects that      | 14      | you were a serial equity issuer. You had to issue a          |
| 15 | you were looking at ahead of you?                           | 15      | lot of money there. It would create a lot of dilution        |
| 16 | A. Through the MLP and with equity.                         | 16      | and put a lot of pressure on the stock.                      |
| 17 | Q. Okay. So why not just borrow the                         | 17      | Q. So if you had, for example, a big cost                    |
| 18 | money?  | 18      | overrun when you were building your pipeline, you            |
| 19 | A. We had no debt   | 19      | didn't have the cash to fund that?                           |
| 20 | Q. Was Columbia able to do that?                            | 20      | A. Exactly. You would have to go to the                      |
| 21 | A. No. We had no debt capacity.                             | 21      | equity markets to fund that. You couldn't do a debt          |
| 22 | Q. And as the time went by, after the                       | 22      | offering to fund that because you were right at the          |
|    |   |         |  |

23 spinoff, into the fall of 2015, what did the MLP

24 market do and how did that affect how you could raise

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24

Q.

23 investment-grade threshold, credit-rating-wise.

I'm going to ask you just a couple

#### S. Smith - Cross S. Smith - Cross Page 1175 Page 1177 questions about initial overtures. 1 1 anything secret or, you know, really strategic that 2 We've heard testimony about inbound 2 should not have been conveyed to him in that script? 3 offers that Columbia received. Were you involved in 3 Not to my knowledge. I mean, it was 4 negotiating at all with these inbound offerors other 4 prepared for me by Goldman Sachs. It was thought --5 5 than TransCanada? the team thought, you know, you don't want to end up 6 A. 6 wasting a lot of time. You want to be definitive. 7 Q. And then with respect to TransCanada, 7 And this is the best way to do that. So I went into 8 what was your role? 8 that meeting thinking that that's what I was supposed 9 Well, I was the contact with Francois. 9 to do. He called me. So that was that. But it was very 10 Q. By handing him the talking points, 10 11 similar to all the other interactions with the 11 were you also conveying a message about where these Dominion staff or the Berkshire staff or the NextEra talking points came from? 12 12 staff. It was largely administrative, providing 13 A. Well, I think they -- it describes 13 14 documents, access to the data room, that sort of 14 itself in the talking points. And it was -- you know, 15 thing. Goldman prepared them. So it was, you know, this is 15 16 Q. Okay. So you weren't involved in what they needed to do, you know, if they were serious 16 17 negotiating the deals? 17 about expressing interest in the company. 18 A. Nο. 18 Q. Well, so my question is more about 19 Q. Let's talk briefly about your 19 tell us whether or not you were trying to convey that 20 reengagement with TransCanada in December 2015. And 20 this is not just Steve Smith talking to you --No. This was -we've heard a lot about the January 7 meeting. 21 A. 21 22 A. That's correct, yes. 22 Q. -- but this is the company. Q. 23 23 A. Yeah. This is the position of the And what we know is that you handed 24 the script over to Mr. Poirier at the meeting. Right? company, you know? If you're serious about it, you CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS S. Smith - Cross S. Smith - Cross Page 1176 Page 1178 A. I did. have to be serious. It's not an academic exercise. 1 1 2 2 Q. Why did you do that? Q. Did you discuss anything about any 3 A. Well, I felt that, you know, he was --3 third party that was not public knowledge? 4 wanted to be clear and definitive about what our point 4 A. I did not. 5 of view was. And he was writing all the notes down. 5 Q. You were asked a few questions earlier 6 6 And I just thought it would be more efficient if I about these third parties and what was going on with 7 just handed it to him and he would see -- you know, 7 these third parties and, frankly, that some of them 8 there would be no risk of misunderstanding or anything 8 were having a tough time. 9 like that. So I just felt that it would be more 9 Do you remember those questions? efficient. 10 10 A. 11 So you didn't come into the meeting 11 Q. Now, why did you say that? Why did and hand it to him just right at the beginning, at the you discuss these third parties? 12 12 13 start of the meeting? 13 A. Because that was the -- that was 14 A. No, I did not. I read them and then 14 reality. I mean, that was what was out there. I 15 handed them to him. mean, it was in the news. Everybody that was in the 16 Q. Okay. So it was sometime during your 16 industry knew about it. I mean, I felt that it was 17 going through and reading the script, and that's when 17 appropriate to talk about it because it was our you made the decision to hand it to him? 18 industry, and there were issues, you know, that people 18 19 were dealing with that were pretty serious. Yeah. I had finished. I mean, there 19 are not very many of them. It doesn't very long to 20 Did you discuss it to give TransCanada 20 read it. So you would read it. And he was writing it some sort of competitive advantage over everybody 21 21 22 down, so I just said, here. 22 else? 23 23 Q. A. Was there anything -- I mean, in your No. I mean, I -- no. I mean, it was 24 mind, when you handed him that script, was there just, you know, making sure that -- you know, you had

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|  |   | S. Smith - Cross Page 1179  |  |  | S. Smith - Cross   | Page 118   |
|--|---|---|--|--|--|--|
| 1  | to maintain yo  | our credibility, you know? The market   | 1  | Q.   | Was a decision made that   | =  |
| 2  | was in a diffic   | cult time. It was in shambles. And  | 2  | deliver that so  | ript to Mr. Poirier or tell him ab   | out  |
| 3  | TransCanada   | was not. You know, they had a single A  | 3  | it?  |  |  |
| 4  | balance shee  | t, and they were a strong company. So   | 4  | A.   | Yes. The board was as  | sked us to   |
| 5  | Q.  | When you conveyed this, in your mind,   | 5  | talk to our co   | ounterparts. So I would talk   | to   |
| 6  | did you believe   | e this was all public knowledge?  | 6  | Francois, and  | d Bob Smith would talk to hi   | s counterpart  |
| 7  | A.  | Absolutely.   | 7  | at TransCana   | nda.   |  |
| 8  | Q.  | Did you say, "The competition has been  | 8  | Q.   | And is that what you did?  |  |
| 9  | eliminated"?  |   | 9  | A.   | l did, yes.  |  |
| 10   | A.  | No, I did not.  | 10   | Q.   | Now, you were asked som  | e questions  |
| 11   | Q.  | Let's talk just a couple minutes about  | 11   | about "serious   | s written proposal" and what th  | at meant.  |
| 12   | The Wall Stree  | et Journal leak. Do you recall on   | 12   | A.   | Yes.   |  |
| 13   | March 10, 201   | 6, The Wall Street Journal leaked the   | 13   | Q.   | And we saw what you said   | in your  |
| 14   | merger?   |   | 14   | deposition.  |  |  |
| 15   | A.  | Yes.  | 15   | A.   | Yes.   |  |
| 16   | Q.  | Let's look at JTX 0952. You are not   | 16   | Q.   | Would you defer to Colum   | bia's counsel  |
| 17   | copied on this,   | but this is an internal Wells Fargo   | 17   | on what the pl   | hrase "serious written proposa   | l" meant?  |
| 18   | email sent aro  | und noon on March 10, 2016, in which  | 18   | A.   | I would.   |  |
| 19   | Eric Fornell de   | scribes the Columbia board as freaking  | 19   | Q.   | Prior to the deposition, who   | en you gave  |
| 20   | out in reaction   | to The Wall Street Journal leak.  | 20   | that testimony   | that we saw today, had you d   | iscussed   |
| 21   |   | You didn't get a copy of this when it   | 21   | with anybody   | what you what the phrase "s  | erious   |
| 22   | went out. Righ  | nt? This email?   | 22   | written propos   | sal" meant?  |  |
| 23   | A.  | I did not.  | 23   | A.   | No, I did not.   |  |
| 24   | Q.  | Was the Columbia board freaking out?  | 24   | Q.   | And so when you were ask   | red the  |
|  |   | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |  |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |  |
|  |   |   |  |  | CHANCERI COURT REPORTERS   |  |
|  |   | S Smith - Cross   |  |  |  |  |
|  | Δ.  | S. Smith - Cross Page 1180  | 1  | guestion in vo   | S. Smith - Cross   | ŭ  |
| 1  | <b>A</b> .  | No. Page 1180   | 1 2  |  | S. Smith - Cross<br>ur deposition, were you drawin   | ng on any  |
| 2  | Q.  | No.  Did the board tell management,   | 2  | knowledge yo   | S. Smith - Cross ur deposition, were you drawir u had based on what outside o  | ng on any  |
| 2  | Q. including you,   | No. Page 1180   | 2  | knowledge you  | S. Smith - Cross ur deposition, were you drawir u had based on what outside o  | ng on any  |
| 2<br>3<br>4  | Q. including you, takes"?   | No.  Did the board tell management, "go get a deal done with whatever it  | 2<br>3<br>4  | knowledge yo<br>inside counse<br><b>A.</b>   | S. Smith - Cross our deposition, were you drawing u had based on what outside of l at Columbia had told you? No.   | ng on any<br>counsel or  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5   | Q. including you, takes"?   | No.  Did the board tell management, "go get a deal done with whatever it  Absolutely not.   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5   | knowledge you<br>inside counse<br><b>A.</b><br>Q.  | S. Smith - Cross our deposition, were you drawing u had based on what outside of I at Columbia had told you? No. Who was the primary parti   | ng on any<br>counsel or  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6  | Q. including you, takes"?  A. Q.  | No. Did the board tell management, "go get a deal done with whatever it  Absolutely not. Did you tell Francois Poirier that the   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6  | knowledge yo<br>inside counse<br><b>A.</b><br>Q.<br>price discussion   | S. Smith - Cross our deposition, were you drawin u had based on what outside of I at Columbia had told you? No. Who was the primary partions with TransCanada?   | ng on any<br>counsel or  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7   | Q. including you, takes"?  A. Q. Columbia boar  | No. Did the board tell management, "go get a deal done with whatever it  Absolutely not. Did you tell Francois Poirier that the rd was freaking out?  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7   | knowledge yo<br>inside counse<br>A.<br>Q.<br>price discussion  | S. Smith - Cross our deposition, were you drawin u had based on what outside of l at Columbia had told you? No. Who was the primary parti ons with TransCanada? Bob and Russ.  | ng on any<br>counsel or<br>cipant in the   |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8  | Q. including you, takes"?  A. Q. Columbia boar A.   | No. Did the board tell management, "go get a deal done with whatever it  Absolutely not. Did you tell Francois Poirier that the dwas freaking out? No, I did not.   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8  | knowledge yo<br>inside counse<br>A.<br>Q.<br>price discussion<br>A.<br>Q.  | S. Smith - Cross our deposition, were you drawing the had based on what outside of all at Columbia had told you?  No.  Who was the primary partions with TransCanada?  Bob and Russ.  So you had one discussion  | ng on any counsel or cipant in the   |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8  | Q. including you, takes"?  A. Q. Columbia boar A. Q.  | No. Did the board tell management, "go get a deal done with whatever it  Absolutely not. Did you tell Francois Poirier that the rd was freaking out? No, I did not. And did you tell him that the board   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9   | knowledge yo<br>inside counse<br>A.<br>Q.<br>price discussion<br>A.<br>Q.  | S. Smith - Cross our deposition, were you drawing the had based on what outside of a Columbia had told you?  No.  Who was the primary partions with TransCanada?  Bob and Russ.  So you had one discussion about price in March of 2016.   | ng on any counsel or cipant in the   |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9   | Q. including you, takes"?  A. Q. Columbia boar A. Q. told managem   | No. Did the board tell management, "go get a deal done with whatever it  Absolutely not. Did you tell Francois Poirier that the dwas freaking out? No, I did not.   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9   | knowledge yo inside counse  A. Q. price discussion A. Q. TransCanada   | S. Smith - Cross our deposition, were you drawing the had based on what outside of a Columbia had told you?  No.  Who was the primary partions with TransCanada?  Bob and Russ.  So you had one discussion about price in March of 2016.  Do you recall that?  | ng on any counsel or cipant in the   |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10   | Q. including you, takes"?  A. Q. Columbia boar A. Q. told managem takes?  | No. Did the board tell management, "go get a deal done with whatever it  Absolutely not. Did you tell Francois Poirier that the days freaking out? No, I did not. And did you tell him that the board ent to get a deal done with whatever it   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10   | knowledge yo inside counse  A. Q. price discussion A. Q. TransCanada   | S. Smith - Cross our deposition, were you drawing the had based on what outside of at Columbia had told you?  No.  Who was the primary partions with TransCanada?  Bob and Russ.  So you had one discussion about price in March of 2016.  Do you recall that?  Yes.   | ng on any counsel or cipant in the   |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12   | Q. including you, takes"?  A. Q. Columbia boar A. Q. told managem takes? A.   | No. Did the board tell management, "go get a deal done with whatever it  Absolutely not. Did you tell Francois Poirier that the rd was freaking out? No, I did not. And did you tell him that the board ent to get a deal done with whatever it  No, I did not.   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11   | knowledge yo inside counse  A. Q. price discussion A. Q. TransCanada  A. Q.  | S. Smith - Cross our deposition, were you drawing the had based on what outside of a Columbia had told you?  No.  Who was the primary partions with TransCanada?  Bob and Russ.  So you had one discussion about price in March of 2016.  Do you recall that?  Yes.  Was that a call with Mr. Po   | og on any counsel or cipant in the n with  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13   | Q. including you, takes"?  A. Q. Columbia boar A. Q. told managem takes? A. Q.  | No. Did the board tell management, "go get a deal done with whatever it  Absolutely not. Did you tell Francois Poirier that the rd was freaking out? No, I did not. And did you tell him that the board ent to get a deal done with whatever it  No, I did not. After The Wall Street Journal leak,   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13   | knowledge you inside counse  A. Q. price discussion A. Q. TransCanada  A. Q. he conveyed to  | S. Smith - Cross our deposition, were you drawing the had based on what outside of a Columbia had told you?  No.  Who was the primary partions with TransCanada?  Bob and Russ.  So you had one discussion about price in March of 2016.  Do you recall that?  Yes.  Was that a call with Mr. Potthe initial offer of \$24, all cash?  | og on any counsel or cipant in the n with  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14   | Q. including you, takes"?  A. Q. Columbia boar A. Q. told managem takes?  A. Q. did any other p.  | No. Did the board tell management, "go get a deal done with whatever it  Absolutely not. Did you tell Francois Poirier that the days freaking out? No, I did not. And did you tell him that the board ent to get a deal done with whatever it  No, I did not. After The Wall Street Journal leak, optential bidder reach out to Columbia?   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14   | knowledge you inside counse  A. Q. price discussion A. Q. TransCanada  A. Q. he conveyed to  | S. Smith - Cross our deposition, were you drawing the had based on what outside of a Columbia had told you?  No.  Who was the primary partions with TransCanada?  Bob and Russ.  So you had one discussion about price in March of 2016.  Do you recall that?  Yes.  Was that a call with Mr. Potthe initial offer of \$24, all cash?  | ng on any counsel or cipant in the n with  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15   | Q. including you, takes"?  A. Q. Columbia boar A. Q. told managem takes?  A. Q. did any other p. A.   | No. Did the board tell management, "go get a deal done with whatever it  Absolutely not. Did you tell Francois Poirier that the rd was freaking out? No, I did not. And did you tell him that the board ent to get a deal done with whatever it  No, I did not. After The Wall Street Journal leak, botential bidder reach out to Columbia? Yes.  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15   | knowledge you inside counse  A. Q. price discussion A. Q. TransCanada  A. Q. he conveyed to A. Q.  | S. Smith - Cross our deposition, were you drawing the had based on what outside of at Columbia had told you?  No.  Who was the primary partions with TransCanada?  Bob and Russ.  So you had one discussion about price in March of 2016.  Do you recall that?  Yes.  Was that a call with Mr. Poot the initial offer of \$24, all cash?  Yes.  How did you react?   | og on any counsel or cipant in the n with  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16                                     | Q. including you, takes"?  A. Q. Columbia boar A. Q. told managem takes?  A. Q. did any other p. A. Q.  | No. Did the board tell management, "go get a deal done with whatever it  Absolutely not. Did you tell Francois Poirier that the rd was freaking out? No, I did not. And did you tell him that the board ent to get a deal done with whatever it  No, I did not. After The Wall Street Journal leak, potential bidder reach out to Columbia? Yes. You recall that Spectra contacted  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16                                     | knowledge you inside counse  A. Q. price discussion A. Q. TransCanada  A. Q. he conveyed to A. Q. A.                                     | S. Smith - Cross our deposition, were you drawing us had based on what outside of a Columbia had told you?  No.  Who was the primary partions with TransCanada?  Bob and Russ.  So you had one discussion about price in March of 2016.  Do you recall that?  Yes.  Was that a call with Mr. Potthe initial offer of \$24, all cash?  Yes.  How did you react?  Not well.  | og on any counsel or cipant in the n with  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17                               | Q. including you, takes"?  A. Q. Columbia boar A. Q. told managem takes?  A. Q. did any other p. A. Q. Columbia after                             | No. Did the board tell management, "go get a deal done with whatever it  Absolutely not. Did you tell Francois Poirier that the rd was freaking out? No, I did not. And did you tell him that the board ent to get a deal done with whatever it  No, I did not. After The Wall Street Journal leak, potential bidder reach out to Columbia? Yes. You recall that Spectra contacted the leak?  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17                               | knowledge you inside counse  A. Q. price discussion A. Q. TransCanada  A. Q. he conveyed to A. Q. A. Q.                                  | S. Smith - Cross our deposition, were you drawing the had based on what outside of a Columbia had told you?  No.  Who was the primary partions with TransCanada?  Bob and Russ.  So you had one discussion about price in March of 2016.  Do you recall that?  Yes.  Was that a call with Mr. Potthe initial offer of \$24, all cash?  Yes.  How did you react?  Not well.  What did you tell him?   | og on any counsel or cipant in the n with  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18                         | Q. including you, takes"?  A. Q. Columbia boar A. Q. told managem takes?  A. Q. did any other p A. Q. Columbia after A.                           | No. Did the board tell management, "go get a deal done with whatever it  Absolutely not. Did you tell Francois Poirier that the days freaking out? No, I did not. And did you tell him that the board ent to get a deal done with whatever it  No, I did not. After The Wall Street Journal leak, botential bidder reach out to Columbia? Yes. You recall that Spectra contacted the leak? Yes.   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18                         | knowledge you inside counse  A. Q. price discussion A. Q. TransCanada  A. Q. he conveyed to A. Q. A. Q. A.                               | S. Smith - Cross our deposition, were you drawing the had based on what outside of a Columbia had told you?  No.  Who was the primary partions with TransCanada?  Bob and Russ.  So you had one discussion about price in March of 2016.  Do you recall that?  Yes.  Was that a call with Mr. Poot the initial offer of \$24, all cash?  Yes.  How did you react?  Not well.  What did you tell him?  I told him that it was belowed.  | og on any counsel or cipant in the m with  |
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| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21       | Q. including you, takes"?  A. Q. Columbia boar A. Q. told managem takes?  A. Q. did any other p. A. Q. Columbia after A. Q. to that inquiry?      | No. Did the board tell management, "go get a deal done with whatever it  Absolutely not. Did you tell Francois Poirier that the days freaking out? No, I did not. And did you tell him that the board ent to get a deal done with whatever it  No, I did not. After The Wall Street Journal leak, potential bidder reach out to Columbia? Yes. You recall that Spectra contacted the leak? Yes. Did Columbia discuss a way to respond   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21       | knowledge you inside counse  A. Q. price discussion A. Q. TransCanada  A. Q. he conveyed to A. Q. A. Q. and that it was work.            | S. Smith - Cross our deposition, were you drawing the had based on what outside of a Columbia had told you?  No.  Who was the primary partions with TransCanada?  Bob and Russ.  So you had one discussion about price in March of 2016.  Do you recall that?  Yes.  Was that a call with Mr. Potthe initial offer of \$24, all cash?  Yes.  How did you react?  Not well.  What did you tell him?  I told him that it was belowed as unacceptable and it was reserved.                        | ounsel or cipant in the n with cirier when counsel or cipant in the  |
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| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21       | Q. including you, takes"?  A. Q. Columbia boar A. Q. told managem takes?  A. Q. did any other p. A. Q. Columbia after A. Q. to that inquiry?      | No. Did the board tell management, "go get a deal done with whatever it  Absolutely not. Did you tell Francois Poirier that the dwas freaking out? No, I did not. And did you tell him that the board ent to get a deal done with whatever it  No, I did not. After The Wall Street Journal leak, botential bidder reach out to Columbia? Yes. You recall that Spectra contacted the leak? Yes. Did Columbia discuss a way to respond Yes. And what was that? That was a script, which we've talked | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21       | knowledge you inside counse  A. Q. price discussion A. Q. TransCanada  A. Q. he conveyed to A. Q. A. A. and that it was work.            | S. Smith - Cross our deposition, were you drawing the had based on what outside of a Columbia had told you?  No.  Who was the primary partions with TransCanada?  Bob and Russ.  So you had one discussion about price in March of 2016.  Do you recall that?  Yes.  Was that a call with Mr. Potthe initial offer of \$24, all cash?  Yes.  How did you react?  Not well.  What did you tell him?  I told him that it was belowed as unacceptable and it was reserved.                        | cipant in the cipant in the n with cirier when countries when coun |

|  | S. Smith - Cross   | 3   | S. Smith - Cross Page 1185   |
|--|--|---|--|
| 1  | are you referring to how the board would take it?  | 1   | A. Yes, I do.  |
| 2  | A. Yes.  | 2   | Q. So, as you indicated, this is an email  |
| 3  | Q. And that resulted in, later in the  | 3   | where Mr. Rivera is asking you to provide target   |
| 4  | day, an offer at \$25.25. Is that right?   | 4   | retirement dates. Right?   |
| 5  | A. That's my understanding, yes.   | 5   | A. Yes. It's a letter, actually.   |
| 6  | Q. A couple of quick questions about   | 6   | Q. Yes, a letter.  |
| 7  | retirement. And let me just first ask you: Did you   | 7   | Let's go to Exhibit 77, please. Is   |
| 8  | have plans to retire in the 2014-2016 time frame?  | 8   | this another letter from Mr. Rivera?   |
| 9  | A. No, I did not.  | 9   | A. Yes, it is.   |
| 10   | Q. Rick Rivera, who we've heard about in   | 10  | Q. And this one is dated February of   |
| 11   | this trial, was a financial planner for AYCO, who  | 11  | 2015. Correct?   |
| 12   | provided services to NiSource executives. Right?   | 12  | A. Yes.  |
| 13   | A. Yes.  | 13  | Q. Let's go to Section 2.c, please. And  |
| 14   | Q. And that would include you.   | 14  | he says, "You are in good shape to walk away as you  |
| 15   | A. Yes.  | 15  | desire at 55. However, you put the new target as   |
| 16   | Q. Did he manage your retirement   | 16  | early as June of 2016."  |
| 17   | investments?   | 17  | This is a few months after the letter  |
| 18   | A. No, he did not.   | 18  | which Rick asked you to provide target retirement  |
| 19   | Q. At various points, did you provide him  | 19  | dates. Right?  |
| 20   | with target retirement dates?  | 20  | A. Yes.  |
| 21   | A. I provided him with dates that would  | 21  | Q. And, in fact, you did provide a date  |
| 22   | be used to run planning scenarios for potential  | 22  | for retirement planning purposes as he requested.  |
| 23   | retirement dates.  | 23  | Right?   |
| 24   | Q. Let's look at Joint Exhibit 1926.   | 24  | A. Yes. June of 2016.  |
|  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |   | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |
|  | CHANCERI COURI REFORTERS   |   | CHANCERI COURT REPORTERS   |
|  |  |   |  |
|  | S. Smith - Cross Page 118  | 4   | S. Smith - Cross Page 1186   |
| 1  | This is a letter from Mr. Rivera to you dated  | 1   | S. Smith - Cross Page 1186 Q. And why did you do that?   |
| 1 2  | Page 118   |   | Q. And why did you do that?  A. Because I, you know, I turned 55   |
|  | This is a letter from Mr. Rivera to you dated  November 12, 2014. Correct?  A. Yes.  | 1   | Q. And why did you do that?  A. Because I, you know, I turned 55  March 1st of 2016. And so, typically, if people were   |
| 2<br>3<br>4  | Page 118 This is a letter from Mr. Rivera to you dated November 12, 2014. Correct?  A. Yes. Q. Let's go down to Section 2, please.   | 1<br>2<br>3<br>4  | Q. And why did you do that?  A. Because I, you know, I turned 55  March 1st of 2016. And so, typically, if people were going to retire, they always retire on a quarter. So  |
| 2  | Page 118 This is a letter from Mr. Rivera to you dated November 12, 2014. Correct?  A. Yes.  Q. Let's go down to Section 2, please. And that's on the second page, I believe. And at the   | 1<br>2<br>3<br>4<br>5   | Q. And why did you do that?  A. Because I, you know, I turned 55  March 1st of 2016. And so, typically, if people were going to retire, they always retire on a quarter. So it was just the earliest date at which one could   |
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## S. Smith - Redirect

|  |  | S. Smith - Redirect Page  | 1187  |  |   | S. Smith - Redirect  | Page 1189  |
|--|--|---|---|--|---|--|--|
| 1  | Q.   | What was Sullivan & Cromwell's role in  | 1   | cash p   | roceeds   | of our \$1.4 billion secondary   | equity   |
| 2  | the drafting pro   | ocess?  | 2   | offering   | j in Dece   | ember. This enhanced liquidit  | ty   |
| 3  | A.   | They drafted the proxy.   | 3   | position   | n allows  | us to fund our deep investme   | nt   |
| 4  | Q.   | And what was your role?   | 4   | invento  | ry witho  | ut having to access the capita   | al markets   |
| 5  | A.   | I provided some factual information in  | n 5   |  | -   | 017. Our credit metrics are st   |  |
| 6  | terms of dates   | s and meetings and things like that.  | 6   |  |   | unwavering commitment to m   | -  |
| 7  | Q.   | And who made the decisions on what  | 7   |  |   | grade credit rating."  | •  |
| 8  | needed to be in  | n it and what did not need to be in it?   | 8   |  |   | You were truthful when you   | ı were   |
| 9  | A.   | The lawyers.  | 9   | talking  | to the a  | nalysts and you said that. Co  |  |
| 10   | Q.   | And there's been a lot of testimony in  | 10  | J  | Α.  | Yes. That means the cree   |  |
| 11   | this case about  | t standstill provisions, NDAs, "Don't   | 1-  | would  | work o  | ut to about the second quar  |  |
| 12   |  | ve." In all of those decisions that got   | 12  |  |   | etting stressed.   | , , , , , , ,  |
| 13   |  | management rely on in making those  | 13  |  | Q.  | When you said this here, re  | eflected in  |
| 14   | decisions?   | gg  | 14  | this tra   |   | you were truthful. Correct?  |  |
| 15   | <b>A</b> .   | The lawyers, both internal and  | 15  |  | A.  | Yes.   |  |
| 16   | external.  | , ,   | 16  |  | Q.  | And if we scroll down, it tall   | ks about   |
| 17   | OATOTTICH.   | ATTORNEY HARRELL: I'll pass the   | 17  | the MI   |   | , at the bottom, last paragrap   |  |
| 18   | witness.   | ATTOTIVET TIME TELES. TIL PAGG ING  | 18  |  |   | to maintain a \$500 million five   |  |
| 19   | Without.   | REDIRECT EXAMINATION  | 19  |  |   | t facility, only []15 million of wh  | -  |
| 20   | BY ATTORNE   | Y van KWAWEGEN:   | 20  |  | -   | n as of December 31, 2015,"  |  |
| 21   | Q.   | Thank you. A few follow-up questions.   | 2   |  | cor draw<br>cpectation  |  | III IIIIG WILII  |
| 22   | Q.   | Mr. Smith, did I just hear you testify  | 22  | your ex  | pecialic  | Do you see that?   |  |
| 23   | that you had no  | p plan to retire in the 2014-2016 time  | 23  |  | Α.  | Yes.   |  |
| 24   | frame?   | plan to retire in the 2014-2016 time  | 24  |  | Q.  | And you were truthful wher   | you said   |
| 24   | name:  |   | 24  |  | Q.  | And you were trutinul when   | i you salu   |
|  |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |   |  |   | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |  |
|  |  |   |   |  |   |  |  |
|  |  | S. Smith - Redirect   | 1188  |  |   | S. Smith - Redirect  | Page 1190  |
| 1  | A.   | S. Smith - Redirect Page Yes.   | 1188  | that to  | the marl  |  | Page 1190  |
| 1 2  | <b>A.</b><br>Q.  | Page  |   | that to  | the marl  | S. Smith - Redirect ket. Right? Yes.   | Page 1190  |
|  |  | Yes. Let's take a look at a document. It's  | 1   | that to  |   | ket. Right?<br><b>Yes.</b>   | Ü  |
| 2  | Q.   | Yes. Let's take a look at a document. It's  | 1 2   |  | <b>A.</b><br>Q.   | ket. Right?  Yes.  And if we go to the next pa   | ge, in the   |
| 2  | Q.<br>Joint Exhibit 11   | Yes. Let's take a look at a document. It's 38. And in the middle, there is an email   | 1<br>2<br>3<br>4  | middle   | A.<br>Q.<br>of the p  | ket. Right?  Yes.  And if we go to the next paage, right before the final com  | ge, in the<br>nment  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5   | Q. Joint Exhibit 11 where Rick Riv   | Yes. Let's take a look at a document. It's 38. And in the middle, there is an email tera is congratulating you. And right   | 1<br>2<br>3<br>4<br>5   | middle<br>that yo  | A.<br>Q.<br>of the p<br>u make,   | ket. Right?  Yes.  And if we go to the next pa age, right before the final com prepared remarks, "I'll close b   | ge, in the<br>nment<br>by  |
| 2<br>3<br>4  | Q.<br>Joint Exhibit 11<br>where Rick Riv<br>above, on Marc   | Yes. Let's take a look at a document. It's 38. And in the middle, there is an email era is congratulating you. And right ch 17, when the merger agreement is  | 1<br>2<br>3<br>4  | middle<br>that you   | A.<br>Q.<br>of the p<br>u make,<br>hting on   | ket. Right?  Yes.  And if we go to the next pa age, right before the final com prepared remarks, "I'll close to slide 8 that we expect to end  | ge, in the<br>nment<br>by  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7   | Q.<br>Joint Exhibit 11<br>where Rick Riv<br>above, on Marc<br>signed, you say  | Yes. Let's take a look at a document. It's 38. And in the middle, there is an email era is congratulating you. And right ch 17, when the merger agreement is you Mr. Rivera scroll up, please   | 1<br>2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6  | middle<br>that you   | A.<br>Q.<br>of the p<br>u make,<br>hting on   | ket. Right?  Yes.  And if we go to the next pa age, right before the final comprepared remarks, "I'll close be slide 8 that we expect to end 1.6 billion of liquidity."  | ge, in the<br>nment<br>by<br>the year  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8  | Q.<br>Joint Exhibit 11<br>where Rick Riv<br>above, on Marc<br>signed, you say  | Yes. Let's take a look at a document. It's 38. And in the middle, there is an email era is congratulating you. And right ch 17, when the merger agreement is y to Mr. Rivera scroll up, please do you think I can retire now?"  | 1<br>2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8  | middle<br>that you<br>highligh<br>with a s   | A.<br>Q.<br>of the p<br>u make,<br>hting on<br>strong \$  | ket. Right?  Yes.  And if we go to the next pa age, right before the final com prepared remarks, "I'll close to slide 8 that we expect to end 1.6 billion of liquidity."  You were truthful and accu   | ge, in the<br>nment<br>by<br>the year  |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9   | Q. Joint Exhibit 11 where Rick Riv above, on Mare signed, you say "Thanks Rick, o  | Yes.  Let's take a look at a document. It's 38.  And in the middle, there is an email era is congratulating you. And right ch 17, when the merger agreement is y to Mr. Rivera scroll up, please do you think I can retire now?"  You wrote that on March 17th. Right?  | 1<br>2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9   | middle<br>that you<br>highligh<br>with a s   | A. Q. of the p u make, hting on strong \$   | ket. Right?  Yes.  And if we go to the next pa age, right before the final comprepared remarks, "I'll close to slide 8 that we expect to end 1.6 billion of liquidity."  You were truthful and accuract.   | ge, in the inment by the year irate when   |
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## S. Smith - Recross

|    | S. Smith   | - nec | 1055   |
|----|--|-------|--|
|    | S. Smith - Recross Page 1191                           |       | T. Meinhart - Direct Page 1193   |
| 1  | the equity raise on a per share DCF basis."            | 1     | Q. What is Willamette Management   |
| 2  | You were truthful and accurate when                    | 2     | Associates?  |
| 3  | you were explaining to Matt Gibson what you indicated  | 3     | A. Willamette is a business valuation,                                       |
| 4  | in the proxy?  | 4     | forensic analysis, and transaction opinions firm. So                         |
| 5  | A. Yes.  | 5     | the members of the firm, such as myself, routinely                           |
| 6  | Q. Okay. And it's fair to say that when                | 6     | provide valuation opinions and damages analyses.                             |
| 7  | you left Columbia Pipeline, you received a \$177,000   | 7     | We're often testifying in defense of our work. And we                        |
| 8  | payment based on Columbia's financial and operational  | 8     | also provide valuation opinions related to                                   |
| 9  | performance metrics as of July 1, 2016.                | 9     | transactions as well as solvency opinions and fairness                       |
| 10 | A. Yes, I did.   | 10    | opinions in connection with those transactions.                              |
| 11 | Q. It's an additional \$177,000. Right?                | 11    | Q. Do you have any degrees or  |
| 12 | A. Yes.  | 12    | accreditations?  |
| 13 | ATTORNEY van KWAWEGEN: No further                      | 13    | A. I do.   |
| 14 | questions.   | 14    | Q. What are those?   |
| 15 | ATTORNEY HARRELL: One question.                        | 15    | A. I hold a BS in finance from Northern                                      |
|    | •  |       |  |
| 16 | Your Honor.  | 16    | Illinois University and an MBA with a concentration in                       |
| 17 | RECROSS-EXAMINATION                                    | 17    | accounting from DePaul University.   |
| 18 | BY ATTORNEY HARRELL:                                   | 18    | Q. Have you testified as an expert on  |
| 19 | Q. When you sent that email back to                    | 19    | valuation or damages before?   |
| 20 | Rick Rivera and you said, can I retire now? what were  | 20    | A. I have.   |
| 21 | you saying?  | 21    | Q. Approximately how many times?   |
| 22 | A. That was a joke. It was                             | 22    | A. Approximately 30 times in total. I  |
| 23 | tongue-in-cheek, because he harassed me about that for | 23    | would estimate that maybe 20 of those times was at                           |
| 24 | years. And, you know, it was just an offhanded joke.   | 24    | deposition and maybe ten times at trial.                                     |
|    | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS                               |       | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |
|    | T. Meinhart - Direct Page 1192                         |       | T. Meinhart - Direct Page 1194   |
| 1  | ATTORNEY HARRELL: Pass the witness.                    | 1     | Q. And have you testified in the Delaware                                    |
| 2  | Your Honor.  | 2     | Court of Chancery before?  |
| 3  | ATTORNEY van KWAWEGEN: Nothing                         | 3     | A. I have.   |
| 4  | further, Your Honor.                                   | 4     | Q. Could you just briefly describe those                                     |
| 5  | THE COURT: Mr. Smith, thank you for                    | 5     | cases to the best of your memory?  |
| 6  | being here. I appreciate your time.                    | 6     | A. Sure. I refer to those cases really                                       |
| 7  | THE WITNESS: Thank you.                                | 7     | based on the company name, the first of which, the                           |
|    | (Witness excused.)                                     | 8     | company was known as Hazelett Strip Casting                                  |
| 8  | ,  | _     |  |
| 9  | ATTORNEY WEINBERGER: Good afternoon,                   | 9     | Corporation, which I testified at deposition and at trial before Your Honor. |
| 10 | Your Honor. Ned Weinberger from Labaton Sucharow.      | 10    |  |
| 11 | Plaintiffs call Timothy Meinhart as                    | 11    | The second company that I can think of                                       |
| 12 | their next witness.                                    | 12    | involved a company named the <i>Orchard Enterprises, Inc.</i>                |
| 13 | Your Honor, we're just handing up a                    | 13    | I testified at deposition and at trial.                                      |
| 14 | couple documents.                                      | 14    | There was another company or case that                                       |
| 15 | THE COURT: That's fine.                                | 15    | involved a company referred to as Sauer-Danfoss, Inc.,                       |
| 16 | TIMOTHY J. MEINHART, having first been                 | 16    | where I testified at deposition.   |
| 17 | duly affirmed, was examined and testified as follows:  | 17    | And there was a fourth case involving  |
| 18 | DIRECT EXAMINATION                                     | 18    | a company referred to as SourceHOV Holdings, Inc.,                           |
| 19 | BY ATTORNEY WEINBERGER:                                | 19    | where I testified at deposition and at trial.                                |
| 20 | Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Meinhart. Can you               | 20    | ATTORNEY WEINBERGER: Your Honor,   |
| 21 | please introduce yourself to the Court.                | 21    | plaintiffs proffer Mr. Meinhart as an expert on                              |
| 22 | A. Good afternoon. My name is Timothy J.               | 22    | business valuation damages.  |
| 23 | Meinhart. I am a managing director with Willamette     | 23    | THE COURT: Any objections?   |
| 24 | Management Associates in Chicago, Illinois.            | 24    | ATTORNEY MASSENGILL: No, sir.  |
|    | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS                               |       | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |
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|  | T. Meinhart - Direct Page 1195   |  | T. Meinhart - Direct Page 1197   |
|--|--|--|--|
| 1  | THE COURT: I'll except Mr. Meinhart  | 1  | Q. How would you calculate damages under   |
| 2  | as an expert on the subjects proffered.  | 2  | Scenario 1?  |
| 3  | ATTORNEY WEINBERGER: Thank you, Your   | 3  | A. Sure. So Scenario 1, I should   |
| 4  | Honor.   | 4  | probably first say, and you saw this on Slide No. 1,   |
| 5  | BY ATTORNEY WEINBERGER:  | 5  | Scenario 1 is what I refer to as the \$26 mixed  |
| 6  | Q. Mr. Meinhart, were you retained by  | 6  | consideration scenario, which was based on 90 percent  |
| 7  | plaintiffs in this action?   | 7  | cash, 10 percent stock.  |
| 8  | A. I was, yes.   | 8  | But going to Slide 2 that you just   |
| 9  | Q. And what was your assignment?   | 9  | pulled up, it's probably easiest for me to walk  |
| 10   | A. Really, in general, my assignment was   | 10   | through that quickly.  |
| 11   | to measure two categories of damages, what I refer to  | 11   | If this scenario would have been   |
| 12   | in my report, number one, as <i>Revion</i> damages; and,   | 12   | announced on March 17, 2016, that first column is what   |
| 13   | number two, the second category would be rescissory  | 13   | it would have looked like, \$23.40 of cash and another   |
| 14   | damages.   | 14   | \$2.60 of stock. That stock component would have been  |
| 15   | Q. And the report you reference, is that   | 15   | set on the date of closing, at least based on my   |
| 16   | the document in front of you?  | 16   | review of the documents in the record. You can   |
| 17   | You have two documents, actually, in   | 17   | certainly see that TransCanada was adamant about   |
| 18   | front of you. One has a JX at the bottom.  | 18   | setting that exchange ratio for the stock on that  |
| 19   | A. Yes. Yes. I see that.   | 19   | date. So on the March 17th date, you would have a  |
| 20   | Q. And that contains your opinions?  | 20   | stated value or a headline price, if you will, of \$26.  |
| 21   | A. Yes, it does.   | 21   | What I did, since I'm measuring my   |
| 22   | Q. And did you prepare slides to   | 22   | damages as of the date of closing, which is July 1,  |
| 23   | accompany your testimony today?  | 23   | 2016, I brought the stock component forward using the  |
| 24   | A. Yes, I did.   | 24   | actual transaction price of TransCanada at that  |
| 24   |  | 24   | ·  |
|  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |
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|  | T. Meinhart - Direct Page 1196   |  | T. Meinhart - Direct Page 1198   |
| 1  | <ul><li>T. Meinhart - Direct</li><li>Page 1196</li><li>Q. And is that the slide are those the</li></ul>  | 1  | T. Meinhart - Direct Page 1198  July 1, 2016, date.  |
| 1 2  | Page 1196  | 1 2  | Page 1198  |
|  | Q. And is that the slide are those the   |  | July 1, 2016, date.  |
| 2  | Q. And is that the slide are those the slides that are sitting in front you?   | 2  | July 1, 2016, date.  So as I'm showing in the chart at the   |
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| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18                               | Q. And is that the slide are those the slides that are sitting in front you?  A. Yes, they are.  ATTORNEY WEINBERGER: And, Joe, would you put the slides up on the screen whenever you're ready.  All right. Let's start with Revion damages. And, Joe, you can go ahead and turn to Slide 1.  Q. Mr. Meinhart, can you describe generally how you went about estimating Revion damages in this case?  A. Sure. As you can see on this slide, I used five discrete scenarios. And these five scenarios are based on five potential transaction prices, which, based on my review of documents and testimony in the record, are five potential transaction could have taken place but for the alleged misconduct of the defendants.   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18                               | July 1, 2016, date.  So as I'm showing in the chart at the bottom of the page, there was a run-up in the TransCanada stock price from signing, March 17, to closing. And that's why you're seeing an increase in the stock component from \$2.60 and, by the way, these are all U.S. dollars to \$3.10. So ultimately, as of July 1, 2016, I am looking at a value for this particular scenario of \$26.50.  Q. And I just want to clarify real quick. I may have misheard you. You said that the I believe you said that the exchange ratio, you had fixed as of closing. Did you mean announcement for determining what the fractional share would be, Mr. Meinhart?  A. Yes. If I said that, I misspoke. So the ratio would have been set or is set in this analysis as of March 17, 2016, which is as of signing. That's correct.  Q. Okay. And then you said, but you   |
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| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22       | Q. And is that the slide are those the slides that are sitting in front you?  A. Yes, they are.  ATTORNEY WEINBERGER: And, Joe, would you put the slides up on the screen whenever you're ready.  All right. Let's start with Revion damages. And, Joe, you can go ahead and turn to Slide 1.  Q. Mr. Meinhart, can you describe generally how you went about estimating Revion damages in this case?  A. Sure. As you can see on this slide, I used five discrete scenarios. And these five scenarios are based on five potential transaction prices, which, based on my review of documents and testimony in the record, are five potential transaction could have taken place but for the alleged misconduct of the defendants.   | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20                   | July 1, 2016, date.  So as I'm showing in the chart at the bottom of the page, there was a run-up in the TransCanada stock price from signing, March 17, to closing. And that's why you're seeing an increase in the stock component from \$2.60 and, by the way, these are all U.S. dollars to \$3.10. So ultimately, as of July 1, 2016, I am looking at a value for this particular scenario of \$26.50.  Q. And I just want to clarify real quick. I may have misheard you. You said that the I believe you said that the exchange ratio, you had fixed as of closing. Did you mean announcement for determining what the fractional share would be, Mr. Meinhart?  A. Yes. If I said that, I misspoke. So the ratio would have been set or is set in this analysis as of March 17, 2016, which is as of signing. That's correct.  Q. Okay. And then you said, but you ultimately value that stub or that fractional share at close. Why did you use the closing date,               |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23 | Q. And is that the slide are those the slides that are sitting in front you?  A. Yes, they are.  ATTORNEY WEINBERGER: And, Joe, would you put the slides up on the screen whenever you're ready.  All right. Let's start with Revlon damages. And, Joe, you can go ahead and turn to Slide 1.  Q. Mr. Meinhart, can you describe generally how you went about estimating Revlon damages in this case?  A. Sure. As you can see on this slide, I used five discrete scenarios. And these five scenarios are based on five potential transaction prices, which, based on my review of documents and testimony in the record, are five potential transaction prices at which the transaction could have taken place but for the alleged misconduct of the defendants.  Q. Okay. Let's focus on a couple of the scenarios. Let's start with Scenario 1.  ATTORNEY WEINBERGER: Joe, you can | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22<br>23 | July 1, 2016, date.  So as I'm showing in the chart at the bottom of the page, there was a run-up in the TransCanada stock price from signing, March 17, to closing. And that's why you're seeing an increase in the stock component from \$2.60 and, by the way, these are all U.S. dollars to \$3.10. So ultimately, as of July 1, 2016, I am looking at a value for this particular scenario of \$26.50.  Q. And I just want to clarify real quick. I may have misheard you. You said that the I believe you said that the exchange ratio, you had fixed as of closing. Did you mean announcement for determining what the fractional share would be, Mr. Meinhart?  A. Yes. If I said that, I misspoke. So the ratio would have been set or is set in this analysis as of March 17, 2016, which is as of signing. That's correct.  Q. Okay. And then you said, but you ultimately value that stub or that fractional share at close. Why did you use the closing date, Mr. Meinhart? |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22       | Q. And is that the slide are those the slides that are sitting in front you?  A. Yes, they are.  ATTORNEY WEINBERGER: And, Joe, would you put the slides up on the screen whenever you're ready.  All right. Let's start with Revlon damages. And, Joe, you can go ahead and turn to Slide 1.  Q. Mr. Meinhart, can you describe generally how you went about estimating Revlon damages in this case?  A. Sure. As you can see on this slide, I used five discrete scenarios. And these five scenarios are based on five potential transaction prices, which, based on my review of documents and testimony in the record, are five potential transaction prices at which the transaction could have taken place but for the alleged misconduct of the defendants.  Q. Okay. Let's focus on a couple of the scenarios. Let's start with Scenario 1.                                    | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6<br>7<br>8<br>9<br>10<br>11<br>12<br>13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22       | July 1, 2016, date.  So as I'm showing in the chart at the bottom of the page, there was a run-up in the TransCanada stock price from signing, March 17, to closing. And that's why you're seeing an increase in the stock component from \$2.60 and, by the way, these are all U.S. dollars to \$3.10. So ultimately, as of July 1, 2016, I am looking at a value for this particular scenario of \$26.50.  Q. And I just want to clarify real quick. I may have misheard you. You said that the I believe you said that the exchange ratio, you had fixed as of closing. Did you mean announcement for determining what the fractional share would be, Mr. Meinhart?  A. Yes. If I said that, I misspoke. So the ratio would have been set or is set in this analysis as of March 17, 2016, which is as of signing. That's correct.  Q. Okay. And then you said, but you ultimately value that stub or that fractional share at close. Why did you use the closing date,               |

#### T. Meinhart - Direct T. Meinhart - Direct Page 1199 Page 1201 be about a billion dollars of sources of cash, if you 1 the best proxy, best representation of what the price 1 2 would have been as of that date. 2 will. It's not really source of cash but source of 3 Q. And why do you believe that it was the 3 funding, which means you would have a billion less 4 best proxy for what it would have been valued at as of 4 that you would have to raise through either asset 5 that date? 5 sales or the subscription receipts offering. So I 6 A. Well, I considered a number of 6 viewed both of those items and said, logically, that 7 different things. But essentially, the actual run-up 7 would have to reduce the execution risk of the asset 8 in the TC stock was one of them. And as I just 8 sales and/or the subscription receipts offering. 9 mentioned, I used the actual price there. 9 So not only did I have a noticeable 10 The second one was there was 10 run-up in the stock prices of these peer group 11 actually -- in the course of my work on rescissory 11 companies in the midstream space, but it seemed as damages, I had the opportunity to look at peer group though there was a logical conclusion that some of the 12 12 companies, other companies in the midstream space. 13 execution risk could have been eliminated or 13 14 And when running betas for those companies, I'm 14 mitigated, I should -- not eliminated -- mitigated 15 clearly looking at the stock performance of those 15 under the mixed consideration scenario. That's what I 16 companies over different lookback periods. 16 was thinking about at the time I decided to use the 17 And I also noted in my analysis, as I 17 actual TransCanada stock price. 18 was doing it, that there was an increase in the value 18 Q. Okay. Why don't we just briefly of those companies and the market cap of those 19 19 quickly flip back to Slide 1, if you could just sort 20 companies at that point in time as well. So that 20 of summarize your bottom-line damages conclusion under allowed me to become very comfortable with the fact 21 Scenario 1. 21 that this wasn't a TransCanada-specific event, but we 22 Yes, so under Scenario 1, and this is 22 23 were actually seeing somewhat of a recovery in the 23 the same for all these, but while it's referred to as 24 sector from a stock price standpoint. the \$26 scenario, as I just pointed out to you on CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS T. Meinhart - Direct T. Meinhart - Direct Page 1200 Page 1202 Q. And did you do any comparison in 1 Slide No. 2, I actually put a price on that, if you 2 considering whether or not to use of the ultimate --2 will, or a value on that of 26.50. 3 the actual closing price of TransCanada, any 3 So the calculation here is taking 4 comparison of the 25.50 cash versus the \$26 cash and 4 \$26.50, subtracting from that the 25.50 actual 5 stock in terms of, I guess, comparing their structure? 5 transaction that was announced and that occurred, the 6 6 Well, comparing the structure as well difference of which results in the lost transaction 7 was another thing that I was thinking about at the 7 price, lost transaction value. And then I multiply 8 time I was developing my analysis. As I mentioned, 8 that difference by number of shares in the class to 9 clearly, I'm viewing the peer group companies as I'm 9 arrive at approximately \$401 million. 10 10 developing my rescissory damages, and I know what's Q. Okay. Let's talk very briefly about 11 happening there. 11 Scenarios 2 through 5. We do not have to go through 12 In terms of the structure, the real each of them, but just, generally, what are you doing 13 question in my mind is, would the stock, the TC -- I'm 13 in Scenarios 2 through 5? 14 sorry -- the TransCanada perform worse had the mixed 14 Well, in 2 through 5, it's really the 15 consideration offer been announced rather than the 15 same thing I just described for Scenario 1. But, 16 25.50? And, frankly, looking at the structures of 16 frankly, it's easier because each of those are based 17 those two transactions the way I understand them, I 17 on a potential transaction price that is an all-cash came to the conclusion that I was not convinced that 18 price, so I don't have to deal with the stock 18 19 it would. And simply because the mixed consideration 19 component of it. 20 structure requires less cash. 20 Quite frankly, it's just basic math.

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And really, when you think about it in

simplest terms, if the CPG shareholders took

10 percent consideration, the deal value, equity value

was about \$10.2 billion, in round numbers. That would

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I mean, I really don't know how else to explain it

price points, subtract from that the actual

other than to say that you could take any of these

transaction price, and multiply it by shares in the

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22 23

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#### T. Meinhart - Direct T. Meinhart - Direct Page 1203 Page 1205 1 class. And that's how I arrived at each of these 1 by TransCanada in 2021. 2 2 aggregate damages figures in the right-hand column. Q. Okay. And what were the 7+5 3 Q. And let me ask you just about a couple 3 projections used for at TransCanada or Columbia? 4 of these. Scenario 4, \$27 per share, what was your 4 Well, my understanding, based on my 5 basis for the \$27 per share? 5 reading of the record and deposition transcripts, I 6 A. The \$27 per share relates back to the 6 believe they were used for a number of different 7 document that I have referred to, and I believe others 7 purposes, but in general, generally speaking, kind of 8 have, as the interloper analysis that was done in late 8 long-term planning purposes. I understand they were 9 April, 2016. 9 shared with the credit agencies and used for a number 10 Q. And Scenario 5 the \$28 per share. 10 of different purposes. 11 A. That scenario is based on the same 11 Okay. All right. So you did a DCF, document, that's correct, the interloper analysis. as you've said. Why did you choose to do a DCF? 12 12 13 Q. Okay. Mr. Meinhart, let's turn to 13 A. Well, because I determined that was 14 your rescissory damages calculation. 14 the most appropriate and I would say the valuation method that resulted in the most accurate indication 15 Can you describe for the Court sort of 15 16 what you sought to do through your rescissory damages 16 of value for the business unit. 17 analysis? 17 Q. Okay. Let's go through sort of at a 18 A. Yes. In simplest terms, I was 18 high level some of the steps in your DCF. Can you 19 quantifying the change in value of the Columbia equity 19 sort of walk through at a high level what you're doing 20 from the time it was acquired, July 1, 2016, to what I 20 in the DCF calculation? would refer to as a current date, which, for purposes 21 A. 21 Sure. It's, quite frankly, your of my analysis, I'm using a valuation date of 22 typical DCF that puts down to an enterprise value. So 22 23 December 31, 2021. 23 what I'm essentially doing is looking at or developing 24 Q. Okav. And at a high level, how did a multiyear projection of net cash flow over a CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS T. Meinhart - Direct T. Meinhart - Direct Page 1204 Page 1206 1 you go about valuing Columbia in this exercise? 1 discrete projection period, which in this case was ten 2 2 A. Well, at a very high level, I used a years. 3 discounted cash flow analysis to value the Columbia 3 At the end of that projection period, 4 equity. 4 I'm developing a terminal value for that company. And 5 Q. 5 then I'm discounting both of those back. The discrete All right. Let's go through, I guess, 6 6 a couple or a few components of the DCF. You net cash flows and the terminal value, I'm discounting 7 mentioned you chose a valuation date. What was the 7 both of those back to a present value using a weighted 8 valuation date that you chose? 8 average cost of capital. 9 A. That was the December 31, 2021, date 9 Q. And just briefly, those steps, how do 10 that I mentioned, yes. 10 you calculate net cash flows in your DCF? 11 Q. Why did you use December 2021? 11 Α. Well, again, the calculation of net 12 A. Well, because that was the most cash flow was based on the 7+5 projections that were 12 13 current date that I felt I had reasonably accurate developed by management. And really, the calculation 14 financial information, and, really, two categories of 14 of cash flow is the common way you would do it in most 15 financial information. Accurate financial statements instances. When you're putting down to invest the 16 of the Columbia business unit, number one, and then, 16 capital, you essentially start with debt-free net 17 number two, probably more importantly, what I believed 17 income. You adjust that for noncash expenses, such as to be a very accurate projection, financial 18 depreciation and amortization. You reduce it for 18 19 projection, multi-year financial projection, of the 19 capital expenditures. And then I also considered in 20 Columbia business unit. 20 that calculation any projected changes in operating 21 Q. 21 Okay. And what were those working capital, the sum of which puts down to net projections? 22 cash flow. 22 23 23 A. The projections I used were commonly Q. And then you mentioned discount rate.

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referred to as the 7+5 projections that were developed

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How did you go about determining the discount rate

#### T. Meinhart - Direct T. Meinhart - Direct Page 1207 Page 1209 1 that you utilized? 1 Q. Okay. And then so let's talk about 2 Well, the appropriate discount rate to 2 how you calculated switching from the net cash flows A. 3 use here and what I did use is the weighted average 3 to the present value of the -- I'm sorry, present 4 cost of capital, which is a weighting of my estimated 4 value of the terminal value. Can you talk about your 5 5 cost of equity capital with my estimated cost of debt calculation of terminal value? 6 6 capital, which is kind of, in a nutshell, what the A. Yes. So the terminal value, in that 7 7 WACC consists of. case, I used the Gordon Growth Model, which is a 8 Q. Can you talk very briefly about your 8 generally accepted model for developing a terminal 9 calculation of the cost of equity capital? 9 value. Really, the process was as simple as 10 A. Sure. The cost of equity capital, in 10 capitalizing normalized cash flow in that terminal 11 that case, I use the generally accepted capitalized 11 period by a risk-adjusted capitalization rate, which pricing model to develop that, a fairly easy model to consisted of my WACC less my long-term growth rate. 12 12 apply. Just a few components: risk-free rate, equity 13 Q. And did you make any other adjustments 13 14 risk premium, the beta, which I am happy to talk more 14 to your calculation of terminal value? 15 15 about if anyone cares to know. And I also use -- it's Well, in that calculation, there are a 16 really a modified version of the capital asset pricing 16 couple of adjustments that I probably should mention, 17 model, because I did include a size premium as well, 17 both of which were tax-related. 18 based on the estimated size of the CPG equity. 18 As I just mentioned, I capitalized 19 Q. what I refer to as normalized cash flow. And what I And your cost of debt calculation, 19 meant by that is I excluded from the cash flow in the 20 Mr. Meinhart? 20 21 A. 21 terminal period that I capitalized, I excluded from So for the cost of debt, I looked at a number of different data points. I looked at the 22 that measure of cash flow the off-shore tax benefits 22 yield on the long-term notes that Columbia had issued. 23 that are running through the cash flow stream because 23 I looked at the interest rate on the term debt, the it's my understanding that those benefits will not CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS T. Meinhart - Direct T. Meinhart - Direct Page 1208 Page 1210 floating rate, interest rate, on the term debt that 1 continue in perpetuity. They have a finite life. So 2 Columbia took out in 2021. And then I also looked at, 2 I stripped those out and valued those separately and 3 basically as a proxy, the yields on long-term debt 3 discretely. 4 that was issued by other market participants in the 4 And then, also, at the end of the 5 energy space that had credit ratings in that single A 5 terminal period, we were at a point where tax to BBB area, to make them consistent with where 6 6 depreciation far exceeded capital expenditures. So, 7 Columbia fell within that range. 7 again, I made a normalization adjustment for 8 Q. And Slide 3 that's in front of you. 8 depreciation and handled that separately and really 9 titled "Rescissory Damages, WACC Components," can you 9 discretely so that it, frankly, wouldn't cloud up my just briefly walk through what this is describing? 10 10 terminal value calculation. 11 Sure. So the selected cost of equity 11 ATTORNEY WEINBERGER: Joe, could we 12 capital, 7.28 percent, that's what I was referring to 12 turn to Slide 4, please. 13 with the capital asset pricing model. I developed a 13 Q. Can you just describe what's on 14 rate of 7.28 percent. 14 Slide 4, I guess, beginning with your calculation of 15 Just skipping down to the cost of 15 enterprise value for Columbia? 16 16 debt, I should mention that the market metrics I was A. Sure. So what I'm showing on Slide 4 is really a sanity check or a check of the 17 using developed a pre-tax cost of debt for the 17 company. I tax-effected that debt, given the fact 18 reasonableness of my conclusion using the DCF. And 18 19 that interest is tax deductible, to arrive at an 19 what I'm doing is comparing it to the DCF valuation 20 after-tax cost of debt of 2.26 percent. And then I 20 that TransCanada did of Columbia at year-end 2021, 21 21 specifically for impairment, goodwill impairment weighted those two cost components approximately 76 percent attributed to equity, 24 percent attributed 22 22 testing purposes. 23 23 to debt, to arrive at my concluded weighted average So as you can see on this slide, my 24 cost of capital of 6.1 percent. concluded enterprise value for Columbia, using the

CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS

|  | T. Meinhart - Direct Page 1211   |  | T. Meinhart - Direct Page 1213  |
|--|--|--|---|
| 1  | DCF, was, in round numbers, \$22.2 billion. The TC   | 1  | Q. Can you just briefly describe why you  |
| 2  | valuation, the TransCanada valuation of CPG around   | 2  | made that adjustment, post-closing dividends net of   |
| 3  | that same time was higher than where I was. They were  | 3  | contributions, and then just explain what your  |
| 4  | at \$26.6 billion. What that really translates to is,  | 4  | bottom-line damages conclusion is?  |
| 5  | obviously, I'm coming up with a value that implies a   | 5  | A. Sure. I think this is a necessary  |
| 6  | lower multiple to 2021 EBITDA than them. I'm at 12.2.  | 6  | adjustment to be made because this is capital that  |
| 7  | They're at 14.6.   | 7  | TransCanada, as I said, contributed to the business.  |
| 8  | I also wanted to provide a little  | 8  | Without making this adjustment, I think it would give   |
| 9  | clarity on the terminal value comparison here and how  | 9  | a distorted view of really what that growth was from  |
| 10   | that was calculated. For purposes of the terminal  | 10   | 2016 to year-end 2021.  |
| 11   | value estimate I came up with, I used a long-term  | 11   | I could illustrate with a very simple   |
| 12   | growth rate of 1.5 percent. In the analysis that   | 12   | example. But the fact of the matter is if I bought a  |
| 13   | TransCanada did of CPG around that same year-end, they   | 13   | company for \$100 and then, five years later, I valued  |
| 14   | used a higher growth rate of 2.26 percent for that.  | 14   | it again, and right before that second valuation date,  |
| 15   | So those are a couple differences, as  | 15   | I pushed in \$400 of capital and now I have a \$500   |
| 16   | you can see. I'm lower than them in terms of value   | 16   | value as of my second date, I could subtract 100 from   |
| 17   | and certainly lower than them in terms of multiples  | 17   | the 500, and it would suggest I had \$400 of growth   |
| 18   | and growth. Where we are the same is actually in the   | 18   | when, in fact, the only reason I had \$400 of growth is   |
| 19   | WACC. As I previously mentioned, I estimate a  | 19   | because of that capital contribution. Without that  |
| 20   | 6.1 percent weighted average cost of capital, which is   | 20   | capital contribution, there would have been no growth.  |
| 21   | what TransCanada used in their analysis, around that   | 21   | So that's really just a real quick  |
| 22   | time as well.  | 22   | summary of the basis for that. But after that   |
| 23   | Q. And, Mr. Meinhart, could you quickly  | 23   | adjustment, I put down the \$3 billion of rescissory  |
| 24   | turn to Slide 5. Can you walk us through Slide 5,  | 24   | damages to the class.   |
|  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |  | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS  |
|  | T Mainhaut Divast  |  |   |
|  | T. Meinhart - Direct   |  | Page 1214   |
| 1  | Page 1212  | 1  | Page 1214 ATTORNEY WEINBERGER: Thank you.   |
| 1 2  | Page 1212 please.  A. Sure. I start on Slide 5 with the  | 1 2  | Page 1214 ATTORNEY WEINBERGER: Thank you, Mr. Meinhart.   |
|  | please.  A. Sure. I start on Slide 5 with the  |  | ATTORNEY WEINBERGER: Thank you, Mr. Meinhart.   |
| 2  | please.  A. Sure. I start on Slide 5 with the equity value of Columbia, which is really just nothing   | 2  | ATTORNEY WEINBERGER: Thank you,   |
| 3  | please.  A. Sure. I start on Slide 5 with the  | 2  | ATTORNEY WEINBERGER: Thank you, Mr. Meinhart.  Your Honor, no further questions at  |
| 2<br>3<br>4  | please.  A. Sure. I start on Slide 5 with the equity value of Columbia, which is really just nothing more than taking my enterprise value from the previous page, reducing it for the debt that existed at that  | 2<br>3<br>4  | ATTORNEY WEINBERGER: Thank you, Mr. Meinhart.  Your Honor, no further questions at this time.  THE COURT: I think it makes sense to   |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5   | please.  A. Sure. I start on Slide 5 with the equity value of Columbia, which is really just nothing more than taking my enterprise value from the previous  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5   | ATTORNEY WEINBERGER: Thank you, Mr. Meinhart.  Your Honor, no further questions at this time.   |
| 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6  | please.  A. Sure. I start on Slide 5 with the equity value of Columbia, which is really just nothing more than taking my enterprise value from the previous page, reducing it for the debt that existed at that time, and also factoring in related-party receivables  | 2<br>3<br>4<br>5<br>6  | ATTORNEY WEINBERGER: Thank you, Mr. Meinhart. Your Honor, no further questions at this time. THE COURT: I think it makes sense to stop there for the day, and we'll begin tomorrow  |
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|    |  | Page 1215     |
|----|--|---------------|
| 1  | INDEX  |               |
| 2  | WITNESSES:   | <u>Page</u>   |
| 3  | ROBERT C. SKAGGS, JR.,<br>Cont'd Direct by Attorney van Kwawegen   | 930           |
| 4  | Cross by Attorney Harrell<br>Redirect by Attorney van Kwawegen   | 980<br>1082   |
| 5  | JOEL EDWARD HUNTER   |               |
| 6  | Direct by Attorney Yoch<br>Cross by Attorney Sullivan  | 1087<br>1121  |
| 7  |  |               |
| 8  | Direct by Attorney van Kwawegen  | 1134<br>1160  |
| 9  | STEPHEN PAUL SMITH Direct by Attorney van Kwawegen Cross by Attorney Harrell Redirect by Attorney van Kwawegen Recross by Attorney Harrell | 1187<br>1191  |
| 10 | TIMOTHY J. MEINHART  | 1171          |
| 11 | Direct by Attorney Weinberger  | 1192          |
| 12 |  |               |
| 13 |  |               |
| 14 |  |               |
| 15 |  |               |
| 16 |  |               |
| 17 |  |               |
| 18 |  |               |
| 19 |  |               |
| 20 |  |               |
| 21 |  |               |
| 22 |  |               |
|    |  |               |
| 23 |  |               |
| 24 |  |               |
|    | CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS   |               |
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|    |  | OLIANOEDY OOI |

| Ī |                                       | 1117/14 1121/6                     | <b>\$22.2 billion [1]</b> 1211/1                                | 1108/1 1174/4                                      | 0   |
|---|---------------------------------------|------------------------------------|---|--|---|
|   | <b>Answer: [3]</b> 1158/12            | MR. YOCH: [1] 1111/5               |   | <b>\$4 billion [3]</b> 1107/4                      | <b>003 [1]</b> 978/15                           |
|   | 1158/15 1158/20                       | <b>Question: [3]</b> 1158/8        | 1197/13   | 1108/1 1174/4                                      | <b>009 [1]</b> 1137/7                           |
|   | ATTORNEY                              | 1158/14 1158/18                    | <b>\$24 [6]</b> 940/4 1013/22                                   | <b>\$4.2 [3]</b> 1116/17                           | <b>011 [1]</b> 1139/18                          |
|   | HARRELL: [24]                         | THE COURT: [36]                    | 1052/9 1052/12  | 1116/24 1118/11                                    | <b>0182 [1]</b> 1004/7                          |
|   | 987/16 989/2 994/24                   | 929/1 929/12 929/24                | 1182/13 1182/23   | <b>\$4.2 billion [3]</b> 1116/17                   | <b>0432 [1]</b> 1164/4                          |
|   | 995/6 1000/20 1002/5                  | 978/12 979/23 980/7                | <b>\$24-\$25</b> [1] 1013/22                                    | 1116/24 1118/11                                    | <b>0526 [1]</b> 927/24                          |
|   | 1002/9 1002/15                        | 1003/7 1004/2 1059/9               | <b>\$25 [3]</b> 1013/22 1024/7                                  | <b>\$400 [3]</b> 1213/15                           | <b>0915 [1]</b> 1127/10                         |
|   | 1017/24 1018/17                       | 1068/18 1069/3                     | 1093/18   | 1213/17 1213/18                                    | <b>0952 [1]</b> 1179/16                         |
|   | 1022/5 1069/12                        | 1069/14 1081/13                    | <b>\$25.25 [8]</b> 940/16                                       | <b>\$401</b> [1] 1202/9                            |   |
|   | 1069/15 1070/2 1078/1                 | 1086/20 1094/14                    | 952/2 971/12 1052/9   | <b>\$401</b> million [1] 1202/9                    | 1   |
|   | 1078/15 1080/16                       | 1094/21 1116/12                    | 1053/22 1104/11   | <b>\$49 [1]</b> 1113/1                             | <b>1.4 billion [2]</b> 1162/24                  |
|   | 1081/8 1082/16                        | 1117/8 1118/16                     | 1105/24 1183/4  | <b>\$5 [1]</b> 1036/1                              | 1163/4  |
|   | 1086/18 1162/15                       | 1118/19 1119/11                    | <b>\$25.50 [5]</b> 970/19                                       | <b>\$500 [6]</b> 1107/9 1124/9                     | 1.5 percent [1]                                 |
|   | 1187/17 1191/15                       | 1119/22 1120/17                    | 1067/13 1067/23   | 1128/15 1128/23                                    | 1211/12   |
|   | 1192/1                                | 1121/5 1121/14<br>1133/11 1133/21  | 1077/3 1077/8   | 1189/18 1213/15<br><b>\$500 million [4]</b> 1124/9 | <b>1.a [2]</b> 1184/21                          |
|   | ATTORNEY                              | 1143/23 1145/2 1145/7              | <b>\$25.75 [4]</b> 975/23<br>976/7 976/11 979/11                | 1128/15 1128/23                                    | 1104/22   |
|   | MASSENGILL: [1]                       | 1145/10 1192/5                     | <b>\$26 [61]</b> 936/3 937/2                                    | 1189/18  | <b>1/2 [1]</b> 937/23                           |
|   | 1194/24                               | 1192/15 1194/23                    | 937/21 943/16 943/23  | <b>\$520 [1]</b> 1124/4                            | <b>1/9/2016 [1]</b> 1040/3                      |
|   | ATTORNEY OLSEN:                       | 1195/1 1214/5                      | 944/14 945/11 946/2   | \$520 million [1] 1124/4                           | <b>10 [10]</b> 933/19 950/8                     |
|   | <b>[4]</b> 929/4 979/18               | THE WITNESS: [12]                  | 946/6 946/12 946/14   | \$60 [1] 1171/24                                   | 957/4 958/5 958/7                               |
|   | 1086/24 1115/17                       | 1059/13 1086/22                    | 947/6 947/10 948/14   | \$60 million [1] 1171/24                           | 1052/7 1058/3 1058/14                           |
|   | ATTORNEY                              | 1094/20 1116/14                    | 949/12 950/8 951/18   | <b>\$7 [2]</b> 1171/10 1174/2                      | 11/3/13 11/3/10                                 |
|   | SULLIVAN: [5]                         | 1117/11 1118/18                    | 951/23 952/7 952/9  | <b>\$7 billion [2]</b> 1171/10                     | <b>10 percent [30]</b> 948/16                   |
|   | 1121/20 1127/12                       | 1118/24 1119/21                    | 952/15 954/22 956/17  | 1174/2   | 949/12 951/18 951/23                            |
|   | 1129/3 1131/2 1133/7                  | 1120/8 1121/2 1133/22              | 956/23 957/4 958/15   | -  | 952/9 952/16 954/23                             |
|   | ATTORNEY van                          | 1192/7                             | 967/7 973/13 978/24   | •  | 956/18 956/23 958/15                            |
|   | KWAWEGEN: [26]                        |                                    | 979/4 1024/7 1055/13  | <b>'16 [1]</b> 1137/8                              | 967/7 967/19 970/7                              |
|   | 929/16 933/7 937/17                   | \$                                 | 1056/1 1056/20 1057/4   | 'accepted [1] 1058/4                               | 978/24 979/5 1056/21                            |
|   | 947/14 949/1 950/3                    | <b>\$.25 [1]</b> 975/5             | 1058/4 1075/21  | 'all [1] 943/6                                     | 1058/5 1109/12                                  |
|   | 953/13 960/12 965/18                  | <b>\$.25/share [1]</b> 975/5       | 1077/17 1106/1  | 'bracket' [1] 1009/17                              | 1109/21 1112/23<br>  1114/1 1118/17             |
|   | 966/18 973/4 978/10                   | <b>\$1 [1]</b> 975/7               | 1106/17 1107/2  | 'can [1] 966/4                                     | 1118/21 1119/15                                 |
|   | 979/13 980/1 980/8<br>1081/10 1082/18 | <b>\$1.4 [2]</b> 1162/23           | 1107/20 1109/5  | 'eliminated' [1]                                   | 1120/5 1120/6 1120/11                           |
|   | 1086/16 1133/14                       | 1189/1                             | 1126/23 1127/2 1127/5   | 1139/19  | 1133/2 1197/7 1200/23                           |
|   | 1133/23 1145/4 1145/8                 | <b>\$1.4 billion [1]</b> 1189/1    | 1127/8 1127/22 1128/7   | 'in [1] 1145/18                                    | <b>100 [1]</b> 1213/16                          |
|   | 1150/1 1160/11                        | \$1.4 million [1]                  | 1128/10 1128/13   | 'management [1]                                    | 100 percent [1]                                 |
|   | 1191/13 1192/3                        | 1162/23                            | 1129/8 1130/8 1130/15   | 942/3  | 1102/19   |
|   | ATTORNEY                              | <b>\$1.6 [1]</b> 1190/7            | 1130/20 1132/14   | 'pipeline [1] 935/10                               | <b>1006 [1]</b> 979/16                          |
|   | WEINBERGER: [7]                       | <b>\$1.6 billion [1]</b> 1190/7    | 1132/18 1197/5  | 're [1] 954/4                                      | <b>1023</b> [1] 966/20                          |
|   | 1192/9 1194/20 1195/3                 | <b>\$10.2 [2]</b> 1200/24          | 1197/20 1200/4  | 'revised [1] 971/6                                 | <b>1024 [1]</b> 966/20                          |
|   | 1196/4 1196/23                        | 1212/13                            | 1201/24   | 's [6] 936/3 941/24                                | <b>1028 [2]</b> 1065/16                         |
|   | 1210/11 1214/1                        | \$10.2 billion [2]                 | <b>\$26.00</b> [1] 958/5  | 959/15 959/24 974/20                               | 1065/24   |
|   | <b>ATTORNEY YOCH: [8]</b>             | 1200/24 1212/13                    | <b>\$26.50 [4]</b> 944/4  | 1017/22  | <b>1029 [1]</b> 1150/2                          |
|   | 1093/5 1093/11                        | \$10.8 [1] 1134/15                 | 944/10 1198/9 1202/4  | 'serious' [1] 1151/3                               | <b>1057 [1]</b> 1071/4                          |
|   | 1096/14 1096/20                       | \$10.8 million [1]                 | \$26.6 [1] 1211/4   | 'valuation [1] 935/1                               | <b>1064 [1]</b> 968/1                           |
|   | 1103/23 1108/12                       | 1134/15<br><b>\$100 [2]</b> 976/22 | <b>\$26.6 billion [1]</b> 1211/4 <b>\$27 [6]</b> 1123/13 1126/2 | 1062/6   | <b>1081 [2]</b> 1077/23                         |
|   | 1121/12 1133/9                        | 1213/13                            | 1126/13 1203/4 1203/5   | 'When [1] 966/2                                    | 1084/22   |
|   | BY ATTORNEY                           | \$100 million [1] 976/22           |   | 'would [1] 936/2                                   | <b>1087 [1]</b> 970/23                          |
|   | <b>HARRELL: [7]</b> 980/11            | <b>\$14 [1]</b> 965/8              | <b>\$28 [14]</b> 937/2 939/24                                   |  | <b>1092 [2]</b> 1111/5 1131/2                   |
|   | 1004/5 1060/2 1069/16                 | \$14 billion [1] 965/8             | 1015/13 1025/17   | -  | 10:30 a.m [1] 959/22                            |
|   | 1081/15 1160/15                       | <b>\$17 [1]</b> 1212/9             | 1042/19 1046/18   | -and [5] 928/3 928/5                               | <b>10:45 [1]</b> 1003/10                        |
|   | 1191/18                               | <b>\$17 billion [1]</b> 1212/9     | 1070/20 1083/1 1123/3   | 928/8 928/13 928/20                                | 10th [18] 950/2 953/11                          |
|   | BY ATTORNEY                           | <b>\$177,000 [2]</b> 1191/7        | 1123/14 1126/2  |  | 953/12 953/16 954/1                             |
|   | SULLIVAN: [1]                         | 1191/11                            | 1126/14 1143/19   | <u>•</u>   | 954/15 955/10 955/11                            |
|   | 1121/16                               | <b>\$2.50 [1]</b> 1119/16          | 1203/10   | <b>[3]</b> 943/21 988/14                           | 956/5 957/4 959/22                              |
|   | BY ATTORNEY van                       | <b>\$2.60 [4]</b> 950/16           | <b>\$3 [1]</b> 1213/23  | 1072/15  | 960/21 961/8 961/13                             |
|   | KWAWEGEN: [7]                         |                                    | <b>\$3 billion [1]</b> 1213/23                                  | <b>.003 [1]</b> 978/16                             | 961/20 962/12 963/3                             |
|   | 930/5 1082/21 1134/2                  | <b>\$2.9 [1]</b> 1188/24           | <b>\$3.1 [1]</b> 1128/3   | <b>.007 [1]</b> 1127/21                            | 1057/13   |
|   | 1139/11 1145/11                       | <b>\$2.9 billion [1]</b> 1188/24   | <b>\$3.1 billion [1]</b> 1128/3                                 | <b>.013 [1]</b> 1129/3                             | <b>11 [8]</b> 955/11 963/3 963/15 1041/9 1059/8 |
|   | 1159/5 1187/20                        | <b>\$20 [1]</b> 1044/6             | <b>\$3.10 [1]</b> 1198/7  | . <b>020 [1]</b> 1122/15                           | 1064/24 1149/6 1158/6                           |
|   | BY ATTORNEY                           | <b>\$200 [2]</b> 1107/3 1108/3     | <b>\$30 [2]</b> 1099/23   | <b>.30 [1]</b> 1123/13                             | <b>1107</b> [1] 1067/3                          |
|   | <b>WEINBERGER: [2]</b> 1192/19 1195/5 | <b>\$200</b> million [2] 1107/3    | 1171/24   | <b>.31 [1]</b> 1124/16                             | <b>1114 [1]</b> 1070/3                          |
|   | BY ATTORNEY YOCH:                     | 1108/3                             | <b>\$30 million [1]</b> 1171/24                                 | <b>.32 [1]</b> 1125/3                              | <b>1120 [1]</b> 957/16                          |
|   | [4] 1087/6 1094/22                    | <b>\$22.2 [1]</b> 1211/1           | <b>\$4 [4]</b> 1045/20 1107/4                                   |  | <b>1138 [1]</b> 1188/3                          |
|   | [1] 1007/0 1007/22                    |                                    |   |  |   |

| _ |   |   |  |   |  |
|---|---|---|--|---|--|
|   | 1   | 1073/18 1074/16   | 1172/6 1172/11   | 1027/19 1042/18   | <b>368 [1]</b> 949/2   |
|   |   | 1080/19 1080/22   | 1172/23 1173/13  | 1043/24 1044/6 1106/7   |  |
|   | <b>114 [1]</b> 992/8  | 1188/6 1197/12 1198/4   | 1175/20 1175/11  |   | <b>3:01</b> [1] 1144/2   |
|   | <b>11400 [1]</b> 927/23   |   |  | 1138/21 1143/19   |  |
|   | <b>1195 [2]</b> 1083/16   | 1198/18   | 1188/24 1189/20  | <b>25.25 [8]</b> 941/3  | <b>3:15</b> [2] 1144/1 1145/1  |
|   | 1190/12   | <b>17.50 [1]</b> 1028/10  | 1190/10  | 1053/17 1105/3 1106/7   | <b>3pm [1]</b> 943/13  |
|   | <b>11:00 [2]</b> 1003/9   | <b>1777 [2]</b> 964/17 1149/4   | <b>2016 [71]</b> 933/12  | 1118/4 1120/10  | <b>3rd [1]</b> 1017/23   |
|   |   | <b>1778 [2]</b> 953/12  | 933/16 933/21 938/12   | 1127/23 1128/7  | <u> </u>   |
|   | 1004/1  | 1151/14   | 940/3 949/6 949/7  | <b>25.50 [27]</b> 973/19  | 4  |
|   | <b>11:59 p.m [1]</b> 949/5  | <b>1779 [2]</b> 958/19 962/11   |  | 974/6 1068/7 1070/19  | <b>4.2 billion [2]</b> 1117/2  |
|   | <b>11th [2]</b> 955/6 1060/5  |   | 972/1 973/13 975/12  | 1078/4 1079/3 1079/5  | 1121/3   |
|   | <b>12 [11]</b> 929/7 964/20   | <b>17th [2]</b> 1188/9  |  |   |  |
|   | 964/20 965/20 965/23  | 1197/19   | 979/5 991/2 993/19   | 1118/4 1118/4 1118/16   |  |
|   | 1018/16 1066/2 1072/4   | <b>18 [6]</b> 937/23 1074/17  | 1026/8 1026/9 1036/13  | 1120/7 1120/10 1121/1   |  |
|   | 1072/9 1151/16 1184/2   | 1096/21 1138/5 1138/5   | 1037/10 1040/3 1040/7  | 1121/4 1122/1 1122/7  | <b>4.8 million [1]</b> 1165/21   |
|   |   | 1188/18   | 1043/24 1049/10  | 1123/3 1126/1 1126/5  | <b>40 [3]</b> 1099/3 1100/9  |
|   | <b>12.2 [1]</b> 1211/6  | <b>18-20 [1]</b> 939/6  | 1049/19 1085/19  | 1126/13 1126/17   | 1100/13  |
|   | <b>12/15 [1]</b> 1034/24  |   |  | 1131/23 1132/3 1132/8   | <b>400 million [1]</b> 976/22  |
|   | <b>12/31 [1]</b> 1212/10  | <b>18.5 [2]</b> 937/24 938/7  | 1086/3 1088/12 1089/5  |   |  |
|   | <b>1264 [1]</b> 1122/13   | <b>182 [1]</b> 1003/6   | 1090/17 1092/1 1093/1  | 1200/4 1200/16 1202/4   |  |
|   | <b>1291</b> [1] 978/4   | <b>183 [1]</b> 995/1  | 1094/13 1094/24  | <b>25.60 [1]</b> 1078/13  | <b>420 [1]</b> 973/5   |
|   |   | <b>19 [2]</b> 1010/12 1095/20   | 1096/11 1101/20  | <b>25.70 [1]</b> 1078/13  | <b>421 [1]</b> 973/5   |
|   | <b>12:30 [1]</b> 1068/20  | <b>19.6 [1]</b> 938/11  | 1101/21 1104/3   | <b>253 [1]</b> 1009/9   | <b>422 [1]</b> 974/3   |
|   | <b>12A [1]</b> 927/9  | <b>191 [8]</b> 949/24 1005/17   |  | <b>255-0526 [1]</b> 927/24  | <b>43 [1]</b> 1080/22  |
|   | <b>12th [11]</b> 1072/21  |   |  |   |  |
|   | 1149/6 1149/20 1150/5   | 1008/8 1023/20 1043/8   | 1111/8 1122/2 1122/6   | <b>26 [27]</b> 941/10 941/21  | <b>45 [1]</b> 1169/20  |
|   | 1150/11 1150/13   | 1052/5 1058/12  | 1122/11 1126/22  | 942/1 942/10 945/18   | <b>45.75 [2]</b> 1114/19   |
|   |   | 1072/10   | 1135/2 1137/8 1138/8   | 948/6 949/13 967/19   | 1114/21  |
|   | 1150/23 1151/10   | <b>1910 [1]</b> 1162/16   | 1148/16 1149/1   | 970/7 974/6 1013/8  | <b>450 [1]</b> 1124/3  |
|   | 1151/17 1153/1  | <b>1922 [1]</b> 1103/24   | 1173/16 1173/18  | 1024/23 1027/19   | <b>466 [1]</b> 1168/5  |
|   | 1153/13   |   |  | 1055/3 1056/5 1056/15   | <b>480 [1]</b> 1034/19   |
|   | <b>13 [6]</b> 950/1 968/3   | <b>1926</b> [1] 1183/24   | 1179/13 1179/18  |   |  |
|   | 968/4 968/24 1018/4   | <b>19801 [1]</b> 927/23   | 1182/9 1183/8 1185/16  | 1056/16 1078/4  | <b>484 [1]</b> 932/20  |
|   | 1138/5  | <b>1997 [1]</b> 1087/18   | 1185/24 1186/3   | 1101/21 1118/17   | <b>492 [1]</b> 1045/8  |
|   |   | <b>1:30 [1]</b> 1068/19   | 1187/23 1188/19  | 1118/21 1119/15   | <b>4:00 [1]</b> 1151/16  |
|   | <b>13th</b> [1] 1034/21   | 1:30 p.m [1] 1069/2   | 1191/9 1197/12   | 1119/15 1120/7  | <b>4:44 [1]</b> 1214/10  |
|   | <b>14 [21]</b> 934/6 935/3  | 1st [8] 998/10 1008/15  | 1197/23 1198/1 1198/8  | 1120/22 1138/21   | <b>4:45 [1]</b> 929/11   |
|   | 969/13 969/18 969/19  |   |  |   |  |
|   | 970/23 971/18 972/1   | 1008/16 1088/1 1089/5   | 1198/18 1203/9   | 1138/22   | <b>4pm [1]</b> 943/14  |
|   | 37 0/20 37 1/10 37 <b>2</b> /1  |   |  |   |  |
|   |   | 1101/20 1135/2 1186/3   | 1203/20 1212/13  | <b>26.50 [1]</b> 1202/2   | 4th [1] 1004/14  |
|   | 972/17 1000/22  | 1101/20 1135/2 1186/3<br>1x1he's [1] 936/1  | 1203/20 1212/13<br>1213/10   | <b>264 [1]</b> 1010/12  | <del></del>  |
|   | 972/17 1000/22<br>1058/12 1077/24   | 1x1he's [1] 936/1   | 1213/10  | <b>264 [1]</b> 1010/12  | 5  |
|   | 972/17 1000/22<br>1058/12 1077/24<br>1085/9 1085/19 1086/3  | 1x1he's [1] 936/1   | 1213/10<br><b>2017 [1]</b> 1189/5  | <b>264 [1]</b> 1010/12<br><b>272 [1]</b> 1013/6   | <del></del>  |
|   | 972/17 1000/22<br>1058/12 1077/24<br>1085/9 1085/19 1086/3<br>1111/8 1111/23 1113/7   | 1x1he's [1] 936/1<br>2  | 1213/10<br><b>2017 [1]</b> 1189/5<br><b>2018 [3]</b> 1124/9 1126/4   | <b>264</b> [1] 1010/12<br><b>272</b> [1] 1013/6<br><b>28</b> [6] 938/11 1043/11   | 5<br>5 percent [3] 1116/21   |
|   | 972/17 1000/22<br>1058/12 1077/24<br>1085/9 1085/19 1086/3<br>1111/8 1111/23 1113/7<br>1116/6 1131/1 1131/16  | 1x1he's [1] 936/1<br>2<br>2.26 percent [2]  | 1213/10<br><b>2017 [1]</b> 1189/5<br><b>2018 [3]</b> 1124/9 1126/4<br>1128/23  | <b>264</b> [1] 1010/12<br><b>272</b> [1] 1013/6<br><b>28</b> [6] 938/11 1043/11<br>1046/21 1122/21  | 5 percent [3] 1116/21 1117/4 1121/3  |
|   | 972/17 1000/22<br>1058/12 1077/24<br>1085/9 1085/19 1086/3<br>1111/8 1111/23 1113/7   | 1x1he's [1] 936/1<br>2<br>2.26 percent [2]<br>1208/20 1211/14   | 1213/10<br>2017 [1] 1189/5<br>2018 [3] 1124/9 1126/4<br>1128/23<br>2018-0484-JTL [1]   | <b>264</b> [1] 1010/12<br><b>272</b> [1] 1013/6<br><b>28</b> [6] 938/11 1043/11<br>1046/21 1122/21<br>1138/21 1138/22   | 5 percent [3] 1116/21 1117/4 1121/3 500 [4] 927/10 927/23  |
|   | 972/17 1000/22<br>1058/12 1077/24<br>1085/9 1085/19 1086/3<br>1111/8 1111/23 1113/7<br>1116/6 1131/1 1131/16<br><b>14.6 [1]</b> 1211/7  | 1x1he's [1] 936/1<br>2<br>2.26 percent [2]<br>1208/20 1211/14<br>2.c [1] 1185/13  | 1213/10<br>2017 [1] 1189/5<br>2018 [3] 1124/9 1126/4<br>1128/23<br>2018-0484-JTL [1]<br>927/4  | <b>264</b> [1] 1010/12<br><b>272</b> [1] 1013/6<br><b>28</b> [6] 938/11 1043/11<br>1046/21 1122/21<br>1138/21 1138/22<br><b>283</b> [1] 1016/6  | 5 5 percent [3] 1116/21 1117/4 1121/3 500 [4] 927/10 927/23 1129/23 1213/17  |
|   | 972/17 1000/22<br>1058/12 1077/24<br>1085/9 1085/19 1086/3<br>1111/8 1111/23 1113/7<br>1116/6 1131/1 1131/16<br>14.6 [1] 1211/7<br>143 [1] 1000/21  | 1x1he's [1] 936/1  2  2.26 percent [2] 1208/20 1211/14 2.c [1] 1185/13 20 [10] 939/6 991/18   | 1213/10<br>2017 [1] 1189/5<br>2018 [3] 1124/9 1126/4<br>1128/23<br>2018-0484-JTL [1]<br>927/4<br>2019 [3] 1087/24  | 264 [1] 1010/12<br>272 [1] 1013/6<br>28 [6] 938/11 1043/11<br>1046/21 1122/21<br>1138/21 1138/22<br>283 [1] 1016/6<br>29 [6] 930/13 931/12  | 5 5 percent [3] 1116/21 1117/4 1121/3 500 [4] 927/10 927/23 1129/23 1213/17 521 [1] 1037/7   |
|   | 972/17 1000/22<br>1058/12 1077/24<br>1085/9 1085/19 1086/3<br>1111/8 1111/23 1113/7<br>1116/6 1131/1 1131/16<br>14.6 [1] 1211/7<br>143 [1] 1000/21<br>1439 [1] 973/5  | 1x1he's [1] 936/1<br>2<br>2.26 percent [2]<br>1208/20 1211/14<br>2.c [1] 1185/13  | 1213/10<br>2017 [1] 1189/5<br>2018 [3] 1124/9 1126/4<br>1128/23<br>2018-0484-JTL [1]<br>927/4  | <b>264</b> [1] 1010/12<br><b>272</b> [1] 1013/6<br><b>28</b> [6] 938/11 1043/11<br>1046/21 1122/21<br>1138/21 1138/22<br><b>283</b> [1] 1016/6  | 5 5 percent [3] 1116/21 1117/4 1121/3 500 [4] 927/10 927/23 1129/23 1213/17 521 [1] 1037/7 549 [1] 1136/7  |
|   | 972/17 1000/22<br>1058/12 1077/24<br>1085/9 1085/19 1086/3<br>1111/8 1111/23 1113/7<br>1116/6 1131/1 1131/16<br>14.6 [1] 1211/7<br>143 [1] 1000/21<br>1439 [1] 973/5<br>1496 [1] 966/20   | 1x1he's [1] 936/1  2  2.26 percent [2] 1208/20 1211/14 2.c [1] 1185/13 20 [10] 939/6 991/18 1002/13 1002/16   | 1213/10<br>2017 [1] 1189/5<br>2018 [3] 1124/9 1126/4<br>1128/23<br>2018-0484-JTL [1]<br>927/4<br>2019 [3] 1087/24<br>1126/10 1126/15   | 264 [1] 1010/12<br>272 [1] 1013/6<br>28 [6] 938/11 1043/11<br>1046/21 1122/21<br>1138/21 1138/22<br>283 [1] 1016/6<br>29 [6] 930/13 931/12<br>936/7 939/20 1043/16  | 5 5 percent [3] 1116/21 1117/4 1121/3 500 [4] 927/10 927/23 1129/23 1213/17 521 [1] 1037/7   |
|   | 972/17 1000/22<br>1058/12 1077/24<br>1085/9 1085/19 1086/3<br>1111/8 1111/23 1113/7<br>1116/6 1131/1 1131/16<br>14.6 [1] 1211/7<br>143 [1] 1000/21<br>1439 [1] 973/5<br>1496 [1] 966/20<br>14th [4] 962/23 973/13   | 1x1he's [1] 936/1  2  2.26 percent [2] 1208/20 1211/14 2.c [1] 1185/13 20 [10] 939/6 991/18 1002/13 1002/16 1023/6 1067/4 1067/15   | 1213/10 2017 [1] 1189/5 2018 [3] 1124/9 1126/4 1128/23 2018-0484-JTL [1] 927/4 2019 [3] 1087/24 1126/10 1126/15 202 [1] 1138/5   | 264 [1] 1010/12<br>272 [1] 1013/6<br>28 [6] 938/11 1043/11<br>1046/21 1122/21<br>1138/21 1138/22<br>283 [1] 1016/6<br>29 [6] 930/13 931/12<br>936/7 939/20 1043/16<br>1138/22   | 5 5 percent [3] 1116/21 1117/4 1121/3 500 [4] 927/10 927/23 1129/23 1213/17 521 [1] 1037/7 549 [1] 1136/7  |
|   | 972/17 1000/22<br>1058/12 1077/24<br>1085/9 1085/19 1086/3<br>1111/8 1111/23 1113/7<br>1116/6 1131/1 1131/16<br>14.6 [1] 1211/7<br>143 [1] 1000/21<br>1439 [1] 973/5<br>1496 [1] 966/20<br>14th [4] 962/23 973/13<br>1073/19 1131/20  | 1x1he's [1] 936/1  2  2.26 percent [2] 1208/20 1211/14 2.c [1] 1185/13 20 [10] 939/6 991/18 1002/13 1002/16 1023/6 1067/4 1067/15 1099/3 1100/8 1193/23   | 1213/10 2017 [1] 1189/5 2018 [3] 1124/9 1126/4 1128/23 2018-0484-JTL [1] 927/4 2019 [3] 1087/24 1126/10 1126/15 202 [1] 1138/5 2021 [8] 1203/23  | 264 [1] 1010/12<br>272 [1] 1013/6<br>28 [6] 938/11 1043/11<br>1046/21 1122/21<br>1138/21 1138/22<br>283 [1] 1016/6<br>29 [6] 930/13 931/12<br>936/7 939/20 1043/16<br>1138/22<br>2:00 p.m [1] 970/1   | 5 5 percent [3] 1116/21 1117/4 1121/3 500 [4] 927/10 927/23 1129/23 1213/17 521 [1] 1037/7 549 [1] 1136/7 55 [4] 1134/24 1135/2 1185/15 1186/2   |
|   | 972/17 1000/22<br>1058/12 1077/24<br>1085/9 1085/19 1086/3<br>1111/8 1111/23 1113/7<br>1116/6 1131/1 1131/16<br>14.6 [1] 1211/7<br>143 [1] 1000/21<br>1439 [1] 973/5<br>1496 [1] 966/20<br>14th [4] 962/23 973/13   | 1x1he's [1] 936/1  2  2.26 percent [2] 1208/20 1211/14 2.c [1] 1185/13 20 [10] 939/6 991/18 1002/13 1002/16 1023/6 1067/4 1067/15 1099/3 1100/8 1193/23 20 percent [1] 1028/10  | 1213/10 2017 [1] 1189/5 2018 [3] 1124/9 1126/4 1128/23 2018-0484-JTL [1] 927/4 2019 [3] 1087/24 1126/10 1126/15 202 [1] 1138/5 2021 [8] 1203/23 1204/9 1204/11 1205/1  | 264 [1] 1010/12<br>272 [1] 1013/6<br>28 [6] 938/11 1043/11<br>1046/21 1122/21<br>1138/21 1138/22<br>283 [1] 1016/6<br>29 [6] 930/13 931/12<br>936/7 939/20 1043/16<br>1138/22<br>2:00 p.m [1] 970/1<br>2:30 [1] 969/21  | 5 5 percent [3] 1116/21 1117/4 1121/3 500 [4] 927/10 927/23 1129/23 1213/17 521 [1] 1037/7 549 [1] 1136/7 55 [4] 1134/24 1135/2 1185/15 1186/2 554 [1] 1040/1  |
|   | 972/17 1000/22<br>1058/12 1077/24<br>1085/9 1085/19 1086/3<br>1111/8 1111/23 1113/7<br>1116/6 1131/1 1131/16<br>14.6 [1] 1211/7<br>143 [1] 1000/21<br>1439 [1] 973/5<br>1496 [1] 966/20<br>14th [4] 962/23 973/13<br>1073/19 1131/20  | 1x1he's [1] 936/1  2  2.26 percent [2] 1208/20 1211/14 2.c [1] 1185/13 20 [10] 939/6 991/18 1002/13 1002/16 1023/6 1067/4 1067/15 1099/3 1100/8 1193/23 20 percent [1] 1028/10 20-25 [1] 1013/21  | 1213/10 2017 [1] 1189/5 2018 [3] 1124/9 1126/4 1128/23 2018-0484-JTL [1] 927/4 2019 [3] 1087/24 1126/10 1126/15 202 [1] 1138/5 2021 [8] 1203/23 1204/9 1204/11 1205/1 1208/2 1210/20 1211/6  | 264 [1] 1010/12<br>272 [1] 1013/6<br>28 [6] 938/11 1043/11<br>1046/21 1122/21<br>1138/21 1138/22<br>283 [1] 1016/6<br>29 [6] 930/13 931/12<br>936/7 939/20 1043/16<br>1138/22<br>2:00 p.m [1] 970/1<br>2:30 [1] 969/21<br>2nd [3] 1017/21   | 5 5 percent [3] 1116/21 1117/4 1121/3 500 [4] 927/10 927/23 1129/23 1213/17 521 [1] 1037/7 549 [1] 1136/7 55 [4] 1134/24 1135/2 1185/15 1186/2 554 [1] 1040/1 564 [1] 1041/8   |
|   | 972/17 1000/22<br>1058/12 1077/24<br>1085/9 1085/19 1086/3<br>1111/8 1111/23 1113/7<br>1116/6 1131/1 1131/16<br>14.6 [1] 1211/7<br>143 [1] 1000/21<br>1439 [1] 973/5<br>1496 [1] 966/20<br>14th [4] 962/23 973/13<br>1073/19 1131/20<br>15 [11] 935/9 935/19<br>974/14 974/20 975/4   | 1x1he's [1] 936/1  2  2.26 percent [2] 1208/20 1211/14  2.c [1] 1185/13 20 [10] 939/6 991/18 1002/13 1002/16 1023/6 1067/4 1067/15 1099/3 1100/8 1193/23 20 percent [1] 1028/10 20-25 [1] 1013/21 20.85 [1] 1079/1  | 1213/10 2017 [1] 1189/5 2018 [3] 1124/9 1126/4 1128/23 2018-0484-JTL [1] 927/4 2019 [3] 1087/24 1126/10 1126/15 202 [1] 1138/5 2021 [8] 1203/23 1204/9 1204/11 1205/1 1208/2 1210/20 1211/6 1213/10  | 264 [1] 1010/12<br>272 [1] 1013/6<br>28 [6] 938/11 1043/11<br>1046/21 1122/21<br>1138/21 1138/22<br>283 [1] 1016/6<br>29 [6] 930/13 931/12<br>936/7 939/20 1043/16<br>1138/22<br>2:00 p.m [1] 970/1<br>2:30 [1] 969/21  | 5 5 percent [3] 1116/21 1117/4 1121/3 500 [4] 927/10 927/23 1129/23 1213/17 521 [1] 1037/7 549 [1] 1136/7 55 [4] 1134/24 1135/2 1185/15 1186/2 554 [1] 1040/1 564 [1] 1041/8 571 [1] 985/15  |
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|   | 972/17 1000/22<br>1058/12 1077/24<br>1085/9 1085/19 1086/3<br>1111/8 1111/23 1113/7<br>1116/6 1131/1 1131/16<br>14.6 [1] 1211/7<br>143 [1] 1000/21<br>1439 [1] 973/5<br>1496 [1] 966/20<br>14th [4] 962/23 973/13<br>1073/19 1131/20<br>15 [11] 935/9 935/19<br>974/14 974/20 975/4<br>975/12 979/10 991/17<br>1034/24 1072/10  | 1x1he's [1] 936/1  2  2.26 percent [2] 1208/20 1211/14  2.c [1] 1185/13 20 [10] 939/6 991/18 1002/13 1002/16 1023/6 1067/4 1067/15 1099/3 1100/8 1193/23 20 percent [1] 1028/10 20-25 [1] 1013/21 20.85 [1] 1079/1  | 1213/10 2017 [1] 1189/5 2018 [3] 1124/9 1126/4 1128/23 2018-0484-JTL [1] 927/4 2019 [3] 1087/24 1126/10 1126/15 202 [1] 1138/5 2021 [8] 1203/23 1204/9 1204/11 1205/1 1208/2 1210/20 1211/6 1213/10  | 264 [1] 1010/12<br>272 [1] 1013/6<br>28 [6] 938/11 1043/11<br>1046/21 1122/21<br>1138/21 1138/22<br>283 [1] 1016/6<br>29 [6] 930/13 931/12<br>936/7 939/20 1043/16<br>1138/22<br>2:00 p.m [1] 970/1<br>2:30 [1] 969/21<br>2nd [3] 1017/21<br>1135/14 1147/15  | 5 5 percent [3] 1116/21 1117/4 1121/3 500 [4] 927/10 927/23 1129/23 1213/17 521 [1] 1037/7 549 [1] 1136/7 55 [4] 1134/24 1135/2 1185/15 1186/2 554 [1] 1040/1 564 [1] 1041/8 571 [1] 985/15 573 [1] 934/7 575 [1] 935/6  |
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|   | 972/17 1000/22<br>1058/12 1077/24<br>1085/9 1085/19 1086/3<br>1111/8 1111/23 1113/7<br>1116/6 1131/1 1131/16<br>14.6 [1] 1211/7<br>143 [1] 1000/21<br>1439 [1] 973/5<br>1496 [1] 966/20<br>14th [4] 962/23 973/13<br>1073/19 1131/20<br>15 [11] 935/9 935/19<br>974/14 974/20 975/4<br>975/12 979/10 991/17<br>1034/24 1072/10<br>1098/9<br>15 million [1] 1189/19  | 1x1he's [1] 936/1  2  2.26 percent [2] 1208/20 1211/14  2.c [1] 1185/13  20 [10] 939/6 991/18 1002/13 1002/16 1023/6 1067/4 1067/15 1099/3 1100/8 1193/23 20 percent [1] 1028/10 20-25 [1] 1013/21 20.85 [1] 1079/1 2000 [1] 1087/20 2004 [2] 1160/22 1161/22   | 1213/10 2017 [1] 1189/5 2018 [3] 1124/9 1126/4 1128/23 2018-0484-JTL [1] 927/4 2019 [3] 1087/24 1126/10 1126/15 202 [1] 1138/5 2021 [8] 1203/23 1204/9 1204/11 1205/1 1208/2 1210/20 1211/6 1213/10 2022 [1] 927/11 21 [2] 927/11 936/16 219 [1] 1007/11   | 264 [1] 1010/12<br>272 [1] 1013/6<br>28 [6] 938/11 1043/11<br>1046/21 1122/21<br>1138/21 1138/22<br>283 [1] 1016/6<br>29 [6] 930/13 931/12<br>936/7 939/20 1043/16<br>1138/22<br>2:00 p.m [1] 970/1<br>2:30 [1] 969/21<br>2nd [3] 1017/21<br>1135/14 1147/15<br>3<br>30 [5] 982/16 1099/3   | 5 5 percent [3] 1116/21 1117/4 1121/3 500 [4] 927/10 927/23 1129/23 1213/17 521 [1] 1037/7 549 [1] 1136/7 55 [4] 1134/24 1135/2 1185/15 1186/2 554 [1] 1040/1 564 [1] 1041/8 571 [1] 985/15 573 [1] 934/7 575 [1] 935/6 590 [2] 936/16 937/18  |
|   | 972/17 1000/22<br>1058/12 1077/24<br>1085/9 1085/19 1086/3<br>1111/8 1111/23 1113/7<br>1116/6 1131/1 1131/16<br>14.6 [1] 1211/7<br>143 [1] 1000/21<br>1439 [1] 973/5<br>1496 [1] 966/20<br>14th [4] 962/23 973/13<br>1073/19 1131/20<br>15 [11] 935/9 935/19<br>974/14 974/20 975/4<br>975/12 979/10 991/17<br>1034/24 1072/10<br>1098/9  | 1x1he's [1] 936/1  2  2.26 percent [2] 1208/20 1211/14  2.c [1] 1185/13  20 [10] 939/6 991/18 1002/13 1002/16 1023/6 1067/4 1067/15 1099/3 1100/8 1193/23 20 percent [1] 1028/10 20-25 [1] 1013/21 20.85 [1] 1079/1 2000 [1] 1087/20 2004 [2] 1160/22 1161/22 2008 [1] 1087/21  | 1213/10 2017 [1] 1189/5 2018 [3] 1124/9 1126/4 1128/23 2018-0484-JTL [1] 927/4 2019 [3] 1087/24 1126/10 1126/15 202 [1] 1138/5 2021 [8] 1203/23 1204/9 1204/11 1205/1 1208/2 1210/20 1211/6 1213/10 2022 [1] 927/11 21 [2] 927/11 936/16 219 [1] 1007/11 22 [1] 1164/6   | 264 [1] 1010/12<br>272 [1] 1013/6<br>28 [6] 938/11 1043/11<br>1046/21 1122/21<br>1138/21 1138/22<br>283 [1] 1016/6<br>29 [6] 930/13 931/12<br>936/7 939/20 1043/16<br>1138/22<br>2:00 p.m [1] 970/1<br>2:30 [1] 969/21<br>2nd [3] 1017/21<br>1135/14 1147/15<br>3<br>30 [5] 982/16 1099/3<br>1100/8 1134/23   | 5 5 percent [3] 1116/21 1117/4 1121/3 500 [4] 927/10 927/23 1129/23 1213/17 521 [1] 1037/7 549 [1] 1136/7 55 [4] 1134/24 1135/2 1185/15 1186/2 554 [1] 1040/1 564 [1] 1041/8 571 [1] 985/15 573 [1] 934/7 575 [1] 935/6 590 [2] 936/16 937/18 594 [2] 937/16 938/21  |
|   | 972/17 1000/22<br>1058/12 1077/24<br>1085/9 1085/19 1086/3<br>1111/8 1111/23 1113/7<br>1116/6 1131/1 1131/16<br>14.6 [1] 1211/7<br>143 [1] 1000/21<br>1439 [1] 973/5<br>1496 [1] 966/20<br>14th [4] 962/23 973/13<br>1073/19 1131/20<br>15 [11] 935/9 935/19<br>974/14 974/20 975/4<br>975/12 979/10 991/17<br>1034/24 1072/10<br>1098/9<br>15 million [1] 1189/19  | 1x1he's [1] 936/1  2  2.26 percent [2] 1208/20 1211/14 2.c [1] 1185/13 20 [10] 939/6 991/18 1002/13 1002/16 1023/6 1067/4 1067/15 1099/3 1100/8 1193/23 20 percent [1] 1028/10 20-25 [1] 1013/21 20.85 [1] 1079/1 2000 [1] 1087/20 2004 [2] 1160/22 1161/22 2008 [1] 1087/21 201 [1] 1138/4   | 1213/10 2017 [1] 1189/5 2018 [3] 1124/9 1126/4 1128/23 2018-0484-JTL [1] 927/4 2019 [3] 1087/24 1126/10 1126/15 202 [1] 1138/5 2021 [8] 1203/23 1204/9 1204/11 1205/1 1208/2 1210/20 1211/6 1213/10 2022 [1] 927/11 21 [2] 927/11 21 [2] 927/11 22 [1] 1164/6 22.23 [1] 1079/1   | 264 [1] 1010/12<br>272 [1] 1013/6<br>28 [6] 938/11 1043/11<br>1046/21 1122/21<br>1138/21 1138/22<br>283 [1] 1016/6<br>29 [6] 930/13 931/12<br>936/7 939/20 1043/16<br>1138/22<br>2:00 p.m [1] 970/1<br>2:30 [1] 969/21<br>2nd [3] 1017/21<br>1135/14 1147/15<br>3<br>30 [5] 982/16 1099/3<br>1100/8 1134/23<br>1193/22  | 5 5 percent [3] 1116/21 1117/4 1121/3 500 [4] 927/10 927/23 1129/23 1213/17 521 [1] 1037/7 549 [1] 1136/7 55 [4] 1134/24 1135/2 1185/15 1186/2 554 [1] 1040/1 564 [1] 1041/8 571 [1] 985/15 573 [1] 934/7 575 [1] 935/6 590 [2] 936/16 937/18 594 [2] 937/16 938/21 599 [2] 1137/2 1139/17   |
|   | 972/17 1000/22<br>1058/12 1077/24<br>1085/9 1085/19 1086/3<br>1111/8 1111/23 1113/7<br>1116/6 1131/1 1131/16<br>14.6 [1] 1211/7<br>143 [1] 1000/21<br>1439 [1] 973/5<br>1496 [1] 966/20<br>14th [4] 962/23 973/13<br>1073/19 1131/20<br>15 [11] 935/9 935/19<br>974/14 974/20 975/4<br>975/12 979/10 991/17<br>1034/24 1072/10<br>1098/9<br>15 million [1] 1189/19<br>15 percent [4] 1116/20<br>1125/20 1126/4  | 1x1he's [1] 936/1  2  2.26 percent [2] 1208/20 1211/14 2.c [1] 1185/13 20 [10] 939/6 991/18 1002/13 1002/16 1023/6 1067/4 1067/15 1099/3 1100/8 1193/23 20 percent [1] 1028/10 20-25 [1] 1013/21 20.85 [1] 1079/1 2000 [1] 1087/20 2004 [2] 1160/22 1161/22 2008 [1] 1087/21 201 [1] 1138/4 2010 [1] 1087/22  | 1213/10 2017 [1] 1189/5 2018 [3] 1124/9 1126/4 1128/23 2018-0484-JTL [1] 927/4 2019 [3] 1087/24 1126/10 1126/15 202 [1] 1138/5 2021 [8] 1203/23 1204/9 1204/11 1205/1 1208/2 1210/20 1211/6 1213/10 2022 [1] 927/11 21 [2] 927/11 21 [2] 927/11 22 [1] 1164/6 22.23 [1] 1079/1 23 [2] 966/20 1002/8  | 264 [1] 1010/12<br>272 [1] 1013/6<br>28 [6] 938/11 1043/11<br>1046/21 1122/21<br>1138/21 1138/22<br>283 [1] 1016/6<br>29 [6] 930/13 931/12<br>936/7 939/20 1043/16<br>1138/22<br>2:00 p.m [1] 970/1<br>2:30 [1] 969/21<br>2nd [3] 1017/21<br>1135/14 1147/15<br>3<br>30 [5] 982/16 1099/3<br>1100/8 1134/23<br>1193/22<br>30 percent [1] 1011/8   | 5 5 percent [3] 1116/21 1117/4 1121/3 500 [4] 927/10 927/23 1129/23 1213/17 521 [1] 1037/7 549 [1] 1136/7 55 [4] 1134/24 1135/2 1185/15 1186/2 554 [1] 1040/1 564 [1] 1041/8 571 [1] 985/15 573 [1] 934/7 575 [1] 935/6 590 [2] 936/16 937/18 594 [2] 937/16 938/21 599 [2] 1137/2 1139/17 5th [4] 1093/1 1104/3   |
|   | 972/17 1000/22<br>1058/12 1077/24<br>1085/9 1085/19 1086/3<br>1111/8 1111/23 1113/7<br>1116/6 1131/1 1131/16<br>14.6 [1] 1211/7<br>143 [1] 1000/21<br>1439 [1] 973/5<br>1496 [1] 966/20<br>14th [4] 962/23 973/13<br>1073/19 1131/20<br>15 [11] 935/9 935/19<br>974/14 974/20 975/4<br>975/12 979/10 991/17<br>1034/24 1072/10<br>1098/9<br>15 million [1] 1189/19<br>15 percent [4] 1116/20<br>1125/20 1126/4<br>1126/15   | 1x1he's [1] 936/1  2  2.26 percent [2] 1208/20 1211/14 2.c [1] 1185/13 20 [10] 939/6 991/18 1002/13 1002/16 1023/6 1067/4 1067/15 1099/3 1100/8 1193/23 20 percent [1] 1028/10 20-25 [1] 1013/21 20.85 [1] 1079/1 2000 [1] 1087/20 2004 [2] 1160/22 1161/22 2008 [1] 1087/21 201 [1] 1138/4 2010 [1] 1087/22 2014 [1] 1184/2  | 1213/10 2017 [1] 1189/5 2018 [3] 1124/9 1126/4 1128/23 2018-0484-JTL [1] 927/4 2019 [3] 1087/24 1126/10 1126/15 202 [1] 1138/5 2021 [8] 1203/23 1204/9 1204/11 1205/1 1208/2 1210/20 1211/6 1213/10 2022 [1] 927/11 21 [2] 927/11 21 [2] 927/11 22 [1] 1164/6 22.23 [1] 1079/1   | 264 [1] 1010/12<br>272 [1] 1013/6<br>28 [6] 938/11 1043/11<br>1046/21 1122/21<br>1138/21 1138/22<br>283 [1] 1016/6<br>29 [6] 930/13 931/12<br>936/7 939/20 1043/16<br>1138/22<br>2:00 p.m [1] 970/1<br>2:30 [1] 969/21<br>2nd [3] 1017/21<br>1135/14 1147/15<br>3<br>30 [5] 982/16 1099/3<br>1100/8 1134/23<br>1193/22  | 5 5 percent [3] 1116/21 1117/4 1121/3 500 [4] 927/10 927/23 1129/23 1213/17 521 [1] 1037/7 549 [1] 1136/7 55 [4] 1134/24 1135/2 1185/15 1186/2 554 [1] 1040/1 564 [1] 1041/8 571 [1] 985/15 573 [1] 934/7 575 [1] 935/6 590 [2] 936/16 937/18 594 [2] 937/16 938/21 599 [2] 1137/2 1139/17   |
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|   | 972/17 1000/22<br>1058/12 1077/24<br>1085/9 1085/19 1086/3<br>1111/8 1111/23 1113/7<br>1116/6 1131/1 1131/16<br>14.6 [1] 1211/7<br>143 [1] 1000/21<br>1439 [1] 973/5<br>1496 [1] 966/20<br>14th [4] 962/23 973/13<br>1073/19 1131/20<br>15 [11] 935/9 935/19<br>974/14 974/20 975/4<br>975/12 979/10 991/17<br>1034/24 1072/10<br>1098/9<br>15 million [1] 1189/19<br>15 percent [4] 1116/20<br>1125/20 1126/4<br>1126/15<br>15.4 percent [1]   | 1x1he's [1] 936/1  2  2.26 percent [2] 1208/20 1211/14 2.c [1] 1185/13 20 [10] 939/6 991/18 1002/13 1002/16 1023/6 1067/4 1067/15 1099/3 1100/8 1193/23 20 percent [1] 1028/10 20-25 [1] 1013/21 20.85 [1] 1079/1 2000 [1] 1087/20 2004 [2] 1160/22 1161/22 2008 [1] 1087/21 201 [1] 1138/4 2010 [1] 1087/22  | 1213/10 2017 [1] 1189/5 2018 [3] 1124/9 1126/4 1128/23 2018-0484-JTL [1] 927/4 2019 [3] 1087/24 1126/10 1126/15 202 [1] 1138/5 2021 [8] 1203/23 1204/9 1204/11 1205/1 1208/2 1210/20 1211/6 1213/10 2022 [1] 927/11 21 [2] 927/11 21 [2] 927/11 22 [1] 1164/6 22.23 [1] 1079/1 23 [2] 966/20 1002/8 23.50 [2] 1024/22  | 264 [1] 1010/12<br>272 [1] 1013/6<br>28 [6] 938/11 1043/11<br>1046/21 1122/21<br>1138/21 1138/22<br>283 [1] 1016/6<br>29 [6] 930/13 931/12<br>936/7 939/20 1043/16<br>1138/22<br>2:00 p.m [1] 970/1<br>2:30 [1] 969/21<br>2nd [3] 1017/21<br>1135/14 1147/15<br>3<br>30 [5] 982/16 1099/3<br>1100/8 1134/23<br>1193/22<br>30 percent [1] 1011/8<br>30-minutes [1] 944/8<br>30-year [1] 1124/6   | 5 5 percent [3] 1116/21 1117/4 1121/3 500 [4] 927/10 927/23 1129/23 1213/17 521 [1] 1037/7 549 [1] 1136/7 55 [4] 1134/24 1135/2 1185/15 1186/2 554 [1] 1040/1 564 [1] 1041/8 571 [1] 985/15 573 [1] 934/7 575 [1] 935/6 590 [2] 936/16 937/18 594 [2] 937/16 938/21 599 [2] 1137/2 1139/17 5th [4] 1093/1 1104/3   |
|   | 972/17 1000/22<br>1058/12 1077/24<br>1085/9 1085/19 1086/3<br>1111/8 1111/23 1113/7<br>1116/6 1131/1 1131/16<br>14.6 [1] 1211/7<br>143 [1] 1000/21<br>1439 [1] 973/5<br>1496 [1] 966/20<br>14th [4] 962/23 973/13<br>1073/19 1131/20<br>15 [11] 935/9 935/19<br>974/14 974/20 975/4<br>975/12 979/10 991/17<br>1034/24 1072/10<br>1098/9<br>15 million [1] 1189/19<br>15 percent [4] 1116/20<br>1125/20 1126/4<br>1126/15<br>15.4 percent [1]<br>1125/12  | 1x1he's [1] 936/1  2  2.26 percent [2] 1208/20 1211/14 2.c [1] 1185/13 20 [10] 939/6 991/18 1002/13 1002/16 1023/6 1067/4 1067/15 1099/3 1100/8 1193/23 20 percent [1] 1028/10 20-25 [1] 1013/21 20.85 [1] 1079/1 2000 [1] 1087/20 2004 [2] 1160/22 1161/22 2008 [1] 1087/21 201 [1] 1138/4 2010 [1] 1087/22 2014 [1] 1184/2 2014-2016 [2] 1183/8 1187/23   | 1213/10 2017 [1] 1189/5 2018 [3] 1124/9 1126/4 1128/23 2018-0484-JTL [1] 927/4 2019 [3] 1087/24 1126/10 1126/15 202 [1] 1138/5 2021 [8] 1203/23 1204/9 1204/11 1205/1 1208/2 1210/20 1211/6 1213/10 2022 [1] 927/11 21 [2] 927/11 21 [2] 927/11 22 [1] 1164/6 22.23 [1] 1079/1 23 [2] 966/20 1002/8 23.50 [2] 1024/22 1024/22 24 [9] 940/7 940/8   | 264 [1] 1010/12 272 [1] 1013/6 28 [6] 938/11 1043/11 1046/21 1122/21 1138/21 1138/22 283 [1] 1016/6 29 [6] 930/13 931/12 936/7 939/20 1043/16 1138/22 2:00 p.m [1] 970/1 2:30 [1] 969/21 2nd [3] 1017/21 1135/14 1147/15  3 30 [5] 982/16 1099/3 1100/8 1134/23 1193/22 30 percent [1] 1011/8 30-minutes [1] 944/8 30-year [1] 1124/6 302 [1] 927/24  | 5 5 percent [3] 1116/21 1117/4 1121/3 500 [4] 927/10 927/23 1129/23 1213/17 521 [1] 1037/7 549 [1] 1136/7 55 [4] 1134/24 1135/2 1185/15 1186/2 554 [1] 1040/1 564 [1] 1041/8 571 [1] 985/15 573 [1] 934/7 575 [1] 935/6 590 [2] 936/16 937/18 594 [2] 937/16 938/21 599 [2] 1137/2 1139/17 5th [4] 1093/1 1104/3 1104/18 1190/14 6   |
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|   | 972/17 1000/22<br>1058/12 1077/24<br>1085/9 1085/19 1086/3<br>1111/8 1111/23 1113/7<br>1116/6 1131/1 1131/16<br>14.6 [1] 1211/7<br>143 [1] 1000/21<br>1439 [1] 973/5<br>1496 [1] 966/20<br>14th [4] 962/23 973/13<br>1073/19 1131/20<br>15 [11] 935/9 935/19<br>974/14 974/20 975/4<br>975/12 979/10 991/17<br>1034/24 1072/10<br>1098/9<br>15 million [1] 1189/19<br>15 percent [4] 1116/20<br>1125/20 1126/4<br>1126/15<br>15.4 percent [1]<br>1125/12  | 1x1he's [1] 936/1  2  2.26 percent [2] 1208/20 1211/14 2.c [1] 1185/13 20 [10] 939/6 991/18 1002/13 1002/16 1023/6 1067/4 1067/15 1099/3 1100/8 1193/23 20 percent [1] 1028/10 20-25 [1] 1013/21 20.85 [1] 1079/1 2000 [1] 1087/20 2004 [2] 1160/22 1161/22 2008 [1] 1087/21 201 [1] 1138/4 2010 [1] 1087/22 2014 [1] 1184/2 2014-2016 [2] 1183/8 1187/23 2015 [32] 936/7 992/11 995/4 998/10 1001/9  | 1213/10 2017 [1] 1189/5 2018 [3] 1124/9 1126/4 1128/23 2018-0484-JTL [1] 927/4 2019 [3] 1087/24 1126/10 1126/15 202 [1] 1138/5 2021 [8] 1203/23 1204/9 1204/11 1205/1 1208/2 1210/20 1211/6 1213/10 2022 [1] 927/11 21 [2] 927/11 21 [2] 927/11 22 [1] 1164/6 22.23 [1] 1079/1 23 [2] 966/20 1002/8 23.50 [2] 1024/22 1024/22 24 [9] 940/7 940/8 1052/21 1053/2 1053/16 1053/19  | 264 [1] 1010/12 272 [1] 1013/6 28 [6] 938/11 1043/11 1046/21 1122/21 1138/21 1138/22 283 [1] 1016/6 29 [6] 930/13 931/12 936/7 939/20 1043/16 1138/22 2:00 p.m [1] 970/1 2:30 [1] 969/21 2nd [3] 1017/21 1135/14 1147/15  3 30 [5] 982/16 1099/3 1100/8 1134/23 1193/22 30 percent [1] 1011/8 30-minutes [1] 944/8 30-year [1] 1124/6 302 [1] 927/24 31 [6] 1007/15 1188/24 1189/20 1203/23   | 5 5 percent [3] 1116/21 1117/4 1121/3 500 [4] 927/10 927/23 1129/23 1213/17 521 [1] 1037/7 549 [1] 1136/7 55 [4] 1134/24 1135/2 1185/15 1186/2 554 [1] 1040/1 564 [1] 1041/8 571 [1] 985/15 573 [1] 934/7 575 [1] 935/6 590 [2] 936/16 937/18 594 [2] 937/16 938/21 599 [2] 1137/2 1139/17 5th [4] 1093/1 1104/3 1104/18 1190/14 6 6 percent [6] 1114/14 1117/9 1117/10  |
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|   | 972/17 1000/22<br>1058/12 1077/24<br>1085/9 1085/19 1086/3<br>1111/8 1111/23 1113/7<br>1116/6 1131/1 1131/16<br>14.6 [1] 1211/7<br>143 [1] 1000/21<br>1439 [1] 973/5<br>1496 [1] 966/20<br>14th [4] 962/23 973/13<br>1073/19 1131/20<br>15 [11] 935/9 935/19<br>974/14 974/20 975/4<br>975/12 979/10 991/17<br>1034/24 1072/10<br>1098/9<br>15 million [1] 1189/19<br>15 percent [4] 1116/20<br>1125/20 1126/4<br>1126/15<br>15.4 percent [1]<br>1125/12<br>154 [1] 1002/6<br>16 [14] 975/17 975/18<br>979/10 996/24 1009/11<br>1067/9 1067/11                        | 1x1he's [1] 936/1  2  2.26 percent [2] 1208/20 1211/14  2.c [1] 1185/13 20 [10] 939/6 991/18 1002/13 1002/16 1023/6 1067/4 1067/15 1099/3 1100/8 1193/23 20 percent [1] 1028/10 20-25 [1] 1013/21 20.85 [1] 1079/1 2000 [1] 1087/20 2004 [2] 1160/22 1161/22 2008 [1] 1087/21 201 [1] 1138/4 2010 [1] 1087/22 2014 [1] 1184/2 2014-2016 [2] 1183/8 1187/23 2015 [32] 936/7 992/11 995/4 998/10 1001/9 1002/8 1002/13  | 1213/10 2017 [1] 1189/5 2018 [3] 1124/9 1126/4 1128/23 2018-0484-JTL [1] 927/4 2019 [3] 1087/24 1126/10 1126/15 202 [1] 1138/5 2021 [8] 1203/23 1204/9 1204/11 1205/1 1208/2 1210/20 1211/6 1213/10 2022 [1] 927/11 21 [2] 927/11 21 [2] 927/11 22 [1] 1164/6 22.23 [1] 1079/1 23 [2] 966/20 1002/8 23.50 [2] 1024/22 1024/22 24 [9] 940/7 940/8 1052/21 1053/2 1053/16 1053/19 1094/12 1094/24  | 264 [1] 1010/12 272 [1] 1013/6 28 [6] 938/11 1043/11 1046/21 1122/21 1138/21 1138/22 283 [1] 1016/6 29 [6] 930/13 931/12 936/7 939/20 1043/16 1138/22 2:00 p.m [1] 970/1 2:30 [1] 969/21 2nd [3] 1017/21 1135/14 1147/15  3 30 [5] 982/16 1099/3 1100/8 1134/23 1193/22 30 percent [1] 1011/8 30-minutes [1] 944/8 30-year [1] 1124/6 302 [1] 927/24 31 [6] 1007/15 1188/24 1189/20 1203/23 1204/9 1212/10 32.50 [1] 1002/21  | 5 5 percent [3] 1116/21 1117/4 1121/3 500 [4] 927/10 927/23 1129/23 1213/17 521 [1] 1037/7 549 [1] 1136/7 55 [4] 1134/24 1135/2 1185/15 1186/2 554 [1] 1040/1 564 [1] 1041/8 571 [1] 985/15 573 [1] 934/7 575 [1] 935/6 590 [2] 936/16 937/18 594 [2] 937/16 938/21 599 [2] 1137/2 1139/17 5th [4] 1093/1 1104/3 1104/18 1190/14 6 6 percent [6] 1114/14 117/9 1117/10 1117/12 1119/1 1119/8 6.1 percent [2] 1208/24 1211/20   |
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|   | 972/17 1000/22 1058/12 1077/24 1085/9 1085/19 1086/3 1111/8 1111/23 1113/7 1116/6 1131/1 1131/16 14.6 [1] 1211/7 143 [1] 1000/21 1439 [1] 973/5 1496 [1] 966/20 14th [4] 962/23 973/13 1073/19 1131/20 15 [11] 935/9 935/19 974/14 974/20 975/4 975/12 979/10 991/17 1034/24 1072/10 1098/9 15 million [1] 1189/19 15 percent [4] 1116/20 1125/20 1126/4 1126/15 15.4 percent [1] 1125/12 154 [1] 1002/6 16 [14] 975/17 975/18 979/10 996/24 1009/11 1067/9 1067/11 1070/10 1071/1 1072/11 1077/22 1078/18 1079/5 1158/6  | 1x1he's [1] 936/1  2  2.26 percent [2] 1208/20 1211/14  2.c [1] 1185/13  20 [10] 939/6 991/18 1002/13 1002/16 1023/6 1067/4 1067/15 1099/3 1100/8 1193/23  20 percent [1] 1028/10  20-25 [1] 1013/21  20.85 [1] 1079/1  2000 [1] 1087/20  2004 [2] 1160/22 1161/22  2008 [1] 1087/21  201 [1] 1138/4  2010 [1] 1087/22  2014 [1] 1184/2  2014-2016 [2] 1183/8 1187/23  2015 [32] 936/7 992/11 995/4 998/10 1001/9 1002/8 1002/13 1008/10 1009/11 1016/7 1018/16 1023/22 1028/15 1087/23 1088/12 1090/17 1105/13                       | 1213/10 2017 [1] 1189/5 2018 [3] 1124/9 1126/4 1128/23 2018-0484-JTL [1] 927/4 2019 [3] 1087/24 1126/10 1126/15 202 [1] 1138/5 2021 [8] 1203/23 1204/9 1204/11 1205/1 1208/2 1210/20 1211/6 1213/10 2022 [1] 927/11 21 [2] 927/11 21 [2] 927/11 22 [1] 1164/6 22.23 [1] 1079/1 23 [2] 966/20 1002/8 23.50 [2] 1024/22 1024/22 24 [9] 940/7 940/8 1052/21 1053/2 1053/16 1053/19 1094/12 1094/24 1096/11 24 percent [1] 1208/22 243 [1] 1158/6 244 [1] 1158/6 24th [1] 1096/18                        | 264 [1] 1010/12 272 [1] 1013/6 28 [6] 938/11 1043/11 1046/21 1122/21 1138/21 1138/22 283 [1] 1016/6 29 [6] 930/13 931/12 936/7 939/20 1043/16 1138/22 2:00 p.m [1] 970/1 2:30 [1] 969/21 2nd [3] 1017/21 1135/14 1147/15  3 30 [5] 982/16 1099/3 1100/8 1134/23 1193/22 30 percent [1] 1011/8 30-minutes [1] 944/8 30-year [1] 1124/6 302 [1] 927/24 31 [6] 1007/15 1188/24 1189/20 1203/23 1204/9 1212/10 32.50 [1] 1002/21 327 [1] 1018/1 331 [1] 1022/6 35.50 [1] 1002/21 36 [1] 1058/2                | 5 5 percent [3] 1116/21 1117/4 1121/3 500 [4] 927/10 927/23 1129/23 1213/17 521 [1] 1037/7 549 [1] 1136/7 55 [4] 1134/24 1135/2 1185/15 1186/2 554 [1] 1040/1 564 [1] 1041/8 571 [1] 985/15 573 [1] 934/7 575 [1] 935/6 590 [2] 936/16 937/18 594 [2] 937/16 938/21 599 [2] 1137/2 1139/17 5th [4] 1093/1 1104/3 1104/18 1190/14 6 6 percent [6] 1114/14 117/9 1117/10 1117/12 1119/1 1119/8 6.1 percent [2] 1208/24 1211/20 60 [3] 982/20 983/10 983/17 60s [1] 983/21                |
|   | 972/17 1000/22 1058/12 1077/24 1085/9 1085/19 1086/3 1111/8 1111/23 1113/7 1116/6 1131/1 1131/16 14.6 [1] 1211/7 143 [1] 1000/21 1439 [1] 973/5 1496 [1] 966/20 14th [4] 962/23 973/13 1073/19 1131/20 15 [11] 935/9 935/19 974/14 974/20 975/4 975/12 979/10 991/17 1034/24 1072/10 1098/9 15 million [1] 1189/19 15 percent [4] 1116/20 1125/20 1126/4 1126/15 15.4 percent [1] 1125/12 154 [1] 1002/6 16 [14] 975/17 975/18 979/10 996/24 1009/11 1067/9 1067/11 1072/11 1077/22 1078/18 1079/5 1158/6 16th [2] 957/17   | 1x1he's [1] 936/1  2  2.26 percent [2] 1208/20 1211/14  2.c [1] 1185/13  20 [10] 939/6 991/18 1002/13 1002/16 1023/6 1067/4 1067/15 1099/3 1100/8 1193/23  20 percent [1] 1028/10  20-25 [1] 1013/21  20.85 [1] 1079/1  2000 [1] 1087/20  2004 [2] 1160/22 1161/22  2008 [1] 1087/21  201 [1] 1138/4  2010 [1] 1087/22  2014 [1] 1184/2  2014-2016 [2] 1183/8 1187/23  2015 [32] 936/7 992/11 995/4 998/10 1001/9 1002/8 1002/13 1008/10 1009/11 1016/7 1018/16 1023/22 1028/15 1087/23 1088/12 1090/17 1105/13 1126/4 1135/9 1162/13 | 1213/10 2017 [1] 1189/5 2018 [3] 1124/9 1126/4 1128/23 2018-0484-JTL [1] 927/4 2019 [3] 1087/24 1126/10 1126/15 202 [1] 1138/5 2021 [8] 1203/23 1204/9 1204/11 1205/1 1208/2 1210/20 1211/6 1213/10 2022 [1] 927/11 21 [2] 927/11 21 [2] 927/11 22 [1] 1164/6 22.23 [1] 1079/1 23 [2] 966/20 1002/8 23.50 [2] 1024/22 1024/22 24 [9] 940/7 940/8 1052/21 1053/2 1053/16 1053/19 1094/12 1094/24 1096/11 24 percent [1] 1208/22 243 [1] 1158/6 244 [1] 1158/6 24th [1] 1096/18 25 [11] 939/24 1013/21 | 264 [1] 1010/12 272 [1] 1013/6 28 [6] 938/11 1043/11 1046/21 1122/21 1138/21 1138/22 283 [1] 1016/6 29 [6] 930/13 931/12 936/7 939/20 1043/16 1138/22 2:00 p.m [1] 970/1 2:30 [1] 969/21 2nd [3] 1017/21 1135/14 1147/15  3 30 [5] 982/16 1099/3 1100/8 1134/23 1193/22 30 percent [1] 1011/8 30-minutes [1] 944/8 30-year [1] 1124/6 302 [1] 927/24 31 [6] 1007/15 1188/24 1189/20 1203/23 1204/9 1212/10 32.50 [1] 1002/21 327 [1] 1018/1 331 [1] 1022/6 35.50 [1] 1002/21 36 [1] 1058/2 363 [1] 1023/4 | 5 5 percent [3] 1116/21 1117/4 1121/3 500 [4] 927/10 927/23 1129/23 1213/17 521 [1] 1037/7 549 [1] 1136/7 55 [4] 1134/24 1135/2 1185/15 1186/2 554 [1] 1040/1 564 [1] 1041/8 571 [1] 985/15 573 [1] 934/7 575 [1] 935/6 590 [2] 936/16 937/18 594 [2] 937/16 938/21 599 [2] 1137/2 1139/17 5th [4] 1093/1 1104/3 1104/18 1190/14 6 6 percent [6] 1114/14 1117/9 1117/10 1117/12 1119/1 1119/8 6.1 percent [2] 1208/24 1211/20 60 [3] 982/20 983/10 983/17 60s [1] 983/21 61 [1] 983/21 |
|   | 972/17 1000/22 1058/12 1077/24 1085/9 1085/19 1086/3 1111/8 1111/23 1113/7 1116/6 1131/1 1131/16 14.6 [1] 1211/7 143 [1] 1000/21 1439 [1] 973/5 1496 [1] 966/20 14th [4] 962/23 973/13 1073/19 1131/20 15 [11] 935/9 935/19 974/14 974/20 975/4 975/12 979/10 991/17 1034/24 1072/10 1098/9 15 million [1] 1189/19 15 percent [4] 1116/20 1125/20 1126/4 1126/15 15.4 percent [1] 1125/12 154 [1] 1002/6 16 [14] 975/17 975/18 979/10 996/24 1009/11 1067/9 1067/11 1070/10 1071/1 1072/11 1077/22 1078/18 1079/5 1158/6 16th [2] 957/17 1074/16 17 [13] 930/17 972/1 | 1x1he's [1] 936/1  2  2.26 percent [2] 1208/20 1211/14  2.c [1] 1185/13  20 [10] 939/6 991/18 1002/13 1002/16 1023/6 1067/4 1067/15 1099/3 1100/8 1193/23  20 percent [1] 1028/10  20-25 [1] 1013/21  20.85 [1] 1079/1  2000 [1] 1087/20  2004 [2] 1160/22 1161/22  2008 [1] 1087/21  201 [1] 1138/4  2010 [1] 1087/22  2014 [1] 1184/2  2014-2016 [2] 1183/8 1187/23  2015 [32] 936/7 992/11 995/4 998/10 1001/9 1002/8 1002/13 1008/10 1009/11 1016/7 1018/16 1023/22 1028/15 1087/23 1088/12 1090/17 1105/13                       | 1213/10 2017 [1] 1189/5 2018 [3] 1124/9 1126/4 1128/23 2018-0484-JTL [1] 927/4 2019 [3] 1087/24 1126/10 1126/15 202 [1] 1138/5 2021 [8] 1203/23 1204/9 1204/11 1205/1 1208/2 1210/20 1211/6 1213/10 2022 [1] 927/11 21 [2] 927/11 21 [2] 927/11 22 [1] 1164/6 22.23 [1] 1079/1 23 [2] 966/20 1002/8 23.50 [2] 1024/22 1024/22 24 [9] 940/7 940/8 1052/21 1053/2 1053/16 1053/19 1094/12 1094/24 1096/11 24 percent [1] 1208/22 243 [1] 1158/6 244 [1] 1158/6 24th [1] 1096/18                        | 264 [1] 1010/12 272 [1] 1013/6 28 [6] 938/11 1043/11 1046/21 1122/21 1138/21 1138/22 283 [1] 1016/6 29 [6] 930/13 931/12 936/7 939/20 1043/16 1138/22 2:00 p.m [1] 970/1 2:30 [1] 969/21 2nd [3] 1017/21 1135/14 1147/15  3 30 [5] 982/16 1099/3 1100/8 1134/23 1193/22 30 percent [1] 1011/8 30-minutes [1] 944/8 30-year [1] 1124/6 302 [1] 927/24 31 [6] 1007/15 1188/24 1189/20 1203/23 1204/9 1212/10 32.50 [1] 1002/21 327 [1] 1018/1 331 [1] 1022/6 35.50 [1] 1002/21 36 [1] 1058/2                | 5 5 percent [3] 1116/21 1117/4 1121/3 500 [4] 927/10 927/23 1129/23 1213/17 521 [1] 1037/7 549 [1] 1136/7 55 [4] 1134/24 1135/2 1185/15 1186/2 554 [1] 1040/1 564 [1] 1041/8 571 [1] 985/15 573 [1] 934/7 575 [1] 935/6 590 [2] 936/16 937/18 594 [2] 937/16 938/21 599 [2] 1137/2 1139/17 5th [4] 1093/1 1104/3 1104/18 1190/14 6 6 percent [6] 1114/14 117/9 1117/10 1117/12 1119/1 1119/8 6.1 percent [2] 1208/24 1211/20 60 [3] 982/20 983/10 983/17 60s [1] 983/21                |
|   | 972/17 1000/22 1058/12 1077/24 1085/9 1085/19 1086/3 1111/8 1111/23 1113/7 1116/6 1131/1 1131/16 14.6 [1] 1211/7 143 [1] 1000/21 1439 [1] 973/5 1496 [1] 966/20 14th [4] 962/23 973/13 1073/19 1131/20 15 [11] 935/9 935/19 974/14 974/20 975/4 975/12 979/10 991/17 1034/24 1072/10 1098/9 15 million [1] 1189/19 15 percent [4] 1116/20 1125/20 1126/4 1126/15 15.4 percent [1] 1125/12 154 [1] 1002/6 16 [14] 975/17 975/18 979/10 996/24 1009/11 1067/9 1067/11 1072/11 1077/22 1078/18 1079/5 1158/6 16th [2] 957/17   | 1x1he's [1] 936/1  2  2.26 percent [2] 1208/20 1211/14  2.c [1] 1185/13  20 [10] 939/6 991/18 1002/13 1002/16 1023/6 1067/4 1067/15 1099/3 1100/8 1193/23  20 percent [1] 1028/10  20-25 [1] 1013/21  20.85 [1] 1079/1  2000 [1] 1087/20  2004 [2] 1160/22 1161/22  2008 [1] 1087/21  201 [1] 1138/4  2010 [1] 1087/22  2014 [1] 1184/2  2014-2016 [2] 1183/8 1187/23  2015 [32] 936/7 992/11 995/4 998/10 1001/9 1002/8 1002/13 1008/10 1009/11 1016/7 1018/16 1023/22 1028/15 1087/23 1088/12 1090/17 1105/13 1126/4 1135/9 1162/13 | 1213/10 2017 [1] 1189/5 2018 [3] 1124/9 1126/4 1128/23 2018-0484-JTL [1] 927/4 2019 [3] 1087/24 1126/10 1126/15 202 [1] 1138/5 2021 [8] 1203/23 1204/9 1204/11 1205/1 1208/2 1210/20 1211/6 1213/10 2022 [1] 927/11 21 [2] 927/11 21 [2] 927/11 22 [1] 1164/6 22.23 [1] 1079/1 23 [2] 966/20 1002/8 23.50 [2] 1024/22 1024/22 24 [9] 940/7 940/8 1052/21 1053/2 1053/16 1053/19 1094/12 1094/24 1096/11 24 percent [1] 1208/22 243 [1] 1158/6 244 [1] 1158/6 24th [1] 1096/18 25 [11] 939/24 1013/21 | 264 [1] 1010/12 272 [1] 1013/6 28 [6] 938/11 1043/11 1046/21 1122/21 1138/21 1138/22 283 [1] 1016/6 29 [6] 930/13 931/12 936/7 939/20 1043/16 1138/22 2:00 p.m [1] 970/1 2:30 [1] 969/21 2nd [3] 1017/21 1135/14 1147/15  3 30 [5] 982/16 1099/3 1100/8 1134/23 1193/22 30 percent [1] 1011/8 30-minutes [1] 944/8 30-year [1] 1124/6 302 [1] 927/24 31 [6] 1007/15 1188/24 1189/20 1203/23 1204/9 1212/10 32.50 [1] 1002/21 327 [1] 1018/1 331 [1] 1022/6 35.50 [1] 1002/21 36 [1] 1058/2 363 [1] 1023/4 | 5 5 percent [3] 1116/21 1117/4 1121/3 500 [4] 927/10 927/23 1129/23 1213/17 521 [1] 1037/7 549 [1] 1136/7 55 [4] 1134/24 1135/2 1185/15 1186/2 554 [1] 1040/1 564 [1] 1041/8 571 [1] 985/15 573 [1] 934/7 575 [1] 935/6 590 [2] 936/16 937/18 594 [2] 937/16 938/21 599 [2] 1137/2 1139/17 5th [4] 1093/1 1104/3 1104/18 1190/14 6 6 percent [6] 1114/14 1117/9 1117/10 1117/12 1119/1 1119/8 6.1 percent [2] 1208/24 1211/20 60 [3] 982/20 983/10 983/17 60s [1] 983/21 61 [1] 983/21 |

|   | 1040/F                                     |  | - divet [4] 1000/17                          | 1100/01 1105/00                                |
|---|--|--|--|--|
| 6   | 1049/5<br>ability [18] 1061/4              | accreditations [1]<br>1193/12          | adjust [1] 1206/17<br>adjusted [1] 1209/11   | 1122/21 1135/23<br>1146/10 1146/14             |
| <b>688 [1]</b> 1147/13                      | 1061/13 1064/7                             | accurate [10] 956/13                   | adjustment [7] 1210/7                        | 1146/23 1149/6                                 |
| <b>694 [1]</b> 1092/23                      | 1067/17 1068/6                             | 1123/23 1154/19                        | 1212/16 1212/18                              | 1150/21 1157/16                                |
| <b>694.003</b> [1] 1093/6                   | 1069/20 1070/17                            | 1156/16 1190/8 1191/2                  | 1213/2 1213/6 1213/8                         | 1165/12 1172/13                                |
| <b>694.010 [1]</b> 1093/12                  | 1074/21 1097/11                            | 1204/13 1204/15                        | 1213/23                                      | 1172/22 1180/13                                |
| <b>6:05</b> [1] 1152/7                      | 1099/16 1113/13                            | 1204/18 1205/15                        | adjustments [3]                              | 1180/17 1185/17                                |
| 6:49 [1] 1152/21                            | 1116/15 1118/5 1122/1                      | accused [1] 1081/20                    | 1209/13 1209/16                              | 1208/20 1213/22                                |
| 6th [1] 1106/22                             | 1124/17 1124/21                            | <b>ACEVEDO</b> [1] 928/22              | 1212/11                                      | after-tax [1] 1208/20                          |
| 7   | 1124/22 1125/4                             | achievable [1] 1110/17                 | administers [1]                              | afternoon [10] 956/7                           |
| 7.28 percent [2]                            | able [11] 954/11                           | achieve [3] 1108/4                     | 1006/19                                      | 1068/21 1104/7                                 |
| 1208/12 1208/14                             | 1017/8 1026/24                             | 1125/24 1153/7                         | administrative [1]                           | 1121/17 1144/1                                 |
| <b>707 [1]</b> 1051/5                       | 1027/15 1057/3                             | acknowledged [1]                       | 1175/13                                      | 1160/16 1160/17                                |
| <b>753 [1]</b> 1188/17                      | 1099/19 1107/24                            | 944/11                                 | adopt [1] 991/16                             | 1192/9 1192/20                                 |
| <b>76 percent [1]</b> 1208/22               | 1109/18 1119/13<br>  1142/6 1172/20        | <b>acquire [3]</b> 950/7 1106/5 1147/8 | advance [4] 939/16<br>1035/8 1143/13         | 1192/22  |
| <b>768 [1]</b> 1096/10                      | above [13] 939/4                           | acquired [2] 1090/18                   | 1143/20                                      | against [4] 940/23<br>1046/24 1081/17          |
| <b>768.005</b> [1] 1096/16                  | 943/19 946/17 947/13                       | 1203/20                                | advantage [1] 1178/21                        | 1040/24 1001/17                                |
| <b>768.019</b> [1] 1098/10                  | 1079/4 1086/6 1101/10                      | acquirer [2] 1015/6                    | adverse [3] 1095/8                           | age [3] 983/11 1134/23                         |
| <b>77 [1]</b> 1185/7                        | 1103/14 1107/13                            | 1066/23                                | 1095/15 1113/2                               | 1134/24  |
| <b>776.022 [1]</b> 1096/21                  | 1110/1 1113/1 1148/10                      | acquirers [1] 1014/3                   | advice [5] 987/15                            | agencies [27] 1057/2                           |
| <b>778 [2]</b> 1094/11 1094/23              | 1188/6                                     | acquiring [2] 973/12                   | 1013/2 1044/18 1056/4                        |  |
| <b>799 [1]</b> 1101/19                      | abreast [1] 1061/17                        | 984/12                                 | 1132/22                                      | 1089/2 1090/7 1090/10                          |
| <b>7:00 [1]</b> 1153/13                     | absolutely [33] 947/7                      | acquisition [19]                       | advise [3] 1032/5                            | 1091/14 1091/17                                |
| 7th [7] 1005/16                             | 987/14 991/24 992/3                        | 994/16 998/18 1000/10                  | 1077/12 1159/13                              | 1091/19 1091/22                                |
| 1029/11 1030/16                             | 992/6 994/21 999/19                        | 1013/1 1029/16                         | advised [4] 992/23                           | 1092/3 1092/6 1092/14                          |
| 1041/19 1143/8                              | 1021/23 1028/7 1032/8                      | 1034/16 1036/19                        | 1013/4 1127/7 1130/1                         | 1093/10 1093/17                                |
| 1146/10 1146/14                             | 1034/17 1045/18                            | 1088/13 1089/6                         | advising [1] 1146/4                          | 1094/3 1096/3 1097/1                           |
| 8   | 1050/2 1050/15 1053/3<br>1055/14 1057/8    | 1089/23 1090/13<br>1091/14 1091/22     | advisor [1] 1166/6                           | 1097/3 1097/9 1101/13<br>1102/3 1103/15 1107/9 |
| ·   | 1055/14 1057/6                             | 1093/18 1095/12                        | advisors [17] 972/2<br>972/5 992/2 992/5     | 1125/8 1125/13 1205/9                          |
| 8.5 percent [1] 937/23                      | 1062/14 1066/12                            | 1117/24 1118/1 1121/9                  | 997/19 1002/8 1018/3                         | agencies' [1] 1094/16                          |
| <b>810 [1]</b> 1078/14                      | 1068/16 1068/16                            | 1126/19                                | 1029/19 1032/13                              | agency [1] 1113/2                              |
| <b>882 [1]</b> 1106/19                      | 1075/6 1077/19 1080/1                      | across [3] 990/24                      | 1032/17 1044/19                              | agenda [7] 986/9                               |
| <b>885 [1]</b> 941/13 <b>887 [1]</b> 944/22 | 1082/13 1107/16                            | 1025/18 1171/18                        | 1045/9 1049/4 1065/5                         | 1033/12 1034/24                                |
| <b>889 [4]</b> 944/6 944/7                  | 1170/21 1171/1 1179/7                      | act [1] 1140/4                         | 1068/2 1074/13                               | 1035/7 1035/11                                 |
| 948/3 948/3                                 | 1180/5                                     | acted [1] 1019/12                      | 1074/21                                      | 1047/19 1067/8                                 |
| <b>890 [1]</b> 946/16                       | academic [1] 1178/1                        | action [3] 927/3                       | advisory [7] 981/16                          | aggregate [1] 1203/2                           |
| <b>893 [1]</b> 942/23                       | acc [1] 1070/8                             | 1025/24 1195/7                         | 981/19 1090/12                               | aggressive [1] 1107/6                          |
| <b>8:17 [2]</b> 959/7 959/8                 | acc/dil [1] 1070/8                         | actionable [1] 1120/2                  | 1093/10 1095/9                               | ago [8] 944/9 993/18                           |
| 9   | accept [12] 943/16<br>944/15 948/22 979/23 | activities [2] 999/5<br>1161/3         | 1095/16 1107/8<br><b>AEP [3]</b> 1161/15     | 1011/1 1018/22<br>  1070/24 1085/1             |
|   | 1026/18 1043/3 1057/7                      | activity [1] 982/14                    | 1162/5 1162/10                               | 1139/13 1148/24                                |
| 90 [1] 958/5                                | 1067/12 1079/11                            | actual [11] 998/11                     | <b>AEP's [1]</b> 1161/3                      | agreement [18] 929/15                          |
| <b>90 percent [3]</b> 948/15 949/12 1197/6  | 1079/23 1079/24                            | 1001/14 1126/18                        | affect [2] 1172/24                           | 949/7 951/13 954/21                            |
| <b>94</b> [1] 932/5                         | 1081/13                                    | 1197/24 1199/7 1199/9                  | 1173/23                                      | 956/11 963/6 963/9                             |
| <b>944 [1]</b> 1108/13                      | accepted [9] 956/22                        | 1200/3 1201/17 1202/4                  | affecting [1] 1083/18                        | 965/2 1032/7 1065/20                           |
| <b>952</b> [2] 961/11 1061/20               | 957/4 958/6 958/14                         | 1202/23 1212/12                        | affirmed [4] 930/2                           | 1074/4 1076/6 1076/10                          |
| <b>956</b> [1] 957/2                        | 1076/12 1079/6 1079/8                      | <b>Adam [1]</b> 968/5                  | 1087/4 1133/20                               | 1150/18 1153/16                                |
| <b>958</b> [1] 955/5                        | 1207/11 1209/8                             | adamant [1] 1197/17                    | 1192/17                                      | 1156/8 1159/1 1188/6                           |
| <b>960 [1]</b> 1057/11                      | access [9] 1097/17                         | add [2] 1041/20                        | afford [3] 1122/7                            | agreements [1]                                 |
| <b>971 [1]</b> 1064/23                      | 1097/22 1098/6                             | 1120/11                                | 1122/18 1123/7                               | 1120/23  |
| <b>986 [2]</b> 963/15 1063/8                | 1098/18 1098/22<br>1105/15 1107/24         | added [3] 1026/23<br>1114/24 1163/19   | <b>after [51]</b> 929/19 940/19 941/3 946/23 | ahead [10] 1009/8<br>1026/3 1063/2 1092/16     |
| <b>997 [2]</b> 1059/6 1060/3                | 1175/14 1189/4                             | adding [3] 979/20                      | 947/2 952/6 968/18                           | 1109/24 1110/14                                |
| 9:15 [1] 927/11                             | accessible [1] 1098/7                      | 1114/23 1120/11                        | 968/23 969/15 971/17                         | 1118/14 1119/9                                 |
| 9th [2] 959/16 1132/21                      | accommodate [1]                            | additional [11]                        | 983/5 987/8 1006/3                           | 1172/15 1196/8                                 |
| Α   | 929/19                                     | 1030/18 1101/2                         | 1006/7 1006/10 1007/1                        | Alec [1] 1111/12                               |
| <b>A.1 [4]</b> 933/10 933/11                | accompany [1]                              | 1102/21 1109/19                        | 1020/14 1025/6 1028/9                        | alert [1] 1041/15                              |
| 933/16 988/13                               | 1195/23                                    | 1120/12 1123/15                        | 1028/15 1039/11                              | alerted [1] 1030/6                             |
| <b>A.2</b> [6] 933/15 934/13                | according [2] 934/10                       | 1128/8 1128/10                         | 1039/20 1042/24                              | alerting [1] 1008/5                            |
| 934/15 988/16 988/17                        | 1073/1                                     | 1128/15 1128/18                        | 1048/22 1049/1 1049/8                        |  |
| 988/20                                      | account [1] 1212/19                        | 1191/11                                | 1063/12 1073/15                              | 960/21   |
| <b>a.m [4]</b> 927/11 959/22                | accounting [5] 986/2<br>1087/13 1087/19    | address [2] 996/11<br>1047/23          | 1074/20 1079/7<br>1083/11 1105/23            | <b>aligned [2]</b> 934/11 934/20               |
| 1003/10 1004/1 abbreviated [2] 933/24       |  | adjourned [1] 1214/10                  | 1109/8 1116/5 1122/20                        | all [111] 929/15 931/4                         |
| appleviateu [2] 900/24                      | . 300,0 1100,17                            |  | . 100,0 1110,0 1122,20                       | a[] 020/10 001/4                               |
|   |  |  |  |  |

| A  | 986/16 1009/21                             | 1200/15 1202/5                         | 1040/9                                   | 1167/8 1173/16                             |
|--|--|--|--|--|
|  | along [6] 973/21                           | announcement [3]                       | applaud [1] 1107/16                      | 1179/18 1184/7 1211/2                      |
| all [109] 934/5                            | 1067/1 1091/11                             | 1076/22 1077/13                        | applauded [1] 1108/8                     | 1211/13 1211/21                            |
| 935/24 937/15 938/3<br>938/19 940/2 941/24 | 1093/20 1103/1                             | 1198/13                                | applicable [1] 1072/16                   | arrive [5] 1071/22                         |
| 942/19 955/1 959/24                        | 1129/20                                    | annual [4] 982/15                      | application [1]                          | 1202/9 1208/19                             |
| 961/5 962/10 969/12                        | alternative [4] 973/15                     | 986/7 1033/19 1169/17                  | 1006/17                                  | 1208/23 1212/11                            |
| 973/19 974/6 981/4                         | 1011/16 1095/10                            | annually [1] 1030/5                    | applied [1] 1106/14                      | arrived [2] 1071/23                        |
| 983/14 985/2 990/17                        | 1173/9                                     | another [34] 932/20                    | apply [2] 1092/17                        | 1203/1                                     |
| 996/10 997/6 1009/8                        | alternatives [6] 996/6                     | 935/5 936/15 937/15                    | 1207/13                                  | Arsht [1] 928/20                           |
| 1010/13 1014/2                             | 996/6 996/7 1010/9                         | 941/8 942/23 957/14                    | appraisal [6] 966/19                     | arts [1] 1087/11                           |
| 1015/19 1015/24                            | 1031/23 1046/16                            | 961/10 988/17 988/18                   | 973/2 973/7 1138/4                       | <b>ASAP</b> [1] 956/1                      |
| 1016/2 1021/10                             | Although [2] 944/10                        | 990/4 997/24 1007/10                   | 1156/13 1158/4                           | Ashby [1] 928/10                           |
| 1022/20 1024/7                             | 1007/21                                    | 1007/11 1010/11                        | appreciably [1]                          | aside [1] 1120/20                          |
| 1024/22 1025/17                            | always [2] 1098/21                         | 1012/7 1017/11<br>1017/13 1022/10      | 1130/16                                  | ask [24] 947/9 990/4                       |
| 1025/24 1028/7 1032/3                      | 1186/4<br>  am [8] 1104/5 1141/17          | 1023/8 1034/18 1060/6                  | appreciate [5] 982/13<br>1086/21 1118/20 | 1032/20 1038/1<br>1049/23 1054/11          |
| 1034/4 1041/7 1042/19                      | 1166/8 1168/19 1171/4                      | 1069/8 1107/9 1147/12                  |  | 1055/23 1062/1 1065/8                      |
| 1044/6 1052/2 1053/17                      | 1192/23 1198/8                             | 1154/12 1155/13                        | approach [15] 933/10                     | 1066/8 1066/21                             |
| 1057/24 1064/4 1064/5                      | 1207/14                                    | 1168/12 1184/23                        | 933/11 933/15 933/16                     | 1066/24 1075/20                            |
| 1065/4 1067/1 1067/1                       | American [1] 1161/1                        | 1185/8 1190/11                         | 933/19 934/13 978/11                     | 1094/14 1110/7 1136/4                      |
| 1067/11 1068/2 1069/5                      | among [2] 955/24                           | 1194/14 1197/13                        | 988/13 988/17 988/18                     | 1139/12 1152/7                             |
| 1072/2 1073/7 1073/17                      | 1190/21                                    | 1200/7                                 | 1056/4 1065/10                           | 1160/18 1170/3                             |
| 1075/2 1075/4 1075/7                       | amongst [1] 1130/13                        | answer [15] 943/12                     | 1091/13 1091/21                          | 1174/24 1183/7                             |
| 1075/15 1077/3                             | amortization [1]                           | 967/1 967/3 973/14                     | 1092/3                                   | 1187/12 1203/3                             |
| 1081/22 1086/1                             | 1206/18                                    | 973/18 974/7 993/14                    | approached [2] 1034/3                    | asked [32] 929/6                           |
| 1091/19 1092/6 1093/9                      | amount [9] 981/16                          | 1063/2 1071/21 1082/5                  | 1091/24                                  | 929/17 967/2 969/1                         |
| 1097/3 1098/15<br>1099/19 1102/18          | 1025/17 1025/18                            | 1138/11 1139/2 1139/5                  | approaches [1] 987/24                    | 970/13 982/5 987/21                        |
| 1103/11 1107/8                             | 1060/24 1107/24                            | 1157/8 1159/7                          | approaching [1]                          | 988/17 992/9 996/18                        |
| 1107/22 1107/23                            | 1108/3 1109/17                             | answered [2] 999/15                    | 994/10                                   | 1042/23 1047/24                            |
| 1108/5 1114/9 1117/1                       | 1145/24 1184/8                             | 1108/7                                 | appropriate [6]                          | 1052/8 1058/15 1076/5                      |
| 1119/11 1120/5                             | amounts [1] 1016/1                         | answers [1] 1139/13                    | 1044/21 1062/22                          | 1110/2 1146/9 1146/13                      |
| 1120/15 1120/22                            | anal [1] 1038/17                           | anticipate [2] 983/16                  | 1139/7 1178/17                           | 1151/23 1156/12                            |
| 1120/22 1121/5 1127/8                      | analyses [1] 1193/6                        | 984/9                                  | 1205/14 1207/2                           | 1156/17 1157/7 1157/9                      |
| 1130/16 1131/23                            | analysis [29] 972/5                        | anticipated [1]                        | approval [4] 947/24                      | 1157/12 1159/6                             |
| 1132/8 1134/12                             | 972/13 972/17 997/21                       | 1007/22                                | 948/2 1056/7 1112/21                     | 1166/13 1178/5 1181/4                      |
| 1134/21 1135/8                             | 1005/13 1015/6                             | anticipating [4] 998/3                 | approve [4] 977/4                        | 1181/10 1181/24                            |
| 1138/13 1138/17                            | 1047/17 1064/20                            | 1027/2 1040/12                         | 977/4 977/9 1159/22                      | 1184/20 1185/18                            |
| 1145/12 1148/23                            | 1066/22 1067/16<br>1068/13 1069/20         | 1040/13<br>anticipation [2] 1008/2     | approved [4] 958/4 977/12 1070/11 1129/7 | asking [10] 972/5<br>972/12 1055/16        |
| 1163/16 1167/1 1167/2                      | 1070/9 1070/99                             | 1038/7                                 | approximately [10]                       | 1062/23 1107/10                            |
| 1172/4 1172/14 1175/4                      | 1084/24 1084/24                            | anybody [9] 1050/3                     | 931/20 1058/23                           | 1137/21 1147/5 1154/5                      |
| 1175/11 1176/5 1179/6                      | 1085/17 1184/23                            | 1050/22 1066/10                        | 1059/11 1124/9                           | 1157/3 1185/3                              |
| 1182/13 1186/17                            | 1193/4 1198/18                             | 1066/18 1166/19                        | 1128/23 1188/23                          | asks [1] 1152/24                           |
| 1187/12 1196/7 1198/7                      | 1199/17 1200/8 1203/8                      | 1170/19 1170/23                        | 1193/21 1193/22                          | assess [1] 1059/17                         |
| 1201/23 1202/17                            | 1203/12 1203/17                            | 1171/2 1181/21                         | 1202/9 1208/21                           | assesses [1] 1125/3                        |
| 1204/5 1205/11                             | 1203/22 1204/3                             | anyone [13] 991/22                     | April [4] 1122/11                        | assessing [2] 958/10                       |
| all-cash [6] 1024/22                       | 1211/12 1211/21                            | 1032/5 1047/11 1050/6                  | 1122/21 1190/14                          | 1124/22                                    |
| 1044/6 1127/8 1131/23<br>1132/8 1202/17    | analyst [6] 1087/15                        | 1050/13 1062/16                        | 1203/9                                   | assessment [4] 994/19                      |
| all-stock [1] 1064/4                       | 1087/19 1104/16                            | 1083/11 1083/12                        | April 2016 [1] 1122/11                   | 996/15 996/16 1097/7                       |
| allegation [2] 1170/10                     | 1188/13 1188/17                            | 1089/7 1132/13                         | April 28 [1] 1122/21                     | assessments [1]                            |
| 1170/14                                    | 1188/18                                    | 1132/17 1186/13                        | <b>April 5th [1]</b> 1190/14             | 996/17                                     |
| alleged [1] 1196/19                        | analysts [2] 1169/19                       | 1207/15                                | area [1] 1208/6                          | asset [17] 1093/21                         |
| ALLEN [1] 928/22                           | 1189/9                                     | anywhere [3] 971/8                     | aren't [2] 999/7                         | 1093/21 1093/24                            |
| allocated [1] 1165/21                      | Analytic [1] 1046/9                        | 1052/13 1116/19                        | 1142/24                                  | 1103/1 1123/15 1124/3                      |
| allotment [7] 1107/5                       | analytical [1] 1049/2                      | apart [2] 1020/15                      | arena [1] 987/2                          | 1128/11 1128/15                            |
| 1116/1 1116/18 1121/3                      | analyze [2] 1046/13                        | 1077/20                                | around [29] 935/24                       | 1128/18 1128/20                            |
| 1128/4 1129/11                             | 1146/19                                    | apologize [6] 944/24                   | 975/12 975/15 1002/12                    |  |
| 1129/18                                    | analyzing [1] 972/17<br>Andrew [1] 1096/11 | 989/8 1050/8 1054/21<br>1120/18 1147/3 | 1006/20 1016/5<br>1017/12 1032/22        | 1142/12 1201/4 1201/7<br>  1207/16 1208/13 |
| allow [1] 954/8                            | Angeles [4] 1149/10                        | Apparently [2] 962/2                   | 1033/5 1047/13                           | assets [6] 982/4                           |
| allowed [2] 1097/22                        | 1149/18 1149/19                            | 1166/13                                | 1051/12 1055/3                           | 1000/11 1061/11                            |
| 1199/21                                    | 1152/10                                    | appear [1] 1132/10                     | 1056/22 1075/7                           | 1123/18 1128/8                             |
| allows [1] 1189/3                          | anger [1] 1148/1                           | APPEARANCES [1]                        | 1087/20 1099/23                          | 1128/10                                    |
| alluding [1] 1057/16                       | angry [1] 1053/4                           | 927/24                                 | 1133/24 1138/18                          | assignment [2] 1195/9                      |
| almost [3] 929/8                           | announced [4]                              | appeared [1] 1115/23                   | 1150/5 1153/13                           | 1195/10                                    |
| 1039/23 1081/5                             | 1122/22 1197/12                            | appears [2] 1010/16                    | 1166/17 1166/18                          | assistants [1] 1121/20                     |
| alone [4] 978/6 978/7                      |  |  |  | ]  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  | OLLA                                       | NCERY COURT REPORT                     | EDC                                      | (77) all - assistants                      |

| Α  | average [7] 935/15                          | 1114/16 1117/21                             | 1210/14                                     | 953/10 958/20 964/18                           |
|--|---|---|---|--|
| assisting [1] 936/12                                   | 982/10 982/15 1206/8                        | 1118/6 1118/9 1118/11                       | begins [2] 1058/18                          | 972/1 972/17 974/18                            |
| associated [5] 1089/21                                 | 1207/3 1208/23                              | 1120/1                                      | 1104/5                                      | 1007/12 1028/18                                |
| 1090/5 1090/13   | 1211/20                                     | bar [9] 928/7 928/16                        | <b>begun [1]</b> 1078/9                     | 1037/9 1070/19                                 |
| 1092/12 1107/21  | averse [2] 968/14                           | 928/23 1015/13                              | behalf [3] 1087/8                           | 1080/19 1080/22                                |
| Associates [2] 1192/24                                 | 969/7                                       | 1015/14 1025/17                             | 1145/5 1166/1                               | 1086/13 1104/14                                |
| 1193/2   | avoid [3] 10///1                            | 1082/23 1126/5                              | behest [1] 976/18                           | 1115/1 1128/7 1131/16                          |
| assume [5] 936/13                                      | 1145/18 1146/4                              | 1126/17                                     | behind [2] 980/6                            | 1137/11 1149/5                                 |
| 970/10 989/6 1038/13                                   | aware [17] 949/18                           | base [5] 1014/12                            | 1118/13                                     | 1151/24 1167/24                                |
| 1108/2   | 958/13 966/7 966/10<br>966/13 966/16 966/22 | 1033/13 1046/15<br>1046/15 1116/16          | beholden [1] 1100/21<br>beholder [1] 1151/3 | 1168/2 1212/15<br><b>BH [1]</b> 1023/15        |
| assumed [1] 1093/18                                    | 967/1 974/1 983/22                          |   |   | bias [6] 931/4 945/10                          |
| assuming [1] 1094/2                                    | 989/18 994/15 1006/12                       |   | believed [6] 1032/13                        | 945/13 945/15 945/18                           |
| assumption [1]   | 1132/12 1132/16                             | 1056/3 1074/1 1078/6                        | 1036/18 1057/21                             | 946/1  |
| 1054/15  | 1166/4 1171/2                               | 1078/11 1092/16                             | 1130/7 1156/21                              | bid [11] 936/1 968/8                           |
| assumptions [2]  | away [1] 1185/14                            | 1115/22 1121/2                              | 1204/17                                     | 1045/17 1082/24                                |
| 1085/24 1103/13  | AYCO [2] 992/22                             | 1123/24 1124/22                             | believes [2] 944/10                         | 1140/20 1140/21                                |
| <b>assurance [1]</b> 1074/24 <b>attached [3]</b> 933/5 | 1183/11                                     | 1125/4 1182/2 1191/8                        | 975/18                                      | 1141/14 1142/11                                |
| 1029/1 1056/22   | В   | 1194/7 1196/15                              | <b>below [17]</b> 943/1                     | 1142/14 1145/24                                |
| attaching [1] 1096/12                                  |   | 1196/16 1197/6                              | 985/17 990/9 997/8                          | 1151/4   |
| attachment [5] 1093/4                                  | Babowal [7] 957/3                           | 1197/15 1202/16                             | 1013/10 1013/12                             | bidder [3] 968/20                              |
| 1093/6 1093/7 1093/8                                   | 957/7 957/10 957/18                         | 1203/11 1205/4                              | 1016/10 1025/16                             | 1141/24 1180/14                                |
| 1127/13  | 1066/5 1150/22                              | 1206/12 1207/18                             | 1037/21 1040/5                              | bidders [4] 1136/5                             |
| attachments [1]  | 1150/23                                     | baseline [1] 1046/24                        | 1057/17 1070/6                              | 1141/13 1141/21                                |
| 1096/15  | <b>bachelor [2]</b> 1087/11 1087/13         | bases [1] 1049/2                            | 1101/21 1123/17                             | 1142/3   |
| attempt [5] 966/8                                      | background [7] 957/24                       | basic [1] 1202/20                           | 1126/7 1143/22<br>  1182/18                 | <b>big [8]</b> 936/7 936/12 1017/13 1017/14    |
| 966/13 966/23 1022/19                                  | 980/15 985/22 986/23                        | 1028/13 1094/15                             | benchmark [1]                               | 1017/14 1034/8 1163/3                          |
| 1055/5   | 1087/10 1134/12                             | 1094/17 1097/23                             | 1046/21                                     | 1174/17  |
| attempting [2] 1047/12                                 | 1159/16                                     | 1145/22 1171/17                             | benefit [4] 962/18                          | bigger [2] 1053/13                             |
| 1055/1   | bad [2] 1012/2 1075/5                       | 1208/3                                      | 996/21 1122/24 1123/8                       | 1118/22  |
| attend [2] 1095/1<br>1110/8                            | baked [2] 931/4                             | basis [32] 936/10                           | benefits [3] 1082/2                         | billion [32] 965/8                             |
| attended [2] 1110/23                                   | 1019/12                                     | 942/13 942/20 951/10                        | 1209/22 1209/24                             | 1010/5 1036/1 1045/20                          |
| 1111/13  | baked-in [1] 931/4                          | 952/16 952/20 952/22                        | <b>Berger [2]</b> 928/4 928/8               | 1099/23 1102/14                                |
| attention [3] 970/16                                   | balance [14] 931/6                          | 953/3 957/7 957/10                          | Berkshire [16] 1011/12                      |  |
| 984/11 1108/19   | 931/7 1000/12 1011/12                       | 958/8 958/11 961/18                         | 1015/7 1019/20                              | 1116/24 1117/2 1117/5                          |
| attorneys [1] 1032/17                                  | 1011/13 1011/13                             | 961/22 972/3 974/8<br>979/24 986/7 1003/4   | 1019/22 1020/2<br>1023/10 1023/14           | 1118/11 1121/3 1128/3<br>1162/24 1163/1 1163/4 |
| attracted [1] 970/16                                   | 1048/17 1064/7                              | 1025/15 1048/14                             | 1023/10 1023/14                             | 1171/10 1174/2 1174/4                          |
| attractive [2] 1014/22                                 | 1064/12 1064/13                             | 1055/4 1081/1 1081/2                        | 1024/14 1024/21                             | 1188/24 1189/1 1190/7                          |
| 1016/23  | 1169/20 1179/4                              | 1081/14 1083/21                             | 1026/13 1026/17                             | 1200/24 1201/1 1201/3                          |
| attributed [2] 1208/22                                 | balanced [1] 1044/21                        | 1085/4 1099/7 1114/8                        | 1036/14 1136/1                              | 1211/1 1211/4 1212/9                           |
| 1208/22  | balancing [1] 1048/21                       | 1191/1 1203/5 1213/22                       | 1175/12                                     | 1212/13 1213/23                                |
| <b>auction [2]</b> 1145/22 1146/5                      | ball [1] 1021/21                            | <b>BBB [9]</b> 1094/6 1094/8                | Berkshire's [1]                             | binder [7] 1080/16                             |
| August [12] 984/20                                     | balloon [2] 1052/21                         | 1094/10 1097/3 1098/3                       | 1026/16                                     | 1092/20 1092/22                                |
| 995/4 995/11 997/9                                     | 1052/22                                     | 1101/6 1101/9 1101/10                       |   | 1122/13 1127/11                                |
| 1004/13 1004/14  | balls [1] 1006/20                           | 1208/6                                      | 928/8                                       | 1134/7 1134/7                                  |
| 1005/16 1005/19  | bank [5] 1098/8 1099/9                      |   | besides [1] 1011/12                         | binders [4] 1121/21                            |
| 1007/7 1007/15 1088/1                                  | 1099/11 1110/11<br>  1115/6                 | beat [1] 937/1                              | best [27] 971/8 971/12                      | 1133/18 1133/24                                |
| 1138/13  | bankable [2] 1147/23                        | <b>became [7]</b> 949/18 981/5 983/10 998/9 | 976/1 1000/19 1014/6                        | 1134/6<br>  <b>binding [2]</b> 1058/20         |
| August 1st [1] 1088/1                                  | 1148/4                                      | 1087/20 1087/21                             | 1014/22 1015/6 1036/3<br>1036/20 1045/21    | 1075/24  |
| <b>August 31 [1]</b> 1007/15                           | <b>banker [7]</b> 957/11                    | 1087/20 1007/21                             | 1048/6 1048/17                              | birthday [3] 1149/1                            |
| August 4 [1] 995/4                                     | 961/12 961/23 973/24                        | become [2] 984/16                           | 1057/15 1082/9 1103/3                       | 1149/6 1149/12                                 |
| August 4th [1] 1004/14                                 | 1147/16 1162/3                              | 1199/21                                     | 1105/22 1123/20                             | bit [19] 940/3 976/24                          |
| August 7 [1] 1005/19                                   | 1167/22                                     | bed [1] 973/15                              | 1132/1 1132/9 1135/22                       | 980/15 981/18 994/22                           |
| August 7th [1] 1005/16 authorization [4]               | bankers [7] 941/8                           | began [4] 941/8 984/20                      | 1143/18 1147/7 1177/7                       | 1009/23 1021/2                                 |
| 943/16 1027/20 1056/8                                  | 958/1 1028/21 1054/23                       | 1007/6 1167/24                              | 1194/5 1199/1 1199/1                        | 1043/14 1059/24                                |
| 1056/10  | 1054/24 1055/9                              | begin [12] 986/17                           | 1199/4                                      | 1100/22 1108/11                                |
| authorized [9] 947/4                                   | 1167/22                                     | 986/19 988/2 988/11                         | bet [1] 1150/23                             | 1121/22 1126/22                                |
| 951/11 976/13 1006/4                                   | banking [5] 1059/20                         | 990/19 1006/5 1007/2                        | beta [1] 1207/14                            | 1143/22 1148/12                                |
| 1025/7 1056/16   | 1161/3 1162/2 1167/6<br>  1167/7            |   | betas [1] 1199/14                           | 1155/23 1159/9 1184/6                          |
| 1056/17 1109/9   | banks [13] 995/20                           | 1043/6 1214/6<br>beginning [6] 954/4        | <b>better [5]</b> 943/24<br>1010/1 1050/22  | 1188/11<br>  <b>black [1]</b>   1080/20        |
| 1131/21  | 1110/3 1110/8 1110/23                       |   | 1055/23 1108/7                              | blank [2] 959/24 960/3                         |
| available [2] 1020/12                                  | 1111/2 1111/4 1111/19                       |   | between [24] 936/7                          | bleeding [1] 1035/23                           |
| 1077/18  |   | 100.101.101.1                               |   | 2.2223[.] .000/20                              |
|  |   |   |   |  |

| Е | 3   | 1057/9 1057/12 1058/4                    | 1182/21 1182/22                          | 998/24 1012/16                                  | 1210/10 1210/14                           |
|---|---|--|--|---|---|
| _ | lindsiding [1] 1001/8                       | 1058/11 1058/19                          | 1186/11                                  | 1077/23 1079/10                                 | 1212/7                                    |
|   | low [3] 938/3 953/14                        | 1059/4 1059/7 1059/16                    |  | 1087/9 1087/16 1171/6                           |   |
|   | 143/6                                       |  |  | 1175/19 1194/4                                  | 1078/23                                   |
| b | lown [1] 1009/21                            | 1062/4 1062/7 1062/10                    | bona [2] 1156/3                          | 1201/18 1202/10                                 | <b>calendar [2]</b> 997/5 997/7           |
| b | lue [1] 1080/21                             | 1062/12 1062/15<br>1062/17 1062/19       | 1158/20<br>  <b>bond [1]</b> 1101/11     | 1206/9 1207/8 1208/10<br>  1213/1               | Calgary [1] 1087/14                       |
|   | oard [265] 930/13                           | 1065/1 1067/8 1067/12                    | bondholders [1]                          | bring [8] 943/21                                | call [48] 941/19 941/20                   |
|   | 931/11 934/22 935/13                        | 1068/14 1070/11                          | 1100/1                                   | 954/19 956/4 1023/23                            | 942/18 943/20 953/17                      |
|   | 936/2 936/6 936/6                           |  | bonds [2] 1100/2                         | 1165/1 1165/5 1165/7                            | 961/9 964/21 968/6                        |
|   | 936/8 936/12 936/16<br>936/20 939/11 939/20 | 1072/13 1072/21                          | 1100/6                                   | 1167/3  | 969/20 984/20 998/21                      |
|   | 939/22 940/19 941/22                        | 1072/23 1073/1                           | bonus [2] 1083/20                        | bring-down [4] 1165/1                           | 999/1 999/3 999/9                         |
|   | 942/4 942/9 943/15                          | 1073/12 1073/18                          | 1190/23                                  | 1165/5 1165/7 1167/3                            | 1000/14 1000/15                           |
|   | 943/22 944/3 944/9                          | 1074/1 1074/11                           | book [8] 978/4 1001/21                   |   | 1001/12 1001/21                           |
| Ç | 944/15 944/16 944/23                        | 1074/13 1074/19                          | 1163/10 1163/12                          | 1060/7  | 1002/3 1008/5 1008/7                      |
| 9 | 945/2 947/6 947/8                           | 1074/23 1075/3<br>1076/20 1076/20        | 1163/14 1164/2 1165/2<br>1165/20         | broach [1] 1053/8<br>broached [1] 1029/15       | 1011/22 1021/5 1047/9<br>1053/17 1059/20  |
|   | 947/9 947/18 947/22                         | 1079/17 1079/22                          | booked [1] 1168/18                       | broad [1] 993/14                                | 1079/1 1079/14                            |
|   | 947/23 948/2 948/7                          | 1079/24 1080/2 1080/9                    | borrow [2] 1172/17                       | brought [3] 993/17                              | 1079/15 1087/1                            |
|   | 949/20 949/23 950/2                         | 1080/10 1080/19                          | 1174/11                                  | 1034/9 1197/23                                  | 1095/19 1095/23                           |
|   | 950/24 951/8 951/8<br>951/21 952/3 952/10   | 1080/20 1080/21                          | both [14] 992/24                         | <b>Brown [2]</b> 928/16                         | 1135/11 1135/23                           |
|   | 953/11 955/7 955/12                         | 1080/24 1081/3                           | 1000/13 1060/20                          | 954/12  | 1142/10 1149/8                            |
|   | 956/14 958/3 958/6                          | 1082/12 1082/24                          | 1065/12 1094/1                           | <b>BS</b> [1] 1193/15                           | 1151/24 1152/2 1152/3                     |
|   | 959/16 961/14 962/19                        | 1085/5 1085/11                           | 1108/22 1112/3                           | <b>bsolutely [1]</b> 1108/6                     | 1165/1 1165/6 1165/7                      |
| 9 | 968/23 969/5 969/5                          | 1085/12 1092/9 1095/1<br>1096/13 1096/17 | 1118/11 1136/18<br>1187/15 1201/6 1206/5 | bubble' [1] 935/1                               | 1171/23 1182/12                           |
|   | 970/23 971/2 971/9                          | 1108/15 1109/3 1109/4                    | 1206/7 1209/17                           | <b>bucket [3]</b> 1100/3 1100/4 1100/4          | 1182/21 1188/17<br>1188/18 1192/11        |
|   | 976/5 976/13 976/16                         | 1109/9 1110/7 1110/9                     | bottom [38] 941/21                       | bucks [2] 1119/15                               | called [13] 930/2                         |
|   | 976/18 981/15 981/24<br>982/5 982/8 982/9   | 1110/10 1111/8                           | 942/4 948/4 948/6                        | 1119/15   | 959/16 1001/7 1090/11                     |
|   | 982/9 982/13 983/18                         | 1112/21 1113/20                          | 963/15 968/7 978/15                      | <b>buddy [1]</b> 976/1                          | 1092/14 1097/21                           |
|   | 984/1 985/20 986/8                          | 1115/14 1115/20                          | 990/7 997/14 1005/5                      | budget [4] 998/3                                | 1098/4 1100/4 1107/4                      |
|   | 986/17 986/21 988/15                        | 1118/2 1122/6 1122/17                    | 1007/18 1009/12                          | 1173/24 1174/1 1174/8                           |   |
| 9 | 991/8 991/10 991/12                         | 1122/18 1127/7<br>1127/15 1129/7 1130/2  | 1009/15 1010/19<br>  1010/21 1043/10     | budgets [1] 1174/5<br>  build [2] 1100/8 1173/7 | 1164/16 1175/10<br>calling [1] 1006/20    |
|   | 91/15 992/7 995/14                          | 1131/1 1131/21                           | 1043/15 1046/8 1047/2                    | building [4] 1135/8                             | calls [9] 953/19 999/3                    |
|   | 996/4 996/12 996/20                         | 1131/21 1132/21                          | 1053/22 1060/13                          | 1171/19 1171/22                                 | 1000/7 1001/1 1042/8                      |
|   | 997/2 997/3 997/5<br>  004/9 1004/10        | 1132/24 1137/11                          | 1060/14 1063/15                          | 1174/18   | 1095/21 1095/21                           |
|   | 004/15 1004/18                              | 1137/18 1137/24                          | 1066/3 1074/16 1095/6                    |   | 1096/2 1188/13                            |
|   | 005/6 1006/4 1009/10                        | 1138/8 1138/24 1139/8                    | 1104/2 1106/19 1137/6                    | bulk [1] 987/2                                  | can't [20] 938/17                         |
| 1 | 012/23 1013/16                              | 1143/13 1143/20<br>1153/6 1154/11        | 1139/18 1152/24                          | <b>bullet [9]</b> 995/10                        | 945/14 945/16 962/24                      |
|   | 014/15 1014/19                              | 1154/20 1155/11                          | 1168/15 1188/22<br>1189/17 1195/18       | 996/15 1010/20 1046/8<br>1051/9 1051/16         | 1008/3 1020/23                            |
|   | 015/3 1015/9 1015/15                        | 1158/2 1170/13                           | 1198/3 1201/20 1213/4                    | 1097/10 1102/11                                 | 1027/11 1029/4                            |
|   | 022/1 1022/4 1022/11                        | 1170/23 1179/19                          | bottom-line [2]                          | 1124/2  | 1050/18 1052/20                           |
|   | 022/16 1022/23<br>023/22 1023/23            | 1179/24 1180/2 1180/7                    | 1201/20 1213/4                           | bullets [2] 1005/4                              | 1054/14 1054/22                           |
|   | 023/24 1025/1 1025/6                        | 1180/9 1181/4 1183/1                     | bought [7] 1035/24                       | 1005/9  | 1056/13 1060/11                           |
|   | 025/13 1027/20                              | 1186/12                                  | 1113/4 1114/8 1115/24                    | bullish [1] 984/8                               | 1062/20 1099/8                            |
| 1 | 030/2 1030/6 1031/5                         | <b>board's [2]</b> 1075/10               | 1129/19 1130/3<br>  1213/12              | <b>business [15]</b> 951/15 956/11 984/8 989/19 | 1150/24                                   |
|   | 033/16 1033/23                              | 1154/14<br><b>boards [3]</b> 981/18      | box [2] 1093/20                          | 1034/11 1100/13                                 | <b>Canada [6]</b> 1059/20 1059/22 1097/11 |
|   | 034/4 1034/5 1034/7                         | 981/21 987/7                             | 1093/21                                  | 1100/15 1171/5 1171/9                           |   |
|   | 039/18 1039/20                              | <b>Bob [39]</b> 935/10                   | brand [1] 981/3                          | 1193/3 1194/22                                  | 1099/16                                   |
|   | 040/17 1040/20<br>041/2 1041/4 1042/24      | 935/23 936/22 939/5                      | breach [2] 1077/13                       | 1204/16 1204/20                                 | Canadian [8] 1060/20                      |
|   | 043/1 1044/2 1044/8                         | 944/7 948/9 953/10                       | 1081/21                                  | 1205/16 1213/7                                  | 1061/8 1100/22 1103/3                     |
|   | 044/13 1044/13                              | 953/16 954/4 955/21                      | break [9] 956/1 957/5                    | C   | 1107/6 1113/1 1116/17                     |
|   | 044/16 1044/20                              | 964/7 964/7 964/8                        | 1003/8 1058/6 1068/18                    | calculate [2] 1197/1                            | 1117/6                                    |
|   | 045/17 1046/21                              | 968/6 975/4 975/18<br>1002/7 1006/23     | 1069/18 1076/15<br>1076/19 1144/1        | 1206/10   | cancel [1] 1168/20<br>candid [1] 1012/4   |
|   | 047/5 1048/23                               | 1016/10 1040/6 1040/9                    | breakup [1] 965/9                        | calculated [2] 1209/2                           | Candidate [1] 933/20                      |
|   | 048/23 1049/14                              | 1054/11 1065/12                          | BRENDAN [1] 928/2                        | 1211/10   | candidates [1] 934/1                      |
|   | 050/6 1050/10<br>  050/11 1052/3            | 1143/12 1143/18                          | Brendon [1] 1121/18                      | calculation [14] 1202/3                         | cap [1] 1199/19                           |
|   | 053/20 1053/22                              | 1147/14 1147/19                          | BRIAN [1] 928/15                         | 1203/14 1205/20                                 | capability [1] 1014/22                    |
|   | 053/23 1053/24                              | 1149/21 1151/18                          | bridging [1] 1128/7                      | 1206/11 1206/13                                 | capacity [4] 977/23                       |
|   | 054/1 1055/13                               | 1151/19 1152/5<br>1152/12 1152/24        | brief [4] 929/5 998/22<br>1049/10 1058/2 | 1206/20 1207/9<br>  1207/19 1209/5              | 980/23 1172/21<br>1188/14                 |
|   | 055/18 1056/7 1056/7                        | 1153/9 1181/6 1182/7                     | briefly [16] 988/19                      | 1207/19 1209/5                                  | capex [1] 1174/8                          |
| 1 | 056/10 1056/16                              | 1100/0 1101/0 1102/1                     |  | 1200, 11 1200, 10                               | ouper[i] II/4/0                           |
|   |   |  |  |   |   |

| С  | 1126/14 1126/18                    | 1038/11 1044/15                                   | Chris [1] 1153/9                                | coerce [1] 1080/2                          |
|--|------------------------------------|---|---|--|
| capital [39] 985/4                       | 1127/8 1127/22                     | 1047/20 1052/4                                    | Christine [1] 953/18                            | coercion [1] 1079/23                       |
| 1087/24 1091/5 1091/7                    | 1127/23 1128/7 1128/7              | 1054/19 1059/2                                    | CHRISTOPHER [2]                                 | cold [1] 957/6                             |
| 1091/9 1092/7 1098/7                     | 1128/13 1130/9                     | 1062/22 1076/11                                   | 928/6 936/19                                    | Collateral [1] 1100/24                     |
| 1098/18 1098/22                          | 1130/16 1130/20                    | 1079/16 1080/12                                   | chuck [1] 934/18                                | colleague [1] 960/7                        |
| 1105/5 1105/8 1105/15                    | 1131/23 1132/8                     | 1080/12 1081/18                                   | circa [1] 1065/10                               | colleagues [2] 939/16                      |
| 1108/1 1139/21                           | 1173/24 1174/19                    | 1084/13 1100/5                                    | circle [2] 962/13                               | 1121/21                                    |
| 1140/15 1148/7                           | 1182/13 1189/1                     | 1197/17 1211/17                                   | 1152/1  | collective [4] 946/5                       |
| 1167/17 1174/6 1174/9                    | 1190/21 1197/7                     | certainty [1] 1058/22                             | circling [2] 1016/5                             | 946/11 991/12 991/20                       |
| 1189/4 1206/8 1206/16                    | 1197/13 1200/4 1200/4              |   | 1153/8  | College [1] 1149/19                        |
| 1206/19 1206/21                          | 1200/20 1201/1 1201/2              |   | circuit [1] 1030/14                             | color [1] 941/2                            |
| 1207/4 1207/5 1207/6                     | 1202/17 1204/3                     | <b>CFO [7]</b> 987/5 1018/8                       | circumstances [2]                               | COLUMBIA [118]                             |
| 1207/9 1207/10                           | 1205/24 1206/6                     | 1088/3 1088/6 1134/13                             | 988/8 1160/23                                   | 927/3 931/1 932/17                         |
| 1207/16 1208/12                          | 1206/10 1206/12                    | 1188/12 1188/14                                   | Civil [1] 927/3                                 | 940/4 940/19 952/6                         |
| 1208/13 1208/24                          | 1206/14 1206/22                    | chain [2] 1104/2                                  | clandestine [1] 1032/2                          |  |
| 1210/6 1211/20 1213/6                    | 1209/2 1209/10                     | 1150/21   | clarify [2] 1131/7                              | 956/22 958/14 961/6                        |
| 1213/15 1213/19                          | 1209/19 1209/20                    | <b>chair [3]</b> 981/6 982/9                      | 1198/10   | 962/21 967/20 969/1                        |
| 1213/20                                  | 1209/22 1209/23                    | 987/12  | clarity [1] 1211/9                              | 969/5 973/13 974/4                         |
| capitalization [1]                       | Casting [1] 1194/8                 | chairman [10] 933/12                              | Clark [5] 1111/12                               | 976/10 977/24 980/19                       |
| 1209/11                                  | casual [2] 998/23                  | 977/23 982/7 982/17                               | 1111/23 1116/10<br>1117/16 1118/2               | 980/21 980/23 981/2                        |
| capitalized [3] 1207/11                  | 999/2                              | 988/14 988/23 988/24                              |   | 981/5 981/6 981/7                          |
| 1209/18 1209/21                          | cat [1] 1045/21                    | 990/23 990/23 1162/1                              | class [4] 1082/9                                | 981/8 981/10 985/21<br>988/9 992/24 994/20 |
| capitalizing [1]                         | categorically [1]                  | challenge [1] 1009/17                             | 1202/8 1203/1 1213/24                           | 1001/23 1006/7 1009/1                      |
| 1209/10                                  | 1058/8<br>  categories [2] 1195/11 | <b>challenges [4]</b> 991/6 1113/19 1114/4        | cleanest [1] 1120/14<br>clear [15] 943/10 947/7 |  |
| Capricorn [15] 955/22                    | 1204/14                            | 1131/19 1114/4                                    | 955/23 967/15 980/3                             | 1014/3 1014/15                             |
| 958/6 961/14 961/16                      | category [1] 1195/13               | challenging [3] 931/2                             | 1021/13 1025/21                                 | 1020/8 1023/17                             |
| 962/16 1062/4 1070/9                     | cause [1] 1146/1                   | 931/24 984/6                                      | 1027/3 1056/9 1056/24                           | 1028/18 1029/12                            |
| 1085/19 1086/7                           | cautious [2] 1038/19               | chance [3] 943/22                                 | 1084/14 1119/13                                 | 1036/12 1039/2                             |
| 1095/11 1104/7                           | 1083/23                            | 977/15 1159/24                                    | 1140/5 1154/13 1176/4                           | 1042/14 1062/16                            |
| 1109/10 1112/21                          | cc [1] 1037/19                     | Chancellor [1] 927/13                             | clear-cut [1] 1025/21                           | 1088/13 1089/6 1089/8                      |
| 1113/16 1145/18                          | celebrate [1] 1149/12              | CHANCERY [4] 927/1                                | clearly [5] 941/8                               | 1089/23 1090/18                            |
| Capricorn's [2] 1070/7                   | Center [2] 927/9                   | 927/9 927/22 1194/2                               | 1046/21 1054/24                                 | 1091/15 1091/23                            |
| 1112/20                                  | 927/22                             | change [2] 1134/16                                | 1199/15 1200/9                                  | 1105/2 1105/23 1106/5                      |
| card [1] 1147/20                         | centered [1] 993/12                | 1203/19   | clerks [1] 1069/7                               | 1119/19 1122/2                             |
| career [2] 987/2 987/2                   | Central [1] 949/5                  | changed [2] 984/19                                | clip [6] 1138/3 1138/5                          | 1126/19 1126/24                            |
| cares [1] 1207/15                        | cents [2] 976/21                   | 984/21  | 1138/6 1139/10 1158/7                           | 1127/3 1127/24 1129/8                      |
| <b>carry [2]</b> 944/11 1168/19          | 1106/7                             | changes [2] 1103/13                               | 1159/4  | 1131/22 1134/13                            |
| case [21] 1015/21                        | <b>CEO [46]</b> 933/2 933/9        | 1206/20   | clip 13 [1] 1138/5                              | 1134/17 1135/24                            |
| 1015/21 1061/22                          | 933/12 933/16 933/21               | charged [1] 995/20                                | clock [1] 930/9                                 | 1141/14 1141/21                            |
| 1101/16 1102/5                           | 935/10 941/5 955/20                | charges [1] 1081/23                               | close [12] 940/24                               | 1148/5 1155/1 1157/15                      |
| 1103/16 1107/1                           | 960/23 961/6 977/23                | <b>Charm [1]</b> 1018/19                          | 956/11 1079/14                                  | 1158/11 1162/14                            |
| 1107/17 1107/19                          | 981/5 986/5 987/12                 | chart [5] 989/5 989/7                             | 1079/15 1086/14                                 | 1162/21 1166/7                             |
| 1116/20 1126/18                          | 988/14 988/23 990/8                | 989/13 1125/23 1198/2                             | 1089/7 1103/6 1103/10                           | 1166/19 1167/14                            |
| 1128/13 1128/19                          | 990/23 991/3 991/5                 | charter [1] 1087/14                               | 1103/12 1165/5 1190/5                           | 1168/1 1168/18                             |
| 1143/2 1187/11                           | 991/16 998/15 998/21               | charterholder [1]                                 | 1198/22   | 1168/20 1170/19                            |
| 1194/14 1194/17                          | 1000/2 1000/3 1006/15              | 1087/15   | closed [3] 1009/5                               | 1171/3 1171/21 1172/3                      |
| 1196/12 1206/1                           | 1007/22 1013/14                    | chasing [1] 1073/15                               | 1026/7 1173/5                                   | 1172/5 1172/20 1173/7<br>  1173/10 1173/12 |
| 1207/11 1209/7                           | 1016/12 1016/16<br>1016/20 1017/22 | chat [1] 1152/8                                   | closely [2] 989/24<br>989/24                    | 1173/10 1173/12                            |
| cases [5] 1102/20                        | 1020/17 1023/3 1024/8              | <b>cheap [1]</b> 1098/6 <b>cheaply [1]</b> 1115/9 | closer [1] 1009/23                              | 1179/19 1179/24                            |
| 1123/14 1126/2 1194/5                    | 1020/17 1023/3 1024/8              | check [5] 974/20                                  | closes [2] 975/8                                | 1180/7 1180/14                             |
| 1194/6                                   | 1036/7 1039/17 1042/8              | 1084/18 1086/4                                    | 1103/7  | 1180/17 1180/19                            |
| cash [75] 948/15                         | 1042/16 1056/20                    | 1210/17 1210/17                                   | closing [10] 1060/18                            | 1182/3 1184/13                             |
| 949/12 950/10 950/15                     | 1076/3 1076/18                     | checking [1] 1104/19                              | 1165/9 1197/15                                  | 1186/21 1191/7                             |
| 958/5 971/12 973/19                      | 1084/15 1162/7                     | cheek [1] 1191/23                                 | 1197/22 1198/5                                  | 1203/19 1204/1 1204/3                      |
| 973/21 974/6 976/7                       | CEOs [1] 983/20                    | Chicago [2] 1001/17                               | 1198/13 1198/22                                 | 1204/16 1204/20                            |
| 976/11 1015/16 1016/2                    | certain [6] 971/5                  | 1192/24   | 1200/3 1212/17 1213/2                           | 1205/3 1207/23 1208/2                      |
| 1017/9 1017/16 1024/7<br>1024/22 1042/19 | 990/18 1072/22 1103/5              | chief [6] 958/22 960/7                            | closure [1] 956/4                               | 1208/7 1210/15                             |
| 1024/22 1042/19                          | 1109/23 1113/3                     | 965/24 966/2 1088/2                               | cloud [2] 981/22                                | 1210/20 1210/24                            |
| 1064/8 1075/21 1077/4                    | certainly [31] 938/9               | 1088/18   | 1210/9  | 1212/3                                     |
| 1078/5 1082/1 1088/23                    | 938/18 942/22 943/18               | choice [2] 1099/22                                | clue [1] 957/1                                  | Columbia's [11] 992/1                      |
| 1089/19 1089/20                          | 945/21 945/24 948/24               | 1100/7  | cluster [1] 960/3                               | 1031/20 1077/12                            |
| 1099/4 1098/7 1099/14                    |                                    | -b [4] 100E/10                                    | cobble [1] 1017/14                              | 1104/10 1115/1                             |
|  | 956/19 963/1 987/15                | choose [1] 1205/12                                |   |  |
|  | 1003/5 1012/8 1013/4               | chose [2] 1204/7                                  | cocktail [1] 1151/6                             | 1122/17 1138/8 1171/5                      |
| 1120/22 1126/2                           |                                    |   |   | 1122/17 1138/8 1171/5                      |
|  | 1003/5 1012/8 1013/4               | chose [2] 1204/7                                  | cocktail [1] 1151/6                             |  |

| С  | 1038/5 1140/7 1142/22                          |   | confident [4] 946/4                      | 994/18 996/10 1033/5                    |
|--|--|---|--|---|
| column [3] 997/2                           | 1199/13 1199/13                                | <b>completion</b> [1] 956/10            | 954/11 959/15 1148/13                    | 1034/11 1035/18                         |
| 1197/12 1203/2                             | 1199/14 1199/16                                | complex [3] 984/23                      | confidential [6] 1006/6                  | 1036/11 1046/3                          |
| combination [2]                            | 1199/19 1199/20                                | 1139/20 1140/14                         | 1018/10 1020/8                           | 1047/23 1057/2                          |
| 1018/23 1070/18                            | 1200/9 1201/11                                 | complexity [1] 1019/9                   | 1146/13 1146/24<br>1147/10               | 1065/23 1072/15<br>1075/7               |
| comes [2] 1046/14                          | <b>company [80]</b> 931/18 950/7 968/10 981/17 | component [11]<br>952/10 973/22 1119/19 | confirm [1] 1121/7                       | considered [9] 934/1                    |
| 1165/4                                     | 981/17 982/7 983/15                            | 1120/5 1120/6 1120/11                   | confirmation [1]                         | 1015/19 1016/2                          |
| comfort [2] 951/1                          | 984/3 984/5 984/7                              | 1121/10 1197/14                         | 1068/17                                  | 1074/24 1106/1 1125/8                   |
| 1117/23                                    | 984/9 984/16 986/16                            | 1197/23 1198/6                          | confirmatory [2]                         | 1128/19 1199/6                          |
| comfortable [5] 996/23                     | 987/11 994/4 994/15                            | 1202/19                                 | 1151/4 1167/3                            | 1206/19                                 |
| 1038/21 1117/12                            | 994/16 994/23 995/15                           | components [4]                          | confirmed [3] 955/22                     | considering [8] 974/5                   |
| 1121/1 1199/21                             | 995/23 996/3 998/10                            | 1204/6 1207/13 1208/9                   | 1049/12 1170/12                          | 983/23 994/13 1012/5                    |
| <b>coming [5]</b> 985/9<br>1071/10 1071/20 | 998/16 999/17 999/21                           | 1208/21                                 | confirming [1] 947/4                     | 1047/8 1053/2 1128/6                    |
| 1162/9 1211/5                              | 1001/22 1009/21                                | composed [1] 950/9                      | conflict [1] 1166/20                     | 1200/2                                  |
| commencing [1]                             |  | compromise [1]                          | Conflicts [1] 1164/8                     | consisted [1] 1209/12                   |
| 951/13                                     | 1028/9 1046/5 1073/20                          |   | confused [4] 939/5                       | consistent [4] 975/2                    |
| comment [7] 943/22                         | 1074/3 1079/16 1082/8                          |   | 1037/16 1120/3                           | 1023/1 1116/9 1208/6                    |
| 977/15 1024/18                             |  | conceive [1] 1028/8                     | 1155/10                                  | consisting [1] 958/5                    |
| 1024/20 1105/17                            | 1097/14 1098/1 1099/6                          |   | confusing [1] 1043/14                    | consists [1] 1207/7                     |
| 1159/24 1190/4                             | 1099/19 1099/21                                | 1193/16                                 | congratulate [1]                         | CONSOLIDATED [1]                        |
| commentary [1]                             | 1100/14 1103/8 1105/6<br>1105/19 1135/12       |   | 1135/10                                  | 927/3                                   |
| 1001/22                                    | 1135/18 1137/19                                | concern [2] 1032/9<br>1101/8            | congratulates [1]<br>999/4               | <b>constantly [2]</b> 975/3 975/14      |
| comments [4] 954/7                         |  | concerned [3] 1073/12                   |  | Constellation [6]                       |
| 977/22 1107/22 1108/6                      | 1146/19 1147/1 1147/9                          |   | 1021/1 1188/5                            | 955/14 955/23 971/4                     |
| <b>commerce</b> [1] 1087/13                | 1147/10 1156/4                                 | concerning [1] 1127/7                   | Congratulations [1]                      | 1095/5 1096/13                          |
| commercial [10]                            | 1158/21 1159/2                                 | concerns [1] 1077/21                    | 1000/9                                   | 1112/16                                 |
| 1097/11 1097/14                            | 1169/22 1170/2                                 | concluded [7] 951/9                     | connection [8] 1020/6                    | constrained [2]                         |
| 1097/18 1097/22<br>1097/23 1098/5          | 1172/12 1177/17                                | 1003/4 1073/2 1074/20                   | 1089/22 1091/14                          | 1109/16 1109/17                         |
| 1099/10 1099/13                            | 1177/22 1177/24                                | 1153/10 1208/23                         | 1091/22 1146/5                           | constraints [2] 1099/1                  |
| 1161/3 1167/6                              | 1179/4 1186/10                                 | 1210/24                                 | 1161/12 1186/22                          | 1105/14                                 |
| commit [1] 967/7                           |  | conclusion [10] 954/9                   | 1193/10                                  | constructive [1]                        |
| commitment [7]                             | 1194/11 1194/12                                | 954/19 1045/3 1154/15                   | Conoco [3] 987/3                         | 934/11                                  |
| 972/21 1066/5 1066/11                      | 1194/14 1194/15                                | 1200/18 1201/12                         | 987/6 987/8                              | CONT'D [1] 930/4                        |
| 1117/22 1121/7 1151/7                      | 1194/18 1206/4<br>1208/18 1213/13              | 1201/20 1210/18<br>1212/10 1213/4       | cons [1] 1044/15                         | contact [4] 966/4 999/2 1000/6 1175/9   |
| 1189/6                                     | company's [2] 1048/6                           | concurred [2] 1107/22                   | consensus [4] 1015/9<br>1137/12 1137/18  | contacted [5] 965/24                    |
| <b>committed</b> [1] 956/9                 | 1074/21  | 1108/5                                  | 1138/18                                  | 967/20 999/13 1084/15                   |
| <b>committee [3]</b> 957/20                | comparing [5] 1046/15                          |   | consensus was [1]                        | 1180/16                                 |
| 958/2 958/9                                | 1085/17 1200/5 1200/6                          | conditional [3] 940/18                  | 1137/18                                  | contacts [1] 1080/22                    |
| common [11] 950/9                          | 1210/19  | 1059/5 1075/23                          | conservative [2]                         | <b>contained [1]</b> 1006/13            |
| 950/16 985/4 1032/3<br>1103/7 1105/12      | comparison [4] 996/5                           | conditioned [3] 947/23                  |  | contains [1] 1195/20                    |
| 1109/11 1117/6                             | 1200/1 1200/4 1211/9                           | 948/2 1112/24                           | consider [11] 947/9                      | contemplate [2]                         |
| 1162/20 1206/14                            | <b>Compelling [1]</b> 1047/3                   | <b>conditions</b> [17] 931/1            | 982/21 1010/22 1011/3                    | 1093/24 1186/6                          |
| 1212/7                                     | <b>compete [1]</b> 1075/15                     | 931/2 931/24 1008/23                    | 1023/3 1043/2 1056/15                    | contemplated [6]                        |
| <b>commonly [2]</b> 1087/15                | competition [5]                                | 1012/2 1012/21                          | 1057/5 1074/5 1107/11                    | 950/13 1110/11                          |
| 1204/23                                    | 1139/19 1141/7 1141/7                          |   | 1184/22                                  | 1117/24 1118/1 1118/3                   |
| communicate [3]                            | 1141/10 1179/8                                 | 1021/9 1031/2 1033/17                   | considerable [1]                         | 1121/9                                  |
| 967/5 1026/12 1113/16                      | competitive [2]                                | 1098/20 1103/5                          | 1000/13                                  | contemplates [1]                        |
| communicated [3]                           | 1074/22 1178/21   compilation [1] 979/16       | 1103/11 1109/23<br>  1113/17            | consideration [29]<br>947/7 950/8 973/21 | contemplating [3]                       |
| 1021/7 1053/7 1056/1                       | compiled [1] 1004/10                           | conduct [1] 995/21                      | 1015/17 1015/17                          | 983/11 1110/16                          |
| communicating [5]                          | complaint [1] 1081/16                          | confer [2] 1013/15                      | 1035/22 1074/12                          | 1112/10                                 |
| 1055/20 1055/22                            | complementary [1]                              | 1040/10                                 | 1075/22 1086/7                           | context [5] 938/5                       |
| 1080/24 1081/3                             | 1000/11  | conference [6]                          | 1086/10 1109/12                          | 1039/9 1066/16                          |
| 1154/10 communication [4]                  | complete [3] 934/23                            | 1168/19 1168/24                         | 1109/14 1109/22                          | 1142/17 1142/20                         |
| 968/5 1001/3 1010/17                       | 1008/2 1063/2                                  | 1169/1 1169/1 1169/12                   | 1109/24 1112/23                          | contingent [1] 1103/4                   |
| 1056/14                                    | completed [3] 1063/6                           | 1169/18                                 | 1126/23 1127/3 1127/6                    | continual [1] 1022/3                    |
| communications [3]                         | 1078/8 1152/2                                  | conferred [2] 929/7                     | 1129/8 1129/14                           | continue [18] 951/8                     |
| 1022/11 1022/12                            | completely [5] 1009/6                          | 929/15                                  | 1129/17 1132/19                          | 951/11 952/18 955/22                    |
| 1080/18                                    | 1033/15 1050/9                                 | conferring [1] 1075/8                   | 1133/2 1133/5 1197/6                     | 980/22 990/24 1015/24                   |
| communiqué [2]                             | 1083/20 1190/24                                | confidence [6]<br>1116/15 1116/17       | 1200/15 1200/19<br>1200/23 1201/15       | 1033/4 1033/8 1047/13<br>1063/7 1095/11 |
| 967/14 1004/9                              | completeness [1] 1073/9                        | 1116/13 1116/17                         | considerations [15]                      | 1106/20 1135/12                         |
| companies [15] 969/10                      | completing [4] 963/5                           | 1119/6 1147/21                          | 955/24 971/6 988/3                       | 1135/18 1136/1                          |
| 1016/1 1020/9 1026/22                      | John Procuring [4] 000/0                       |   | 333/2 : 37 1/3 330/0                     | . 100, 10 1 100, 1                      |
| 1  |  | 1                                       |  | 1                                       |

1124/14 1125/22 C 986/22 986/24 988/5 courses [1] 1025/24 D 988/7 1000/23 1001/4 1134/13 1135/3 1135/6 Courtroom [1] 927/9 continue... [2] 1190/23 damages [20] 1193/6 1007/12 1007/19 1136/2 1136/3 1136/16 **cover [3]** 986/8 986/10 1210/1 1193/19 1194/22 1013/7 1013/12 1136/20 1141/21 1040/21 continued [5] 965/14 1195/11 1195/12 1013/18 1023/5 1023/9 1143/16 1146/6 1148/8 covered [1] 929/14 981/12 981/13 1028/12 1195/14 1196/8 1030/7 1033/10 1148/21 1150/6 covering [1] 1091/19 1196/11 1197/1 1076/13 1150/14 1151/10 1034/21 1035/2 **CPG [8]** 947/8 947/9 continues [4] 956/7 1197/22 1199/12 1041/11 1055/15 1152/19 1153/16 1045/23 1200/22 987/1 1113/11 1189/18 1200/10 1201/20 1055/19 1081/4 1153/20 1155/18 1207/18 1211/2 continuing [1] 1076/17 1203/2 1203/14 Cornelius' [1] 1056/3 1155/21 1156/11 1211/13 1212/20 continuity [1] 989/17 1203/16 1208/9 Cornelius's [1] 937/6 1156/19 1157/6 **CPG's [1]** 1188/23 1212/11 1213/4 contract [1] 1076/14 Corp [3] 1172/11 1157/17 1163/2 **CPPL [2]** 1189/17 contracts [3] 1100/10 1213/24 1175/22 1184/2 1173/9 1173/11 1189/17 1101/3 1148/6 **Danfoss [1]** 1194/15 corporate [9] 995/2 1185/11 1188/14 crashed [1] 984/22 contrary [1] 1077/9 dare [5] 1049/14 1004/24 1084/15 1189/9 1189/14 1190/9 **create [1]** 1174/15 contributed [1] 1213/7 1050/6 1052/3 1170/13 1089/12 1089/17 1198/19 1203/12 created [1] 1174/13 contribution [2] 1170/23 1089/18 1090/1 1090/2 correction [1] 944/24 credibility [1] 1179/1 1213/19 1213/20 dark [1] 1024/19 1184/12 credible [3] 1015/14 correspondence [1] data [2] 1175/14 contributions [2] corporation [3] 928/17 1131/17 1029/2 1082/9 1212/18 1213/3 1207/22 987/5 1194/9 cost [27] 937/22 985/4 credit [35] 1057/2 control [5] 954/11 date [37] 938/17 1091/9 1092/7 1098/15 correct [161] 931/13 1059/16 1061/10 948/19 949/18 950/17 1134/16 1163/16 931/17 931/21 932/11 1098/17 1099/15 1068/11 1070/8 1163/17 1163/18 962/24 975/15 980/21 1099/17 1099/20 1070/22 1089/2 932/15 932/16 932/18 convene [3] 944/22 1009/11 1023/24 932/19 932/22 933/4 1172/3 1174/7 1174/17 1090/16 1090/19 1029/4 1052/20 1060/7 944/23 976/16 933/13 933/17 933/18 1206/8 1207/4 1207/5 1091/4 1091/11 convening [1] 943/6 1070/11 1072/5 933/21 933/22 934/15 1207/5 1207/9 1207/10 1092/10 1095/8 conversation [15] 1085/21 1086/11 934/16 935/16 936/9 1207/19 1207/21 1095/16 1097/1 934/19 940/13 1013/13 1086/13 1086/13 937/5 937/13 939/17 1208/11 1208/15 1099/12 1100/12 1023/2 1043/24 1044/3 1126/22 1185/21 1101/2 1101/3 1102/19 940/1 940/5 940/21 1208/17 1208/20 1186/5 1197/15 1053/18 1054/8 941/2 943/17 944/4 1208/21 1208/24 1106/9 1113/2 1125/4 1072/23 1135/17 1197/19 1197/19 945/5 945/13 946/2 1211/20 1125/7 1125/12 1140/1 1140/9 1141/5 1197/22 1198/1 946/13 946/14 949/10 costs [2] 1091/10 1125/15 1163/8 1141/12 1142/2 1198/22 1199/2 1199/5 951/6 951/7 951/19 1099/17 1164/19 1174/23 conversations [2] 1203/21 1203/22 952/4 952/5 952/11 1189/5 1189/7 1189/10 counsel's [2] 1028/17 1204/7 1204/8 1204/9 955/19 971/17 952/12 952/17 952/19 1076/4 1189/19 1205/9 1208/5 **converse [1]** 1086/15 1204/13 1213/14 952/21 953/4 953/5 counted [1] 1080/22 credit-rating-wise [1] 1213/16 convert [1] 1103/7 954/22 956/5 961/21 1174/23 **counter [2]** 1079/17 convey [3] 1054/3 dated [20] 992/10 961/24 962/2 963/6 1109/9 cribbing [1] 979/21 995/4 1000/22 1002/8 1065/11 1177/19 963/7 963/13 963/16 countering [1] 949/13 critical [4] 956/3 1007/15 1009/11 conveyed [8] 1056/11 963/17 963/20 963/21 counteroffer [8] 956/10 972/10 1061/14 1085/11 1085/12 1010/12 1013/8 1018/3 965/10 967/3 967/9 948/15 952/9 952/11 Cromwell [4] 1006/18 1112/19 1117/21 1023/5 1040/3 1040/7 967/13 967/17 968/21 952/15 956/17 958/15 1031/24 1065/5 1177/2 1179/5 1182/13 1064/24 1066/2 968/22 969/10 971/13 976/14 1079/18 1166/18 conveying [3] 1044/7 1070/10 1085/9 971/14 971/15 971/16 counterpart [1] 1181/6 Cromwell's [1] 1187/1 1118/12 1177/11 1106/22 1168/6 1184/1 974/7 977/6 977/11 **cross [5]** 979/15 counterparties [1] conviction [1] 1120/9 1185/10 977/14 977/17 977/21 1006/9 980/10 1121/15 **convince [2]** 1027/18 dates [11] 941/15 978/2 978/17 978/18 1160/14 1214/7 counterparts [1] 1080/10 946/20 993/7 993/9 990/15 992/12 992/20 1181/5 cross-demonstrative convinced [1] 1200/18 1183/20 1183/21 993/3 995/5 996/20 counterparty [4] **[1]** 979/15 1183/23 1184/22 COO [1] 987/9 997/11 997/14 998/2 1015/10 1015/14 CROSS-EXAMINATION Coolidge [4] 1124/3 1185/4 1185/19 1187/6 1002/14 1006/11 1099/22 1100/7 **[3]** 980/10 1121/15 1124/9 1128/20 daughter [1] 1149/18 1008/22 1009/7 counterproductive [1] 1160/14 1128/22 dawn [1] 1166/22 1009/13 1013/9 1053/10 crux [1] 1036/5 copied [4] 1051/6 day [35] 935/6 936/3 counterproposal [1] 1013/23 1018/5 1018/8 crystal [1] 1056/24 1093/3 1168/14 944/11 948/23 953/11 1023/7 1024/13 1030/1 956/22 curious [1] 1119/24 1179/17 953/12 953/19 953/20 1033/21 1036/9 couple [16] 954/10 **currency [6]** 1015/20 copy [8] 1061/24 955/14 965/20 975/17 1037/20 1037/24 1033/14 1071/17 1016/3 1036/3 1078/7 1000/18 1027/12 1092/22 1093/13 1040/4 1041/12 1048/4 1072/8 1102/18 1148/8 1100/17 1100/23 1094/24 1108/14 1059/8 1061/16 1055/11 1063/17 1174/24 1179/11 current [6] 934/22 1111/7 1127/14 1061/19 1065/10 1063/22 1067/10 1183/6 1186/19 968/11 1078/4 1088/1 1067/11 1088/23 1179/21 1067/14 1070/13 1192/14 1196/21 1203/21 1204/13 copying [1] 936/19 1088/23 1095/23 1071/8 1071/9 1072/3 1203/3 1204/6 1209/16 cut [4] 932/14 1011/1 core [1] 1032/1 1098/2 1098/7 1098/7 1073/16 1073/24 1211/15 1025/21 1126/10 1099/14 1099/14 Cornelius [31] 932/18 1083/2 1083/24 1084/2 course [6] 944/24 cuts [1] 1000/8 932/21 934/7 934/18 1104/23 1129/6 1084/10 1118/18 969/21 1038/3 1075/7 cycle [1] 1030/13 935/2 937/8 943/20 1149/20 1152/18 1121/11 1122/2 1075/16 1199/11 955/6 986/14 986/19 1157/24 1169/19

|   | D   | 1098/17 1099/2 1099/6                            | decline [5] 1049/14                                    | describe [9] 1079/11                               | 1211/15  |
|---|---|--|--|--|--|
|   | day [3] 1169/21                                   | 1099/8 1099/24                                   | 1050/6 1052/3 1170/14                                  | 1087/9 1087/16 1114/3                              | different [18] 986/11                            |
| ŀ | 1183/4 1214/6                                     | 1100/18 1102/21                                  | 1170/23  | 1194/4 1196/10                                     | 987/24 996/21 1000/15                            |
| ł | days [8] 954/10 958/3                             | 1102/24 1109/19                                  | decrease [1] 1130/3                                    | 1203/15 1210/13                                    | 1000/17 1017/7 1079/1                            |
| ł | 1018/4 1054/23                                    | 1125/9 1125/12                                   | deductible [1] 1208/19                                 | 1213/1   | 1085/24 1094/16                                  |
| ł | 1073/21 1075/4 1098/2                             | 1125/21 1126/1 1126/6<br>1126/14 1167/6          | <b>deep [2]</b> 983/20 1189/3 <b>deeply [4]</b> 932/14 | 1202/15  | 1097/20 1100/4<br>  1123/18 1157/8 1199/7        |
| ł | 1149/6  | 1172/19 1172/21                                  | 985/23 986/1 1073/12                                   | describes [2] 1177/13                              | 1199/16 1205/6                                   |
| ŀ | <b>DBRS</b> [10] 1090/22                          | 1174/21 1206/16                                  | defend [1] 942/2                                       | 1179/19  | 1205/10 1207/22                                  |
| ŀ | 1091/19 1094/9                                    | 1207/5 1207/19                                   | <b>Defendant [1]</b> 928/17                            |  | differently [2] 1126/3                           |
|   | 1095/23 1097/6<br>1097/16 1097/17                 | 1207/21 1207/24                                  | defendants [2] 929/17                                  | desire [1] 1185/15                                 | 1130/23  |
|   | 1101/17 1102/9                                    | 1208/1 1208/3 1208/16                            | 1196/20  | destroy [3] 1009/2                                 | difficult [8] 1140/11                            |
| ŀ | 1103/19   | 1208/17 1208/18                                  | defense [1] 1193/7                                     | 1012/10 1054/12                                    | 1142/7 1142/22                                   |
|   | DCF [13] 1083/21                                  | 1208/20 1208/23                                  | defer [3] 1025/16                                      | destroyed [1] 1039/22                              | 1142/23 1143/1                                   |
| ŀ | 1124/6 1191/1 1204/6                              | 1212/5   | 1027/18 1181/16  | detailed [3] 1001/19                               | 1157/23 1173/3 1179/2                            |
| ŀ | 1205/11 1205/12                                   | <b>debt-free</b> [1] 1206/16                     | <b>deferred [2]</b> 987/15                             | 1001/20 1001/21                                    | digest [2] 933/2 953/23                          |
|   | 1205/18 1205/20                                   | <b>December [28]</b> 930/17 936/7 1026/6 1028/15 | 988/10<br>definition [1] 1021/11                       | deteriorated [1]<br>1190/20                        | digesting [1] 1003/2<br>dil [1] 1070/8           |
|   | 1205/22 1206/10                                   | 1028/17 1030/11                                  | definitive [3] 1145/23                                 | determination [3]                                  | diligence [30] 951/14                            |
|   | 1210/18 1210/19                                   | 1030/12 1031/6                                   | 1176/4 1177/6  | 979/7 1107/17 1108/9                               | 956/2 956/10 1007/2                              |
|   | 1211/1  | 1034/21 1037/4 1045/9                            | <b>DEGNAN [1]</b> 928/9                                | determine [6] 971/19                               | 1039/12 1039/14                                  |
|   | dead [1] 1054/18                                  | 1105/13 1135/9                                   | degree [2] 932/13                                      | 971/24 1043/5 1089/18                              | 1039/15 1039/16                                  |
|   | <b>deal [69]</b> 946/6 946/12 948/1 949/16 951/18 | 1135/14 1135/23                                  | 1116/23  | 1090/3 1090/15                                     | 1040/12 1040/15                                  |
|   | 955/20 959/17 959/24                              | 1162/13 1168/6 1168/8                            | degrees [1] 1193/11                                    | <b>determined [2]</b> 950/24                       | 1042/19 1076/14                                  |
|   | 960/8 960/11 960/14                               | 1168/9 1173/13                                   | <b>DELAWARE [5]</b> 927/1                              | 1205/13  | 1078/7 1078/9 1146/10                            |
|   | 960/23 961/15 967/19                              | 1173/13 1175/20                                  | 927/10 927/23 979/16                                   | determining [2]                                    | 1146/13 1146/24                                  |
|   | 969/14 970/7 972/21                               | 1188/24 1189/2<br>1189/20 1203/23                | 1194/1   | 1198/14 1206/24                                    | 1147/9 1151/5 1157/17<br>1163/23 1165/1 1165/2   |
|   | 975/18 976/7 976/16                               | 1204/9 1204/11                                   | delay [1] 1184/9<br>delays [1] 1174/7                  | <b>develop [4]</b> 996/1 1005/12 1047/13           | 1165/6 1165/7 1165/13                            |
| ŀ | 978/24 979/4 985/10                               | <b>December 1 [2]</b> 936/7                      | deliberate [1] 1044/8                                  | 1207/12  | 1166/1 1166/14 1167/2                            |
| ŀ | 995/19 1028/5 1028/7                              | 1173/13  | deliberating [1] 947/3                                 | developed [7] 1010/3                               | 1167/3   |
|   | 1036/4 1046/9 1048/10<br>1051/13 1055/5 1061/2    | December 17 [2]                                  | deliberation [1] 1109/8                                |  | diligencing [1]                                  |
|   | 1062/5 1062/8 1064/1                              | 930/17 1045/9                                    | deliberations [2]                                      | 1206/13 1208/13                                    | 1164/23  |
|   | 1064/10 1064/11                                   | December 2015 [4]                                | 1004/12 1035/16  | 1208/17  | diligent [1] 1146/18                             |
|   | 1064/14 1070/12                                   | 1028/15 1135/9                                   |  | developing [6]                                     | diluted [2] 1016/24                              |
|   | 1082/1 1108/9 1113/4                              | 1162/13 1175/20                                  | <b>deliver [2]</b> 970/3 1181/2                        | 1065/23 1200/8<br>1200/10 1205/23                  | 1028/10  |
|   | 1114/8 1115/24 1118/7                             | <b>December 2021 [1]</b> 1204/11                 | delivered [3] 942/6                                    | 1206/4 1209/8                                      | <b>dilution [6]</b> 1027/1 1061/4 1061/6 1115/11 |
|   | 1129/19 1130/3                                    | December 2nd [1]                                 | 942/14 942/21  | development [3]                                    | 1123/4 1174/15                                   |
| ŀ | 1138/12 1143/15                                   | 1135/14  | demand [1] 975/23                                      | 965/24 966/3 1084/16                               | dilutive [4] 1064/16                             |
|   | 1147/24 1151/1 1153/6<br>1154/9 1154/16           | December 31 [3]                                  | demanded [1] 979/11                                    | developments [5]                                   | 1068/9 1070/20                                   |
|   | 1154/9 1154/16                                    | 1189/20 1203/23                                  | demonstrative [7]                                      | 971/4 999/5 1001/6                                 | 1106/11  |
|   | 1155/16 1155/18                                   | 1204/9   | 979/14 979/15 980/4                                    | 1041/5 1113/15                                     | dinner [1] 933/1                                 |
|   | 1159/16 1163/18                                   | <b>December 7 [3]</b> 1168/6                     |  | did [339]  | direct [9] 930/4 993/17                          |
|   | 1163/19 1180/3                                    | 1168/8 1168/9                                    | 1081/11  | didn't [40] 942/2                                  | 1055/8 1058/16 1076/4                            |
|   | 1180/10 1184/9                                    | <b>decide [3]</b> 1026/23 1048/23 1053/24        | deny [1] 1140/7<br>department [1] 1065/6               | 943/15 961/3 961/4<br>971/21 974/4 999/10          | 1087/5 1108/18 1134/1<br>  1192/18               |
|   | 1184/11 1200/23                                   | decided [8] 977/9                                | <b>DePaul [1]</b> 1193/17                              | 1012/21 1025/15                                    | direction [1] 942/3                              |
|   | 1202/18 1212/12                                   | 1015/3 1015/15                                   | depending [3] 982/13                                   | 1026/18 1027/20                                    | directly [4] 963/16                              |
|   | 1212/12   | 1044/13 1054/1                                   | 1098/19 1101/3   | 1029/1 1030/24 1031/3                              | 1055/14 1096/3                                   |
|   | <b>dealing [4]</b> 988/9 1016/3 1045/19           | 1072/23 1159/21                                  | deposition [23] 957/16                                 | 1031/5 1036/2 1049/20                              | 1119/19  |
|   | 1178/19   | 1201/16  | 1049/20 1121/19  | 1051/10 1053/15                                    | director [5] 988/14                              |
|   | deals [1] 1175/17                                 | decided let's [1]                                | 1127/18 1138/4   | 1061/24 1072/1                                     | 1030/7 1087/21 1102/1                            |
|   | dealt [1] 1032/10                                 | 1015/3   | 1139/14 1156/13<br>1156/18 1157/10                     | 1076/24 1130/15<br>1132/21 1136/4 1139/9           | 1192/23<br>Director Stove [1]                    |
| 1 | debate [4] 1079/7                                 | decimal [1] 1126/6<br>decision [9] 977/3         | 1157/13 1157/10  | 1140/21 1140/23                                    | <b>Director Steve [1]</b> 988/14                 |
| ŀ | 1079/11 1079/19                                   | 982/3 1025/21 1039/18                            | 1158/5 1159/7 1170/8                                   | 1141/9 1141/9 1141/10                              | directors [14] 930/12                            |
|   | 1080/4  | 1075/10 1076/21                                  | 1181/14 1181/19  | 1151/11 1153/12                                    | 931/12 931/23 932/18                             |
|   | debate/vetting [1] 1079/19                        | 1082/12 1176/18                                  | 1182/1 1193/24 1194/9                                  | 1166/21 1166/22                                    | 935/24 1032/22 1033/1                            |
| 1 | debated [1] 1074/11                               | 1181/1   | 1194/13 1194/16  | 1167/10 1174/19                                    | 1034/15 1041/10                                  |
|   | debating [1] 946/8                                | decisions [4] 1006/16                            | 1194/19 1205/5   | 1176/11 1179/21                                    | 1041/21 1042/3 1092/9                            |
|   | debrief [2] 1137/1                                | 1187/7 1187/12                                   | depreciation [5]                                       | 1186/13  | 1108/16 1111/9                                   |
|   | 1139/17   | 1187/14  | 1083/20 1190/24  | <b>difference [5]</b> 1078/5 1128/14 1202/6 1202/8 | disagree [3] 939/8                               |
|   | debt [37] 1070/21                                 | <b>deck [5]</b> 937/20 1002/4 1096/17 1098/10    | 1206/18 1210/6 1210/8 depth [1] 951/14                 | 1212/15  | 1058/7 1058/8<br>disagreement [1]                |
|   | 1091/10 1093/19                                   | 1129/2   | derogatory [1] 1014/24                                 |  | 956/17   |
|   | 1093/24 1094/2                                    | · · · • · · ·                                    |  |  |  |
| ł |   |  |  |  |  |
| ŀ |   |  |  |  |  |

| D   | 1004/23 1005/24        | 961/10 964/17 967/24        | 1007/2 1007/4 1007/20   | 1167/1 1180/3 1180/10       |
|---|------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------------|
| disappoint [1] 1069/13                      | 1014/8 1014/13         | 978/4 978/6 978/7           | 1008/18 1008/19         | 1203/8                      |
|   | 1014/18 1016/16        | 978/15 980/6 985/13         | 1009/2 1009/5 1010/20   | door [2] 1021/13            |
| disappointed [4]                            | 1018/15 1020/20        | 985/15 992/14 992/16        | 1010/23 1011/2 1011/3   | 1046/14                     |
| 1017/6 1027/11 1053/4                       | 1020/21 1021/6 1023/2  | 995/2 1005/2 1010/17        | 1011/10 1011/17         | doors [1] 1104/20           |
| 1104/6                                      | 1024/4 1029/15 1033/5  |                             | 1011/19 1012/24         | dotted [1] 1125/18          |
| disappointment [1]                          | 1033/8 1034/24 1035/7  |                             | 1013/14 1013/19         | double [1] 1168/17          |
| 1054/7                                      | 1035/14 1038/7         | 1062/24 1069/19             | 1014/14 1014/16         | doubles [1] 1171/24         |
| disapprove [2] 977/9                        | 1044/15 1048/22        | 1069/24 1071/3 1071/5       | 1014/21 1015/2 1015/4   | doubt [2] 938/14 965/5      |
| 1159/22                                     | 1049/1 1065/19 1068/3  | 1078/18 1078/20             | 1017/22 1018/7 1018/9   | down [56] 941/4             |
| discloses [5] 978/23                        | 1079/7 1080/4 1113/7   | 1083/15 1084/21             | 1020/15 1024/12         | 946/23 950/4 953/19         |
| 979/3 979/9 1160/4                          |                        | 1085/5 1085/8 1085/21       | 1020/15 1024/12         |                             |
| 1160/8                                      | 1137/16 1139/6         |                             |                         | 957/5 957/23 959/18         |
| disclosure [3] 982/13                       | 1140/18 1141/20        | 1092/20 1092/22             | 1036/14 1135/24         | 959/20 968/4 973/14         |
| 986/2 1186/22                               | 1141/22 1142/17        | 1096/15 1115/18             | 1139/21 1140/15         | 975/17 976/19 999/7         |
| discomfort [2] 944/13                       | 1142/21 1182/8         | 1145/13 1146/9              | 1142/18 1175/12         | 1000/9 1000/23              |
| 944/17                                      | discussions [58]       | 1147/12 1149/3              | Dominion's [1]          | 1001/17 1010/3              |
| discount [13] 1114/13                       | 949/16 951/10 960/3    | 1162/17 1163/7 1188/2       | 1007/22                 | 1010/19 1030/8              |
| 1114/14 1115/8 1117/9                       | 983/1 988/2 993/12     | 1190/11 1190/12             | <b>Don [3]</b> 1088/4   | 1037/21 1043/23             |
| 1117/10 1117/12                             | 994/17 1005/22 1007/4  |                             | 1088/17 1093/2          | 1045/3 1051/3 1053/21       |
| 1118/22 1119/2 1119/8                       | 1007/19 1007/23        | 1203/12                     | Don Marchand [1]        | 1057/17 1060/13             |
| 1120/13 1206/23                             | 1008/21 1009/4 1011/2  | documents [8] 1055/8        | 1088/4                  | 1061/3 1065/9 1066/2        |
| 1206/24 1207/2                              | 1012/10 1012/14        | 1134/8 1163/17              | don't [75] 938/17 939/9 | 1071/15 1084/1              |
|   | 1013/1 1014/16         | 1175/14 1192/14             | 939/9 940/23 942/8      | 1097/10 1098/3              |
| discounted [1] 1204/3                       | 1019/14 1019/19        | 1195/17 1196/16             | 942/9 948/1 948/23      | 1098/18 1101/5              |
| <b>discounting [2]</b> 1206/5               | 1020/13 1020/15        | 1197/16                     | 954/20 964/13 965/5     | 1105/11 1105/18             |
| 1206/6                                      | 1021/3 1021/14 1022/1  | does [28] 951/16            | 965/6 965/12 969/3      | 1151/16 1152/21             |
| discrete [4] 1017/10                        | 1022/3 1025/6 1025/8   | 953/21 964/10 964/23        | 969/3 969/4 969/8       | 1165/1 1165/5 1165/7        |
| 1196/14 1206/1 1206/5                       | 1026/14 1028/6 1028/8  |                             | 969/11 970/9 971/19     | 1167/2 1167/3 1168/8        |
| discretely [2] 1210/3                       | 1028/18 1030/5 1041/5  |                             | 971/23 972/4 972/6      | 1169/5 1173/2 1176/5        |
| 1210/9                                      | 1041/16 1042/1 1042/6  |                             | 972/19 976/8 978/5      | 1176/22 1184/4              |
| discuss [23] 932/1                          | 1054/18 1055/2 1055/2  |                             | 978/9 979/6 979/12      | 1189/16 1205/22             |
| 945/10 946/1 963/10                         |                        |                             |                         |                             |
| 974/12 991/13 993/6                         | 1055/9 1062/17 1073/2  | 1068/4 1072/19 1078/6       | 979/20 983/20 993/8     | 1206/15 1206/21             |
| 993/10 1014/15                              | 1074/20 1095/9         | 1093/23 1125/6              | 1035/19 1046/2 1051/7   | 1208/15 1213/23             |
| 1034/11 1049/11                             | 1095/17 1095/17        | 1126/14 1151/3              | 1051/11 1052/11         | downgrade [6]               |
| 1053/23 1075/4                              | 1111/22 1115/23        | 1155/22 1165/18             | 1063/2 1063/4 1066/9    | 1070/22 1097/3              |
| 1079/17 1112/4                              | 1116/4 1116/4 1131/15  |                             | 1069/12 1080/1 1082/4   | 1098/11 1098/15             |
| 1112/11 1143/13                             | 1131/18 1131/22        | 1195/21                     | 1085/6 1085/13          | 1100/21 1101/2              |
| 1143/19 1151/24                             | 1132/23 1167/24        | doesn't [15] 954/21         | 1085/15 1094/15         | downgraded [7]              |
| 1178/2 1178/12                              | 1169/12 1182/6         | 965/4 971/8 994/5           | 1099/2 1115/10          | 1068/11 1094/6 1094/8       |
| 1178/20 1180/19                             | dislocated [2] 1015/23 | 1052/4 1073/9 1078/6        | 1116/12 1133/6 1137/4   | 1094/10 1094/18             |
| discussed [29] 939/23                       | 1076/23                | 1103/10 1125/23             | 1137/20 1137/20         | 1099/24 1101/6              |
| 1016/17 1030/21                             | dislocation [3] 1008/2 | 1126/8 1141/6 1155/6        | 1137/21 1139/8          | downside [1] 931/3          |
|   | 1011/5 1028/12         | 1155/7 1155/20              | 1145/21 1148/13         | draft [3] 932/6 932/8       |
| 1033/1 1044/12 1045/6                       | dispatch [1] 1021/12   | 1176/20                     | 1151/11 1154/8 1157/9   | 938/18                      |
| 1048/2 1051/12                              | dispute [12] 935/18    | <b>Dogwood [1]</b> 1008/17  | 1157/13 1158/15         | drafted [3] 1037/22         |
| 1051/18 1053/22                             | 936/10 942/5 942/14    | Dogwood's [1]               | 1158/17 1159/1          | 1038/2 1187/3               |
| 1058/24 1059/2                              | 942/20 957/7 957/10    | 1016/12                     | 1160/10 1166/23         | drafting [2] 1076/24        |
| 1061/22 1067/20                             | 958/8 958/11 961/19    | doing [21] 966/5            | 1177/5 1184/17          | 1187/2                      |
| 1067/21 1070/24                             | 961/22 974/8           | 971/23 972/6 972/8          | 1184/18 1187/11         | drag [1] 954/8              |
| 1072/14 1072/21                             | disputing [1] 965/12   | 974/15 982/20 1018/23       | 1187/12 1201/18         | dramatically [1]            |
| 1074/11 1078/3 1102/6                       | disrupted [1] 984/24   | 1021/18 1025/3              | 1202/18 1202/21         | 984/22                      |
| 1111/19 1112/5                              | disruption [2] 1008/2  | 1048/12 1050/19             | done [42] 929/10        | draw [3] 945/18 945/19      |
| 1112/14 1113/12                             | 1010/2                 | 1064/18 1105/10             |                         | 984/11                      |
| 1127/17 1157/4 1171/3                       |                        |                             | 944/12 959/17 961/15    |                             |
| 1181/20                                     | disruptive [1] 1008/23 | 1116/17 1123/2              | 962/8 981/10 981/14     | drawing [1] 1182/1          |
| discussing [11] 930/11                      | distinction [3] 973/16 | 1173/13 1199/18             | 981/15 981/18 1013/4    | drawn [1] 1189/20           |
| 931/10 931/15 963/19                        | 1012/15 1012/17        | 1202/12 1205/19             | 1038/18 1054/9          | drew [1] 952/7              |
| 993/8 998/17 1033/11                        | distorted [1] 1213/9   | 1205/23 1210/19             |                         |                             |
| 1046/4 1109/4 1118/2                        | diversify [1] 994/12   | dollar [1] 1174/9           | 1108/9 1153/3 1153/6    | driver [1] 1171/9           |
| 1129/6                                      | dividends [2] 1212/17  | dollars [3] 1100/19         | 1154/9 1154/16          | dropped [2] 1011/8          |
| discussion [53] 930/24                      | 1213/2                 | 1198/7 1201/1               | 1154/18 1155/1 1155/3   | 1013/24                     |
| 933/6 941/5 941/10                          | document [64] 930/16   | domestically [1] 987/4      | 1155/3 1155/5 1155/5    | drove [1] 1174/8            |
| 943/2 950/5 950/21                          | 932/20 933/8 933/15    | <b>Dominion [47]</b> 998/15 | 1155/6 1155/9 1155/16   | <b>DT [1]</b> 982/7         |
| 956/16 957/24 986/5                         | 935/5 936/15 937/16    | 999/1 999/13 999/13         | 1155/18 1156/9          | <b>DTE [3]</b> 981/24 982/2 |
|   | 938/20 941/12 942/23   | 999/16 999/23 1000/1        | 1157/16 1157/20         | 982/8                       |
| 986/14 989/14 991/18<br>991/20 992/7 1000/4 | 944/6 944/22 955/4     | 1001/10 1002/12             | 1158/16 1158/19         | <b>DTM [3]</b> 982/8 982/17 |
|   | 955/18 957/15 958/18   | 1005/23 1006/2 1006/5       | 1159/1 1165/2 1165/13   | 982/19                      |
| 1002/11 1004/15                             |                        |                             |                         |                             |
|   |                        |                             |                         |                             |

| D  | EBITA [1] 934/22  | 1063/24 1064/24   | 1047/11 1072/16  | 1061/7 1061/10   |
|--|---|---|--|--|
| due [25] 951/14 1007/2   | ebitda [5] 935/10 939/6   | 1066/1 1066/5 1073/23   | 1090/6 1090/10   | 1082/23 1083/3 1083/5  |
| 1039/11 1039/14  | 1046/23 1089/20   | 1077/24 1078/3  | enhanced [1] 1189/2  | 1083/11 1083/21  |
| 1042/19 1078/7 1078/9  | 1211/6  | 1083/16 1085/8 1093/2   | enormous [4] 1016/1  | 1086/7 1086/10   |
| 1099/7 1119/1 1146/9   | economic [1] 1098/19  | 1093/3 1096/11  | 1025/17 1025/18  | 1093/20 1093/24  |
|  | economics [2] 1087/12   | 1101/20 1101/22   | 1033/6   | 1102/19 1105/12  |
| 1146/13 1146/24  | 1163/20   | 1102/9 1104/2 1104/3  | enough [4] 1119/2  | 1105/12 1105/15  |
| 1147/9 1151/5 1157/17  | educational [1]   | 1104/14 1104/19   | 1119/4 1145/23 1158/2  | 1106/11 1107/10  |
| 1163/22 1165/1 1165/1  | 1087/10   | 1106/21 1106/24   | ensure [2] 933/1   | 1108/1 1112/22 1117/7  |
| 1165/5 1165/7 1165/12  | <b>EDWARD [1]</b> 1087/3  | 1147/14 1150/20   | 1164/14  | 1118/17 1118/21  |
| 1166/1 1166/14 1167/2  | EEE [1] 1100/4  | 1150/22 1151/18   | entail [1] 1090/9  | 1119/4 1119/17 1121/9  |
| 1167/3   | effect [2] 1070/18  | 1151/18 1166/13   | entailed [2] 1000/5  | 1128/3 1129/14   |
| dull [1] 1152/3  | 1150/18   | 1168/6 1169/5 1179/18   | 1090/11  | 1129/17 1135/10  |
| duly [4] 930/2 1087/4  | effected [1] 1208/18  | 1179/22 1185/2 1188/4   | enter [3] 1020/1 1020/4  |  |
| 1133/20 1192/17  | effective [1] 998/9   | 1190/13 1191/19   | 1139/7   | 1162/14 1165/19  |
| dunk [2] 1147/23   | effectively [4] 1026/7  | emailed [1] 1020/18   | entered [2] 1006/8   | 1167/7 1172/16   |
| 1148/4   | 1105/11 1114/12   | emailing [1] 963/18   | 1065/21  | 1173/10 1173/11  |
| during [28] 931/10   | 1173/2  | emails [5] 1060/7   | entering [2] 1007/1  | 1174/4 1174/10   |
| 931/16 939/19 941/10   | efficient [3] 1099/13   | 1080/21 1148/17   | 1074/4   | 1174/12 1174/14  |
| 947/17 964/13 967/3  | 1176/6 1176/10  | 1152/19 1168/23   | enterprise [5] 1205/22   | 1174/21 1189/1 1191/1  |
| 991/11 1003/1 1021/24  | efficiently [1] 1105/19   | emotional [1] 1079/15   | 1210/15 1210/24  | 1200/23 1203/19  |
| 1029/15 1030/20  | effort [3] 986/20   | <b>Enable [1]</b> 1168/18   | 1212/4 1212/8  | 1204/4 1207/5 1207/9   |
| 1031/6 1036/19 1055/2  | 1055/12 1146/18   | Enbridge [6] 968/15   | Enterprises [1]  | 1207/10 1207/13  |
| 1055/10 1058/16  | efforts [2] 945/4   | 968/19 1139/20  | 1194/12  | 1207/10 1207/13  |
| 1061/14 1068/2   | 997/15  | 1140/14 1140/22   | entire [8] 936/6 990/24  | 1208/22 1212/3 1212/8  |
| 1080/24 1088/12  | egarding [1] 1132/7   | 1142/18   | 1080/3 1081/2 1081/4   | 1212/9 1212/19   |
| 1105/9 1135/11   |   | enclosed [1] 1004/22  | 1118/11 1119/2 1119/4  |  |
| 1135/16 1141/14  | eight [1] 929/9<br>either [12] 970/2 985/3  | enclosures [1] 1004/22  |  | equivocation [1]<br>941/24   |
| 1141/18 1156/18  | 988/23 1001/6 1128/2  | end [32] 937/22 938/12  | entirety [1] 1165/6  | Eric [20] 941/20 941/21  |
| 1176/16  |   |   |  |  |
| duties [5] 1040/17   | 1136/5 1154/15<br>1154/15 1155/3 1155/4   | 990/13 1007/16<br>1007/23 1010/5 1026/8   | <b>entitled [7]</b> 995/2 995/8 996/13 997/1 1002/17   | 942/6 942/15 942/18<br>942/21 943/3 943/5  |
| 1040/21 1041/2   | 1155/16 1201/4  | 1026/10 1031/11   | 1018/15 1018/19  | 957/18 1061/23 1062/2  |
| 1073/13 1081/21  |   | 1033/20 1034/6  |  | 1063/1 1160/20   |
| dwindling [2] 983/19   | elected [1] 988/15<br>electric [3] 982/1  | 1047/18 1055/20   | entitles [1] 1100/10<br>entity [1] 1098/23   | 1161/21 1162/11  |
| 000/40   | electric   3   302/   | 1047/10 1033/20   | entity   1   1090/23   |  |
| 983/19   |   | 1056/1 1093/10 1110/1   |  |  |
| dynamic [2] 985/6  | 1017/14 1161/1  | 1056/1 1083/19 1110/1   | entries [1] 1080/20  | 1166/5 1167/18 1168/1  |
|  | 1017/14 1161/1 elements [1] 1076/15   | 1131/20 1132/6  | entries [1] 1080/20<br>entry [2] 959/12 964/19   | 1166/5 1167/18 1168/1<br>1168/6 1179/19  |
| dynamic [2] 985/6  | 1017/14 1161/1<br>elements [1] 1076/15<br>eliminate [1] 1010/10   | 1131/20 1132/6<br>1139/10 1143/20   | entries [1] 1080/20<br>entry [2] 959/12 964/19<br>environment [2]  | 1166/5 1167/18 1168/1<br>1168/6 1179/19<br>error [1] 931/3   |
| dynamic [2] 985/6<br>1047/10<br>dynamics [1] 985/12  | 1017/14 1161/1<br>elements [1] 1076/15<br>eliminate [1] 1010/10<br>eliminated [3] 1179/9  | 1131/20 1132/6<br>1139/10 1143/20<br>1145/22 1155/4   | entries [1] 1080/20<br>entry [2] 959/12 964/19<br>environment [2]<br>1008/4 1028/11  | 1166/5 1167/18 1168/1<br>1168/6 1179/19<br>error [1] 931/3<br>escrow [1] 1103/11   |
| dynamic [2] 985/6<br>1047/10<br>dynamics [1] 985/12  | 1017/14 1161/1<br>elements [1] 1076/15<br>eliminate [1] 1010/10<br>eliminated [3] 1179/9<br>1201/13 1201/14   | 1131/20 1132/6<br>1139/10 1143/20<br>1145/22 1155/4<br>1157/24 1159/4   | entries [1] 1080/20<br>entry [2] 959/12 964/19<br>environment [2]<br>1008/4 1028/11<br>EPS [1] 1123/4  | 1166/5 1167/18 1168/1<br>1168/6 1179/19<br>error [1] 931/3<br>escrow [1] 1103/11<br>especially [4] 1091/5  |
| dynamic [2] 985/6<br>1047/10<br>dynamics [1] 985/12<br>E<br>each [10] 929/9 929/10   | 1017/14 1161/1<br>elements [1] 1076/15<br>eliminate [1] 1010/10<br>eliminated [3] 1179/9<br>1201/13 1201/14<br>else [12] 974/2 1017/2   | 1131/20 1132/6<br>1139/10 1143/20<br>1145/22 1155/4<br>1157/24 1159/4<br>1163/16 1177/5 1190/6  | entries [1] 1080/20<br>entry [2] 959/12 964/19<br>environment [2]<br>1008/4 1028/11<br>EPS [1] 1123/4<br>equal [2] 997/6 1101/4  | 1166/5 1167/18 1168/1<br>1168/6 1179/19<br>error [1] 931/3<br>escrow [1] 1103/11<br>especially [4] 1091/5<br>1101/7 1106/8 1126/7  |
| dynamic [2] 985/6<br>1047/10<br>dynamics [1] 985/12<br>E<br>each [10] 929/9 929/10<br>1030/20 1035/11  | 1017/14 1161/1 elements [1] 1076/15 eliminate [1] 1010/10 eliminated [3] 1179/9 1201/13 1201/14 else [12] 974/2 1017/2 1017/4 1024/18 1050/6  | 1131/20 1132/6<br>1139/10 1143/20<br>1145/22 1155/4<br>1157/24 1159/4<br>1163/16 1177/5 1190/6<br>1206/3 1210/4 1210/20   | entries [1] 1080/20<br>entry [2] 959/12 964/19<br>environment [2]<br>1008/4 1028/11<br>EPS [1] 1123/4<br>equal [2] 997/6 1101/4<br>equals [1] 1017/15  | 1166/5 1167/18 1168/1<br>1168/6 1179/19<br>error [1] 931/3<br>escrow [1] 1103/11<br>especially [4] 1091/5<br>1101/7 1106/8 1126/7<br>ESQ [24] 928/2 928/2  |
| dynamic [2] 985/6<br>1047/10<br>dynamics [1] 985/12<br>E<br>each [10] 929/9 929/10<br>1030/20 1035/11<br>1094/17 1097/8 1139/8   | 1017/14 1161/1 elements [1] 1076/15 eliminate [1] 1010/10 eliminated [3] 1179/9 1201/13 1201/14 else [12] 974/2 1017/2 1017/4 1024/18 1050/6 1066/18 1140/12  | 1131/20 1132/6<br>1139/10 1143/20<br>1145/22 1155/4<br>1157/24 1159/4<br>1163/16 1177/5 1190/6<br>1206/3 1210/4 1210/20<br>1211/13 1213/10  | entries [1] 1080/20<br>entry [2] 959/12 964/19<br>environment [2]<br>1008/4 1028/11<br>EPS [1] 1123/4<br>equal [2] 997/6 1101/4<br>equals [1] 1017/15<br>equity [122] 937/23   | 1166/5 1167/18 1168/1<br>1168/6 1179/19<br>error [1] 931/3<br>escrow [1] 1103/11<br>especially [4] 1091/5<br>1101/7 1106/8 1126/7<br>ESQ [24] 928/2 928/2<br>928/4 928/5 928/6   |
| dynamic [2] 985/6<br>1047/10<br>dynamics [1] 985/12<br>E<br>each [10] 929/9 929/10<br>1030/20 1035/11<br>1094/17 1097/8 1139/8<br>1202/12 1202/16  | 1017/14 1161/1 elements [1] 1076/15 eliminate [1] 1010/10 eliminated [3] 1179/9 1201/13 1201/14 else [12] 974/2 1017/2 1017/4 1024/18 1050/6 1066/18 1140/12 1170/19 1170/23  | 1131/20 1132/6<br>1139/10 1143/20<br>1145/22 1155/4<br>1157/24 1159/4<br>1163/16 1177/5 1190/6<br>1206/3 1210/4 1210/20<br>1211/13 1213/10<br>ended [3] 1012/10   | entries [1] 1080/20<br>entry [2] 959/12 964/19<br>environment [2]<br>1008/4 1028/11<br>EPS [1] 1123/4<br>equal [2] 997/6 1101/4<br>equals [1] 1017/15<br>equity [122] 937/23<br>948/16 949/13 951/18   | 1166/5 1167/18 1168/1<br>1168/6 1179/19<br>error [1] 931/3<br>escrow [1] 1103/11<br>especially [4] 1091/5<br>1101/7 1106/8 1126/7<br>ESQ [24] 928/2 928/2<br>928/4 928/5 928/6<br>928/6 928/7 928/9  |
| dynamic [2] 985/6<br>1047/10<br>dynamics [1] 985/12<br>E<br>each [10] 929/9 929/10<br>1030/20 1035/11<br>1094/17 1097/8 1139/8<br>1202/12 1202/16<br>1203/1  | 1017/14 1161/1 elements [1] 1076/15 eliminate [1] 1010/10 eliminated [3] 1179/9 1201/13 1201/14 else [12] 974/2 1017/2 1017/4 1024/18 1050/6 1066/18 1140/12 1170/19 1170/23 1171/2 1178/22   | 1131/20 1132/6<br>1139/10 1143/20<br>1145/22 1155/4<br>1157/24 1159/4<br>1163/16 1177/5 1190/6<br>1206/3 1210/4 1210/20<br>1211/13 1213/10<br>ended [3] 1012/10<br>1162/23 1173/12  | entries [1] 1080/20<br>entry [2] 959/12 964/19<br>environment [2]<br>1008/4 1028/11<br>EPS [1] 1123/4<br>equal [2] 997/6 1101/4<br>equals [1] 1017/15<br>equity [122] 937/23<br>948/16 949/13 951/18<br>951/23 952/10 952/16   | 1166/5 1167/18 1168/1<br>1168/6 1179/19<br>error [1] 931/3<br>escrow [1] 1103/11<br>especially [4] 1091/5<br>1101/7 1106/8 1126/7<br>ESQ [24] 928/2 928/2<br>928/4 928/5 928/6<br>928/6 928/7 928/9<br>928/9 928/11 928/12   |
| dynamic [2] 985/6<br>1047/10<br>dynamics [1] 985/12<br>E<br>each [10] 929/9 929/10<br>1030/20 1035/11<br>1094/17 1097/8 1139/8<br>1202/12 1202/16<br>1203/1<br>earlier [14] 957/15   | 1017/14 1161/1 elements [1] 1076/15 eliminate [1] 1010/10 eliminated [3] 1179/9 1201/13 1201/14 else [12] 974/2 1017/2 1017/4 1024/18 1050/6 1066/18 1140/12 1170/19 1170/23 1171/2 1178/22 1202/21   | 1131/20 1132/6<br>1139/10 1143/20<br>1145/22 1155/4<br>1157/24 1159/4<br>1163/16 1177/5 1190/6<br>1206/3 1210/4 1210/20<br>1211/13 1213/10<br>ended [3] 1012/10<br>1162/23 1173/12<br>ending [2] 1123/12  | entries [1] 1080/20<br>entry [2] 959/12 964/19<br>environment [2]<br>1008/4 1028/11<br>EPS [1] 1123/4<br>equal [2] 997/6 1101/4<br>equals [1] 1017/15<br>equity [122] 937/23<br>948/16 949/13 951/18<br>951/23 952/10 952/16<br>954/6 954/22 954/23  | 1166/5 1167/18 1168/1<br>1168/6 1179/19<br>error [1] 931/3<br>escrow [1] 1103/11<br>especially [4] 1091/5<br>1101/7 1106/8 1126/7<br>ESQ [24] 928/2 928/2<br>928/4 928/5 928/6<br>928/6 928/7 928/9<br>928/9 928/11 928/12<br>928/12 928/14 928/14   |
| dynamic [2] 985/6<br>1047/10<br>dynamics [1] 985/12<br><b>E</b><br>each [10] 929/9 929/10<br>1030/20 1035/11<br>1094/17 1097/8 1139/8<br>1202/12 1202/16<br>1203/1<br>earlier [14] 957/15<br>985/14 987/22 1005/1  | 1017/14 1161/1 elements [1] 1076/15 eliminate [1] 1010/10 eliminated [3] 1179/9 1201/13 1201/14 else [12] 974/2 1017/2 1017/4 1024/18 1050/6 1066/18 1140/12 1170/19 1170/23 1171/2 1178/22 1202/21 email [92] 932/21   | 1131/20 1132/6<br>1139/10 1143/20<br>1145/22 1155/4<br>1157/24 1159/4<br>1163/16 1177/5 1190/6<br>1206/3 1210/4 1210/20<br>1211/13 1213/10<br>ended [3] 1012/10<br>1162/23 1173/12<br>ending [2] 1123/12  | entries [1] 1080/20<br>entry [2] 959/12 964/19<br>environment [2]<br>1008/4 1028/11<br>EPS [1] 1123/4<br>equal [2] 997/6 1101/4<br>equals [1] 1017/15<br>equity [122] 937/23<br>948/16 949/13 951/18<br>951/23 952/10 952/16<br>954/6 954/22 954/23<br>956/2 956/18 956/23   | 1166/5 1167/18 1168/1<br>1168/6 1179/19<br>error [1] 931/3<br>escrow [1] 1103/11<br>especially [4] 1091/5<br>1101/7 1106/8 1126/7<br>ESQ [24] 928/2 928/2<br>928/4 928/5 928/6<br>928/6 928/7 928/9<br>928/9 928/11 928/12<br>928/12 928/14 928/14<br>928/15 928/15 928/18   |
| dynamic [2] 985/6<br>1047/10<br>dynamics [1] 985/12<br><b>E</b><br>each [10] 929/9 929/10<br>1030/20 1035/11<br>1094/17 1097/8 1139/8<br>1202/12 1202/16<br>1203/1<br>earlier [14] 957/15<br>985/14 987/22 1005/1<br>1035/1 1039/22 1080/5   | 1017/14 1161/1 elements [1] 1076/15 eliminate [1] 1010/10 eliminated [3] 1179/9 1201/13 1201/14 else [12] 974/2 1017/2 1017/4 1024/18 1050/6 1066/18 1140/12 1170/19 1170/23 1171/2 1178/22 1202/21 email [92] 932/21 934/6 935/8 938/23  | 1131/20 1132/6<br>1139/10 1143/20<br>1145/22 1155/4<br>1157/24 1159/4<br>1163/16 1177/5 1190/6<br>1206/3 1210/4 1210/20<br>1211/13 1213/10<br>ended [3] 1012/10<br>1162/23 1173/12<br>ending [2] 1123/12<br>1127/20<br>endorsement [2]  | entries [1] 1080/20<br>entry [2] 959/12 964/19<br>environment [2]<br>1008/4 1028/11<br>EPS [1] 1123/4<br>equal [2] 997/6 1101/4<br>equals [1] 1017/15<br>equity [122] 937/23<br>948/16 949/13 951/18<br>951/23 952/10 952/16<br>954/6 954/22 954/23<br>956/2 956/18 956/23<br>958/16 967/8 967/19  | 1166/5 1167/18 1168/1<br>1168/6 1179/19<br>error [1] 931/3<br>escrow [1] 1103/11<br>especially [4] 1091/5<br>1101/7 1106/8 1126/7<br>ESQ [24] 928/2 928/2<br>928/4 928/5 928/6<br>928/6 928/7 928/9<br>928/9 928/11 928/12<br>928/12 928/14 928/14<br>928/15 928/15 928/18<br>928/18 928/19 928/19   |
| dynamic [2] 985/6<br>1047/10<br>dynamics [1] 985/12<br><b>E</b><br>each [10] 929/9 929/10<br>1030/20 1035/11<br>1094/17 1097/8 1139/8<br>1202/12 1202/16<br>1203/1<br>earlier [14] 957/15<br>985/14 987/22 1005/1<br>1035/1 1039/22 1080/5<br>1092/5 1097/2 1099/10  | 1017/14 1161/1 elements [1] 1076/15 eliminate [1] 1010/10 eliminated [3] 1179/9 1201/13 1201/14 else [12] 974/2 1017/2 1017/4 1024/18 1050/6 1066/18 1140/12 1170/19 1170/23 1171/2 1178/22 1202/21 email [92] 932/21 934/6 935/8 938/23 938/23 939/14 941/13   | 1131/20 1132/6<br>1139/10 1143/20<br>1145/22 1155/4<br>1157/24 1159/4<br>1163/16 1177/5 1190/6<br>1206/3 1210/4 1210/20<br>1211/13 1213/10<br>ended [3] 1012/10<br>1162/23 1173/12<br>ending [2] 1123/12<br>1127/20<br>endorsement [2]<br>1069/6 1069/10  | entries [1] 1080/20<br>entry [2] 959/12 964/19<br>environment [2]<br>1008/4 1028/11<br>EPS [1] 1123/4<br>equal [2] 997/6 1101/4<br>equals [1] 1017/15<br>equity [122] 937/23<br>948/16 949/13 951/18<br>951/23 952/10 952/16<br>954/6 954/22 954/23<br>956/2 956/18 956/23<br>958/16 967/8 967/19<br>970/8 978/24 979/5  | 1166/5 1167/18 1168/1<br>1168/6 1179/19<br>error [1] 931/3<br>escrow [1] 1103/11<br>especially [4] 1091/5<br>1101/7 1106/8 1126/7<br>ESQ [24] 928/2 928/2<br>928/4 928/5 928/6<br>928/6 928/7 928/9<br>928/9 928/11 928/12<br>928/12 928/14 928/14<br>928/15 928/15 928/18<br>928/18 928/19 928/19<br>928/21 928/21 928/22   |
| dynamic [2] 985/6<br>1047/10<br>dynamics [1] 985/12<br>E<br>each [10] 929/9 929/10<br>1030/20 1035/11<br>1094/17 1097/8 1139/8<br>1202/12 1202/16<br>1203/1<br>earlier [14] 957/15<br>985/14 987/22 1005/1<br>1035/1 1039/22 1080/5<br>1092/5 1097/2 1099/10<br>1120/12 1120/14  | 1017/14 1161/1 elements [1] 1076/15 eliminate [1] 1010/10 eliminated [3] 1179/9 1201/13 1201/14 else [12] 974/2 1017/2 1017/4 1024/18 1050/6 1066/18 1140/12 1170/19 1170/23 1171/2 1178/22 1202/21 email [92] 932/21 934/6 935/8 938/23 938/23 939/14 941/13 942/16 942/17 943/19  | 1131/20 1132/6<br>1139/10 1143/20<br>1145/22 1155/4<br>1157/24 1159/4<br>1163/16 1177/5 1190/6<br>1206/3 1210/4 1210/20<br>1211/13 1213/10<br>ended [3] 1012/10<br>1162/23 1173/12<br>ending [2] 1123/12<br>1127/20<br>endorsement [2]<br>1069/6 1069/10<br>ends [2] 1124/16  | entries [1] 1080/20<br>entry [2] 959/12 964/19<br>environment [2]<br>1008/4 1028/11<br>EPS [1] 1123/4<br>equal [2] 997/6 1101/4<br>equals [1] 1017/15<br>equity [122] 937/23<br>948/16 949/13 951/18<br>951/23 952/10 952/16<br>954/6 954/22 954/23<br>956/2 956/18 956/23<br>958/16 967/8 967/19<br>970/8 978/24 979/5<br>985/3 985/4 985/4   | 1166/5 1167/18 1168/1<br>1168/6 1179/19<br>error [1] 931/3<br>escrow [1] 1103/11<br>especially [4] 1091/5<br>1101/7 1106/8 1126/7<br>ESQ [24] 928/2 928/2<br>928/4 928/5 928/6<br>928/6 928/7 928/9<br>928/9 928/11 928/12<br>928/12 928/14 928/14<br>928/15 928/15 928/18<br>928/18 928/19 928/19<br>928/21 928/21 928/22<br>928/22   |
| dynamic [2] 985/6<br>1047/10<br>dynamics [1] 985/12<br>E<br>each [10] 929/9 929/10<br>1030/20 1035/11<br>1094/17 1097/8 1139/8<br>1202/12 1202/16<br>1203/1<br>earlier [14] 957/15<br>985/14 987/22 1005/1<br>1035/1 1039/22 1080/5<br>1092/5 1097/2 1099/10<br>1120/12 1120/14<br>1178/5 1180/24  | 1017/14 1161/1 elements [1] 1076/15 eliminate [1] 1010/10 eliminated [3] 1179/9 1201/13 1201/14 else [12] 974/2 1017/2 1017/4 1024/18 1050/6 1066/18 1140/12 1170/19 1170/23 1171/2 1178/22 1202/21 email [92] 932/21 934/6 935/8 938/23 938/23 939/14 941/13 942/16 942/17 943/19 945/21 945/24 946/17   | 1131/20 1132/6<br>1139/10 1143/20<br>1145/22 1155/4<br>1157/24 1159/4<br>1163/16 1177/5 1190/6<br>1206/3 1210/4 1210/20<br>1211/13 1213/10<br>ended [3] 1012/10<br>1162/23 1173/12<br>ending [2] 1123/12<br>1127/20<br>endorsement [2]<br>1069/6 1069/10<br>ends [2] 1124/16<br>1125/3  | entries [1] 1080/20<br>entry [2] 959/12 964/19<br>environment [2]<br>1008/4 1028/11<br>EPS [1] 1123/4<br>equal [2] 997/6 1101/4<br>equals [1] 1017/15<br>equity [122] 937/23<br>948/16 949/13 951/18<br>951/23 952/10 952/16<br>954/6 954/22 954/23<br>956/2 956/18 956/23<br>958/16 967/8 967/19<br>970/8 978/24 979/5<br>985/3 985/4 985/4<br>985/8 986/15 990/1   | 1166/5 1167/18 1168/1<br>1168/6 1179/19<br>error [1] 931/3<br>escrow [1] 1103/11<br>especially [4] 1091/5<br>1101/7 1106/8 1126/7<br>ESQ [24] 928/2 928/2<br>928/4 928/5 928/6<br>928/6 928/7 928/9<br>928/9 928/11 928/12<br>928/12 928/14 928/14<br>928/15 928/15 928/18<br>928/18 928/19 928/19<br>928/21 928/21 928/22<br>928/22<br>essence [2] 943/9  |
| dynamic [2] 985/6<br>1047/10<br>dynamics [1] 985/12<br>E<br>each [10] 929/9 929/10<br>1030/20 1035/11<br>1094/17 1097/8 1139/8<br>1202/12 1202/16<br>1203/1<br>earlier [14] 957/15<br>985/14 987/22 1005/1<br>1035/1 1039/22 1080/5<br>1092/5 1097/2 1099/10<br>1120/12 1120/14<br>1178/5 1180/24<br>earliest [1] 1186/5   | 1017/14 1161/1 elements [1] 1076/15 eliminate [1] 1010/10 eliminated [3] 1179/9 1201/13 1201/14 else [12] 974/2 1017/2 1017/4 1024/18 1050/6 1066/18 1140/12 1170/19 1170/23 1171/2 1178/22 1202/21 email [92] 932/21 934/6 935/8 938/23 938/23 939/14 941/13 942/16 942/17 943/19 945/21 945/24 946/17 947/16 948/4 955/2  | 1131/20 1132/6<br>1139/10 1143/20<br>1145/22 1155/4<br>1157/24 1159/4<br>1163/16 1177/5 1190/6<br>1206/3 1210/4 1210/20<br>1211/13 1213/10<br>ended [3] 1012/10<br>1162/23 1173/12<br>ending [2] 1123/12<br>1127/20<br>endorsement [2]<br>1069/6 1069/10<br>ends [2] 1124/16<br>1125/3<br>energy [14] 928/17  | entries [1] 1080/20<br>entry [2] 959/12 964/19<br>environment [2]<br>1008/4 1028/11<br>EPS [1] 1123/4<br>equal [2] 997/6 1101/4<br>equals [1] 1017/15<br>equity [122] 937/23<br>948/16 949/13 951/18<br>951/23 952/10 952/16<br>954/6 954/22 954/23<br>956/2 956/18 956/23<br>958/16 967/8 967/19<br>970/8 978/24 979/5<br>985/3 985/4 985/4<br>985/8 986/15 990/1<br>990/20 996/8 998/4   | 1166/5 1167/18 1168/1<br>1168/6 1179/19<br>error [1] 931/3<br>escrow [1] 1103/11<br>especially [4] 1091/5<br>1101/7 1106/8 1126/7<br>ESQ [24] 928/2 928/2<br>928/4 928/5 928/6<br>928/6 928/7 928/9<br>928/9 928/11 928/12<br>928/12 928/14 928/14<br>928/15 928/15 928/18<br>928/18 928/19 928/19<br>928/21 928/21 928/22<br>928/22<br>essence [2] 943/9<br>1071/12   |
| dynamic [2] 985/6<br>1047/10<br>dynamics [1] 985/12<br>E<br>each [10] 929/9 929/10<br>1030/20 1035/11<br>1094/17 1097/8 1139/8<br>1202/12 1202/16<br>1203/1<br>earlier [14] 957/15<br>985/14 987/22 1005/1<br>1035/1 1039/22 1080/5<br>1092/5 1097/2 1099/10<br>1120/12 1120/14<br>1178/5 1180/24<br>earliest [1] 1186/5<br>early [19] 940/3 940/9   | 1017/14 1161/1 elements [1] 1076/15 eliminate [1] 1010/10 eliminated [3] 1179/9 1201/13 1201/14 else [12] 974/2 1017/2 1017/4 1024/18 1050/6 1066/18 1140/12 1170/19 1170/23 1171/2 1178/22 1202/21 email [92] 932/21 934/6 935/8 938/23 938/23 939/14 941/13 942/16 942/17 943/19 945/21 945/24 946/17 947/16 948/4 955/2 955/3 955/4 955/6  | 1131/20 1132/6<br>1139/10 1143/20<br>1145/22 1155/4<br>1157/24 1159/4<br>1163/16 1177/5 1190/6<br>1206/3 1210/4 1210/20<br>1211/13 1213/10<br>ended [3] 1012/10<br>1162/23 1173/12<br>ending [2] 1123/12<br>1127/20<br>endorsement [2]<br>1069/6 1069/10<br>ends [2] 1124/16<br>1125/3<br>energy [14] 928/17<br>981/22 981/24 982/2   | entries [1] 1080/20<br>entry [2] 959/12 964/19<br>environment [2]<br>1008/4 1028/11<br>EPS [1] 1123/4<br>equal [2] 997/6 1101/4<br>equals [1] 1017/15<br>equity [122] 937/23<br>948/16 949/13 951/18<br>951/23 952/10 952/16<br>954/6 954/22 954/23<br>956/2 956/18 956/23<br>958/16 967/8 967/19<br>970/8 978/24 979/5<br>985/3 985/4 985/4<br>985/8 986/15 990/1<br>990/20 996/8 998/4<br>998/5 1009/17 1010/5   | 1166/5 1167/18 1168/1 1168/6 1179/19 error [1] 931/3 escrow [1] 1103/11 especially [4] 1091/5 1101/7 1106/8 1126/7 ESQ [24] 928/2 928/4 928/5 928/6 928/6 928/6 928/7 928/9 928/11 928/12 928/12 928/14 928/15 928/14 928/15 928/15 928/18 928/18 928/18 928/19 928/21 928/21 928/22 928/22 essence [2] 943/9 1071/12 essentially [5] 934/4  |
| dynamic [2] 985/6<br>1047/10<br>dynamics [1] 985/12<br>E<br>each [10] 929/9 929/10<br>1030/20 1035/11<br>1094/17 1097/8 1139/8<br>1202/12 1202/16<br>1203/1<br>earlier [14] 957/15<br>985/14 987/22 1005/1<br>1035/1 1039/22 1080/5<br>1092/5 1097/2 1099/10<br>1120/12 1120/14<br>1178/5 1180/24<br>earliest [1] 1186/5<br>early [19] 940/3 940/9<br>999/24 1007/7 1020/15  | 1017/14 1161/1 elements [1] 1076/15 eliminate [1] 1010/10 eliminated [3] 1179/9 1201/13 1201/14 else [12] 974/2 1017/2 1017/4 1024/18 1050/6 1066/18 1140/12 1170/19 1170/23 1171/2 1178/22 1202/21 email [92] 932/21 934/6 935/8 938/23 938/23 939/14 941/13 942/16 942/17 943/19 945/21 945/24 946/17 947/16 948/4 955/2 955/3 955/4 955/6 955/7 955/11 957/3   | 1131/20 1132/6 1139/10 1143/20 1145/22 1155/4 1157/24 1159/4 1163/16 1177/5 1190/6 1206/3 1210/4 1210/20 1211/13 1213/10 ended [3] 1012/10 1162/23 1173/12 ending [2] 1123/12 1127/20 endorsement [2] 1069/6 1069/10 ends [2] 1124/16 1125/3 energy [14] 928/17 981/22 981/24 982/2 986/24 987/2 987/7  | entries [1] 1080/20<br>entry [2] 959/12 964/19<br>environment [2]<br>1008/4 1028/11<br>EPS [1] 1123/4<br>equal [2] 997/6 1101/4<br>equals [1] 1017/15<br>equity [122] 937/23<br>948/16 949/13 951/18<br>951/23 952/10 952/16<br>954/6 954/22 954/23<br>956/2 956/18 956/23<br>958/16 967/8 967/19<br>970/8 978/24 979/5<br>985/3 985/4 985/4<br>985/8 986/15 990/1<br>990/20 996/8 998/4<br>998/5 1009/17 1010/5<br>1010/10 1011/6   | 1166/5 1167/18 1168/1 1168/6 1179/19 error [1] 931/3 escrow [1] 1103/11 especially [4] 1091/5 1101/7 1106/8 1126/7 ESQ [24] 928/2 928/4 928/5 928/6 928/6 928/6 928/6 928/9 928/11 928/12 928/12 928/12 928/12 928/12 928/15 928/15 928/18 928/18 928/18 928/19 928/21 928/21 928/22 928/22 essence [2] 943/9 1071/12 essentially [5] 934/4 950/15 1199/7 1205/23  |
| dynamic [2] 985/6<br>1047/10<br>dynamics [1] 985/12<br>E<br>each [10] 929/9 929/10<br>1030/20 1035/11<br>1094/17 1097/8 1139/8<br>1202/12 1202/16<br>1203/1<br>earlier [14] 957/15<br>985/14 987/22 1005/1<br>1035/1 1039/22 1080/5<br>1092/5 1097/2 1099/10<br>1120/12 1120/14<br>1178/5 1180/24<br>earliest [1] 1186/5<br>early [19] 940/3 940/9<br>999/24 1007/7 1020/15<br>1020/18 1026/8  | 1017/14 1161/1 elements [1] 1076/15 eliminate [1] 1010/10 eliminated [3] 1179/9 1201/13 1201/14 else [12] 974/2 1017/2 1017/4 1024/18 1050/6 1066/18 1140/12 1170/19 1170/23 1171/2 1178/22 1202/21 email [92] 932/21 934/6 935/8 938/23 938/23 939/14 941/13 942/16 942/17 943/19 945/21 945/24 946/17 947/16 948/4 955/2 955/3 955/4 955/6 955/7 955/11 957/3 963/4 968/4 970/22  | 1131/20 1132/6 1139/10 1143/20 1145/22 1155/4 1157/24 1159/4 1163/16 1177/5 1190/6 1206/3 1210/4 1210/20 1211/13 1213/10 ended [3] 1012/10 1162/23 1173/12 ending [2] 1123/12 1127/20 endorsement [2] 1069/6 1069/10 ends [2] 1124/16 1125/3 energy [14] 928/17 981/22 981/24 982/2 986/24 987/2 987/7 998/15 1081/17 1094/2  | entries [1] 1080/20<br>entry [2] 959/12 964/19<br>environment [2]<br>1008/4 1028/11<br>EPS [1] 1123/4<br>equal [2] 997/6 1101/4<br>equals [1] 1017/15<br>equity [122] 937/23<br>948/16 949/13 951/18<br>951/23 952/10 952/16<br>954/6 954/22 954/23<br>956/2 956/18 956/23<br>958/16 967/8 967/19<br>970/8 978/24 979/5<br>985/3 985/4 985/4<br>985/8 986/15 990/1<br>990/20 996/8 998/4<br>998/5 1009/17 1010/5<br>1010/10 1011/6<br>1011/14 1012/5   | 1166/5 1167/18 1168/1 1168/6 1179/19 error [1] 931/3 escrow [1] 1103/11 especially [4] 1091/5 1101/7 1106/8 1126/7 ESQ [24] 928/2 928/2 928/4 928/5 928/6 928/6 928/6 928/7 928/9 928/11 928/12 928/12 928/14 928/15 928/15 928/18 928/18 928/19 928/21 928/21 928/22 essence [2] 943/9 1071/12 essentially [5] 934/4 950/15 1199/7 1205/23 1206/16  |
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| dynamic [2] 985/6 1047/10 dynamics [1] 985/12  E each [10] 929/9 929/10 1030/20 1035/11 1094/17 1097/8 1139/8 1202/12 1202/16 1203/1 earlier [14] 957/15 985/14 987/22 1005/1 1035/1 1039/22 1080/5 1092/5 1097/2 1099/10 1120/12 1120/14 1178/5 1180/24 earliest [1] 1186/5 early [19] 940/3 940/9 999/24 1007/7 1020/15 1020/18 1026/8 1028/17 1029/23 1031/6 1034/1 1034/2 1037/5 1051/13 1090/17 1091/24 1104/21 1138/8 1185/16 earnings [2] 1089/19 1090/4 easier [1] 1202/16                                     | 1017/14 1161/1 elements [1] 1076/15 eliminate [1] 1010/10 eliminated [3] 1179/9 1201/13 1201/14 else [12] 974/2 1017/2 1017/4 1024/18 1050/6 1066/18 1140/12 1170/19 1170/23 1171/2 1178/22 1202/21 email [92] 932/21 934/6 935/8 938/23 938/23 939/14 941/13 942/16 942/17 943/19 945/21 945/24 946/17 947/16 948/4 955/2 955/3 955/4 955/6 955/7 955/11 957/3 963/4 968/4 970/22 971/9 971/10 985/16 985/18 986/4 987/23 1000/22 1000/24 1002/7 1007/11 1007/17 1010/14 1013/7 1016/7 1017/20 1018/2 1018/7 1020/24 1023/5 1034/20 1037/9 1037/14 1040/2 1040/6   | 1131/20 1132/6 1139/10 1143/20 1145/22 1155/4 1157/24 1159/4 1163/16 1177/5 1190/6 1206/3 1210/4 1210/20 1211/13 1213/10 ended [3] 1012/10 1162/23 1173/12 ending [2] 1123/12 1127/20 endorsement [2] 1069/6 1069/10 ends [2] 1124/16 1125/3 energy [14] 928/17 981/22 981/24 982/2 986/24 987/2 987/7 998/15 1081/17 1094/2 1141/23 1142/21 1169/1 1208/5 engage [9] 955/22 965/15 965/17 1003/4 1011/10 1024/18 1082/24 1131/22 1155/14 engaged [2] 1024/23 1052/24                       | entries [1] 1080/20 entry [2] 959/12 964/19 environment [2] 1008/4 1028/11 EPS [1] 1123/4 equal [2] 997/6 1101/4 equals [1] 1017/15 equity [122] 937/23 948/16 949/13 951/18 951/23 952/10 952/16 954/6 954/22 954/23 956/2 956/18 956/23 958/16 967/8 967/19 970/8 978/24 979/5 985/3 985/4 985/4 985/8 986/15 990/1 990/20 996/8 998/4 998/5 1009/17 1010/5 1010/10 1011/6 1011/14 1012/5 1015/12 1016/1 1017/9 1021/10 1021/19 1025/3 1025/14 1025/16 1025/22 1026/5 1026/7 1026/21 1026/24 1027/2 1027/13 1028/3 1028/5 1028/15 1031/2 1031/12 1033/6 1033/7                 | 1166/5 1167/18 1168/1 1168/6 1179/19 error [1] 931/3 escrow [1] 1103/11 especially [4] 1091/5 1101/7 1106/8 1126/7 ESQ [24] 928/2 928/2 928/4 928/5 928/6 928/6 928/7 928/9 928/9 928/11 928/12 928/12 928/14 928/14 928/15 928/15 928/18 928/18 928/19 928/19 928/21 928/21 928/22 928/22 essence [2] 943/9 1071/12 essentially [5] 934/4 950/15 1199/7 1205/23 1206/16 estate [1] 993/13 estimate [4] 1124/1 1193/23 1211/11 1211/19 estimated [3] 1207/4 1207/5 1207/18 estimates [1] 1196/11 estimation [1] 1083/7                             |
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| dynamic [2] 985/6 1047/10 dynamics [1] 985/12  E each [10] 929/9 929/10 1030/20 1035/11 1094/17 1097/8 1139/8 1202/12 1202/16 1203/1 earlier [14] 957/15 985/14 987/22 1005/1 1035/1 1039/22 1080/5 1092/5 1097/2 1099/10 1120/12 1120/14 1178/5 1180/24 earliest [1] 1186/5 early [19] 940/3 940/9 999/24 1007/7 1020/15 1020/18 1026/8 1028/17 1029/23 1031/6 1034/1 1034/2 1037/5 1051/13 1090/17 1091/24 1104/21 1138/8 1185/16 earnings [2] 1089/19 1090/4 easier [1] 1202/16 easiest [1] 1197/9 easy [1] 1207/12 | 1017/14 1161/1 elements [1] 1076/15 eliminate [1] 1010/10 eliminated [3] 1179/9 1201/13 1201/14 else [12] 974/2 1017/2 1017/4 1024/18 1050/6 1066/18 1140/12 1170/19 1170/23 1171/2 1178/22 1202/21 email [92] 932/21 934/6 935/8 938/23 938/23 939/14 941/13 942/16 942/17 943/19 945/21 945/24 946/17 947/16 948/4 955/2 955/3 955/4 955/6 955/7 955/11 957/3 963/4 968/4 970/22 971/9 971/10 985/16 985/18 986/4 987/23 1000/22 1000/24 1002/7 1007/11 1007/17 1010/14 1013/7 1016/7 1017/20 1018/2 1018/7 1020/24 1023/5 1034/20 1037/9 1037/14 1040/2 1040/6 1041/9 1045/9 1057/12 1059/7 1060/4 1061/21 | 1131/20 1132/6 1139/10 1143/20 1145/22 1155/4 1157/24 1159/4 1163/16 1177/5 1190/6 1206/3 1210/4 1210/20 1211/13 1213/10 ended [3] 1012/10 1162/23 1173/12 ending [2] 1123/12 1127/20 endorsement [2] 1069/6 1069/10 ends [2] 1124/16 1125/3 energy [14] 928/17 981/22 981/24 982/2 986/24 987/2 987/7 998/15 1081/17 1094/2 1141/23 1142/21 1169/1 1208/5 engage [9] 955/22 965/15 965/17 1003/4 1011/10 1024/18 1082/24 1131/22 1155/14 engaged [2] 1024/23 1052/24 engagement [1] 965/17 | entries [1] 1080/20 entry [2] 959/12 964/19 environment [2] 1008/4 1028/11 EPS [1] 1123/4 equal [2] 997/6 1101/4 equals [1] 1017/15 equity [122] 937/23 948/16 949/13 951/18 951/23 952/10 952/16 954/6 954/22 954/23 956/2 956/18 956/23 958/16 967/8 967/19 970/8 978/24 979/5 985/3 985/4 985/4 985/8 986/15 990/1 990/20 996/8 998/4 998/5 1009/17 1010/5 1010/10 1011/6 1011/14 1012/5 1015/12 1016/1 1017/9 1021/10 1021/19 1025/3 1025/14 1025/16 1025/22 1026/5 1026/7 1026/21 1026/24 1027/2 1027/13 1028/3 1028/5 1031/12 1033/6 1033/7 1035/23 1036/2 1045/20 1056/21 | 1166/5 1167/18 1168/1 1168/6 1179/19 error [1] 931/3 escrow [1] 1103/11 especially [4] 1091/5 1101/7 1106/8 1126/7 ESQ [24] 928/2 928/2 928/4 928/5 928/6 928/6 928/6 928/7 928/9 928/11 928/12 928/12 928/14 928/15 928/15 928/18 928/15 928/15 928/18 928/19 928/21 928/21 928/22 essence [2] 943/9 1071/12 essentially [5] 934/4 950/15 1199/7 1205/23 1206/16 estate [1] 993/13 estimate [4] 1124/1 1193/23 1211/11 1211/19 estimated [3] 1207/4 1207/5 1207/18 estimates [1] 1196/11 estimation [1] 1083/7 esuscitate [1] 945/7 et [1] 968/16 |
| dynamic [2] 985/6 1047/10 dynamics [1] 985/12  E each [10] 929/9 929/10 1030/20 1035/11 1094/17 1097/8 1139/8 1202/12 1202/16 1203/1 earlier [14] 957/15 985/14 987/22 1005/1 1035/1 1039/22 1080/5 1092/5 1097/2 1099/10 1120/12 1120/14 1178/5 1180/24 earliest [1] 1186/5 early [19] 940/3 940/9 999/24 1007/7 1020/15 1020/18 1026/8 1028/17 1029/23 1031/6 1034/1 1034/2 1037/5 1051/13 1090/17 1091/24 1104/21 1138/8 1185/16 earnings [2] 1089/19 1090/4 easier [1] 1202/16 easiest [1] 1197/9                  | 1017/14 1161/1 elements [1] 1076/15 eliminate [1] 1010/10 eliminated [3] 1179/9 1201/13 1201/14 else [12] 974/2 1017/2 1017/4 1024/18 1050/6 1066/18 1140/12 1170/19 1170/23 1171/2 1178/22 1202/21 email [92] 932/21 934/6 935/8 938/23 938/23 939/14 941/13 942/16 942/17 943/19 945/21 945/24 946/17 947/16 948/4 955/2 955/3 955/4 955/6 955/7 955/11 957/3 963/4 968/4 970/22 971/9 971/10 985/16 985/18 986/4 987/23 1000/22 1000/24 1002/7 1007/11 1007/17 1010/14 1013/7 1016/7 1017/20 1018/2 1018/7 1020/24 1023/5 1034/20 1037/9 1037/14 1040/2 1040/6 1041/9 1045/9 1057/12                       | 1131/20 1132/6 1139/10 1143/20 1145/22 1155/4 1157/24 1159/4 1163/16 1177/5 1190/6 1206/3 1210/4 1210/20 1211/13 1213/10 ended [3] 1012/10 1162/23 1173/12 ending [2] 1123/12 1127/20 endorsement [2] 1069/6 1069/10 ends [2] 1124/16 1125/3 energy [14] 928/17 981/22 981/24 982/2 986/24 987/2 987/7 998/15 1081/17 1094/2 1141/23 1142/21 1169/1 1208/5 engage [9] 955/22 965/15 965/17 1003/4 1011/10 1024/18 1082/24 1131/22 1155/14 engaged [2] 1024/23 1052/24 engagement [1]        | entries [1] 1080/20 entry [2] 959/12 964/19 environment [2] 1008/4 1028/11 EPS [1] 1123/4 equal [2] 997/6 1101/4 equals [1] 1017/15 equity [122] 937/23 948/16 949/13 951/18 951/23 952/10 952/16 954/6 954/22 954/23 956/2 956/18 956/23 958/16 967/8 967/19 970/8 978/24 979/5 985/3 985/4 985/4 985/8 986/15 990/1 990/20 996/8 998/4 998/5 1009/17 1010/5 1010/10 1011/6 1011/14 1012/5 1015/12 1016/1 1017/9 1021/10 1021/19 1025/3 1025/14 1025/16 1025/22 1026/5 1026/7 1026/21 1026/24 1027/2 1027/13 1028/3 1028/5 1031/12 1033/6 1033/7 1035/23 1036/2 1045/20 1056/21 | 1166/5 1167/18 1168/1 1168/6 1179/19 error [1] 931/3 escrow [1] 1103/11 especially [4] 1091/5 1101/7 1106/8 1126/7 ESQ [24] 928/2 928/4 928/5 928/6 928/6 928/6 928/7 928/9 928/11 928/12 928/12 928/14 928/15 928/15 928/18 928/15 928/15 928/18 928/19 928/21 928/21 928/21 928/22 essence [2] 943/9 1071/12 essentially [5] 934/4 950/15 1199/7 1205/23 1206/16 estate [1] 993/13 estimate [4] 1124/1 1193/23 1211/11 1211/19 estimated [3] 1207/4 1207/5 1207/18 estimates [1] 1196/11 estimation [1] 1083/7 esuscitate [1] 945/7              |

| E  | 1119/20 1131/13   | 1043/8 1045/8 1051/5  | 1031/19 1032/12  | fact [20] 951/1 952/15  |
|--|---|---|--|---|
|  | 1197/18 1198/12   | 1052/5 1057/11  | 1085/12 1184/9   | 965/23 976/15 983/13  |
| <b>evaluate [2]</b> 1073/10  | excited [1] 984/18  | 1058/12 1059/6 1060/3   | expecting [1] 1013/21  | 988/6 995/16 1001/16  |
| 1090/1   |   |   |  |   |
| evaluating [2] 1018/11   | excluded [2] 1209/20  | 1061/20 1063/8  | expedited [1] 1042/19  | 1024/8 1045/20  |
| 1089/23  | 1209/21   | 1064/23 1065/16   | expenditure [1] 1174/6   |   |
| evaluation [1] 1090/2  | exclusive [1] 1035/15   | 1067/3 1070/3 1071/4  | expenditures [3] 985/8   | 1122/20 1124/8  |
|  | exclusivity [30] 948/18   | 1072/10 1077/23   | 1206/19 1210/6   | 1173/19 1185/21   |
| eve [2] 1040/23 1042/7   | 948/21 949/6 949/7  | 1078/14 1080/13   | expenses [1] 1206/17   | 1199/21 1208/18   |
| even [16] 947/9 1011/5   |   |   |  |   |
| 1011/7 1027/20   | 949/13 1040/16  | 1080/14 1080/15   | expensive [1] 1099/12  | 1213/12 1213/18   |
| 1028/22 1043/6   | 1042/20 1044/12   | 1081/9 1081/9 1081/12   | experience [3] 984/6   | factoring [1] 1212/6  |
| 1049/20 1053/8   | 1044/16 1044/22   | 1136/7 1139/17  | 1019/5 1171/22   | factors [3] 1083/18   |
|  | 1045/5 1048/2 1048/7  | 1147/13 1149/4  | experienced [1] 986/1  | 1113/3 1190/22  |
| 1066/16 1076/11  | 1048/16 1048/23   | 1151/14 1151/15   | experiencing [1] 984/5   |   |
| 1078/9 1080/6 1106/7   | 1065/20 1084/5  | 1164/5 1168/5 1183/24   | expert [3] 1193/18   | fair [28] 937/8 937/11  |
| 1118/23 1126/8   |   |   |  |   |
| 1173/18  | 1084/12 1084/17   | 1185/7 1188/3 1188/16   | 1194/21 1195/2   | 939/18 945/17 945/22  |
| evening [1] 947/18   | 1150/9 1150/10  | Exhibit 1 [1] 1081/9  | <b>experts [3]</b> 1075/8  | 945/23 948/13 948/17  |
| evening's [2] 945/1  | 1150/11 1150/13   | Exhibit 1057 [1]  | 1075/8 1079/16   | 972/4 987/12 1012/12  |
|  | 1150/18 1151/1  | 1071/4  | <b>expiration</b> [1] 948/24   | 1021/21 1045/5 1082/9   |
| 971/2  | 1153/16 1154/12   | Exhibit 1064 [1] 968/1  | <b>expired [5]</b> 948/18  | 1109/3 1134/19  |
| event [3] 1103/9   | 1155/12 1155/12   | Exhibit 1087 [1]  | 948/21 948/24 949/8  | 1137/22 1139/24   |
| 1168/9 1199/22   | 1155/14   | 970/23  | 949/13   | 1140/13 1142/16   |
| events [2] 953/19  |   |   |  |   |
| 991/14   | <b>Excuse [4]</b> 945/7   | Exhibit 1114 [1]  | explain [5] 942/2  | 1146/3 1146/17  |
| eventually [2] 1129/7  | 971/21 979/1 1030/10  | 1070/3  | 1012/16 1022/20  | 1146/21 1147/6  |
| 1146/1   | excused [3] 1086/23   | Exhibit 1120 [1]  | 1202/21 1213/3   | 1149/14 1150/16   |
|  | 1133/13 1192/8  | 957/16  | <b>explained [2]</b> 1118/19   | 1165/11 1191/6  |
| everybody [8] 929/23   | execute [9] 1006/2  | Exhibit 114 [1] 992/8   | 1153/4   | fairly [4] 930/9 1001/4   |
| 943/21 1031/22 1065/6  |   | Exhibit 143 [1]   | <b>explaining [2]</b> 1044/7   | 1038/17 1207/12   |
| 1069/9 1140/12   | 1112/9 1117/22 1118/5   |   | 1191/3   | fairness [6] 957/19   |
| 1178/15 1178/21  | 1118/14 1121/8  | Exhibit 1496 [1]  |  | 958/2 958/9 1068/1  |
| <b>everyone [5]</b> 929/1  |   |   | explicit [1] 1021/16   |   |
| 1004/2 1032/1 1069/3   | executed [1] 983/12   | 966/20  | explicitly [1] 1021/17   | 1168/14 1193/9  |
| 1214/8   | execution [10] 931/24   | Exhibit 154 [1] 1002/6  | <b>exploded [1]</b> 935/14   | fall [2] 1166/4 1172/23   |
| everything [2] 1152/8  | 1113/14 1113/20   | Exhibit 1778 [1]  | <b>explore [2]</b> 1010/8  | falling [1] 1077/20   |
| 1152/14  | 1114/4 1115/6 1130/4  | 953/12  | 1048/10  | false [3] 1082/2 1082/3   |
| evidence [2] 979/15  | 1130/8 1130/16 1201/7   | Exhibit 1779 [1]  | explored [1] 1095/11   | 1082/5  |
|  | 1201/13   | 958/19  | <b>exploring [1]</b> 1012/13   | family [10] 963/23  |
| 979/22   | executive [12] 959/5  | Exhibit 182 [1] 1003/6  | export [1] 987/10  | 964/3 964/12 964/21   |
| evolve [1] 1007/5  | 982/6 982/9 982/17  | Exhibit 183 [1] 995/1   | express [1] 963/18   | 965/3 965/22 1149/8   |
| <b>exact [3]</b> 948/23  | 988/23 990/23 992/23  | Exhibit 191 [2] 949/24  | expressed [1] 956/16   | 1149/15 1149/15   |
| 962/24 1052/20   | 1004/16 1004/22   | 1072/10   | expressing [2] 1021/3  | 1149/17   |
| exactly [12] 929/8   |   |   |  | far [4] 1008/12 1046/17   |
| 966/6 1008/14 1025/11  | 1043/16 1088/2  |   |  |   |
| 1027/7 1052/15   | 1088/17   |   | <b>expression</b> [1] 1042/9   |   |
| 1057/22 1069/15  |   | Exhibit 573 [1] 934/7   | expressions [1]  | far-right [1] 1046/17   |
| 1083/14 1137/21  | 1183/12   | Exhibit 575 [1] 935/6   | 1149/22  | Fargo [30] 943/3  |
| 1145/10 1174/20  | <b>exercise [4]</b> 1048/13   | Exhibit 590 [1] 936/16  | extend [2] 940/17  | 943/24 956/21 957/3   |
|  | 1117/2 1178/1 1204/1  |   |  |   |
| examination [12]   | 1111/2 11/0/1 120 1/1   | <b>Exhibit 594 [2]</b> 937/16   | 1154/11  | 957/8 957/11 957/14   |
| 930/4 980/10 1046/4  |   |   |  | 957/8 957/11 957/14   |
|  | exercised [2] 1129/11   | 938/21  | <b>extended [3]</b> 949/7  | 957/8 957/11 957/14<br>957/19 957/20 958/1  |
| 1080/6 1082/20 1087/5  | <b>exercised [2]</b> 1129/11 1129/19  | 938/21<br>Exhibit 599 [1]   | <b>extended [3]</b> 949/7 1045/1 1139/22   | 957/8 957/11 957/14<br>957/19 957/20 958/1<br>958/2 961/13 1049/24  |
|  | exercised [2] 1129/11<br>1129/19<br>exhibit [86] 934/7  | 938/21<br>Exhibit 599 [1]<br>1139/17  | extended [3] 949/7<br>1045/1 1139/22<br>extending [1] 1155/12  | 957/8 957/11 957/14<br>957/19 957/20 958/1<br>958/2 961/13 1049/24<br>1050/4 1050/5 1061/21   |
| 1080/6 1082/20 1087/5  | exercised [2] 1129/11<br>1129/19<br>exhibit [86] 934/7<br>935/6 936/16 937/16   | 938/21<br><b>Exhibit 599 [1]</b><br>1139/17<br><b>Exhibit 889 [1]</b> 944/7   | extended [3] 949/7<br>1045/1 1139/22<br>extending [1] 1155/12<br>extensive [2] 1014/18   | 957/8 957/11 957/14<br>957/19 957/20 958/1<br>958/2 961/13 1049/24<br>1050/4 1050/5 1061/21<br>1150/22 1151/10  |
| 1080/6 1082/20 1087/5<br>1121/15 1134/1  | exercised [2] 1129/11<br>1129/19<br>exhibit [86] 934/7<br>935/6 936/16 937/16<br>938/21 944/7 949/24  | 938/21<br>Exhibit 599 [1]<br>1139/17<br>Exhibit 889 [1] 944/7<br>Exhibit 952 [1] 961/11   | extended [3] 949/7<br>1045/1 1139/22<br>extending [1] 1155/12<br>extensive [2] 1014/18<br>1039/15  | 957/8 957/11 957/14<br>957/19 957/20 958/1<br>958/2 961/13 1049/24<br>1050/4 1050/5 1061/21<br>1150/22 1151/10<br>1164/1 1165/15 1166/2   |
| 1080/6 1082/20 1087/5<br>1121/15 1134/1<br>1160/14 1187/19<br>1191/17 1192/18  | exercised [2] 1129/11<br>1129/19<br>exhibit [86] 934/7<br>935/6 936/16 937/16<br>938/21 944/7 949/24<br>953/12 955/5 957/2  | 938/21<br>Exhibit 599 [1]<br>1139/17<br>Exhibit 889 [1] 944/7<br>Exhibit 952 [1] 961/11<br>Exhibit 956 [1] 957/2  | extended [3] 949/7<br>1045/1 1139/22<br>extending [1] 1155/12<br>extensive [2] 1014/18<br>1039/15<br>extent [3] 984/2 1174/4   | 957/8 957/11 957/14<br>957/19 957/20 958/1<br>958/2 961/13 1049/24<br>1050/4 1050/5 1061/21<br>1150/22 1151/10<br>1164/1 1165/15 1166/2<br>1166/5 1167/12   |
| 1080/6 1082/20 1087/5<br>1121/15 1134/1<br>1160/14 1187/19<br>1191/17 1192/18<br>examined [3] 1087/4   | exercised [2] 1129/11<br>1129/19<br>exhibit [86] 934/7<br>935/6 936/16 937/16<br>938/21 944/7 949/24  | 938/21<br>Exhibit 599 [1]<br>1139/17<br>Exhibit 889 [1] 944/7<br>Exhibit 952 [1] 961/11<br>Exhibit 956 [1] 957/2<br>Exhibit 958 [1] 955/5   | extended [3] 949/7<br>1045/1 1139/22<br>extending [1] 1155/12<br>extensive [2] 1014/18<br>1039/15<br>extent [3] 984/2 1174/4<br>1174/6   | 957/8 957/11 957/14<br>957/19 957/20 958/1<br>958/2 961/13 1049/24<br>1050/4 1050/5 1061/21<br>1150/22 1151/10<br>1164/1 1165/15 1166/2   |
| 1080/6 1082/20 1087/5<br>1121/15 1134/1<br>1160/14 1187/19<br>1191/17 1192/18<br>examined [3] 1087/4<br>1133/20 1192/17  | exercised [2] 1129/11<br>1129/19<br>exhibit [86] 934/7<br>935/6 936/16 937/16<br>938/21 944/7 949/24<br>953/12 955/5 957/2  | 938/21<br>Exhibit 599 [1]<br>1139/17<br>Exhibit 889 [1] 944/7<br>Exhibit 952 [1] 961/11<br>Exhibit 956 [1] 957/2  | extended [3] 949/7<br>1045/1 1139/22<br>extending [1] 1155/12<br>extensive [2] 1014/18<br>1039/15<br>extent [3] 984/2 1174/4   | 957/8 957/11 957/14<br>957/19 957/20 958/1<br>958/2 961/13 1049/24<br>1050/4 1050/5 1061/21<br>1150/22 1151/10<br>1164/1 1165/15 1166/2<br>1166/5 1167/12   |
| 1080/6 1082/20 1087/5<br>1121/15 1134/1<br>1160/14 1187/19<br>1191/17 1192/18<br>examined [3] 1087/4<br>1133/20 1192/17<br>example [5] 1023/8  | exercised [2] 1129/11<br>1129/19<br>exhibit [86] 934/7<br>935/6 936/16 937/16<br>938/21 944/7 949/24<br>953/12 955/5 957/2<br>957/16 958/19 961/11  | 938/21<br>Exhibit 599 [1]<br>1139/17<br>Exhibit 889 [1] 944/7<br>Exhibit 952 [1] 961/11<br>Exhibit 956 [1] 957/2<br>Exhibit 958 [1] 955/5<br>Exhibit 986 [1] 963/15   | extended [3] 949/7<br>1045/1 1139/22<br>extending [1] 1155/12<br>extensive [2] 1014/18<br>1039/15<br>extent [3] 984/2 1174/4<br>1174/6   | 957/8 957/11 957/14<br>957/19 957/20 958/1<br>958/2 961/13 1049/24<br>1050/4 1050/5 1061/21<br>1150/22 1151/10<br>1164/1 1165/15 1166/2<br>1166/5 1167/12<br>1167/15 1168/10  |
| 1080/6 1082/20 1087/5<br>1121/15 1134/1<br>1160/14 1187/19<br>1191/17 1192/18<br>examined [3] 1087/4<br>1133/20 1192/17<br>example [5] 1023/8<br>1100/11 1123/5  | exercised [2] 1129/11<br>1129/19<br>exhibit [86] 934/7<br>935/6 936/16 937/16<br>938/21 944/7 949/24<br>953/12 955/5 957/2<br>957/16 958/19 961/11<br>963/15 966/20 968/1   | 938/21 Exhibit 599 [1] 1139/17 Exhibit 889 [1] 944/7 Exhibit 952 [1] 961/11 Exhibit 956 [1] 957/2 Exhibit 958 [1] 955/5 Exhibit 986 [1] 963/15 exhibits [1] 979/21  | extended [3] 949/7<br>1045/1 1139/22<br>extending [1] 1155/12<br>extensive [2] 1014/18<br>1039/15<br>extent [3] 984/2 1174/4<br>1174/6<br>external [3] 933/20  | 957/8 957/11 957/14<br>957/19 957/20 958/1<br>958/2 961/13 1049/24<br>1050/4 1050/5 1061/21<br>1150/22 1151/10<br>1164/1 1165/15 1166/2<br>1166/5 1167/12<br>1167/15 1168/10<br>1169/18 1169/23   |
| 1080/6 1082/20 1087/5<br>1121/15 1134/1<br>1160/14 1187/19<br>1191/17 1192/18<br>examined [3] 1087/4<br>1133/20 1192/17<br>example [5] 1023/8<br>1100/11 1123/5<br>1174/17 1213/12   | exercised [2] 1129/11<br>1129/19<br>exhibit [86] 934/7<br>935/6 936/16 937/16<br>938/21 944/7 949/24<br>953/12 955/5 957/2<br>957/16 958/19 961/11<br>963/15 966/20 968/1<br>970/23 979/14 985/15<br>989/3 989/4 992/8  | 938/21 Exhibit 599 [1] 1139/17 Exhibit 889 [1] 944/7 Exhibit 952 [1] 961/11 Exhibit 956 [1] 955/2 Exhibit 958 [1] 963/15 exhibits [1] 979/21 exist [1] 1002/1   | extended [3] 949/7<br>1045/1 1139/22<br>extending [1] 1155/12<br>extensive [2] 1014/18<br>1039/15<br>extent [3] 984/2 1174/4<br>1174/6<br>external [3] 933/20<br>933/20 1187/16  | 957/8 957/11 957/14<br>957/19 957/20 958/1<br>958/2 961/13 1049/24<br>1050/4 1050/5 1061/21<br>1150/22 1151/10<br>1164/1 1165/15 1166/2<br>1166/5 1167/12<br>1167/15 1168/10<br>1169/18 1169/23<br>1170/18 1170/22<br>1179/17   |
| 1080/6 1082/20 1087/5<br>1121/15 1134/1<br>1160/14 1187/19<br>1191/17 1192/18<br>examined [3] 1087/4<br>1133/20 1192/17<br>example [5] 1023/8<br>1100/11 1123/5<br>1174/17 1213/12<br>exceed [1] 1126/14   | exercised [2] 1129/11<br>1129/19<br>exhibit [86] 934/7<br>935/6 936/16 937/16<br>938/21 944/7 949/24<br>953/12 955/5 957/2<br>957/16 958/19 961/11<br>963/15 966/20 968/1<br>970/23 979/14 985/15<br>989/3 989/4 992/8<br>992/9 995/1 996/24  | 938/21 Exhibit 599 [1] 1139/17 Exhibit 889 [1] 944/7 Exhibit 952 [1] 961/11 Exhibit 956 [1] 957/2 Exhibit 958 [1] 955/5 Exhibit 986 [1] 963/15 exhibits [1] 979/21 exist [1] 1002/1 existed [1] 1212/5  | extended [3] 949/7<br>1045/1 1139/22<br>extending [1] 1155/12<br>extensive [2] 1014/18<br>1039/15<br>extent [3] 984/2 1174/4<br>1174/6<br>external [3] 933/20<br>933/20 1187/16<br>extraordinarily [1]<br>1053/7   | 957/8 957/11 957/14<br>957/19 957/20 958/1<br>958/2 961/13 1049/24<br>1050/4 1050/5 1061/21<br>1150/22 1151/10<br>1164/1 1165/15 1166/2<br>1166/5 1167/12<br>1167/15 1168/10<br>1169/18 1169/23<br>1170/18 1170/22<br>1179/17<br>Fargo's [3] 958/9  |
| 1080/6 1082/20 1087/5 1121/15 1134/1 1160/14 1187/19 1191/17 1192/18 examined [3] 1087/4 1133/20 1192/17 example [5] 1023/8 1100/11 1123/5 1174/17 1213/12 exceed [1] 1126/14 exceeded [1] 1210/6  | exercised [2] 1129/11<br>1129/19<br>exhibit [86] 934/7<br>935/6 936/16 937/16<br>938/21 944/7 949/24<br>953/12 955/5 957/2<br>957/16 958/19 961/11<br>963/15 966/20 968/1<br>970/23 979/14 985/15<br>989/3 989/4 992/8<br>992/9 995/1 996/24<br>1000/21 1002/6  | 938/21 Exhibit 599 [1] 1139/17 Exhibit 889 [1] 944/7 Exhibit 952 [1] 961/11 Exhibit 956 [1] 957/2 Exhibit 958 [1] 955/5 Exhibit 986 [1] 963/15 exhibits [1] 979/21 exist [1] 1002/1 existed [1] 1212/5 exit [5] 1049/13 1050/1  | extended [3] 949/7<br>1045/1 1139/22<br>extending [1] 1155/12<br>extensive [2] 1014/18<br>1039/15<br>extent [3] 984/2 1174/4<br>1174/6<br>external [3] 933/20<br>933/20 1187/16<br>extraordinarily [1]<br>1053/7<br>extraordinary [1]  | 957/8 957/11 957/14<br>957/19 957/20 958/1<br>958/2 961/13 1049/24<br>1050/4 1050/5 1061/21<br>1150/22 1151/10<br>1164/1 1165/15 1166/2<br>1166/5 1167/12<br>1167/15 1168/10<br>1169/18 1169/23<br>1170/18 1170/22<br>1179/17<br>Fargo's [3] 958/9<br>1165/19 1169/24   |
| 1080/6 1082/20 1087/5 1121/15 1134/1 1160/14 1187/19 1191/17 1192/18 examined [3] 1087/4 1133/20 1192/17 example [5] 1023/8 1100/11 1123/5 1174/17 1213/12 exceed [1] 1126/14 exceeded [1] 1210/6 except [1] 1195/1  | exercised [2] 1129/11<br>1129/19<br>exhibit [86] 934/7<br>935/6 936/16 937/16<br>938/21 944/7 949/24<br>953/12 955/5 957/2<br>957/16 958/19 961/11<br>963/15 966/20 968/1<br>970/23 979/14 985/15<br>989/3 989/4 992/8<br>992/9 995/1 996/24<br>1000/21 1002/6<br>1002/16 1003/6 1004/7   | 938/21 Exhibit 599 [1] 1139/17 Exhibit 889 [1] 944/7 Exhibit 952 [1] 961/11 Exhibit 956 [1] 957/2 Exhibit 958 [1] 955/5 Exhibit 986 [1] 963/15 exhibits [1] 979/21 exist [1] 1002/1 existed [1] 1212/5 exit [5] 1049/13 1050/1 1051/23 1170/12  | extended [3] 949/7<br>1045/1 1139/22<br>extending [1] 1155/12<br>extensive [2] 1014/18<br>1039/15<br>extent [3] 984/2 1174/4<br>1174/6<br>external [3] 933/20<br>933/20 1187/16<br>extraordinarily [1]<br>1053/7<br>extraordinary [1]<br>984/10  | 957/8 957/11 957/14<br>957/19 957/20 958/1<br>958/2 961/13 1049/24<br>1050/4 1050/5 1061/21<br>1150/22 1151/10<br>1164/1 1165/15 1166/2<br>1166/5 1167/12<br>1167/15 1168/10<br>1169/18 1169/23<br>1170/18 1170/22<br>1179/17<br>Fargo's [3] 958/9<br>1165/19 1169/24<br>Farrell [13] 1000/1  |
| 1080/6 1082/20 1087/5 1121/15 1134/1 1160/14 1187/19 1191/17 1192/18 examined [3] 1087/4 1133/20 1192/17 example [5] 1023/8 1100/11 1123/5 1174/17 1213/12 exceed [1] 1126/14 exceeded [1] 1210/6  | exercised [2] 1129/11<br>1129/19<br>exhibit [86] 934/7<br>935/6 936/16 937/16<br>938/21 944/7 949/24<br>953/12 955/5 957/2<br>957/16 958/19 961/11<br>963/15 966/20 968/1<br>970/23 979/14 985/15<br>989/3 989/4 992/8<br>992/9 995/1 996/24<br>1000/21 1002/6<br>1002/16 1003/6 1004/7<br>1005/16 1007/10  | 938/21 Exhibit 599 [1] 1139/17 Exhibit 889 [1] 944/7 Exhibit 952 [1] 961/11 Exhibit 956 [1] 957/2 Exhibit 958 [1] 955/5 Exhibit 986 [1] 963/15 exhibits [1] 979/21 exist [1] 1002/1 existed [1] 1212/5 exit [5] 1049/13 1050/1 1051/23 1170/12 1170/19  | extended [3] 949/7<br>1045/1 1139/22<br>extending [1] 1155/12<br>extensive [2] 1014/18<br>1039/15<br>extent [3] 984/2 1174/4<br>1174/6<br>external [3] 933/20<br>933/20 1187/16<br>extraordinarily [1]<br>1053/7<br>extraordinary [1]  | 957/8 957/11 957/14<br>957/19 957/20 958/1<br>958/2 961/13 1049/24<br>1050/4 1050/5 1061/21<br>1150/22 1151/10<br>1164/1 1165/15 1166/2<br>1166/5 1167/12<br>1167/15 1168/10<br>1169/18 1169/23<br>1170/18 1170/22<br>1179/17<br>Fargo's [3] 958/9<br>1165/19 1169/24<br>Farrell [13] 1000/1<br>1001/10 1002/12   |
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| 1080/6 1082/20 1087/5 1121/15 1134/1 1160/14 1187/19 1191/17 1192/18 examined [3] 1087/4 1133/20 1192/17 example [5] 1023/8 1100/11 1123/5 1174/17 1213/12 exceed [1] 1126/14 exceeded [1] 1210/6 except [1] 980/5   | exercised [2] 1129/11 1129/19 exhibit [86] 934/7 935/6 936/16 937/16 938/21 944/7 949/24 953/12 955/5 957/2 957/16 958/19 961/11 963/15 966/20 968/1 970/23 979/14 985/15 989/3 989/4 992/8 992/9 995/1 996/24 1000/21 1002/6 1002/16 1003/6 1004/7 1005/16 1007/10 1007/11 1008/8 1009/9 1009/14 1010/12   | 938/21 Exhibit 599 [1] 1139/17 Exhibit 889 [1] 944/7 Exhibit 952 [1] 961/11 Exhibit 956 [1] 957/2 Exhibit 958 [1] 955/5 Exhibit 986 [1] 963/15 exhibits [1] 979/21 exist [1] 1002/1 existed [1] 1212/5 exit [5] 1049/13 1050/1 1051/23 1170/12 1170/19 expect [8] 984/5 1026/18 1031/15   | extended [3] 949/7<br>1045/1 1139/22<br>extending [1] 1155/12<br>extensive [2] 1014/18<br>1039/15<br>extent [3] 984/2 1174/4<br>1174/6<br>external [3] 933/20<br>933/20 1187/16<br>extraordinarily [1]<br>1053/7<br>extraordinary [1]<br>984/10<br>eye [1] 1151/3  | 957/8 957/11 957/14<br>957/19 957/20 958/1<br>958/2 961/13 1049/24<br>1050/4 1050/5 1061/21<br>1150/22 1151/10<br>1164/1 1165/15 1166/2<br>1166/5 1167/12<br>1167/15 1168/10<br>1169/18 1169/23<br>1170/18 1170/22<br>1179/17<br>Fargo's [3] 958/9<br>1165/19 1169/24<br>Farrell [13] 1000/1<br>1001/10 1002/12<br>1002/18 1011/22<br>1012/1 1014/8 1016/14   |
| 1080/6 1082/20 1087/5 1121/15 1134/1 1160/14 1187/19 1191/17 1192/18 examined [3] 1087/4 1133/20 1192/17 example [5] 1023/8 1100/11 1123/5 1174/17 1213/12 exceed [1] 1126/14 exceeded [1] 1210/6 except [1] 980/5 exchange [20] 950/14  | exercised [2] 1129/11 1129/19 exhibit [86] 934/7 935/6 936/16 937/16 938/21 944/7 949/24 953/12 955/5 957/2 957/16 958/19 961/11 963/15 966/20 968/1 970/23 979/14 985/15 989/3 989/4 992/8 992/9 995/1 996/24 1000/21 1002/6 1002/16 1003/6 1004/7 1005/16 1007/10 1007/11 1008/8 1009/9 1009/14 1010/12 1013/6 1016/6 1018/1  | 938/21 Exhibit 599 [1] 1139/17 Exhibit 889 [1] 944/7 Exhibit 952 [1] 961/11 Exhibit 956 [1] 957/2 Exhibit 958 [1] 955/5 Exhibit 986 [1] 963/15 exhibits [1] 979/21 exist [1] 1002/1 existed [1] 1212/5 exit [5] 1049/13 1050/1 1051/23 1170/12 1170/19 expect [8] 984/5 1026/18 1031/15 1051/21 1064/6  | extended [3] 949/7<br>1045/1 1139/22<br>extending [1] 1155/12<br>extensive [2] 1014/18<br>1039/15<br>extent [3] 984/2 1174/4<br>1174/6<br>external [3] 933/20<br>933/20 1187/16<br>extraordinarily [1]<br>1053/7<br>extraordinary [1]<br>984/10<br>eye [1] 1151/3<br>F<br>face [1] 1036/2  | 957/8 957/11 957/14<br>957/19 957/20 958/1<br>958/2 961/13 1049/24<br>1050/4 1050/5 1061/21<br>1150/22 1151/10<br>1164/1 1165/15 1166/2<br>1166/5 1167/12<br>1167/15 1168/10<br>1169/18 1169/23<br>1170/18 1170/22<br>1179/17<br>Fargo's [3] 958/9<br>1165/19 1169/24<br>Farrell [13] 1000/1<br>1001/10 1002/12<br>1002/18 1011/22<br>1012/1 1014/8 1016/14<br>1016/18 1016/19  |
| 1080/6 1082/20 1087/5 1121/15 1134/1 1160/14 1187/19 1191/17 1192/18 examined [3] 1087/4 1133/20 1192/17 example [5] 1023/8 1100/11 1123/5 1174/17 1213/12 exceed [1] 1126/14 exceeded [1] 1210/6 except [1] 1195/1 excerpt [1] 980/5 exchange [20] 950/14 953/19 981/17 1007/6 1007/12 1037/9   | exercised [2] 1129/11 1129/19 exhibit [86] 934/7 935/6 936/16 937/16 938/21 944/7 949/24 953/12 955/5 957/2 957/16 958/19 961/11 963/15 966/20 968/1 970/23 979/14 985/15 989/3 989/4 992/8 992/9 995/1 996/24 1000/21 1002/6 1002/16 1003/6 1004/7 1005/16 1007/10 1007/11 1008/8 1009/9 1009/14 1010/12 1013/6 1016/6 1018/1 1022/6 1022/8 1022/14                                | 938/21 Exhibit 599 [1] 1139/17 Exhibit 889 [1] 944/7 Exhibit 952 [1] 961/11 Exhibit 956 [1] 957/2 Exhibit 958 [1] 955/5 Exhibit 986 [1] 963/15 exhibits [1] 979/21 exist [1] 1002/1 existed [1] 1212/5 exit [5] 1049/13 1050/1 1051/23 1170/12 1170/19 expect [8] 984/5 1026/18 1031/15 1051/21 1064/6 1071/16 1074/2 1190/6                          | extended [3] 949/7<br>1045/1 1139/22<br>extending [1] 1155/12<br>extensive [2] 1014/18<br>1039/15<br>extent [3] 984/2 1174/4<br>1174/6<br>external [3] 933/20<br>933/20 1187/16<br>extraordinarily [1]<br>1053/7<br>extraordinary [1]<br>984/10<br>eye [1] 1151/3<br>F<br>face [1] 1036/2<br>facilities [2] 1099/12                                    | 957/8 957/11 957/14<br>957/19 957/20 958/1<br>958/2 961/13 1049/24<br>1050/4 1050/5 1061/21<br>1150/22 1151/10<br>1164/1 1165/15 1166/2<br>1166/5 1167/12<br>1167/15 1168/10<br>1169/18 1169/23<br>1170/18 1170/22<br>1179/17<br>Fargo's [3] 958/9<br>1165/19 1169/24<br>Farrell [13] 1000/1<br>1001/10 1002/12<br>1002/18 1011/22<br>1012/1 1014/8 1016/14<br>1016/18 1016/19<br>1018/22 1019/3 1021/9                                 |
| 1080/6 1082/20 1087/5 1121/15 1134/1 1160/14 1187/19 1191/17 1192/18 examined [3] 1087/4 1133/20 1192/17 example [5] 1023/8 1100/11 1123/5 1174/17 1213/12 exceed [1] 1126/14 exceeded [1] 1210/6 except [1] 1195/1 excerpt [1] 980/5 exchange [20] 950/14 953/19 981/17 1007/6 1007/12 1037/9 1063/21 1064/2 1093/2                                 | exercised [2] 1129/11 1129/19 exhibit [86] 934/7 935/6 936/16 937/16 938/21 944/7 949/24 953/12 955/5 957/2 957/16 958/19 961/11 963/15 966/20 968/1 970/23 979/14 985/15 989/3 989/4 992/8 992/9 995/1 996/24 1000/21 1002/6 1002/16 1003/6 1004/7 1005/16 1007/10 1007/11 1008/8 1009/9 1009/14 1010/12 1013/6 1016/6 1018/1 1022/6 1022/8 1022/14 1023/4 1023/20                 | 938/21 Exhibit 599 [1] 1139/17 Exhibit 889 [1] 944/7 Exhibit 952 [1] 961/11 Exhibit 956 [1] 957/2 Exhibit 958 [1] 955/5 Exhibit 986 [1] 963/15 exhibits [1] 979/21 exist [1] 1002/1 existed [1] 1212/5 exit [5] 1049/13 1050/1 1051/23 1170/12 1170/19 expect [8] 984/5 1026/18 1031/15 1051/21 1064/6 1071/16 1074/2 1190/6 expectations [1]         | extended [3] 949/7<br>1045/1 1139/22<br>extending [1] 1155/12<br>extensive [2] 1014/18<br>1039/15<br>extent [3] 984/2 1174/4<br>1174/6<br>external [3] 933/20<br>933/20 1187/16<br>extraordinarily [1]<br>1053/7<br>extraordinary [1]<br>984/10<br>eye [1] 1151/3<br>F<br>face [1] 1036/2<br>facilities [2] 1099/12<br>1167/17                         | 957/8 957/11 957/14<br>957/19 957/20 958/1<br>958/2 961/13 1049/24<br>1050/4 1050/5 1061/21<br>1150/22 1151/10<br>1164/1 1165/15 1166/2<br>1166/5 1167/12<br>1167/15 1168/10<br>1169/18 1169/23<br>1170/18 1170/22<br>1179/17<br>Fargo's [3] 958/9<br>1165/19 1169/24<br>Farrell [13] 1000/1<br>1001/10 1002/12<br>1002/18 1011/22<br>1012/1 1014/8 1016/14<br>1016/18 1016/19<br>1018/22 1019/3 1021/9<br>fashion [2] 966/15           |
| 1080/6 1082/20 1087/5 1121/15 1134/1 1160/14 1187/19 1191/17 1192/18 examined [3] 1087/4 1133/20 1192/17 example [5] 1023/8 1100/11 1123/5 1174/17 1213/12 exceed [1] 1126/14 exceeded [1] 1210/6 except [1] 1195/1 excerpt [1] 980/5 exchange [20] 950/14 953/19 981/17 1007/6 1007/12 1037/9 1063/21 1064/2 1093/2 1104/14 1112/13                 | exercised [2] 1129/11 1129/19 exhibit [86] 934/7 935/6 936/16 937/16 938/21 944/7 949/24 953/12 955/5 957/2 957/16 958/19 961/11 963/15 966/20 968/1 970/23 979/14 985/15 989/3 989/4 992/8 992/9 995/1 996/24 1000/21 1002/6 1002/16 1003/6 1004/7 1005/16 1007/10 1007/11 1008/8 1009/9 1009/14 1010/12 1013/6 1016/6 1018/1 1022/6 1022/8 1022/14 1023/4 1023/20 1034/18 1034/19 | 938/21 Exhibit 599 [1] 1139/17 Exhibit 889 [1] 944/7 Exhibit 952 [1] 961/11 Exhibit 956 [1] 957/2 Exhibit 958 [1] 955/5 Exhibit 986 [1] 963/15 exhibits [1] 979/21 exist [1] 1002/1 existed [1] 1212/5 exit [5] 1049/13 1050/1 1051/23 1170/12 1170/19 expect [8] 984/5 1026/18 1031/15 1051/21 1064/6 1071/16 1074/2 1190/6 expectations [1] 1189/21 | extended [3] 949/7<br>1045/1 1139/22<br>extending [1] 1155/12<br>extensive [2] 1014/18<br>1039/15<br>extent [3] 984/2 1174/4<br>1174/6<br>external [3] 933/20<br>933/20 1187/16<br>extraordinarily [1]<br>1053/7<br>extraordinary [1]<br>984/10<br>eye [1] 1151/3<br>F<br>face [1] 1036/2<br>facilities [2] 1099/12<br>1167/17<br>facility [1] 1189/19 | 957/8 957/11 957/14<br>957/19 957/20 958/1<br>958/2 961/13 1049/24<br>1050/4 1050/5 1061/21<br>1150/22 1151/10<br>1164/1 1165/15 1166/2<br>1166/5 1167/12<br>1167/15 1168/10<br>1169/18 1169/23<br>1170/18 1170/22<br>1179/17<br>Fargo's [3] 958/9<br>1165/19 1169/24<br>Farrell [13] 1000/1<br>1001/10 1002/12<br>1002/18 1011/22<br>1012/1 1014/8 1016/14<br>1016/18 1016/19<br>1018/22 1019/3 1021/9<br>fashion [2] 966/15<br>999/19 |
| 1080/6 1082/20 1087/5 1121/15 1134/1 1160/14 1187/19 1191/17 1192/18 examined [3] 1087/4 1133/20 1192/17 example [5] 1023/8 1100/11 1123/5 1174/17 1213/12 exceed [1] 1126/14 exceeded [1] 1210/6 except [1] 1195/1 excerpt [1] 980/5 exchange [20] 950/14 953/19 981/17 1007/6 1007/12 1037/9 1063/21 1064/2 1093/2 1104/14 1112/13 1113/19 1113/23 | exercised [2] 1129/11 1129/19 exhibit [86] 934/7 935/6 936/16 937/16 938/21 944/7 949/24 953/12 955/5 957/2 957/16 958/19 961/11 963/15 966/20 968/1 970/23 979/14 985/15 989/3 989/4 992/8 992/9 995/1 996/24 1000/21 1002/6 1002/16 1003/6 1004/7 1005/16 1007/10 1007/11 1008/8 1009/9 1009/14 1010/12 1013/6 1016/6 1018/1 1022/6 1022/8 1022/14 1023/4 1023/20                 | 938/21 Exhibit 599 [1] 1139/17 Exhibit 889 [1] 944/7 Exhibit 952 [1] 961/11 Exhibit 956 [1] 957/2 Exhibit 958 [1] 955/5 Exhibit 986 [1] 963/15 exhibits [1] 979/21 exist [1] 1002/1 existed [1] 1212/5 exit [5] 1049/13 1050/1 1051/23 1170/12 1170/19 expect [8] 984/5 1026/18 1031/15 1051/21 1064/6 1071/16 1074/2 1190/6 expectations [1]         | extended [3] 949/7<br>1045/1 1139/22<br>extending [1] 1155/12<br>extensive [2] 1014/18<br>1039/15<br>extent [3] 984/2 1174/4<br>1174/6<br>external [3] 933/20<br>933/20 1187/16<br>extraordinarily [1]<br>1053/7<br>extraordinary [1]<br>984/10<br>eye [1] 1151/3<br>F<br>face [1] 1036/2<br>facilities [2] 1099/12<br>1167/17                         | 957/8 957/11 957/14<br>957/19 957/20 958/1<br>958/2 961/13 1049/24<br>1050/4 1050/5 1061/21<br>1150/22 1151/10<br>1164/1 1165/15 1166/2<br>1166/5 1167/12<br>1167/15 1168/10<br>1169/18 1169/23<br>1170/18 1170/22<br>1179/17<br>Fargo's [3] 958/9<br>1165/19 1169/24<br>Farrell [13] 1000/1<br>1001/10 1002/12<br>1002/18 1011/22<br>1012/1 1014/8 1016/14<br>1016/18 1016/19<br>1018/22 1019/3 1021/9<br>fashion [2] 966/15<br>999/19 |
| 1080/6 1082/20 1087/5 1121/15 1134/1 1160/14 1187/19 1191/17 1192/18 examined [3] 1087/4 1133/20 1192/17 example [5] 1023/8 1100/11 1123/5 1174/17 1213/12 exceed [1] 1126/14 exceeded [1] 1210/6 except [1] 1195/1 excerpt [1] 980/5 exchange [20] 950/14 953/19 981/17 1007/6 1007/12 1037/9 1063/21 1064/2 1093/2 1104/14 1112/13                 | exercised [2] 1129/11 1129/19 exhibit [86] 934/7 935/6 936/16 937/16 938/21 944/7 949/24 953/12 955/5 957/2 957/16 958/19 961/11 963/15 966/20 968/1 970/23 979/14 985/15 989/3 989/4 992/8 992/9 995/1 996/24 1000/21 1002/6 1002/16 1003/6 1004/7 1005/16 1007/10 1007/11 1008/8 1009/9 1009/14 1010/12 1013/6 1016/6 1018/1 1022/6 1022/8 1022/14 1023/4 1023/20 1034/18 1034/19 | 938/21 Exhibit 599 [1] 1139/17 Exhibit 889 [1] 944/7 Exhibit 952 [1] 961/11 Exhibit 956 [1] 957/2 Exhibit 958 [1] 955/5 Exhibit 986 [1] 963/15 exhibits [1] 979/21 exist [1] 1002/1 existed [1] 1212/5 exit [5] 1049/13 1050/1 1051/23 1170/12 1170/19 expect [8] 984/5 1026/18 1031/15 1051/21 1064/6 1071/16 1074/2 1190/6 expectations [1] 1189/21 | extended [3] 949/7<br>1045/1 1139/22<br>extending [1] 1155/12<br>extensive [2] 1014/18<br>1039/15<br>extent [3] 984/2 1174/4<br>1174/6<br>external [3] 933/20<br>933/20 1187/16<br>extraordinarily [1]<br>1053/7<br>extraordinary [1]<br>984/10<br>eye [1] 1151/3<br>F<br>face [1] 1036/2<br>facilities [2] 1099/12<br>1167/17<br>facility [1] 1189/19 | 957/8 957/11 957/14<br>957/19 957/20 958/1<br>958/2 961/13 1049/24<br>1050/4 1050/5 1061/21<br>1150/22 1151/10<br>1164/1 1165/15 1166/2<br>1166/5 1167/12<br>1167/15 1168/10<br>1169/18 1169/23<br>1170/18 1170/22<br>1179/17<br>Fargo's [3] 958/9<br>1165/19 1169/24<br>Farrell [13] 1000/1<br>1001/10 1002/12<br>1002/18 1011/22<br>1012/1 1014/8 1016/14<br>1016/18 1016/19<br>1018/22 1019/3 1021/9<br>fashion [2] 966/15<br>999/19 |

| F   | 1204/13                                       | financing [17] 972/11                         | 1149/5 1188/21                                 | forwarding [2] 955/7                        |
|---|---|---|--|---|
|   | few [14] 936/23 993/17                        | 996/7 1057/3 1061/8                           | 1196/21  | 1101/21                                     |
| fast [6] 971/3 1025/2                         | 1032/20 1033/15                               | 1077/21 1089/1                                | focused [1] 984/3                              | forwards [1] 1150/21                        |
| 1028/2 1063/10 1156/5<br>1158/22              | 1042/23 1073/21                               | 1095/10 1101/14                               | focusing [2] 1025/14                           | found [2] 1092/6                            |
| fast-forward [2]                              | 1075/4 1115/9 1160/18                         | 1102/5 1103/4 1105/8                          | 1061/12  | 1152/17                                     |
| 1025/2 1028/2                                 | 1178/5 1185/17                                | 1110/3 1110/8 1110/23                         |  | four [5] 929/8 989/21                       |
| fatal [2] 1107/17                             | 1187/21 1204/6                                | 1111/19 1172/7                                | folding [1] 954/6                              | 990/24 993/5 995/10                         |
| 1107/19                                       | 1207/13                                       | 1173/23                                       | folks [5] 929/13 932/14                        |   |
| favorable [1] 1033/7                          | <b>FFO [6]</b> 1125/9                         | find [10] 1014/20                             | 954/12 1041/18 1069/6                          |   |
| feasibility [1] 1064/17                       | 1125/12 1125/21                               | 1015/1 1015/7 1016/10                         | follow [8] 944/19 948/1                        |   |
| feasible [3] 1019/11                          | 1125/24 1126/6<br>1126/14                     | 1016/23 1055/1<br>1058/18 1060/12             | 955/18 965/17 966/16<br>1041/16 1048/18        | fractional [2] 1198/14<br>1198/21           |
| 1019/23 1026/21                               | fide [2] 1156/3 1158/20                       |   | 1187/21  | frame [6] 963/1 991/1                       |
| Feb24final [1] 1096/13                        | fiduciary [5] 1040/21                         | fine [4] 1081/11 1137/5                       |  | 1135/15 1159/3 1183/8                       |
| February [20] 1049/7                          | 1041/2 1073/12                                | 1152/14 1192/15                               | 1041/16 1187/21                                | 1187/24                                     |
| 1049/10 1049/18                               | 1081/21 1153/5                                | finish [1] 1025/19                            | followed [1] 1030/8                            | framework [3] 986/9                         |
| 1051/8 1051/13<br>1091/24 1093/1              | field [1] 1081/24                             | finished [2] 998/8                            | following [11] 958/2                           | 986/12 1046/9                               |
| 1094/12 1094/24                               | fifth [1] 1096/15                             | 1176/19                                       | 958/3 959/22 998/2                             | framing [1] 934/23                          |
| 1095/20 1096/11                               | figure [1] 1171/15                            | finite [1] 1210/1                             | 1058/2 1081/23                                 | Francois [39] 955/20                        |
| 1096/18 1101/21                               | figures [1] 1203/2                            | firm [8] 968/12 1043/2                        | 1095/24 1107/1                                 | 956/9 959/14 964/20                         |
| 1147/15 1148/15                               | file [4] 992/10 992/17                        | 1057/6 1058/22                                | 1119/12 1134/17                                | 969/19 970/13 975/8                         |
| 1170/5 1172/6 1172/11                         | 1004/23 1096/12                               | 1059/14 1059/14<br>  1193/4 1193/5            | 1147/20  | 1106/21 1135/9<br>  1135/23 1136/11         |
| 1185/10 1188/18                               | filed [3] 977/13<br>1081/17 1186/21           | firms [1] 968/17                              | <b>follows [6]</b> 930/3 1087/4 1133/20 1138/6 |   |
| February 18 [1]                               | filled [1] 990/12                             | fit [2] 1001/23 1121/4                        | 1158/7 1192/17                                 | 1137/17 1137/23                             |
| 1188/18                                       | final [8] 958/9 971/8                         | five [11] 976/21 989/22                       |  | 1140/1 1140/14                              |
| February 19 [1]                               | 971/13 1132/1 1132/9                          | 990/24 1084/24                                | fore [1] 985/6                                 | 1140/17 1140/22                             |
| 1095/20                                       | 1136/14 1143/6 1190/4                         | 1189/18 1196/14                               | forecasting [2] 1089/4                         |   |
| February 2 [1] 1148/15 February 24 [3]        | finalized [2] 977/16                          | 1196/14 1196/15                               | 1104/17  | 1150/21 1152/8                              |
| 1094/12 1094/24                               | 1160/1  | 1196/17 1212/21                               | forensic [1] 1193/4                            | 1152/16 1153/1 1153/3                       |
| 1096/11                                       | finalizing [4] 965/1                          | 1213/13                                       | forget [1] 1157/9                              | 1153/8 1153/18                              |
| February 24th [1]                             | 965/7 967/19 970/7                            |   | form [3] 999/19 1002/2                         |   |
| 1096/18                                       | finance [31] 985/3                            | 1212/21                                       | 1098/7   | 1153/24 1154/6<br>  1154/18 1160/20         |
| February 26 [1]                               | 985/8 986/2 987/4<br>1026/5 1036/3 1061/1     | five-year [2] 990/24<br>1189/18               | <b>formal [8]</b> 997/6<br>1071/16 1071/20     | 1168/2 1175/9 1180/6                        |
| 1101/21                                       | 1087/20 1087/21                               | fixed [3] 950/14                              | 1071/10 1071/20                                | 1181/6                                      |
| February 2nd [1]                              | 1087/22 1087/23                               | 1086/11 1198/13                               | 1074/5 1075/1 1076/3                           | Francois' [2] 1107/17                       |
| 1147/15                                       | 1088/9 1088/14                                | flag [1] 1032/8                               | formalized [1] 1076/2                          | 1108/8                                      |
| February 5th [1]<br>1093/1                    | 1088/20 1089/1                                | flesh [1] 1020/7                              | formally [1] 991/15                            | frankly [7] 1066/16                         |
| February 9 [4] 1049/10                        | 1089/10 1089/20                               | fleshed [1] 1019/6                            | formed [1] 1138/18                             | 1178/7 1200/16                              |
| 1049/18 1051/8 1170/5                         | 1090/4 1090/13                                | flew [1] 1001/17                              | former [1] 1151/7                              | 1202/16 1202/20                             |
| fee [11] 950/10 950/22                        | 1092/12 1101/24                               | flexibility [1] 1077/10                       | forming [1] 1129/17                            | 1205/21 1210/9                              |
| 950/23 950/24 951/5                           | 1102/1 1102/11                                | flight [1] 1069/9                             | forms [1] 1129/14                              | freaking [7] 961/14                         |
| 956/1 957/5 965/9                             | 1102/22 1103/14<br>1106/8 1107/21             | flip [5] 1096/14 1098/9<br>1122/14 1127/20    | <b>Fornell [23]</b> 941/20 942/6 942/15 942/21 | 1062/4 1062/13<br>  1062/19 1179/19         |
| 1058/6 1076/15                                | 1110/15 1112/5                                | 1201/19                                       | 943/3 957/18 961/12                            | 1179/24 1180/7                              |
| 1076/19                                       | 1172/14 1193/15                               | float [1] 976/21                              | 961/23 1049/11                                 | free [2] 1206/16                            |
| feed [1] 943/24                               | financed [1] 1151/4                           | floated [1] 1052/21                           | 1061/23 1062/2 1063/1                          | 1207/13                                     |
| feedback [6] 1032/16<br>1096/6 1101/12        | financial [35] 956/2                          | floating [1] 1208/1                           | 1063/4 1160/20                                 | frequent [2] 1081/1                         |
| 1101/17 1116/9                                | 972/15 985/23 985/24                          | flow [15] 1089/19                             | 1161/21 1162/11                                | 1081/2                                      |
| 1119/24                                       | 992/22 994/9 995/23                           | 1089/20 1090/4                                | 1165/24 1166/5                                 | Friday [2] 956/12                           |
| feel [4] 944/13 944/17                        | 997/15 997/17 997/19                          | 1118/20 1173/24                               | 1167/18 1168/2 1168/7                          | 1095/20                                     |
| 968/7 1064/9                                  | 1019/22 1021/2                                | 1204/3 1205/24                                | 1170/6 1179/19                                 | friendly [1] 1036/4                         |
| feeling [3] 1016/2                            | 1029/20 1032/17<br>1044/19 1049/4             | 1206/12 1206/14<br>1206/22 1209/10            | <b>forth [2]</b> 1048/17 1152/13               | front [9] 969/17 978/3 980/5 1069/6 1092/22 |
| 1157/10 1157/13                               | 1059/18 1074/21                               | 1209/19 1209/10                               | forward [22] 940/2                             | 1195/16 1195/18                             |
| feet [1] 957/6                                | 1078/10 1087/14                               | 1209/22 1209/23                               | 951/10 952/17 952/20                           | 1196/2 1208/8                               |
| fell [2] 1020/15 1208/7                       |   | flow-back [1] 1118/20                         | 953/4 975/19 997/1                             | fruit [1] 1021/6                            |
| felt [22] 986/14 986/19 988/10 996/22 1014/19 | 1124/23 1124/24                               | flows [5] 1007/9                              | 1005/14 1006/4 1008/3                          |   |
| 1026/20 1033/10                               | 1166/6 1167/5 1183/11                         | 1190/21 1206/6                                | 1025/2 1026/24                                 | frustrated [1] 1053/4                       |
| 1042/14 1044/20                               | 1190/13 1191/8                                | 1206/10 1209/2                                |  | full [12] 943/22 962/13                     |
| 1079/13 1079/16                               | 1204/14 1204/15                               | fluctuates [1] 982/12                         | 1055/5 1056/17                                 | 980/6 984/17 1005/24                        |
| 1092/13 1105/16                               | 1204/15 1204/18                               | flying [2] 935/24                             | 1109/20 1148/23                                | 1009/21 1072/12                             |
| 1105/17 1108/3 1120/3                         | 1204/19                                       | 1133/24                                       | 1155/4 1155/15                                 | 1073/19 1081/5 1081/7                       |
| 1130/23 1152/16                               | financially [1] 1046/5 financials [1] 1026/10 | <b>focus [7]</b> 954/8 1040/6 1140/24 1147/13 | 1197/23<br>forwarded [1] 955/11                | 1109/7 1115/19<br>full-blown [1] 1009/21    |
| 1176/3 1176/9 1178/16                         | 1020/10                                       | 1170/27 1147/13                               |  |   |
|   |   |   |  |   |
| <u> </u>                                      | L   | NOEDY COURT REPORT                            | İ  | ı   |

| F  | 1041/13 1091/8   | 1037/10 1037/19  | group [15] 927/3   | 1117/11 1207/14   |
|--|--|--|--|---|
| full-time [2] 1081/5   | 1196/11 1202/12  | 1037/22 1047/16  | 968/17 981/1 981/7   | harassed [1] 1191/23  |
| 1081/7   | 1205/7 1207/11 1209/8  | 1047/21 1047/21  | 982/3 985/21 1087/19   | hard [8] 994/4 1046/20  |
| fully [10] 982/21  | generate [1] 1100/19   | 1047/22 1065/6   | 1087/20 1104/17  | 1062/9 1092/21  |
| 1007/22 1019/6   | genesis [1] 986/18   | 1066/21 1069/20  | 1162/21 1164/19  | 1093/13 1156/5  |
| 1019/12 1065/4 1065/7  | get-go [1] 1064/12   | 1070/23 1071/5 1071/6  | 1173/10 1199/12  | 1158/21 1163/3  |
| 1065/7 1074/12   | gets [3] 966/2 1029/23 1165/3  | 1071/10 1072/15<br>1073/22 1078/22   | 1200/9 1201/10<br>group' [1] 935/10  | harder [1] 936/3<br>HARRELL [1] 928/14  |
| 1074/13 1075/4   | getting [14] 936/2   | 1084/16 1136/4   | group's [1] 1089/24  | hasn't [1] 1173/20  |
| fulsome [1] 1080/4   | 957/6 962/19 1047/18   | 1147/17 1151/10  | groups [1] 1032/4  | Hathaway [6] 1011/13  |
| functionally [1]   | 1068/5 1108/10 1120/2  | 1151/21 1163/8   | growing [1] 1069/5   | 1015/7 1023/11  |
| 1100/19 <b>functions [1]</b> 1161/4  | 1130/22 1142/11  | 1164/18 1166/17  | growth [18] 984/10   | 1023/14 1024/14   |
| fund [12] 1098/7   | 1146/24 1147/9   | 1177/4 1177/15   | 984/14 985/2 989/21  | 1024/21   |
| 1119/2 1119/4 1120/19  | 1152/13 1155/10  | 1190/14 1190/16  | 990/1 1171/10 1171/11  | haven't [1] 1047/24   |
| 1120/23 1127/22  | 1189/12  | Goldman's [2] 947/23   | 1172/8 1174/2 1209/7   | having [25] 930/1   |
| 1132/13 1132/18  | Gibson [13] 935/9  | 1067/16  | 1209/12 1211/12<br>  1211/14 1211/18   | 971/17 983/17 1021/3  |
| 1174/19 1174/21  | 935/19 935/22 936/11<br>936/14 938/15 939/15   | Golf [1] 969/21<br>gone [5] 1039/14  | 1213/9 1213/17   | 1022/2 1022/18 1032/6<br>  1032/22 1034/14  |
| 1174/22 1189/3   | 1085/9 1148/10   | 1086/12 1120/22  | 1213/18 1213/20  | 1036/1 1044/24  |
| fundamental [3]  | 1151/20 1151/21  | 1123/9 1138/12   | guaranteed [3] 1114/9  | 1049/22 1074/5 1087/3   |
| 995/22 1005/12   | 1190/14 1191/3   | good [21] 930/6 930/7  | 1114/20 1117/1   | 1097/16 1099/6  |
| 1042/15   funded [3] 1123/14   | Gillian [3] 1104/14  | 934/21 954/12 962/15   | <b>guarantees</b> [1] 1165/8   | 1100/11 1114/16   |
| 1174/3 1174/10   | 1104/15 1104/16  | 980/12 980/13 1021/1   | guess [8] 942/17   | 1133/19 1137/23   |
| funding [6] 1095/8   | <b>Girling [17]</b> 940/6  | 1059/21 1075/5   | 993/14 1027/5 1054/9   | 1168/10 1171/3 1178/8   |
| 1105/19 1128/14  | 940/17 951/2 953/6   | 1079/17 1079/19  | 1067/5 1200/5 1204/5   | 1189/4 1192/16  |
| 1129/21 1129/23  | 961/19 971/11 1027/22  | 1101/6 1121/17   | 1210/14  | Hazelett [1] 1194/8   |
| 1201/3   | 1028/23 1043/24<br>1044/4 1052/23  | 1121/19 1160/16<br>  1160/17 1185/14   | <b>guys [7]</b> 970/2 1065/11 1120/6 1120/21 1169/6  | 957/12 957/12 961/8   |
| funds [3] 1108/23  | 1053/15 1054/4   | 1192/9 1192/20   | 1169/9 1169/16   | 961/13 962/1 963/18   |
| 1164/14 1172/8   | 1056/20 1057/14  | 1192/22  |  | 964/20 1002/22 1107/1   |
| furious [1] 971/3  | 1104/4 1131/21   | goodwill [1] 1210/21   | <u>H</u>   | 1107/10 1147/19   |
| further [18] 930/3 968/13 1021/14  | given [22] 931/2 968/8   | <b>Gordon [1]</b> 1209/7   | hadn't [3] 973/15  | 1148/4  |
| 1068/14 1077/7   | 968/13 970/10 976/11   | got [20] 960/22 969/15   | 1007/21 1138/2   | head [2] 1084/15  |
| 1086/17 1086/18  | 986/15 988/8 990/18  | 984/19 990/13 995/3  | half [1] 1212/21   | 1094/16   |
| 1097/7 1109/8 1114/24  | 991/6 1008/1 1010/2<br>1012/21 1015/22   | 998/7 999/24 1000/16<br>1002/12 1017/11  | halfway [1] 1072/18<br>hand [6] 1093/17  | headed [1] 1006/22<br>heading [2] 1095/5  |
| 1121/12 1133/7 1133/9  | 1016/20 1016/21  | 1027/9 1063/16   | 1121/21 1133/18  | 1112/16   |
| 1160/11 1191/13  | 1025/20 1071/8   | 1063/24 1083/19  | 1176/12 1176/18  | headline [1] 1197/20  |
| 1192/4 1212/18 1214/3  | 1002/11 1105/14  | 1114/24 1147/22  | 1203/2   | hear [15] 971/21  |
| future [2] 937/1 997/13  | 1110/11 1129/6   | 1151/15 1171/15  | handed [6] 1134/6  | 1033/16 1038/23   |
| G  | 1208/18  | 1187/12 1190/23  | 1136/18 1175/23  | 1049/16 1062/3  |
| gained [2] 1069/8  | giving [2] 980/14  | gotcha [1] 959/13  | 1176/7 1176/15   | 1062/12 1066/18   |
| 1069/8   | 1151/6   | Gotta [2] 932/14 970/4   | 1176/24<br>  handful [1] 1161/14   | 1072/1 1082/22 1083/4   |
| gap [3] 941/1 1128/7   | glad [1] 929/14  | gotten [5] 1011/5  | handing [3] 1038/13  | 1083/6 1083/10 1100/9<br>  1110/10 1187/22  |
| 1137/11  | glance [1] 939/2<br>Glen [19] 933/11   | 1011/7 1157/20<br>  1158/16 1173/21  | 1177/10 1192/13  | heard [17] 930/8 940/8  |
| Gardner [5] 1111/12  | 933/16 938/24 953/10   | grade [2] 1174/23  | handled [1] 1210/8   | 986/22 1013/15 1014/3   |
| 1111/23 1116/10  | 965/8 968/2 969/19   | 1189/7   | handout [1] 1002/2   | 1028/16 1029/9  |
| 1117/17 1118/2<br><b>Garret [1]</b> 1104/15  | 969/20 969/22 974/13   | grant [1] 1044/22  | hands [2] 943/6 1170/3   | 1038/18 1049/3  |
| Garrett [2] 1104/15  | 974/18 974/23 974/24   | granting [1] 1155/12   | handwriting [2] 930/21   | 1049/17 1096/2 1097/1   |
| 1104/16  | 975/6 976/1 988/13   | gray [1] 1093/21   | 932/10   | 1115/20 1135/5 1175/2   |
| gas [9] 980/20 981/1   | 988/21 988/22 1151/19  | Great [2] 929/12   | handwritten [3] 989/5  | 1175/21 1183/10   |
| 981/1 982/1 982/4  | 1 543 4450/7   |  | 000/0 1045/10  |   |
| 984/23 1171/14   | goal [1] 1153/7  | 1107/16  | 990/9 1045/12  | heavily [1] 1105/7  |
| 1171/16 1171/17  | goes [5] 1043/17   | 1107/16<br>green [2] 1126/5  | happen [6] 1030/23   | heels [1] 1040/10   |
| gathering [1] 982/4  | <b>goes [5]</b> 1043/17 1061/3 1071/17 1099/1  | 1107/16<br>green [2] 1126/5<br>1126/17   | <b>happen [6]</b> 1030/23 1031/21 1038/6 1156/6  | heels [1] 1040/10<br>held [1] 1103/11   |
| govo [61 067/9 070/7   | goes [5] 1043/17<br>1061/3 1071/17 1099/1<br>1106/9  | 1107/16<br>green [2] 1126/5  | happen [6] 1030/23   | heels [1] 1040/10<br>held [1] 1103/11   |
| gave [6] 967/3 978/7   | <b>goes [5]</b> 1043/17 1061/3 1071/17 1099/1  | 1107/16<br>green [2] 1126/5<br>1126/17<br>greenshoe [3] 1107/4   | <b>happen [6]</b> 1030/23<br>1031/21 1038/6 1156/6<br>1158/23 1172/9   | heels [1] 1040/10<br>held [1] 1103/11<br>hello [4] 1087/7 1134/3  |
| 1120/1 1143/7 1143/11  | goes [5] 1043/17<br>1061/3 1071/17 1099/1<br>1106/9<br>Goldman [55] 932/9<br>932/12 935/9 936/11<br>936/18 936/19 936/19   | 1107/16<br>green [2] 1126/5<br>1126/17<br>greenshoe [3] 1107/4<br>1116/18 1117/3<br>GREGORY [2] 928/4<br>1016/8  | happen [6] 1030/23<br>1031/21 1038/6 1156/6<br>1158/23 1172/9<br>happened [9] 1008/13<br>1008/14 1011/20<br>1025/10 1025/11  | heels [1] 1040/10<br>held [1] 1103/11<br>hello [4] 1087/7 1134/3<br>1134/4 1170/3<br>help [10] 953/21<br>964/10 964/23 965/4  |
| 1120/1 1143/7 1143/11<br>1181/19   | goes [5] 1043/17<br>1061/3 1071/17 1099/1<br>1106/9<br>Goldman [55] 932/9<br>932/12 935/9 936/11<br>936/18 936/19 936/19<br>936/23 937/10 937/12   | 1107/16<br>green [2] 1126/5<br>1126/17<br>greenshoe [3] 1107/4<br>1116/18 1117/3<br>GREGORY [2] 928/4<br>1016/8<br>Grind [1] 931/8   | happen [6] 1030/23<br>1031/21 1038/6 1156/6<br>1158/23 1172/9<br>happened [9] 1008/13<br>1008/14 1011/20<br>1025/10 1025/11<br>1042/5 1054/20 1165/8   | heels [1] 1040/10<br>held [1] 1103/11<br>hello [4] 1087/7 1134/3<br>1134/4 1170/3<br>help [10] 953/21<br>964/10 964/23 965/4<br>975/10 1029/19  |
| 1120/1 1143/7 1143/11<br>1181/19<br>Geddes [1] 928/10<br>general [8] 931/14  | goes [5] 1043/17<br>1061/3 1071/17 1099/1<br>1106/9<br>Goldman [55] 932/9<br>932/12 935/9 936/11<br>936/18 936/19 936/19<br>936/23 937/10 937/12<br>937/20 939/14 939/19   | 1107/16<br>green [2] 1126/5<br>1126/17<br>greenshoe [3] 1107/4<br>1116/18 1117/3<br>GREGORY [2] 928/4<br>1016/8<br>Grind [1] 931/8<br>Grossmann [2] 928/4  | happen [6] 1030/23<br>1031/21 1038/6 1156/6<br>1158/23 1172/9<br>happened [9] 1008/13<br>1008/14 1011/20<br>1025/10 1025/11<br>1042/5 1054/20 1165/8<br>1172/10  | heels [1] 1040/10<br>held [1] 1103/11<br>hello [4] 1087/7 1134/3<br>1134/4 1170/3<br>help [10] 953/21<br>964/10 964/23 965/4<br>975/10 1029/19<br>1068/13 1153/7  |
| 1120/1 1143/7 1143/11<br>1181/19<br><b>Geddes [1]</b> 928/10<br><b>general [8]</b> 931/14<br>993/10 1006/24 1021/4   | goes [5] 1043/17<br>1061/3 1071/17 1099/1<br>1106/9<br>Goldman [55] 932/9<br>932/12 935/9 936/11<br>936/18 936/19 936/19<br>936/23 937/10 937/12<br>937/20 939/14 939/19<br>944/8 944/14 947/3   | 1107/16<br>green [2] 1126/5<br>1126/17<br>greenshoe [3] 1107/4<br>1116/18 1117/3<br>GREGORY [2] 928/4<br>1016/8<br>Grind [1] 931/8<br>Grossmann [2] 928/4<br>928/8   | happen [6] 1030/23<br>1031/21 1038/6 1156/6<br>1158/23 1172/9<br>happened [9] 1008/13<br>1008/14 1011/20<br>1025/10 1025/11<br>1042/5 1054/20 1165/8<br>1172/10<br>happening [7] 972/20  | heels [1] 1040/10<br>held [1] 1103/11<br>hello [4] 1087/7 1134/3<br>1134/4 1170/3<br>help [10] 953/21<br>964/10 964/23 965/4<br>975/10 1029/19<br>1068/13 1153/7<br>1163/19 1168/11   |
| 1120/1 1143/7 1143/11<br>1181/19<br><b>Geddes [1]</b> 928/10<br><b>general [8]</b> 931/14<br>993/10 1006/24 1021/4<br>1028/24 1059/23                              | goes [5] 1043/17<br>1061/3 1071/17 1099/1<br>1106/9<br>Goldman [55] 932/9<br>932/12 935/9 936/11<br>936/18 936/19 936/19<br>936/23 937/10 937/12<br>937/20 939/14 939/19<br>944/8 944/14 947/3<br>947/4 965/24 966/1   | 1107/16<br>green [2] 1126/5<br>1126/17<br>greenshoe [3] 1107/4<br>1116/18 1117/3<br>GREGORY [2] 928/4<br>1016/8<br>Grind [1] 931/8<br>Grossmann [2] 928/4<br>928/8<br>grounding [2] 934/21                                 | happen [6] 1030/23<br>1031/21 1038/6 1156/6<br>1158/23 1172/9<br>happened [9] 1008/13<br>1008/14 1011/20<br>1025/10 1025/11<br>1042/5 1054/20 1165/8<br>1172/10<br>happening [7] 972/20<br>1029/22 1041/14                                     | heels [1] 1040/10<br>held [1] 1103/11<br>hello [4] 1087/7 1134/3<br>1134/4 1170/3<br>help [10] 953/21<br>964/10 964/23 965/4<br>975/10 1029/19<br>1068/13 1153/7<br>1163/19 1168/11<br>helpful [2] 979/17                                 |
| 1120/1 1143/7 1143/11<br>1181/19<br>Geddes [1] 928/10<br>general [8] 931/14<br>993/10 1006/24 1021/4<br>1028/24 1059/23<br>1195/10 1205/7                          | goes [5] 1043/17<br>1061/3 1071/17 1099/1<br>1106/9<br>Goldman [55] 932/9<br>932/12 935/9 936/11<br>936/18 936/19 936/19<br>936/23 937/10 937/12<br>937/20 939/14 939/19<br>944/8 944/14 947/3<br>947/4 965/24 966/1<br>972/13 972/16 995/21                   | 1107/16<br>green [2] 1126/5<br>1126/17<br>greenshoe [3] 1107/4<br>1116/18 1117/3<br>GREGORY [2] 928/4<br>1016/8<br>Grind [1] 931/8<br>Grossmann [2] 928/4<br>928/8<br>grounding [2] 934/21<br>939/11                       | happen [6] 1030/23<br>1031/21 1038/6 1156/6<br>1158/23 1172/9<br>happened [9] 1008/13<br>1008/14 1011/20<br>1025/10 1025/11<br>1042/5 1054/20 1165/8<br>1172/10<br>happening [7] 972/20  | heels [1] 1040/10<br>held [1] 1103/11<br>hello [4] 1087/7 1134/3<br>1134/4 1170/3<br>help [10] 953/21<br>964/10 964/23 965/4<br>975/10 1029/19<br>1068/13 1153/7<br>1163/19 1168/11<br>helpful [2] 979/17<br>1121/22                      |
| 1120/1 1143/7 1143/11<br>1181/19<br>Geddes [1] 928/10<br>general [8] 931/14<br>993/10 1006/24 1021/4<br>1028/24 1059/23<br>1195/10 1205/7<br>generally [10] 975/13 | goes [5] 1043/17<br>1061/3 1071/17 1099/1<br>1106/9<br>Goldman [55] 932/9<br>932/12 935/9 936/11<br>936/18 936/19 936/19<br>936/23 937/10 937/12<br>937/20 939/14 939/19<br>944/8 944/14 947/3<br>947/4 965/24 966/1   | 1107/16<br>green [2] 1126/5<br>1126/17<br>greenshoe [3] 1107/4<br>1116/18 1117/3<br>GREGORY [2] 928/4<br>1016/8<br>Grind [1] 931/8<br>Grossmann [2] 928/4<br>928/8<br>grounding [2] 934/21<br>939/11<br>grounds [1] 995/24 | happen [6] 1030/23<br>1031/21 1038/6 1156/6<br>1158/23 1172/9<br>happened [9] 1008/13<br>1008/14 1011/20<br>1025/10 1025/11<br>1042/5 1054/20 1165/8<br>1172/10<br>happening [7] 972/20<br>1029/22 1041/14<br>1044/1 1055/9 1145/23<br>1200/11 | heels [1] 1040/10<br>held [1] 1103/11<br>hello [4] 1087/7 1134/3<br>1134/4 1170/3<br>help [10] 953/21<br>964/10 964/23 965/4<br>975/10 1029/19<br>1068/13 1153/7<br>1163/19 1168/11<br>helpful [2] 979/17                                 |
| 1120/1 1143/7 1143/11<br>1181/19<br>Geddes [1] 928/10<br>general [8] 931/14<br>993/10 1006/24 1021/4<br>1028/24 1059/23<br>1195/10 1205/7                          | goes [5] 1043/17<br>1061/3 1071/17 1099/1<br>1106/9<br>Goldman [55] 932/9<br>932/12 935/9 936/11<br>936/18 936/19 936/19<br>936/23 937/10 937/12<br>937/20 939/14 939/19<br>944/8 944/14 947/3<br>947/4 965/24 966/1<br>972/13 972/16 995/21<br>996/15 1010/14 | 1107/16<br>green [2] 1126/5<br>1126/17<br>greenshoe [3] 1107/4<br>1116/18 1117/3<br>GREGORY [2] 928/4<br>1016/8<br>Grind [1] 931/8<br>Grossmann [2] 928/4<br>928/8<br>grounding [2] 934/21<br>939/11<br>grounds [1] 995/24 | happen [6] 1030/23<br>1031/21 1038/6 1156/6<br>1158/23 1172/9<br>happened [9] 1008/13<br>1008/14 1011/20<br>1025/10 1025/11<br>1042/5 1054/20 1165/8<br>1172/10<br>happening [7] 972/20<br>1029/22 1041/14<br>1044/1 1055/9 1145/23<br>1200/11 | heels [1] 1040/10<br>held [1] 1103/11<br>hello [4] 1087/7 1134/3<br>1134/4 1170/3<br>help [10] 953/21<br>964/10 964/23 965/4<br>975/10 1029/19<br>1068/13 1153/7<br>1163/19 1168/11<br>helpful [2] 979/17<br>1121/22<br>hence [2] 1093/21 |

| Н  | 987/15 998/16 1001/21                            | I  | identify [2] 1010/14                   | included [5] 977/20                    |
|--|--|--|--|--|
| her [1] 954/7                                  | 1001/24 1012/6                                   | l'd [12] 938/5 958/17                      | 1067/6                                 | 986/13 987/23 1041/2                   |
| Here's [1] 1046/8                              | 1013/15 1019/5                                   | 979/6 979/18 982/15                        | ii [1] 1040/20                         | 1095/7                                 |
| hesitate [1] 940/6                             | 1021/21 1021/23                                  | 985/24 998/6 1014/5                        | Illinois [3] 928/16                    | includes [1] 1188/24                   |
| hey've [1] 1139/19                             | 1027/20 1043/23                                  | 1092/19 1095/4                             | 1192/24 1193/16                        | including [24] 932/3                   |
| hi [1] 1170/1                                  | 1044/4 1055/16 1102/2                            | 1106/18 1108/18                            | illustrate [1] 1213/11                 | 932/4 951/12 951/18                    |
| hidden [1] 1055/13                             | 1107/18 1108/5                                   | I'II [10] 944/6 948/22                     | illustrative [2] 1018/20               |  |
| high [10] 1018/11                              | 1161/23 1181/6                                   | 963/2 1059/20 1086/4                       | 1019/9                                 | 956/18 956/23 958/15                   |
| 1098/4 1107/3 1107/6                           | 1184/17  | 1151/12 1152/5                             | imaginable [1] 1068/8                  | 967/7 967/19 970/7                     |
| 1108/3 1116/23                                 | historic [3] 934/22                              | 1187/17 1190/5 1195/1                      | imagine [5] 1050/18                    | 978/24 979/4 987/5                     |
| 1203/24 1204/2                                 | 935/9 989/20                                     | l'm [102] 929/14 930/8                     | 1050/24 1062/10<br>1062/20 1064/15     | 996/7 1006/9 1006/20<br>1113/3 1113/20 |
| 1205/18 1205/19                                | historically [3] 931/1 931/24 1012/2             | 930/9 931/5 938/1                          | impact [7] 994/18                      | 1134/16 1156/24                        |
| higher [13] 1027/21                            | history [4] 942/3                                | 941/2 944/19 945/19                        | 1028/5 1089/19 1090/3                  | 1180/3                                 |
| 1091/8 1091/10                                 | 984/15 1087/17 1117/6                            | 946/20 949/9 949/22                        | 1090/15 1100/5                         | income [1] 1206/17                     |
| 1098/17 1098/23                                | hit [1] 1035/17                                  | 954/10 954/24 955/9                        | 1113/12                                | increase [10] 966/8                    |
| 1109/15 1114/21                                | hockey [3] 1147/22                               | 957/12 958/24 959/8                        | impacts [2] 1089/17                    | 966/14 966/23 1115/3                   |
| 1115/8 1119/6 1120/13                          | 1147/23 1148/4                                   | 959/10 963/24 964/14                       | 1090/1                                 | 1122/7 1122/18 1123/7                  |
| 1126/5 1211/3 1211/14                          | hold [3] 1015/1 1148/1                           | 965/12 966/15 967/1                        | impairment [2]                         | 1130/16 1198/5                         |
| highlight [3] 936/24                           | 1193/15  | 969/12 969/14 969/21                       | 1210/21 1210/21                        | 1199/18                                |
| 960/13 1063/18                                 | holder [3] 968/3                                 | 972/14 973/6 974/22<br>978/5 979/23 983/14 | implication [2] 943/12                 | increased [1] 1086/12                  |
| highlighted [3]<br>1024/11 1043/22             | 968/24 969/6                                     | 983/22 983/23 983/24                       | 944/15                                 | increases [1] 1099/5                   |
| 1131/12  | Holdings [1] 1194/18                             | 984/3 986/9 989/3                          | implications [3]                       | increasing [2] 1060/24                 |
| highlighting [1] 1190/6                        | holiday [1] 1059/20                              | 1004/14 1009/22                            | 1098/10 1098/13                        | 1116/15                                |
| highlights [1] 1097/5                          | <b>HUN [1]</b> 927/13                            | 1013/20 1037/2                             | 1113/2                                 | incredible [1] 1050/9                  |
| highly [11] 1019/4                             | honest [1] 1082/10                               | 1037/11 1038/21                            | implied [1] 1085/18                    | incremental [3]                        |
| 1019/4 1057/10 1059/4                          | Honor's [1] 1133/17                              | 1041/20 1042/15                            | implies [1] 1211/5                     | 1102/24 1130/8                         |
| 1059/5 1064/15                                 | Hook [4] 1101/20                                 | 1043/12 1044/3 1044/7                      | imply [1] 1061/12                      | 1130/20                                |
| 1070/20 1070/20                                | 1101/22 1101/23                                  | 1044/7 1052/15                             | importance [2]                         | incur [2] 1102/21                      |
| 1075/13 1075/13                                | 1101/24  | 1055/21 1059/11                            | 1097/16 1102/16                        | 1109/19                                |
| 1075/13  | hope [2] 1104/20                                 | 1060/14 1061/24                            | important [16] 986/19                  | incurring [1] 1102/24                  |
| him [55] 932/22 970/13                         | 1145/18  | 1063/9 1063/20 1065/8                      | 1039/3 1090/24 1091/4                  | Indeed [2] 1008/13                     |
| 987/13 993/1 993/7                             | hopefully [3] 1069/12<br>1119/13 1121/22         | 1066/16 1070/15                            | 1092/4 1092/7 1092/8                   | 1139/15                                |
| 994/1 994/3 1001/8                             | hoping [1] 1168/19                               | 1085/22 1085/23                            | 1092/9 1092/13<br>1097/12 1097/13      | independent [2]<br>1010/4 1146/8       |
| 1008/5 1008/6 1011/23                          | horizontal [1] 1057/18                           | 1087/14 1104/19                            | 1097/12 1097/13                        | indicate [3] 997/3                     |
| 1012/1 1012/4 1012/9                           | Hort [2] 1016/8                                  | 1106/8 1120/2 1120/18                      | 1100/15 1153/5                         | 1056/5 1111/11                         |
| 1012/11 1020/20                                | 1017/20  | 1121/17 1125/1 1126/9                      | 1159/18                                | indicated [12] 944/9                   |
| 1020/21 1021/5 1021/5                          | host [1] 1056/22                                 | 1132/5 1134/12                             | importantly [2] 1112/8                 | 951/2 965/16 990/3                     |
| 1021/8 1023/13 1035/8                          | hosted [1] 1169/18                               | 1136/23 1137/3                             | 1204/17                                | 998/16 1027/14 1044/6                  |
| 1038/23 1042/12                                | hotel [4] 964/21 965/21                          | 1141/11 1143/10                            | impossible [1] 1133/4                  | 1053/3 1077/9 1113/15                  |
| 1043/1 1050/18                                 | 1149/7 1149/15                                   | 1143/23 1143/23                            | impression [1]                         | 1185/2 1191/3                          |
| 1050/21 1050/22                                | hourly [1] 972/3                                 | 1145/7 1146/11 1147/2                      | 1019/10                                | indicates [1] 1117/16                  |
| 1087/2 1140/2 1143/12<br>1148/21 1153/6 1154/8 | hours [5] 929/7 982/10                           | 1154/5 1155/10 1157/3<br>1174/24 1197/21   | inadequate [1]                         | indicating [2] 990/21                  |
| 1154/17 1155/9                                 | 982/16 982/20 1104/22                            | 1198/2 1199/14 1200/9                      | 1138/15                                | 990/22                                 |
| 1155/17 1160/24                                | house [1] 1167/19                                | 1200/9 1200/13                             | inbound [15] 966/8                     | indication [11] 939/23                 |
| 1161/12 1161/18                                | housekeeping [2]                                 | 1203/22 1205/23                            | 966/11 966/13 966/17                   | 995/16 1002/19 1003/3                  |
| 1162/4 1176/7 1176/12                          | 929/5 929/17                                     | 1206/4 1206/5 1206/6                       | 966/23 967/6 998/7                     | 1024/6 1040/14 1043/5                  |
| 1176/15 1176/18                                | however [4] 945/1                                | 1209/3 1210/16                             | 1001/1 1022/15 1037/5                  | 1044/5 1058/21 1152/2                  |
| 1176/24 1177/2                                 | 954/10 1109/22                                   | 1210/19 1211/5 1211/6                      | 1037/6 1046/12 1065/1                  | 1205/15                                |
| 1177/10 1180/9 1181/2                          | 1185/15  | 1211/16                                    | 1175/2 1175/4                          | indications [3] 956/8                  |
| 1182/17 1182/18                                | HR [1] 1186/12                                   | l've [18] 943/1 981/13                     | inbound's [1] 1149/22                  | 995/14 1138/14                         |
| 1182/22 1183/19                                | HSR [2] 1139/21                                  | 981/15 981/16 981/18                       | inbounds [8] 931/8                     | indicative [18] 950/6                  |
| 1183/21  | 1140/15  | 981/22 981/23 981/23                       | 970/5 985/10 995/20                    | 950/7 950/14 951/9                     |
| himself [1] 993/18                             | huge [4] 989/22 989/22                           | 986/1 999/11 1004/22                       | 1005/13 1047/8                         | 951/24 952/14 1002/17                  |
| hindsight [2] 1123/1                           | 1033/13 1061/9<br>  <b>Hugh [5]</b> 957/3 957/18 | 1007/24 1017/7                             | 1156/24 1160/9<br>INC [5] 927/3 981/23 | 1023/10 1023/17<br>1023/24 1040/13     |
| 1123/8   | 1066/4 1150/22                                   | 1017/11 1017/12                            | 1194/12 1194/15                        | 1042/9 1056/23                         |
| hired [1] 1148/21                              | 1150/22  | 1031/1 1038/15                             | 1194/12 1194/15                        | 1057/13 1057/18                        |
| his [42] 935/19 935/22                         | huh [2] 942/12 990/6                             | 1151/15                                    | incentive [1] 1063/6                   | 1077/18 1092/15                        |
| 935/24 936/11 939/16                           | Hunter [9] 929/18                                | i.e [1] 1174/6                             | inclined [1] 1142/15                   | 1147/8                                 |
| 943/2 953/17 957/3                             | 1087/1 1087/3 1087/7                             | idea [2] 1018/23                           | include [9] 1010/23                    | indicator [1] 1061/2                   |
| 957/8 960/7 961/13                             | 1094/12 1121/17                                  | 1029/17                                    |  | indifference [6] 931/9                 |
| 962/1 963/23 964/2                             | 1121/24 1122/4 1126/9                            | ideas [1] 1017/7                           | 1109/11 1110/3                         | 936/24 937/4 937/21                    |
| 964/12 965/3 965/21                            | Hunter's [1] 929/19                              | identical [2] 1020/11                      | 1112/22 1183/14                        | 938/11 1148/2                          |
| 965/21 973/3 985/22                            | hurt [1] 1190/22                                 | 1039/23                                    | 1207/17                                | individually [1] 991/19                |
| 986/23 987/1 987/2                             |  | identifies [1] 1129/10                     |  | '.'                                    |
|  |  |  |  |  |

|  |                         |                         | 1                             | 1                           |
|--|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| I  | interactions [2] 1038/4 | investment-grade [1]    | J.P. Morgan [1]               | 962/17 1130/11              |
| individuals [2] 1041/17                        | 1175/11                 | 1174/23                 | 1167/16                       | Johnston [1] 953/18         |
| 1101/22  | interest [30] 939/24    | investments [2]         | <b>JAMES [3]</b> 928/6        | joined [2] 973/24           |
|  | 963/19 995/15 995/17    | 1148/7 1183/17          | 928/12 1087/8                 | 1117/17                     |
| industrial [1] 1000/11                         | 998/17 1002/19 1012/7   | investor [3] 1088/10    | January [50] 930/13           | joint [50] 934/7 935/6      |
| industry [7] 984/21                            | 1012/19 1021/3 1024/7   | 1169/10 1169/12         | 931/12 934/6 935/3            | 936/16 937/16 938/20        |
| 999/4 1011/14 1021/2                           | 1027/15 1040/14         | investors [3] 1062/3    | 935/9 935/19 936/7            | 944/6 949/24 953/12         |
| 1021/4 1178/16                                 | 1042/9 1042/14 1043/5   | 1090/20 1103/10         | 936/16 939/20 1029/8          | 955/5 957/2 957/16          |
| 1178/18  | 1044/5 1048/6 1058/21   | invited [2] 1111/20     | 1029/11 1029/23               | 958/18 961/11 963/14        |
| influence [1] 1115/2                           | 1063/9 1073/8 1099/16   | 1162/6                  | 1030/13 1030/16               | 966/19 967/24 970/23        |
| info [3] 961/17 1006/6                         | 1145/24 1149/22         | involve [1] 1089/14     | 1031/7 1031/21                | 985/15 994/24 1000/20       |
| 1041/20  | 1164/8 1166/20          | involved [8] 1166/1     | 1033/20 1034/6                | 1002/5 1004/6 1005/16       |
| inform [5] 968/23                              | 1166/21 1177/17         | 1166/15 1167/13         | 1036/13 1037/5                | 1007/11 1013/6 1016/6       |
| 976/5 977/2 1022/23                            | 1207/24 1208/1          | 1167/17 1175/3          | 1037/10 1037/23               | 1022/5 1023/4 1023/20       |
| 1068/13  | 1208/19                 | 1175/16 1194/12         | 1037/10 1037/23               | 1029/16 1034/19             |
| information [19] 977/8                         | interested [10] 973/12  | 1194/15                 | 1040/24 1041/9                | 1037/7 1040/1 1041/8        |
| 977/20 1007/7 1007/9                           | 974/5 984/11 1028/22    | involving [1] 1194/17   | 1040/24 1041/9                | 1045/8 1051/5 1052/5        |
| 1020/9 1020/11 1074/1                          | 1028/24 1042/18         | IPO [1] 1172/10         | 1043/11 1043/16               | 1057/11 1059/6 1060/3       |
| 1085/10 1092/16                                | 1044/24 1064/1          | IPO'd [1] 1172/6        | 1043/11 1045/10               | 1065/16 1067/3 1070/2       |
| 1123/24 1146/13                                | 1083/12 1138/24         | IR [3] 1169/6 1169/9    | 1048/1 1135/5 1135/20         |                             |
| 1147/10 1148/19                                |                         |                         | 1136/11 1136/19               |                             |
| 1159/17 1159/21                                | Interesting [1] 1104/23 |                         |                               | 1151/14 1183/24             |
| 1167/9 1187/5 1204/14                          | interests [1] 1099/20   | iron [1] 1043/7         | 1137/8 1137/8 1137/17         |                             |
| 1204/15  | interloper [2] 1203/8   | is [422]                | 1138/8 1140/1 1141/14         | 1,                          |
| informed [7] 977/3                             | 1203/12                 | isand [1] 935/12        | 1141/18 1143/8                | 1191/24                     |
| 1022/1 1030/3 1041/4                           | intermediary [1]        | Isherwood [1] 1096/12   |                               | JONATHAN [1] 928/22         |
| 1058/3 1070/16                                 | 1168/2                  | isn't [4] 972/4 1115/14 | 1146/10 1146/14               | Journal [5] 1063/13         |
| 1071/19  | intern [2] 1069/8       | 1137/22 1147/24         | 1175/21                       | 1179/12 1179/13             |
| informing [2] 956/14                           | 1069/9                  | issuance [4] 996/7      | January 11 [1] 1041/9         | 1179/20 1180/13             |
| 1007/18  | internal [8] 997/15     | 1031/2 1083/3 1114/19   | January 14 [2] 934/6          | JPMorgan [3] 1161/5         |
| infrastructure [3]                             | 1006/19 1006/22         | issue [23] 988/7 998/4  | 935/3                         | 1161/24 1162/2              |
| 982/4 987/7 1100/8                             | 1010/17 1031/24         | 1009/21 1010/4          | January 15 [2] 935/9          | JR [3] 928/12 928/24        |
| Ingrassia [14] 941/14                          | 1061/21 1179/17         | 1010/10 1025/3 1026/5   | 935/19                        | 930/1                       |
| 941/19 942/6 942/14                            | 1187/15                 | 1032/18 1047/4 1047/7   |                               | JTL [1] 927/4               |
| 942/17 943/1 943/5                             | internally [4] 1010/15  | 1094/2 1097/11 1099/2   |                               |                             |
| 944/7 948/5 948/9                              | 1065/6 1093/13          | 1099/8 1100/17          | January 28 [1] 1043/11        |                             |
| 1147/14 1147/16                                | 1096/21                 | 1102/14 1103/4          | January 28-29 [1]             | 978/4 1018/1 1083/16        |
| 1148/3 1148/18                                 | internationally [1]     | 1109/18 1115/9          | 1043/16                       | 1084/22 1092/23             |
| inherent [1] 1019/10                           | 987/4                   | 1118/20 1146/1          | January 28/29 [4]             | 1093/6 1093/12              |
| initial [3] 1000/6                             | interpretation [7]      | 1166/24 1174/14         | 930/13 931/12 936/7           | 1094/11 1094/23             |
| 1175/1 1182/13                                 | 1006/16 1156/10         | issued [8] 986/15       | 939/20                        | 1096/10 1096/16             |
| initially [3] 980/24                           | 1156/22 1157/4 1157/5   |                         | <b>January 5 [1]</b> 1037/10  |                             |
| 1019/3 1166/8                                  | 1160/4 1160/8           | 1035/22 1119/19         | <b>January 7 [13]</b> 1029/8  | 1103/24 1106/19             |
| initiated [2] 986/4                            | interpreted [1] 966/4   | 1122/23 1207/23         | 1031/21 1037/23               | 1108/13 1111/5              |
| 1011/21  | interpreters [1]        | 1208/4                  | 1039/11 1135/5                | 1122/13 1122/15             |
| initiative [1] 989/21                          | 1006/19                 | issuer [1] 1174/14      | 1136/11 1136/19               | 1127/10 1131/2 1137/2       |
| inject [1] 986/11                              | interrupt [1] 931/5     | issues [15] 984/6       | 1137/8 1137/17 1140/1         | 1150/2 1162/16 1164/4       |
| input [2] 1068/2 1112/7                        | interrupted [1] 1037/2  | 986/11 986/12 1033/14   | 1141/14 1141/18               | 1179/16                     |
| inquiry [2] 1019/16                            | intervening [1] 991/14  | 1033/15 1036/10         | 1175/21                       | <b>JTX .020 [1]</b> 1122/15 |
| 1180/20  | interviews [1] 1020/12  | 1036/11 1038/12         | January 7th [5]               | <b>JTX 0432 [1]</b> 1164/4  |
| inside [1] 1182/3                              | intrinsic [9] 995/9     | 1046/5 1075/5 1095/7    | 1030/16 1041/19               | <b>JTX 0915 [1]</b> 1127/10 |
| insight [1] 1059/22                            | 995/21 996/14 997/8     | 1140/15 1152/17         | 1143/8 1146/10                | <b>JTX 0952 [1]</b> 1179/16 |
| insisting [1] 1048/20                          | 997/20 997/20 1078/19   | 1174/1 1178/18          | 1146/14                       | <b>JTX 1029 [1]</b> 1150/2  |
| instances [1] 1206/15                          | 1078/23 1079/4          | issuing [4] 973/21      | <b>January 9 [1]</b> 1040/7   | <b>JTX 1081 [1]</b> 1084/22 |
| instead [1] 1038/19                            | introduce [2] 979/21    | 1028/3 1093/19          | <b>JENKINS</b> [1] 928/9      | <b>JTX 1092 [2]</b> 1111/5  |
|  | 1192/21                 | 1114/12                 | <b>JEROEN [2]</b> 928/5       | 1131/2                      |
| institutions [1] 1167/6<br>instruct [2] 951/22 | introducing [1] 1130/2  | italics [1] 1150/4      | 1145/5                        | <b>JTX 1195 [1]</b> 1083/16 |
| 952/10   | introduction [1]        | item [6] 983/24 986/5   | <b>JESSICA</b> [1] 928/22     | JTX 1264 [1] 1122/13        |
| instructed [1] 952/3                           | 991/19                  | 1013/11 1033/12         | job [2] 978/1 1143/24         | JTX 1291 [1] 978/4          |
|  | invent [2] 962/3 962/7  | 1035/18 1036/6          | <b>Joe [11]</b> 947/15 950/4  | JTX 1439 [1] 973/5          |
| intended [3] 970/11<br>991/2 996/11            | invented [1] 962/4      | items [1] 1201/6        | 953/13 960/12 965/18          | JTX 1910 [1] 1162/16        |
|  | inventory [1] 1189/4    | itself [2] 1142/12      | 966/18 973/4 1196/4           | JTX 1922 [1] 1103/24        |
| intent [3] 941/9 1048/9                        | invest [3] 1017/8       | 1177/14                 | 1196/8 1196/23                | JTX 327 [1] 1018/1          |
| 1140/8   | 1048/12 1206/15         | IV [1] 927/18           | 1210/11                       | <b>JTX 599 [1]</b> 1137/2   |
| intention [2] 1045/16                          | investment [7] 973/24   |                         | <b>Joel [2]</b> 1087/1 1087/3 | JTX 694 [1] 1092/23         |
| 1082/6   | 1018/3 1162/2 1167/7    | J                       | Johannson [6] 958/21          | JTX 694.003 [1] 1093/6      |
| intentional [1] 1076/16                        |                         | <b>J.P.</b> [1] 1167/16 | 959/5 959/21 960/22           | JTX 694.010 [1]             |
| intents [1] 1167/1                             |                         |                         |                               |                             |
|  |                         |                         |                               |                             |
|  | 0114                    | NCEDY COLIDT DEDORT     | EDO (00)                      | individuals ITV 604 010     |

933/16 939/1 951/4 969/9 982/16 986/3 970/16 975/8 1063/12 989/2 989/4 992/8 953/10 964/6 965/8 987/9 1060/10 1105/5 1179/12 1179/20 994/22 994/24 995/6 JTX 694.010... [1] 966/1 968/2 969/15 1167/5 1180/13 1180/17 996/24 998/24 999/23 1093/12 969/19 969/24 974/13 large-scale [1] 986/3 leaked [3] 1146/1 1000/20 1002/5 1002/9 **JTX 768 [1]** 1096/10 974/18 974/23 974/24 largely [2] 1039/21 1151/1 1179/13 1002/15 1003/6 1004/4 JTX 768.005 [1] 975/6 988/13 988/22 1175/13 1004/6 1005/15 leaks [1] 1060/9 1096/16 1007/10 1008/8 1009/8 989/16 1151/19 1169/5 leaning [1] 1145/17 larger [1] 1115/24 JTX 776.022 [1] largest [4] 981/24 **KEVIN [1]** 928/12 learn [3] 1042/11 1009/14 1010/11 1096/21 1166/9 1166/10 1010/13 1010/18 key [11] 985/1 985/12 984/14 1117/5 1117/6 JTX 778 [2] 1094/11 995/9 996/14 997/1 last [17] 929/7 944/24 learned [5] 1019/2 1013/6 1015/3 1015/5 1094/23 1061/2 1065/22 955/17 1010/20 1025/5 1016/6 1017/24 1038/14 1038/15 **JTX 799 [1]** 1101/19 1072/22 1094/1 1095/7 1044/10 1076/15 1071/11 1102/19 1018/13 1018/17 **JTX 882 [1]** 1106/19 1080/13 1088/1 1109/7 least [13] 944/3 944/9 1022/5 1022/8 1022/22 1102/2 **JTX 885 [1]** 941/13 keystone [1] 996/10 1113/10 1114/15 1035/15 1045/7 1023/4 1023/20 JTX 889 [1] 948/3 kill [2] 1028/7 1048/19 1117/20 1129/1 1150/3 1104/23 1105/19 1034/18 1036/23 JTX 890 [1] 946/16 **killing [2]** 959/17 1153/8 1189/17 1108/9 1117/1 1143/19 1037/7 1040/1 1041/8 JTX 94 [1] 932/5 1106/22 **LASTER [1]** 927/13 1154/14 1157/16 1043/8 1045/8 1045/22 **JTX 944 [1]** 1108/13 kind [7] 1029/17 late [10] 956/7 1009/9 1174/3 1197/15 1046/7 1047/1 1051/5 judgment [2] 946/5 1031/6 1040/23 1042/6 1052/5 1053/5 1057/11 1035/24 1037/16 leave [1] 1173/6 946/11 1099/4 1138/20 1205/7 1058/11 1059/6 1060/3 1045/13 1048/1 led [1] 1088/12 July [21] 927/11 1090/17 1143/24 1060/11 1060/12 1207/6 ledger [1] 984/12 933/12 933/16 933/21 King [2] 927/10 927/23 1061/20 1063/8 1203/8 left-hand [1] 1093/17 993/19 995/16 998/7 Kittrell [4] 932/18 legal [10] 955/21 956/8 1064/23 1065/16 later [15] 1001/9 998/10 998/12 1000/22 975/20 985/20 1035/4 1012/6 1018/4 1029/3 1006/18 1029/20 1065/24 1067/3 1067/6 1001/9 1002/8 1002/13 KMI [3] 1139/23 1038/23 1040/14 1031/24 1032/12 1067/15 1070/2 1089/5 1171/6 1191/9 1140/16 1142/19 1058/23 1059/11 1044/19 1065/5 1070/14 1072/9 1197/22 1198/1 1198/8 knew [19] 929/23 1076/22 1104/13 1074/13 1077/12 1075/17 1077/23 1203/20 1212/13 947/22 949/15 958/21 1147/24 1148/12 legit [1] 1029/2 1078/13 1079/1 July 1 [10] 933/12 1165/12 1183/3 959/2 983/18 983/18 legitimate [2] 1003/3 1080/13 1085/16 933/16 933/21 1171/6 984/16 985/9 985/12 1213/13 1101/19 1112/15 1048/18 1191/9 1197/22 1198/1 1015/12 1017/5 1017/6 latest [2] 943/2 lending [2] 1167/13 1122/11 1123/12 1198/8 1203/20 1032/2 1077/20 1113/16 1167/19 1130/24 1143/5 1150/1 1212/13 1109/18 1137/24 latter [1] 941/7 length [1] 1059/3 1158/4 1158/5 1162/13 July 14 [1] 1000/22 1139/3 1178/16 Leonard [2] 927/9 1163/6 1164/4 1164/5 launched [1] 1165/4 July 1st [2] 998/10 knowing [1] 1016/3 launching [1] 1165/3 927/22 1168/5 1168/15 1171/5 1089/5 knowledge [13] 951/21 1175/19 1179/11 **LAUREN [1]** 928/19 **Les [1]** 1041/10 July 20 [1] 1002/13 966/22 1032/3 1050/16 1179/16 1183/24 law [1] 1083/8 **Leslie [1]** 1093/2 July 23 [1] 1002/8 1135/22 1143/18 lawsuit [4] 1166/10 less [10] 941/22 947/5 1184/4 1184/21 1185/7 jump [1] 1009/8 1147/7 1165/24 1166/3 1166/12 1170/11 947/10 948/6 1027/21 1185/13 1188/2 junctures [1] 1041/7 1177/3 1178/3 1179/6 1170/15 1050/4 1062/18 1188/16 1196/7 June [4] 992/11 994/10 1200/20 1201/3 1196/21 1196/22 1182/2 lawyers [9] 1031/20 1185/16 1185/24 1049/3 1054/15 1209/12 1202/10 1203/13 knowledgeable [1] June 4 [1] 992/11 932/14 1204/5 1205/17 1209/1 1069/10 1076/5 **LESSNER [1]** 928/11 junk [1] 1101/10 **known [2]** 1087/15 1076/10 1076/13 let [32] 932/5 932/20 letter [12] 1009/2 Justice [2] 927/9 1012/10 1054/12 1194/8 1187/9 1187/15 935/5 937/15 957/2 927/22 958/18 959/18 961/10 1071/12 1071/16 knows [1] 1134/11 lay [1] 988/1 justify [1] 942/2 knuckle [1] 1108/11 layperson [1] 1171/12 967/24 973/1 990/4 1071/20 1071/22 **JV [1]** 1018/11 **KWAWEGEN [2]** 928/5 999/18 1022/7 1032/13 1184/1 1185/5 1185/6 **Lazard [8]** 995/21 JX [1] 1195/18 1145/5 996/15 1016/8 1031/24 1049/23 1055/23 1185/8 1185/17 1047/22 1066/21 1058/18 1066/8 letters [1] 1101/3 1075/20 1077/16 1070/1 1070/5 level [13] 975/8 KABOLY [1] 928/19 Labaton [3] 928/3 1083/15 1104/6 **Lazard's [1]** 1078/23 1018/11 1094/15 Karl [3] 958/21 959/4 1121/18 1192/10 lea [1] 955/20 1124/18 1126/10 1094/18 1094/19 959/21 labeled [1] 1122/14 lead [15] 982/5 988/14 1127/4 1132/14 1138/3 1094/20 1094/21 Katz [1] 928/23 labor [1] 1082/7 1030/7 1039/19 1110/3 1151/14 1168/21 1112/11 1145/24 keenly [2] 989/18 **LAFFERTY [1]** 928/18 1110/8 1110/23 1111/3 1183/7 1203/3 1212/11 1203/24 1204/2 989/18 laid [5] 1017/17 1111/19 1115/23 let's [134] 938/19 1205/18 1205/19 keep [10] 970/4 970/6 1017/18 1042/21 1117/21 1119/24 940/2 941/12 942/23 levels [2] 1070/21 1022/1 1041/4 1054/22 1046/3 1057/13 1163/10 1163/12 944/21 946/16 946/19 1108/24 1055/13 1091/10 landing [1] 959/23 948/3 953/9 954/18 1164/2 life [3] 983/18 1134/21 1161/18 1162/11 language [6] 954/6 leader [1] 959/2 955/1 955/17 957/14 1210/1 1168/23 1039/8 1076/14 1152/1 leaders [1] 1038/4 963/14 964/17 964/19 light [3] 967/6 1113/14 keeping [2] 1061/17 1152/15 1190/15 970/22 974/17 975/17 1117/23 leading [3] 1033/19 1091/11 large [14] 934/18 1077/22 1132/23 976/24 980/14 981/9 liked [2] 1135/12 Kentaro [1] 1093/12 967/20 968/3 968/16 leak [12] 940/3 949/16 985/13 985/15 987/16 1135/18

953/22 960/2 960/18

kept [1] 1033/12

Kettering [22] 933/11

968/24 969/1 969/6

likelihood [2] 1029/1

987/17 987/20 988/16

| L   | logically [2] 1051/17                     | lowball [5] 1049/14                           | 1062/7 1072/14  | 1101/20 1104/3                              |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| likelihood [1]                            | 1201/6                                    | 1050/7 1052/3 1170/14                         | 1074/20 1079/13   | 1104/18 1104/22                             |
| 1036/19                                   | long [22] 968/12 991/2                    | 1170/24                                       | 1088/9 1088/23 1089/7                                       | 1106/22 1107/13                             |
| likely [6] 968/13                         | 1043/21 1044/10                           | lower [14] 962/16                             | 1092/8 1108/21 1109/9                                       | 1108/15 1111/8                              |
| 1015/12 1064/4                            | 1050/21 1050/21                           | 962/21 972/22 1091/9                          | 1110/2 1112/19  | 1111/23 1113/7 1116/5                       |
| 1066/22 1074/23                           | 1064/22 1089/1 1089/3                     | 1098/16 1098/19                               | 1112/20 1113/15   | 1116/6 1123/11                              |
| 1141/7                                    | 1100/8 1100/10                            | 1098/20 1099/1                                | 1113/18 1115/14   | 1126/22 1129/6 1130/2                       |
| limited [5] 981/15                        | 1100/19 1103/5                            | 1099/18 1117/15                               | 1115/22 1122/5  | 1131/1 1131/16                              |
| 1105/7 1105/10                            | 1125/21 1125/24                           | 1190/21 1211/6                                | 1122/16 1127/7 1130/1                                       | 1131/16 1131/20                             |
| 1105/16 1184/8                            | 1147/21 1176/20                           | 1211/16 1211/17                               | 1130/7 1131/12  | 1132/21 1135/2                              |
| <b>LINDA [2]</b> 928/15                   | 1205/8 1207/23 1208/3                     | lowers [1] 1212/14                            | 1131/22 1137/11   | 1148/24 1149/1 1149/6                       |
| 1093/2                                    | 1209/12 1211/11                           | LOWING [1] 928/7                              | 1158/2 1166/19 1180/2                                       | 1149/20 1150/5                              |
| line [29] 941/21 945/10                   | long-term [11] 968/12                     | lunatic [1] 1104/19                           | 1180/10 1187/13   | 1150/11 1150/13                             |
| 945/18 946/1 948/6                        | 1089/1 1089/3 1100/10                     | lunch [3] 1068/19                             | 1192/24 1193/1  | 1150/23 1151/10                             |
| 952/7 966/20 966/20                       | 1125/21 1125/24                           | 1068/20 1069/18                               | 1206/13   | 1151/16 1151/17                             |
| 973/5 990/9 993/17                        | 1205/8 1207/23 1208/3                     | М   | management's [2]  | 1153/1 1153/13                              |
| 993/23 997/14 1025/19                     | 1209/12 1211/11                           | MA [1] 966/2                                  | 945/17 1025/6   | 1179/13 1179/18<br>  1182/9 1186/3 1188/6   |
| 1027/20 1034/23                           | longer [6] 935/14<br>1098/6 1099/3 1099/8 | macro [3] 995/19                              | manager [2] 1101/24<br>1161/2                               | 1188/9 1197/12                              |
| 1057/18 1058/19                           | 1113/17 1113/18                           | 1083/18 1190/22                               |   | 1197/19 1198/4                              |
| 1063/20 1063/21                           | look at [1] 1158/3                        | magical [1] 1134/24                           | managers [3] 1127/4<br>1163/10 1165/2                       | 1198/18                                     |
| 1066/7 1125/18 1138/5                     | lookback [1] 1199/16                      | magnitude [1] 989/24                          | managing [2] 1163/15  | March 1 [1] 1149/1                          |
| 1138/5 1158/6 1158/6                      | looked [13] 934/15                        | mainly [1] 929/12                             | 1192/23   | March 10 [5] 958/7                          |
| 1189/20 1201/20                           | 948/4 1046/21 1070/24                     | maintain [9] 1091/1                           | manner [4] 1054/16  | 1058/3 1058/14                              |
| 1213/4                                    | 1089/16 1105/2 1105/2                     | 1092/10 1103/18                               | 1056/6 1056/13  | 1179/13 1179/18                             |
| line 18 [1] 1138/5                        | 1105/3 1197/13                            | 1103/19 1103/21                               | 1074/23   | March 10th [16] 950/2                       |
| line.' [1] 942/4                          | 1207/21 1207/22                           | 1125/15 1147/21                               | Marcellus [1] 1171/17                                       | 953/12 953/16 954/1                         |
| linear [1] 1100/8                         | 1207/24 1208/2                            | 1179/1 1189/18                                | March [151] 940/3   | 954/15 955/10 955/11                        |
| lines [5] 945/20 973/5                    | looking [22] 937/23                       | maintaining [2] 989/17                        | 940/9 941/16 942/7  | 956/5 957/4 959/22                          |
| 974/3 990/13 1043/23                      | 972/2 975/14 995/22                       | 1189/6  | 942/10 942/15 942/21  | 960/21 961/8 961/13                         |
| linkage [1] 1115/1                        | 1009/9 1011/9 1015/11                     | majoring [1] 1087/13                          | 942/24 944/7 944/22   | 961/20 962/12 963/3                         |
| Lipton [1] 928/23                         | 1046/22 1060/14                           | majority [1] 1163/20                          | 945/14 946/10 946/22  | March 11 [5] 955/11                         |
| liquidity [4] 1098/1                      | 1068/1 1079/3 1082/11                     | make [43] 929/22                              | 947/1 947/17 948/14   | 963/3 963/15 1059/8                         |
| 1188/23 1189/2 1190/7                     | 1083/2 1106/8 1106/14                     | 939/2 959/18 977/3                            | 948/20 948/20 949/6   | 1064/24                                     |
| list [5] 929/14 1011/11<br>1164/9 1164/10 | 1107/20 1145/14                           | 979/7 979/19 989/23                           | 949/7 949/11 950/2  | March 11th [1] 955/6                        |
| 1164/12                                   | 1172/15 1198/8                            | 994/5 1006/16 1021/13                         | 952/7 952/8 953/11  | March 12 [8] 964/20                         |
| listed [2] 1098/13                        | 1199/15 1200/16                           | 1022/8 1035/13                                | 953/12 953/16 954/1   | 964/20 965/20 965/23                        |
| 1164/1                                    | 1205/23                                   | 1039/18 1039/19                               | 954/15 955/6 955/10   | 1066/2 1072/4 1072/9                        |
| listen [4] 942/11                         | looks [3] 1004/10                         | 1056/9 1057/3 1062/18                         | 955/11 955/11 956/5   | 1151/16                                     |
| 966/12 1003/2 1064/21                     | 1082/14 1107/12                           | 1064/9 1065/19                                | 957/4 957/17 958/4  | March 12th [10]                             |
| listening [1] 1042/22                     | looming [1] 1045/21                       | 1071/17 1073/20                               | 958/7 959/15 959/22   | 1149/6 1149/20 1150/5                       |
| literally [4] 991/17                      | Los [4] 1149/10                           | 1075/1 1076/21                                | 960/21 961/8 961/13   | 1150/11 1150/13                             |
| 999/9 999/11 1148/1                       | 1149/18 1149/19                           | 1076/21 1077/3 1082/7                         | 961/20 962/12 962/23  | 1150/23 1151/10                             |
| litigation [3] 927/3                      | 1152/10                                   | 1088/23 1100/14                               | 963/3 963/3 963/15  | 1151/17 1153/1                              |
| 993/21 1069/7                             | Los Angeles [1]                           | 1106/1 1109/9 1138/16                         | 964/20 964/20 965/20  | 1153/13                                     |
| Litowitz [2] 928/4                        | 1152/10                                   | 1140/19 1140/21                               | 965/23 968/3 968/4  | March 13 [3] 968/3                          |
| 928/8                                     | lose [2] 1076/24                          | 1141/13 1142/6<br>  1142/14 1151/14           | 968/24 969/13 969/18  | 968/4 968/24                                |
| little [21] 931/2 940/3                   | 1097/11                                   | 1170/1 1190/5 1208/6                          | 969/19 970/23 971/18  | March 14 [17] 969/13                        |
| 976/24 980/14 981/18                      | losing [2] 1073/3                         | 1209/13 1212/10                               | 972/1 972/1 972/17<br>972/17 973/13 974/14                  | 969/18 969/19 970/23                        |
| 984/15 994/22 1009/23                     | 1099/10<br>  lost [3] 1053/3 1202/6       | 1212/18                                       | 974/20 975/4 975/12   | 971/18 972/1 972/17                         |
| 1009/23 1021/2                            | 1202/7                                    | makes [4] 960/24                              | 975/17 975/18 979/5   | 1085/19 1086/3 1111/8                       |
| 1043/14 1117/15                           | lot [22] 970/16 986/10                    | 1107/22 1190/19                               | 979/10 979/10 998/1   | 1111/23 1113/7 1116/6                       |
| 1121/22 1126/22                           | 987/13 1061/22 1066/9                     | 1214/5  | 1052/6 1053/21  | 1131/1 1131/16                              |
| 1143/6 1143/22                            | 1080/14 1100/1                            | making [14] 971/1                             | 1057/13 1058/3  | March 14th [3] 962/23                       |
| 1148/12 1155/23                           | 1100/20 1106/7 1140/7                     | 983/15 990/19 1002/22                         | 1058/13 1058/14   | 1073/19 1131/20                             |
| 1159/9 1188/11 1211/8                     | 1142/22 1167/15                           | 1083/12 1105/16                               | 1059/8 1060/4 1064/24                                       | March 15 [5] 974/14                         |
| lives [1] 1149/18                         | 1167/16 1171/14                           | 1119/3 1127/2 1127/5                          | 1066/2 1067/9 1067/11                                       | 974/20 975/4 975/12                         |
| LLP [6] 928/3 928/4                       | 1172/3 1173/20                            | 1129/7 1142/11                                | 1070/10 1071/1 1072/4                                       | 979/10                                      |
| 928/8 928/13 928/16                       | 1174/15 1174/15                           | 1178/24 1187/13                               | 1072/9 1072/21  | March 16 [10] 975/17                        |
| 928/20                                    | 1174/16 1175/21                           | 1213/8  | 1073/19 1074/15   | 975/18 979/10 1067/9                        |
| LNG [1] 987/9                             | 1177/6 1187/10                            | manage [1] 1183/16                            | 1077/22 1077/24   | 1067/11 1070/10                             |
| lock [1] 1098/5                           |   | management [42]                               | 1078/18 1079/5  | 1071/1 1077/22                              |
| logic [2] 976/6 1000/11                   | Hove III TUUU/9                           |   | <del></del>   |   |
|   | love [1] 1000/9<br>low [5] 984/23 1090/23 |   | 1080/19 1080/19   | 1078/18 1079/5                              |
| logical [4] 1051/20                       | low [5] 984/23 1090/23                    |   | 1080/19 1080/19<br>1080/22 1080/22                          | 1078/18 1079/5 <b>March 16th [1]</b> 957/17 |
| logical [4] 1051/20<br>1154/15 1155/4     | low [5] 984/23 1090/23 1091/10 1097/21    | 951/11 951/22 961/15                          | 1080/19 1080/19<br>1080/22 1080/22<br>1085/9 1085/19 1086/3 | March 16th [1] 957/17                       |
| logical [4] 1051/20                       | low [5] 984/23 1090/23                    | 951/11 951/22 961/15<br>969/10 1007/8 1020/12 | 1080/22 1080/22   |   |

| M                      | marketed [1] 1165/4                          | 1038/16 1043/4        | 1032/14 1033/20       | 944/3 981/24          |
|------------------------|--|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
|                        | marketing [2] 1163/18                        | 1046/19 1050/2 1050/8 | 1034/3 1034/7 1034/8  | members [15] 944/10   |
| March 17 [7] 972/17    | 1173/3                                       | 1066/17 1079/23       | 1034/10 1035/1 1035/9 | 985/21 986/22 992/23  |
| 1080/19 1080/22        | marketplace [4]                              | 1091/9 1098/16        | 1037/23 1038/10       | 1007/8 1020/12 1030/6 |
| 1188/6 1197/12 1198/4  | 1012/3 1045/19                               | 1104/24 1107/18       | 1039/3 1039/11        | 1034/4 1113/20 1122/5 |
| 1198/18                | 1122/23 1123/10                              | 1138/11 1139/5 1140/6 | 1040/10 1041/19       | 1127/7 1130/7 1138/24 |
| March 17th [2] 1188/9  | markets [20] 1011/6                          | 1140/7 1141/3 1142/20 | 1042/8 1043/1 1044/2  | 1139/8 1193/5         |
| 1197/19                | 1015/23 1021/19                              | 1145/20 1145/22       | 1045/6 1045/13        | memo [5] 957/17 958/9 |
| March 1st [3] 1101/20  | 1026/7 1033/7 1059/18                        | 1151/4 1154/10        | 1047/19 1048/1 1048/3 | 993/20 997/9 1004/10  |
| 1135/2 1186/3          | 1059/22 1060/10                              | 1154/17 1155/8        | 1048/23 1049/8        | memorandum [2]        |
| March 2 [1] 949/7      | 1076/23 1087/24                              | 1156/17 1158/19       | 1049/11 1049/12       | 992/10 992/17         |
| March 2016 [1] 940/3   | 1091/7 1098/22                               | 1169/9 1176/19        | 1049/19 1049/20       | memory [4] 964/10     |
| March 4 [2] 1080/19    | 1100/18 1100/22                              | 1176/23 1177/3        | 1049/22 1051/8        | 964/23 975/10 1194/5  |
| 1080/22                | 1108/1 1116/2 1171/18                        | 1178/14 1178/15       | 1051/11 1051/18       | mention [3] 1032/10   |
| March 5 [2] 1052/6     | 1174/12 1174/21                              | 1178/16 1178/23       | 1051/11 1053/10       | 1208/16 1209/16       |
| 1053/21                | 1189/4                                       | 1178/23 1198/13       | 1059/1 1059/3 1067/8  | mentioned [21] 940/7  |
| March 5th [2] 1104/3   | MARTIN [1] 928/11                            | 1202/21               | 1067/19 1067/22       | 985/2 989/20 995/13   |
| 1104/18                | Marty [13] 932/13                            | meaning [4] 962/12    | 1070/11 1071/1        | 996/18 999/12 1013/14 |
| March 6 [16] 941/16    | 932/18 934/10 934/13                         | 970/13 1100/19        | 1077/23 1078/19       | 1019/16 1044/6 1092/5 |
| 942/7 942/10 942/15    |  | 1153/19               | 1077/23 1076/19       |                       |
| 942/21 942/24 944/7    | 934/20 934/24 975/18<br>975/20 985/17 985/18 |                       |                       | 1097/2 1099/10        |
| 944/22 945/14 946/10   |  | means [8] 973/18      | 1080/20 1095/1 1095/2 | 1120/12 1120/14       |
| 946/22 947/1 947/17    | 985/19 985/20 986/4                          | 1027/22 1106/7        | 1096/18 1108/15       | 1199/9 1200/8 1204/7  |
| 952/7 1104/22 1107/13  | Marty's [1] 935/13                           | 1106/10 1114/8 1115/7 | 1108/16 1109/4 1110/4 | 1204/10 1206/23       |
| March 8 [2] 948/20     | MASSENGILL [1]                               | 1189/10 1201/3        | 1110/9 1110/24 1111/8 | 1209/18 1211/19       |
| 949/6                  | 928/15                                       | meant [14] 990/16     | 1111/9 1111/13        | mentioning [1]        |
| March 9 [10] 948/14    | massive [1] 1148/6                           | 1014/24 1035/15       | 1111/16 1111/20       | 1033/13               |
| 948/20 949/11 958/4    | massively [1] 1068/8                         | 1105/1 1116/22 1154/6 | 1111/23 1113/8        | mentions [2] 1024/12  |
| 1108/15 1116/5         | master [4] 976/2                             | 1156/1 1181/11        | 1113/12 1115/13       | 1169/3                |
| 1126/22 1129/6 1130/2  | 1105/7 1105/9 1105/16                        | 1181/17 1181/22       | 1116/5 1116/6 1116/10 | merger [16] 927/3     |
| 1131/16                | material [1] 1041/5                          | 1184/15 1184/18       | 1117/17 1131/1 1131/5 | 951/12 956/11 963/5   |
| March 9th [1] 1132/21  | materials [5] 1002/11                        | 1209/20 1212/19       | 1131/9 1131/11        | 963/9 965/1 994/19    |
| Marchand [6] 1088/4    | 1018/16 1035/12                              | meantime [1] 1030/2   | 1131/21 1132/21       | 1017/15 1049/12       |
| 1088/17 1093/2         | 1136/10 1166/14                              | Meanwhile [1] 965/14  | 1132/24 1135/5        | 1054/18 1074/4        |
| 1107/12 1107/15        | math [5] 975/7 976/23                        | measure [2] 1195/11   | 1136/11 1136/15       | 1076/10 1124/13       |
| 1107/22                | 1078/6 1078/11                               | 1209/22               | 1136/20 1137/23       | 1129/17 1179/14       |
| MARGARET [1] 928/7     | 1202/20                                      | measuring [1] 1197/21 | 1141/15 1141/18       | 1188/6                |
| marginal [1] 1174/9    | Matrix [1] 1046/18                           | media [2] 1060/9      | 1146/10 1146/15       | merit [1] 1158/10     |
| MARIE [1] 928/9        | Matt [7] 935/8 1085/8                        | 1113/12               | 1153/10 1168/9        | message [9] 942/6     |
| mark [2] 990/14 1018/7 | 1151/20 1151/21                              | meet [9] 993/1 1001/9 | 1168/20 1168/23       | 942/14 942/21 943/4   |
| market [62] 968/9      | 1152/13 1190/14                              | 1029/11 1059/15       | 1170/6 1170/8 1170/11 | 947/23 954/14 959/21  |
| 968/14 998/4 999/18    | 1191/3                                       | 1135/20 1160/21       | 1175/21 1175/24       | 968/18 1177/11        |
| 1005/12 1007/24        | matter [8] 929/5 994/3                       | 1161/21 1169/21       | 1176/11 1176/13       | messages [10] 953/9   |
| 1008/1 1008/22 1010/2  | 1000/8 1032/17 1038/3                        | 1174/1                | 1177/8                | 958/20 962/11 964/18  |
| 1011/5 1011/7 1012/21  | 1039/24 1075/2                               | meeting [150] 930/13  | meeting' [1] 943/7    | 969/15 970/2 974/18   |
| 1014/4 1016/20         | 1213/12                                      | 930/17 931/12 932/22  | meetings [26] 930/12  | 1013/15 1149/4        |
| 1025/20 1026/10        | matters [2] 929/17                           | 933/1 934/10 936/6    | 931/11 931/16 931/23  | 1151/12               |
| 1031/2 1046/23 1061/8  | 1126/7                                       | 936/8 936/12 936/17   | 935/24 949/21 982/13  | messaging [1] 941/24  |
| 1075/8 1082/14         | maturities [1] 1099/7                        | 939/20 939/22 940/19  | 986/11 991/12 991/17  | met [9] 958/3 986/1   |
| 1097/18 1097/23        | maturity [1] 1099/5                          | 944/23 946/19 947/18  | 997/2 997/3 997/6     | 1007/7 1034/1 1103/6  |
| 1098/5 1098/8 1098/20  | maximize [1] 1082/1                          | 947/22 950/2 953/11   | 1030/16 1030/18       | 1103/12 1109/23       |
| 1099/9 1099/11         | may [11] 962/15 975/9                        | 959/16 986/10 986/14  | 1030/20 1032/21       | 1113/18 1160/24       |
| 1099/11 1099/13        | 978/11 994/13 1035/3                         | 991/13 1001/15        | 1033/2 1033/3 1034/15 | method [1] 1205/15    |
| 1101/11 1103/3 1105/8  | 1078/9 1085/10 1101/2                        | 1001/16 1002/18       | 1035/11 1143/13       | metric [1] 1125/7     |
| 1105/10 1106/15        | 1119/11 1134/8                               | 1003/1 1004/12        | 1143/20 1162/6        | metrics [6] 1106/9    |
| 1107/6 1109/18         | 1198/11                                      | 1004/16 1005/16       | 1169/20 1187/6        | 1124/23 1125/5 1189/5 |
| 1110/13 1110/18        | maybe [7] 943/20                             | 1005/19 1005/21       | Meinhart [14] 1192/11 | 1191/9 1208/16        |
| 1112/7 1114/7 1114/17  | 962/18 1028/22                               | 1006/3 1016/12        | 1192/16 1192/20       | mic [1] 1009/23       |
| 1114/22 1123/1         | 1038/23 1084/22                              | 1016/14 1016/18       | 1192/23 1194/21       | MICHAEL [1] 928/14    |
|                        | 1193/23 1193/24                              | 1017/21 1023/22       | 1195/1 1195/6 1196/10 | Michigan [1] 982/1    |
| 1139/23 1140/6         | Mayer [2] 928/16                             | 1023/23 1029/5 1029/8 | 1198/15 1198/23       | micro [1] 1035/21     |
| 1140/16 1141/23        | 954/11                                       | 1029/13 1029/21       | 1203/13 1207/20       | mid [9] 1000/7 1007/7 |
| 1141/23 1142/2         | MBA [1] 1193/16                              | 1029/24 1030/23       | 1211/23 1214/2        | 1010/24 1030/8        |
| 1142/21 1147/22        | McGettrick [1] 1018/7                        | 1030/24 1031/5        | meltdown [3] 935/1    | 1030/10 1030/11       |
| 1171/16 1172/24        | mean [42] 970/11                             | 1031/10 1031/14       | 984/21 1007/24        | 1037/4 1065/10        |
| 1173/2 1173/4 1173/15  | 973/17 975/13 984/8                          | 1031/16 1031/21       | melting [1] 1105/11   | 1101/10               |
| 1179/1 1190/1 1199/19  | 1032/15 1036/5                               | 1032/2 1032/3 1032/6  | member [3] 935/13     | mid-August [1] 1007/7 |
| 1208/4 1208/16         |  |                       | L-3                   | J                     |
|                        |  |                       |                       |                       |
|                        | A114   | NACRY AGUST BERART    | EBA (444              | \ B                   |

| М  | 1008/16 1043/9  | month [9] 994/3  | 988/7 989/16 1001/10  | Mr. Cornelius' [1]  |
|--|---|--|---|---|
|  | 1044/14 1048/2 1052/6   | 1000/7 1005/11   | 1002/12 1002/18   | 1056/3  |
| mid-BBB [1] 1101/10  | 1058/11 1058/14   | 1007/16 1029/3 1030/8  | 1004/6 1007/12  | Mr. Cornelius's [1]   |
| mid-day [1] 1065/10  | 1072/8 1072/9 1073/18   | 1030/10 1031/11  | 1007/19 1011/22   | 937/6   |
| mid-December [2]   | 1075/12 1085/1  | 1040/15  | 1012/1 1013/7 1013/12   | Mr. Ebel [1] 963/15   |
| 1030/11 1037/4   | 1094/12 1094/24   |  | 1013/18 1014/8  | Mr. Farrell [12]  |
| mid-month [2] 1000/7   |   | months [6] 931/19  |   |   |
| 1030/8   | 1108/14 1108/19   | 931/20 1006/10   | 1014/11 1016/14   | 1001/10 1002/12   |
| mid-October [1]  | 1111/7 1111/11  | 1104/23 1157/16  | 1016/18 1016/19   | 1002/18 1011/22   |
| 1010/24  | 1117/16 1143/24   | 1185/17  | 1017/20 1018/3  | 1012/1 1014/8 1016/14   |
| middle [16] 938/22   | 1169/20 1179/11   | Moody's [9] 1090/20  | 1018/22 1019/3 1021/9   | 1016/18 1016/19   |
| 965/7 1030/12 1051/3   | 1212/23   | 1091/18 1094/6   | 1023/5 1023/9 1028/23   | 1018/22 1019/3 1021/9   |
| 1061/23 1063/21  | misconduct [1]  | 1095/21 1097/5   | 1029/4 1029/11  | Mr. Fornell [5] 961/12  |
| 1074/7 1074/17   | 1196/19   | 1101/17 1101/22  | 1033/10 1034/21   | 961/23 1063/4 1165/24   |
| 1074/18 1084/1 1135/9  | misheard [1] 1198/11  | 1102/8 1103/17   | 1035/2 1035/4 1038/12   | 1170/6  |
| 1137/10 1150/23  | mismatch [2] 1100/17  | moral [3] 1066/5   | 1038/17 1040/6  | Mr. Gardner [4]   |
| 1188/4 1190/4 1212/16  | 1100/23   | 1066/10 1151/7   | 1040/11 1044/4 1051/6   | 1111/23 1116/10   |
| midst [1] 1007/24  | missing [1] 1085/23   | Morgan [1] 1167/16   | 1052/23 1053/1 1053/2   | 1117/17 1118/2  |
| midstream [4] 969/10   | misspoke [2] 1037/15  | morning [11] 930/6   | 1053/6 1053/9 1053/15   | <b>Mr. Gibson [7]</b> 935/19  |
| 982/7 1199/13 1201/11  | 1198/16   | 930/7 958/7 959/17   | 1054/4 1055/15  | 935/22 936/11 936/14  |
| might [38] 970/15  | misunderstanding [1]  | 959/22 961/19 980/12   | 1055/19 1056/3  | 938/15 939/15 1148/10   |
| 984/11 990/20 994/8  | 1176/8  | 980/13 1003/8 1058/3   | 1056/20 1057/14   | Mr. Girling [13] 940/6  |
| 994/16 998/3 999/22  | mitigate [3] 1010/10  | 1214/7   | 1063/4 1066/1 1069/17   | 940/17 951/2 953/6  |
| 1001/23 1008/7 1010/9  | 1129/13 1129/18   | Morris [1] 928/20  | 1080/6 1081/4 1081/17   | 961/19 971/11 1028/23   |
| 1011/10 1012/19  | mitigated [4] 1083/21   | most [12] 981/23   | 1081/20 1082/22   | 1044/4 1052/23  |
| 1013/19 1016/3   | 1190/24 1201/14   | 1014/21 1044/21  | 1083/22 1086/20   | 1053/15 1054/4  |
| 1016/23 1017/8   | 1201/14   | 1051/2 1100/18   | 1087/7 1094/12  | 1056/20 1057/14   |
| 1018/14 1027/15  | mixed [13] 1075/21  | 1113/13 1147/23  | 1106/23 1107/12   | Mr. Hort [1] 1017/20  |
| 1028/22 1028/23  | 1109/13 1126/23   | 1167/5 1204/12   | 1107/15 1107/22   | Mr. Hunter [6] 929/18   |
| 1029/15 1038/6 1038/8  | 1127/3 1127/6 1129/8  | 1205/14 1205/15  | 1111/23 1111/23   | 1087/7 1094/12  |
| 1040/13 1042/10  | 1132/14 1132/18   | 1206/14  | 1116/10 1116/10   | 1121/17 1121/24   |
| 1047/10 1048/16  | 1133/5 1197/5 1200/14   | mouth [2] 1066/14  | 1117/16 1117/17   | 1122/4  |
| 1052/23 1055/17  | 1200/19 1201/15   | 1066/15  | 1118/2 1118/2 1121/17   | Mr. Hunter's [1]  |
| 1056/8 1061/12 1063/1  | MLP [12] 985/3 998/5  | move [14] 940/2  | 1121/24 1122/4  | 929/19  |
| 1063/5 1064/1 1065/20  | 1011/7 1036/2 1172/5  | 954/12 979/15 1009/23  | 1130/11 1133/15   | Mr. Ingrassia [8]   |
| 1071/20 1079/18  | 1172/10 1172/16   | 1025/22 1055/4 1059/9  | 1134/3 1136/10 1143/8   | 941/14 941/19 942/6   |
| 1168/11  | 1172/23 1173/2 1173/3   | 1063/9 1077/16   | 1143/9 1145/12 1148/3   | 942/14 943/5 948/5  |
| Milestones [1] 997/1   | 1173/15 1189/17   | 1148/23 1155/4   | 1148/10 1148/18   | 1148/3 1148/18  |
| million [18] 976/22  | MLPs [1] 1173/20  | 1155/15 1170/5 1212/8  | 1160/13 1160/16   | Mr. Johannson [3]   |
| 976/22 1107/3 1107/9   | mode [3] 1003/2   | moved [2] 1087/24  | 1160/18 1160/21   | 960/22 962/17 1130/11   |
| 1108/3 1124/4 1124/9   | 1031/12 1042/22   | 1171/18  |   | Mr. Kettering [5] 951/4   |
| 1128/15 1128/23  | model [17] 1034/9   | moving [6] 951/10  | 1170/6 1175/24 1181/2   | 964/6 969/15 969/24   |
| 1129/23 1134/15  | 1089/15 1089/17   | 952/16 952/20 953/3  | 1182/12 1184/1 1185/3   |   |
|  | 1089/18 1089/18   |  | 1102/12 1104/1 1103/3   | 989/16  |
| 1 1169/93 1165/91  | 1009/10 1009/10   | 1084/20 1104/13  | 1185/8 1187/22 1188/7   | Mr. Kittrell [1] 1035/4   |
| 1162/23 1165/21  |   | 1084/20 1104/13<br><b>Mr [1]</b> 1126/9  |   |   |
| 1171/24 1171/24  |   | Mr [1] 1126/9<br>Mr. [179] 929/18  | 1185/8 1187/22 1188/7   | Mr. Kittrell [1] 1035/4   |
| 1171/24 1171/24<br>1189/18 1189/19   | 1090/2 1090/3 1090/13   | <b>Mr [1]</b> 1126/9   | 1185/8 1187/22 1188/7<br>1192/5 1192/20   | Mr. Kittrell [1] 1035/4<br>Mr. Marchand [3]   |
| 1171/24 1171/24<br>1189/18 1189/19<br>1202/9   | 1090/2 1090/3 1090/13<br>1090/14 1092/17  | Mr [1] 1126/9<br>Mr. [179] 929/18  | 1185/8 1187/22 1188/7<br>1192/5 1192/20<br>1194/21 1195/1 1195/6  | Mr. Kittrell [1] 1035/4<br>Mr. Marchand [3]<br>1107/12 1107/15  |
| 1171/24 1171/24<br>1189/18 1189/19<br>1202/9<br><b>mind [12]</b> 945/19  | 1090/2 1090/3 1090/13<br>1090/14 1092/17<br>1129/22 1207/12   | <b>Mr [1]</b> 1126/9<br><b>Mr. [179]</b> 929/18<br>929/19 929/19 929/21  | 1185/8 1187/22 1188/7<br>1192/5 1192/20<br>1194/21 1195/1 1195/6<br>1196/10 1198/15   | Mr. Kittrell [1] 1035/4<br>Mr. Marchand [3]<br>1107/12 1107/15<br>1107/22   |
| 1171/24 1171/24<br>1189/18 1189/19<br>1202/9<br><b>mind [12]</b> 945/19<br>995/18 1141/3 1154/13   | 1090/2 1090/3 1090/13<br>1090/14 1092/17<br>1129/22 1207/12<br>1207/12 1207/17<br>1208/13 1209/7 1209/8<br>modeling [1] 1089/12   | <b>Mr [1]</b> 1126/9<br><b>Mr. [179]</b> 929/18<br>929/19 929/19 929/21<br>930/6 935/2 935/19  | 1185/8 1187/22 1188/7<br>1192/5 1192/20<br>1194/21 1195/1 1195/6<br>1196/10 1198/15<br>1198/23 1203/13<br>1207/20 1211/23<br>1214/2   | Mr. Kittrell [1] 1035/4<br>Mr. Marchand [3]<br>1107/12 1107/15<br>1107/22<br>Mr. Meinhart [11]<br>1192/20 1194/21   |
| 1171/24 1171/24<br>1189/18 1189/19<br>1202/9<br><b>mind [12]</b> 945/19<br>995/18 1141/3 1154/13<br>1154/14 1154/24  | 1090/2 1090/3 1090/13<br>1090/14 1092/17<br>1129/22 1207/12<br>1207/12 1207/17<br>1208/13 1209/7 1209/8   | <b>Mr [1]</b> 1126/9<br><b>Mr. [179]</b> 929/18<br>929/19 929/19 929/21<br>930/6 935/2 935/19<br>935/22 936/11 936/14  | 1185/8 1187/22 1188/7<br>1192/5 1192/20<br>1194/21 1195/1 1195/6<br>1196/10 1198/15<br>1198/23 1203/13<br>1207/20 1211/23   | Mr. Kittrell [1] 1035/4 Mr. Marchand [3] 1107/12 1107/15 1107/22 Mr. Meinhart [11] 1192/20 1194/21 1195/1 1195/6 1196/10 1198/15 1198/23  |
| 1171/24 1171/24<br>1189/18 1189/19<br>1202/9<br><b>mind [12]</b> 945/19<br>995/18 1141/3 1154/13<br>1154/14 1154/24<br>1156/2 1166/22  | 1090/2 1090/3 1090/13<br>1090/14 1092/17<br>1129/22 1207/12<br>1207/12 1207/17<br>1208/13 1209/7 1209/8<br>modeling [1] 1089/12<br>Modification [1]<br>933/15   | Mr [1] 1126/9 Mr. [179] 929/18 929/19 929/19 929/21 930/6 935/2 935/19 935/22 936/11 936/14 936/19 937/6 937/8   | 1185/8 1187/22 1188/7<br>1192/5 1192/20<br>1194/21 1195/1 1195/6<br>1196/10 1198/15<br>1198/23 1203/13<br>1207/20 1211/23<br>1214/2<br><b>Mr. Babowal [2]</b> 957/7<br>957/10   | Mr. Kittrell [1] 1035/4 Mr. Marchand [3] 1107/12 1107/15 1107/22 Mr. Meinhart [11] 1192/20 1194/21 1195/1 1195/6 1196/10 1198/15 1198/23 1203/13 1207/20  |
| 1171/24 1171/24<br>1189/18 1189/19<br>1202/9<br><b>mind [12]</b> 945/19<br>995/18 1141/3 1154/13<br>1154/14 1154/24<br>1156/2 1166/22<br>1176/24 1179/5 1184/7   | 1090/2 1090/3 1090/13<br>1090/14 1092/17<br>1129/22 1207/12<br>1207/12 1207/17<br>1208/13 1209/7 1209/8<br>modeling [1] 1089/12<br>Modification [1]<br>933/15<br>modified [1] 1207/16   | Mr [1] 1126/9 Mr. [179] 929/18 929/19 929/19 929/21 930/6 935/2 935/19 935/22 936/11 936/14 936/19 937/6 937/8 938/7 938/15 939/4 939/15 940/6 940/8 940/17 941/14 941/19  | 1185/8 1187/22 1188/7<br>1192/5 1192/20<br>1194/21 1195/1 1195/6<br>1196/10 1198/15<br>1198/23 1203/13<br>1207/20 1211/23<br>1214/2<br>Mr. Babowal [2] 957/7<br>957/10<br>Mr. Bob [1] 1040/6  | Mr. Kittrell [1] 1035/4 Mr. Marchand [3] 1107/12 1107/15 1107/22 Mr. Meinhart [11] 1192/20 1194/21 1195/1 1195/6 1196/10 1198/15 1198/23 1203/13 1207/20 1211/23 1214/2   |
| 1171/24 1171/24<br>1189/18 1189/19<br>1202/9<br>mind [12] 945/19<br>995/18 1141/3 1154/13<br>1154/14 1154/24<br>1156/2 1166/22<br>1176/24 1179/5 1184/7<br>1200/13   | 1090/2 1090/3 1090/13<br>1090/14 1092/17<br>1129/22 1207/12<br>1207/12 1207/17<br>1208/13 1209/7 1209/8<br>modeling [1] 1089/12<br>Modification [1]<br>933/15<br>modified [1] 1207/16<br>moment [6] 1018/22   | Mr [1] 1126/9 Mr. [179] 929/18 929/19 929/19 929/21 930/6 935/2 935/19 935/22 936/11 936/14 936/19 937/6 937/8 938/7 938/15 939/4 939/15 940/6 940/8   | 1185/8 1187/22 1188/7<br>1192/5 1192/20<br>1194/21 1195/1 1195/6<br>1196/10 1198/15<br>1198/23 1203/13<br>1207/20 1211/23<br>1214/2<br><b>Mr. Babowal [2]</b> 957/7<br>957/10   | Mr. Kittrell [1] 1035/4 Mr. Marchand [3] 1107/12 1107/15 1107/22 Mr. Meinhart [11] 1192/20 1194/21 1195/1 1195/6 1196/10 1198/15 1198/23 1203/13 1207/20 1211/23 1214/2 Mr. Poirier [16] 964/19   |
| 1171/24 1171/24<br>1189/18 1189/19<br>1202/9<br>mind [12] 945/19<br>995/18 1141/3 1154/13<br>1154/14 1154/24<br>1156/2 1166/22<br>1176/24 1179/5 1184/7<br>1200/13<br>Mindful [1] 931/8  | 1090/2 1090/3 1090/13<br>1090/14 1092/17<br>1129/22 1207/12<br>1207/12 1207/17<br>1208/13 1209/7 1209/8<br>modeling [1] 1089/12<br>Modification [1]<br>933/15<br>modified [1] 1207/16<br>moment [6] 1018/22<br>1063/19 1067/7   | Mr [1] 1126/9 Mr. [179] 929/18 929/19 929/19 929/21 930/6 935/2 935/19 935/22 936/11 936/14 936/19 937/6 937/8 938/7 938/15 939/4 939/15 940/6 940/8 940/17 941/14 941/19  | 1185/8 1187/22 1188/7<br>1192/5 1192/20<br>1194/21 1195/1 1195/6<br>1196/10 1198/15<br>1198/23 1203/13<br>1207/20 1211/23<br>1214/2<br>Mr. Babowal [2] 957/7<br>957/10<br>Mr. Bob [1] 1040/6<br>Mr. Christopher [1]<br>936/19   | Mr. Kittrell [1] 1035/4 Mr. Marchand [3] 1107/12 1107/15 1107/22 Mr. Meinhart [11] 1192/20 1194/21 1195/1 1195/6 1196/10 1198/15 1198/23 1203/13 1207/20 1211/23 1214/2 Mr. Poirier [16] 964/19 973/2 973/23 1014/11  |
| 1171/24 1171/24<br>1189/18 1189/19<br>1202/9<br>mind [12] 945/19<br>995/18 1141/3 1154/13<br>1154/14 1154/24<br>1156/2 1166/22<br>1176/24 1179/5 1184/7<br>1200/13<br>Mindful [1] 931/8<br>Mindful/Vet [1] 931/8   | 1090/2 1090/3 1090/13<br>1090/14 1092/17<br>1129/22 1207/12<br>1207/12 1207/17<br>1208/13 1209/7 1209/8<br>modeling [1] 1089/12<br>Modification [1]<br>933/15<br>modified [1] 1207/16<br>moment [6] 1018/22   | Mr [1] 1126/9 Mr. [179] 929/18 929/19 929/19 929/21 930/6 935/2 935/19 935/22 936/11 936/14 936/19 937/6 937/8 938/7 938/15 939/4 939/15 940/6 940/8 940/17 941/14 941/19 942/6 942/14 943/5   | 1185/8 1187/22 1188/7<br>1192/5 1192/20<br>1194/21 1195/1 1195/6<br>1196/10 1198/15<br>1198/23 1203/13<br>1207/20 1211/23<br>1214/2<br>Mr. Babowal [2] 957/7<br>957/10<br>Mr. Bob [1] 1040/6<br>Mr. Christopher [1]   | Mr. Kittrell [1] 1035/4 Mr. Marchand [3] 1107/12 1107/15 1107/22 Mr. Meinhart [11] 1192/20 1194/21 1195/1 1195/6 1196/10 1198/15 1198/23 1203/13 1207/20 1211/23 1214/2 Mr. Poirier [16] 964/19 973/2 973/23 1014/11 1029/4 1029/11   |
| 1171/24 1171/24<br>1189/18 1189/19<br>1202/9<br>mind [12] 945/19<br>995/18 1141/3 1154/13<br>1154/14 1154/24<br>1156/2 1166/22<br>1176/24 1179/5 1184/7<br>1200/13<br>Mindful [1] 931/8<br>Mindful/Vet [1] 931/8<br>minimum [2] 968/11   | 1090/2 1090/3 1090/13<br>1090/14 1092/17<br>1129/22 1207/12<br>1207/12 1207/17<br>1208/13 1209/7 1209/8<br>modeling [1] 1089/12<br>Modification [1]<br>933/15<br>modified [1] 1207/16<br>moment [6] 1018/22<br>1063/19 1067/7<br>1075/18 1148/24<br>1152/4  | Mr [1] 1126/9 Mr. [179] 929/18 929/19 929/19 929/21 930/6 935/2 935/19 935/22 936/11 936/14 936/19 937/6 937/8 938/7 938/15 939/4 939/15 940/6 940/8 940/17 941/14 941/19 942/6 942/14 943/5 943/20 948/5 951/2  | 1185/8 1187/22 1188/7<br>1192/5 1192/20<br>1194/21 1195/1 1195/6<br>1196/10 1198/15<br>1198/23 1203/13<br>1207/20 1211/23<br>1214/2<br>Mr. Babowal [2] 957/7<br>957/10<br>Mr. Bob [1] 1040/6<br>Mr. Christopher [1]<br>936/19<br>Mr. Clark [4] 1111/23<br>1116/10 1117/16   | Mr. Kittrell [1] 1035/4 Mr. Marchand [3] 1107/12 1107/15 1107/22 Mr. Meinhart [11] 1192/20 1194/21 1195/1 1195/6 1196/10 1198/15 1198/23 1203/13 1207/20 1211/23 1214/2 Mr. Poirier [16] 964/19 973/2 973/23 1014/11  |
| 1171/24 1171/24<br>1189/18 1189/19<br>1202/9<br>mind [12] 945/19<br>995/18 1141/3 1154/13<br>1154/14 1154/24<br>1156/2 1166/22<br>1176/24 1179/5 1184/7<br>1200/13<br>Mindful [1] 931/8<br>Mindful/Vet [1] 931/8<br>minimum [2] 968/11<br>1117/1   | 1090/2 1090/3 1090/13<br>1090/14 1092/17<br>1129/22 1207/12<br>1207/12 1207/17<br>1208/13 1209/7 1209/8<br>modeling [1] 1089/12<br>Modification [1]<br>933/15<br>modified [1] 1207/16<br>moment [6] 1018/22<br>1063/19 1067/7<br>1075/18 1148/24  | Mr [1] 1126/9 Mr. [179] 929/18 929/19 929/19 929/21 930/6 935/2 935/19 935/22 936/11 936/14 936/19 937/6 937/8 938/7 938/15 939/4 939/15 940/6 940/8 940/17 941/14 941/19 942/6 942/14 943/5 943/20 948/5 951/2 951/2 951/4 953/6  | 1185/8 1187/22 1188/7<br>1192/5 1192/20<br>1194/21 1195/1 1195/6<br>1196/10 1198/15<br>1198/23 1203/13<br>1207/20 1211/23<br>1214/2<br>Mr. Babowal [2] 957/7<br>957/10<br>Mr. Bob [1] 1040/6<br>Mr. Christopher [1]<br>936/19<br>Mr. Clark [4] 1111/23  | Mr. Kittrell [1] 1035/4 Mr. Marchand [3] 1107/12 1107/15 1107/22 Mr. Meinhart [11] 1192/20 1194/21 1195/1 1195/6 1196/10 1198/15 1198/23 1203/13 1207/20 1211/23 1214/2 Mr. Poirier [16] 964/19 973/2 973/23 1014/11 1029/4 1029/11   |
| 1171/24 1171/24<br>1189/18 1189/19<br>1202/9<br>mind [12] 945/19<br>995/18 1141/3 1154/13<br>1154/14 1154/24<br>1156/2 1166/22<br>1176/24 1179/5 1184/7<br>1200/13<br>Mindful [1] 931/8<br>Mindful/Vet [1] 931/8<br>minimum [2] 968/11<br>1117/1<br>minuscule [1] 1064/18  | 1090/2 1090/3 1090/13<br>1090/14 1092/17<br>1129/22 1207/12<br>1207/12 1207/17<br>1208/13 1209/7 1209/8<br>modeling [1] 1089/12<br>Modification [1]<br>933/15<br>modified [1] 1207/16<br>moment [6] 1018/22<br>1063/19 1067/7<br>1075/18 1148/24<br>1152/4  | Mr [1] 1126/9 Mr. [179] 929/18 929/19 929/19 929/21 930/6 935/2 935/19 935/22 936/11 936/14 936/19 937/6 937/8 938/7 938/15 939/4 939/15 940/6 940/8 940/17 941/14 941/19 942/6 942/14 943/5 943/20 948/5 951/2 951/2 951/4 953/6 954/3 957/7 957/10   | 1185/8 1187/22 1188/7 1192/5 1192/20 1194/21 1195/1 1195/6 1196/10 1198/15 1198/23 1203/13 1207/20 1211/23 1214/2 Mr. Babowal [2] 957/7 957/10 Mr. Bob [1] 1040/6 Mr. Christopher [1] 936/19 Mr. Clark [4] 1111/23 1116/10 1117/16 1118/2 Mr. Cornelius [20]  | Mr. Kittrell [1] 1035/4 Mr. Marchand [3] 1107/12 1107/15 1107/22 Mr. Meinhart [11] 1192/20 1194/21 1195/1 1195/6 1196/10 1198/15 1198/23 1203/13 1207/20 1211/23 1214/2 Mr. Poirier [16] 964/19 973/2 973/23 1014/11 1029/4 1029/11 1040/11 1053/2 1066/1   |
| 1171/24 1171/24<br>1189/18 1189/19<br>1202/9<br>mind [12] 945/19<br>995/18 1141/3 1154/13<br>1154/14 1154/24<br>1156/2 1166/22<br>1176/24 1179/5 1184/7<br>1200/13<br>Mindful [1] 931/8<br>Mindful/Vet [1] 931/8<br>minimum [2] 968/11<br>1117/1<br>minuscule [1] 1064/18<br>minute [6] 944/24   | 1090/2 1090/3 1090/13<br>1090/14 1092/17<br>1129/22 1207/12<br>1207/12 1207/17<br>1208/13 1209/7 1209/8<br>modeling [1] 1089/12<br>Modification [1]<br>933/15<br>modified [1] 1207/16<br>moment [6] 1018/22<br>1063/19 1067/7<br>1075/18 1148/24<br>1152/4<br>money [16] 1027/5   | Mr [1] 1126/9 Mr. [179] 929/18 929/19 929/19 929/21 930/6 935/2 935/19 935/22 936/11 936/14 936/19 937/6 937/8 938/7 938/15 939/4 939/15 940/6 940/8 940/17 941/14 941/19 942/6 942/14 943/5 943/20 948/5 951/2 951/2 951/4 953/6 954/3 957/7 957/10 958/22 959/21 960/6   | 1185/8 1187/22 1188/7 1192/5 1192/20 1194/21 1195/1 1195/6 1196/10 1198/15 1198/23 1203/13 1207/20 1211/23 1214/2 Mr. Babowal [2] 957/7 957/10 Mr. Bob [1] 1040/6 Mr. Christopher [1] 936/19 Mr. Clark [4] 1111/23 1116/10 1117/16 1118/2 Mr. Cornelius [20] 935/2 937/8 943/20   | Mr. Kittrell [1] 1035/4 Mr. Marchand [3] 1107/12 1107/15 1107/22 Mr. Meinhart [11] 1192/20 1194/21 1195/1 1195/6 1196/10 1198/15 1198/23 1203/13 1207/20 1211/23 1214/2 Mr. Poirier [16] 964/19 973/2 973/23 1014/11 1029/4 1029/11 1040/11 1053/2 1066/1 1106/23 1143/8 1160/21 1161/8 1175/24 1181/2  |
| 1171/24 1171/24<br>1189/18 1189/19<br>1202/9<br>mind [12] 945/19<br>995/18 1141/3 1154/13<br>1154/14 1154/24<br>1156/2 1166/22<br>1176/24 1179/5 1184/7<br>1200/13<br>Mindful [1] 931/8<br>Mindful/Vet [1] 931/8<br>minimum [2] 968/11<br>1117/1<br>minuscule [1] 1064/18<br>minute [6] 944/24<br>963/2 981/9 999/9  | 1090/2 1090/3 1090/13<br>1090/14 1092/17<br>1129/22 1207/12<br>1207/12 1207/17<br>1208/13 1209/7 1209/8<br>modeling [1] 1089/12<br>Modification [1]<br>933/15<br>modified [1] 1207/16<br>moment [6] 1018/22<br>1063/19 1067/7<br>1075/18 1148/24<br>1152/4<br>money [16] 1027/5<br>1088/23 1098/15  | Mr [1] 1126/9 Mr. [179] 929/18 929/19 929/19 929/21 930/6 935/2 935/19 935/22 936/11 936/14 936/19 937/6 937/8 938/7 938/15 939/4 939/15 940/6 940/8 940/17 941/14 941/19 942/6 942/14 943/5 943/20 948/5 951/2 951/2 951/4 953/6 954/3 957/7 957/10 958/22 959/21 960/6 960/13 960/15 960/22  | 1185/8 1187/22 1188/7 1192/5 1192/20 1194/21 1195/1 1195/6 1196/10 1198/15 1198/23 1203/13 1207/20 1211/23 1214/2 Mr. Babowal [2] 957/7 957/10 Mr. Bob [1] 1040/6 Mr. Christopher [1] 936/19 Mr. Clark [4] 1111/23 1116/10 1117/16 1118/2 Mr. Cornelius [20]  | Mr. Kittrell [1] 1035/4 Mr. Marchand [3] 1107/12 1107/15 1107/22 Mr. Meinhart [11] 1192/20 1194/21 1195/1 1195/6 1196/10 1198/15 1198/23 1203/13 1207/20 1211/23 1214/2 Mr. Poirier [16] 964/19 973/2 973/23 1014/11 1029/4 1029/11 1040/11 1053/2 1066/1 1106/23 1143/8 1160/21 1161/8 1175/24 1181/2 1182/12  |
| 1171/24 1171/24<br>1189/18 1189/19<br>1202/9<br>mind [12] 945/19<br>995/18 1141/3 1154/13<br>1154/14 1154/24<br>1156/2 1166/22<br>1176/24 1179/5 1184/7<br>1200/13<br>Mindful [1] 931/8<br>Mindful/Vet [1] 931/8<br>minimum [2] 968/11<br>1117/1<br>minuscule [1] 1064/18<br>minute [6] 944/24<br>963/2 981/9 999/9<br>1070/24 1131/1  | 1090/2 1090/3 1090/13<br>1090/14 1092/17<br>1129/22 1207/12<br>1207/12 1207/17<br>1208/13 1209/7 1209/8<br>modeling [1] 1089/12<br>Modification [1]<br>933/15<br>modified [1] 1207/16<br>moment [6] 1018/22<br>1063/19 1067/7<br>1075/18 1148/24<br>1152/4<br>money [16] 1027/5<br>1088/23 1098/15<br>1103/10 1103/11   | Mr [1] 1126/9 Mr. [179] 929/18 929/19 929/19 929/21 930/6 935/2 935/19 935/22 936/11 936/14 936/19 937/6 937/8 938/7 938/15 939/4 939/15 940/6 940/8 940/17 941/14 941/19 942/6 942/14 943/5 943/20 948/5 951/2 951/2 951/4 953/6 954/3 957/7 957/10 958/22 959/21 960/6 960/13 960/15 960/22 961/2 961/12 961/19  | 1185/8 1187/22 1188/7 1192/5 1192/20 1194/21 1195/1 1195/6 1196/10 1198/15 1198/23 1203/13 1207/20 1211/23 1214/2 Mr. Babowal [2] 957/7 957/10 Mr. Bob [1] 1040/6 Mr. Christopher [1] 936/19 Mr. Clark [4] 1111/23 1116/10 1117/16 1118/2 Mr. Cornelius [20] 935/2 937/8 943/20 986/19 986/24 988/5 988/7 1007/12 1007/19   | Mr. Kittrell [1] 1035/4 Mr. Marchand [3] 1107/12 1107/15 1107/22 Mr. Meinhart [11] 1192/20 1194/21 1195/1 1195/6 1196/10 1198/15 1198/23 1203/13 1207/20 1211/23 1214/2 Mr. Poirier [16] 964/19 973/2 973/23 1014/11 1029/4 1029/11 1040/11 1053/2 1066/1 1106/23 1143/8 1160/21 1161/8 1175/24 1181/2 1182/12 Mr. Pourbaix [5]   |
| 1171/24 1171/24 1189/18 1189/19 1202/9 mind [12] 945/19 995/18 1141/3 1154/13 1154/14 1154/24 1156/2 1166/22 1176/24 1179/5 1184/7 1200/13 Mindful [1] 931/8 Mindful/Vet [1] 931/8 minimum [2] 968/11 1117/1 minuscule [1] 1064/18 minute [6] 944/24 963/2 981/9 999/9 1070/24 1131/1 minutes [38] 944/8   | 1090/2 1090/3 1090/13<br>1090/14 1092/17<br>1129/22 1207/12<br>1207/12 1207/17<br>1208/13 1209/7 1209/8<br>modeling [1] 1089/12<br>Modification [1]<br>933/15<br>modified [1] 1207/16<br>moment [6] 1018/22<br>1063/19 1067/7<br>1075/18 1148/24<br>1152/4<br>money [16] 1027/5<br>1088/23 1098/15<br>1103/10 1103/11<br>1114/9 1114/20   | Mr [1] 1126/9 Mr. [179] 929/18 929/19 929/19 929/21 930/6 935/2 935/19 935/22 936/11 936/14 936/19 937/6 937/8 938/7 938/15 939/4 939/15 940/6 940/8 940/17 941/14 941/19 942/6 942/14 943/5 943/20 948/5 951/2 951/2 951/4 953/6 954/3 957/7 957/10 958/22 959/21 960/6 960/13 960/15 960/22 961/2 961/12 962/17  | 1185/8 1187/22 1188/7 1192/5 1192/20 1194/21 1195/1 1195/6 1196/10 1198/15 1198/23 1203/13 1207/20 1211/23 1214/2 Mr. Babowal [2] 957/7 957/10 Mr. Bob [1] 1040/6 Mr. Christopher [1] 936/19 Mr. Clark [4] 1111/23 1116/10 1117/16 1118/2 Mr. Cornelius [20] 935/2 937/8 943/20 986/19 986/24 988/5   | Mr. Kittrell [1] 1035/4 Mr. Marchand [3] 1107/12 1107/15 1107/22 Mr. Meinhart [11] 1192/20 1194/21 1195/1 1195/6 1196/10 1198/15 1198/23 1203/13 1207/20 1211/23 1214/2 Mr. Poirier [16] 964/19 973/2 973/23 1014/11 1029/4 1029/11 1040/11 1053/2 1066/1 1106/23 1143/8 1160/21 1161/8 1175/24 1181/2 1182/12  |
| 1171/24 1171/24 1189/18 1189/19 1202/9 mind [12] 945/19 995/18 1141/3 1154/13 1154/14 1154/24 1156/2 1166/22 1176/24 1179/5 1184/7 1200/13 Mindful [1] 931/8 Mindful/Vet [1] 931/8 minimum [2] 968/11 1117/1 minuscule [1] 1064/18 minute [6] 944/24 963/2 981/9 999/9 1070/24 1131/1 minutes [38] 944/8 949/23 950/18 950/19  | 1090/2 1090/3 1090/13<br>1090/14 1092/17<br>1129/22 1207/12<br>1207/12 1207/17<br>1208/13 1209/7 1209/8<br>modeling [1] 1089/12<br>Modification [1]<br>933/15<br>modified [1] 1207/16<br>moment [6] 1018/22<br>1063/19 1067/7<br>1075/18 1148/24<br>1152/4<br>money [16] 1027/5<br>1088/23 1098/15<br>1103/10 1103/11<br>1114/9 1114/20<br>1130/23 1172/3<br>1172/18 1173/1 1173/4<br>1173/7 1174/11                                      | Mr [1] 1126/9 Mr. [179] 929/18 929/19 929/19 929/21 930/6 935/2 935/19 935/22 936/11 936/14 936/19 937/6 937/8 938/7 938/15 939/4 939/15 940/6 940/8 940/17 941/14 941/19 942/6 942/14 943/5 943/20 948/5 951/2 951/2 951/4 953/6 954/3 957/7 957/10 958/22 959/21 960/6 960/13 960/15 960/22 961/2 961/12 961/19 961/23 962/12 962/17 963/15 964/6 964/11   | 1185/8 1187/22 1188/7 1192/5 1192/20 1194/21 1195/1 1195/6 1196/10 1198/15 1198/23 1203/13 1207/20 1211/23 1214/2 Mr. Babowal [2] 957/7 957/10 Mr. Bob [1] 1040/6 Mr. Christopher [1] 936/19 Mr. Clark [4] 1111/23 1116/10 1117/16 1118/2 Mr. Cornelius [20] 935/2 937/8 943/20 986/19 986/24 988/5 988/7 1007/12 1007/19   | Mr. Kittrell [1] 1035/4 Mr. Marchand [3] 1107/12 1107/15 1107/22 Mr. Meinhart [11] 1192/20 1194/21 1195/1 1195/6 1196/10 1198/15 1198/23 1203/13 1207/20 1211/23 1214/2 Mr. Poirier [16] 964/19 973/2 973/23 1014/11 1029/4 1029/11 1040/11 1053/2 1066/1 1106/23 1143/8 1160/21 1161/8 1175/24 1181/2 1182/12 Mr. Pourbaix [5] 958/22 959/21 960/6 961/2 962/12  |
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| 1171/24 1171/24 1189/18 1189/19 1202/9 mind [12] 945/19 995/18 1141/3 1154/13 1154/14 1154/24 1156/2 1166/22 1176/24 1179/5 1184/7 1200/13 Mindful [1] 931/8 Mindful/Vet [1] 931/8 minimum [2] 968/11 1117/1 minuscule [1] 1064/18 minute [6] 944/24 963/2 981/9 999/9 1070/24 1131/1 minutes [38] 944/8 949/23 950/18 950/19 951/8 951/20 952/21 953/1 953/2 953/2  | 1090/2 1090/3 1090/13<br>1090/14 1092/17<br>1129/22 1207/12<br>1207/12 1207/17<br>1208/13 1209/7 1209/8<br>modeling [1] 1089/12<br>Modification [1]<br>933/15<br>modified [1] 1207/16<br>moment [6] 1018/22<br>1063/19 1067/7<br>1075/18 1148/24<br>1152/4<br>money [16] 1027/5<br>1088/23 1098/15<br>1103/10 1103/11<br>1114/9 1114/20<br>1130/23 1172/3<br>1172/18 1173/1 1173/4<br>1173/7 1174/11<br>1174/12 1174/15<br>monitoring [1] | Mr [1] 1126/9 Mr. [179] 929/18 929/19 929/19 929/21 930/6 935/2 935/19 935/22 936/11 936/14 936/19 937/6 937/8 938/7 938/15 939/4 939/15 940/6 940/8 940/17 941/14 941/19 942/6 942/14 943/5 943/20 948/5 951/2 951/2 951/4 953/6 954/3 957/7 957/10 958/22 959/21 960/6 960/13 960/15 960/22 961/2 961/12 961/19 961/23 962/12 962/17 963/15 964/6 964/11 964/18 964/19 965/2 965/21 969/15 969/23 969/24 971/11 973/2 973/23 978/14 980/12 | 1185/8 1187/22 1188/7 1192/5 1192/20 1194/21 1195/1 1195/6 1196/10 1198/15 1198/23 1203/13 1207/20 1211/23 1214/2 Mr. Babowal [2] 957/7 957/10 Mr. Bob [1] 1040/6 Mr. Christopher [1] 936/19 Mr. Clark [4] 1111/23 1116/10 1117/16 1118/2 Mr. Cornelius [20] 935/2 937/8 943/20 986/19 986/24 988/5 988/7 1007/12 1007/19 1013/7 1013/12 1013/18 1023/5 1023/9 1033/10 1034/21 1035/2 1055/15 | Mr. Kittrell [1] 1035/4 Mr. Marchand [3] 1107/12 1107/15 1107/22 Mr. Meinhart [11] 1192/20 1194/21 1195/1 1195/6 1196/10 1198/15 1198/23 1203/13 1207/20 1211/23 1214/2 Mr. Poirier [16] 964/19 973/2 973/23 1014/11 1029/4 1029/11 1040/11 1053/2 1066/1 1106/23 1143/8 1160/21 1161/8 1175/24 1181/2 1182/12 Mr. Pourbaix [5] 958/22 959/21 960/6 961/2 962/12 Mr. Rivera [4] 1184/1 1185/3 1185/8 1188/7 |
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| M                      | 1052/18 1052/18              | 970/16 985/8 1010/10      | 980/18 980/19 980/21       | 1020/15 1020/18        |
| -                      | 1052/19 1053/2 1053/8        | 1015/10 1018/14           | 980/23 981/8 992/24        | 1021/24 1022/4 1023/6  |
| Mr. Skaggs [16]        | 1054/15 1054/21              | 1068/18 1097/17           | 1034/10 1183/12            | 1023/22 1138/14        |
| 929/19 930/6 938/7     | 1057/20 1059/13              | 1107/7 1119/8 1143/24     | 1184/12                    | 1184/2                 |
| 940/8 951/2 960/13     | 1059/19 1059/22              | 1148/13 1151/8 1187/8     | = '                        | November 12 [2]        |
| 960/15 978/14 980/12   | 1062/10 1064/20              | needed [26] 986/16        | 1080/14                    | 1018/16 1184/2         |
| 1004/6 1051/6 1053/9   | 1066/15 1069/7               | 986/17 988/11 989/23      | No. 1 [1] 1080/14          | November 13 [1]        |
| 1069/17 1082/22        | 1072/19 1075/3               | 1011/14 1013/3            | No. 1081 [1] 1077/23       | 1018/4                 |
| 1086/20 1170/6         |                              |                           |                            |                        |
| Mr. Smith [22] 929/21  | 1078/20 1080/23              | 1013/15 1015/7 1016/1     | NOAH [1] 928/21            | November 2 [1] 1016/7  |
| 954/3 964/11 964/18    | 1083/7 1084/19 1087/7        | 1021/10 1021/11           | Nobody [1] 1173/4          | November 20 [1]        |
| 969/23 1038/12         | 1088/1 1088/8 1089/24        | 1021/12 1025/3            | non [1] 1058/20            | 1023/6                 |
| 1038/17 1053/1 1053/6  | 1094/16 1102/1               | 1025/14 1025/22           | non-binding [1]            | November 25 [1]        |
| 1080/6 1081/17         | 1104/16 1104/19              | 1033/8 1036/3 1044/17     | 1058/20                    | 1023/22                |
| 1081/20 1083/22        | 1105/14 1105/22              | 1044/18 1045/2 1047/9     | 3.1.                       | number [39] 929/13     |
| 1134/3 1136/10 1143/9  | 1119/13 1121/20              | 1057/3 1058/5 1095/23     | 1109/22 1133/1             | 940/8 940/12 943/23    |
| 1145/12 1160/13        | 1121/21 1133/3 1141/3        | 1177/16 1187/8            | noncash [1] 1206/17        | 947/8 947/10 950/15    |
| 1160/16 1160/18        | 1143/21 1145/9 1149/7        | needs [5] 1011/14         | none [2] 1126/10           | 983/16 1017/19 1036/7  |
| 1187/22 1192/5         | 1150/12 1150/23              | 1033/7 1088/24 1098/8     | 1152/17                    | 1042/13 1052/8         |
| Mr. Steve [5] 939/4    | 1154/13 1156/12              | 1099/14                   | nonevent [1] 1031/19       | 1052/12 1053/13        |
| 965/2 965/21 1018/3    | 1157/10 1157/12              | negative [7] 1053/10      | nonexclusivity [1]         | 1053/14 1053/16        |
|                        | 1157/22 1158/13              | 1094/7 1094/8 1094/18     | 1048/20                    | 1055/6 1055/7 1055/13  |
| 1133/15                | 1158/13 1164/24              | 1097/6 1101/7 1103/21     | nonexecutive [1]           | 1055/16 1066/1 1069/5  |
| much [15] 980/9        | 1166/3 1166/22 1177/3        | negligible [1] 1101/1     | 988/24                     | 1093/22 1117/4 1121/2  |
| 982/20 1016/4 1027/5   | 1177/18 1182/21              | negotiate [6] 940/23      | noodling [2] 1017/7        | 1136/9 1139/13         |
| 1027/21 1031/15        | 1183/5 1192/22               | 951/3 951/17 952/18       | 1017/12                    | 1169/18 1171/23        |
| 1049/1 1050/3 1061/7   | 1195/10 1195/12              | 957/5 1058/6              | noon [1] 1179/18           | 1195/12 1195/13        |
| 1062/18 1079/7 1082/4  | 1196/16 1197/15              | negotiating [4] 951/5     | normalization [1]          | 1199/6 1202/8 1204/16  |
| 1126/8 1130/7 1130/20  | 1197/21 1199/11              | 965/9 1175/4 1175/17      | 1210/7                     | 1204/17 1205/6 1205/9  |
| multi [1] 1204/19      | 1199/17 1200/8               | negotiation [2] 956/1     | normalized [2]             | 1207/22 1212/9         |
| multi-year [1] 1204/19 | 1200/10 1200/13              | 1045/1                    | 1209/10 1209/19            |                        |
| multiple [5] 937/24    |                              |                           |                            | numbered [1] 1093/13   |
| 938/8 938/12 1081/21   | 1203/22 1205/4 1205/4        | negotiations [7]          | North [2] 927/10<br>927/23 | numbers [3] 1079/14    |
| 1211/6                 | 1207/4 1207/5 1208/23        | 952/22 1039/12            |                            | 1200/24 1211/1         |
| multiple' [1] 935/15   | 1209/12 1209/12              | 1039/19 1043/6 1056/6     |                            | nuts [1] 1050/9        |
| multiples [6] 934/22   | 1209/24 1210/9               | 1063/12 1077/7            | nose [1] 975/23            | nutshell [1] 1207/6    |
| 935/10 984/15 1046/23  | 1210/18 1210/23              | net [10] 1021/6           | notation [2] 1102/17       | 0                      |
| 1046/23 1211/17        | 1212/4 1212/9 1213/16        | 1205/24 1206/6            | 1117/18                    |                        |
| multiply [2] 1202/7    | myself [3] 989/15            | 1206/10 1206/11           | notch [1] 1097/2           | objection [1] 979/19   |
| 1202/24                | 1076/19 1193/5               | 1206/16 1206/21           | notches [1] 1101/10        | objections [1] 1194/23 |
| multiyear [1] 1205/24  | N                            | 1209/2 1212/17 1213/2     | note [10] 943/1 944/2      | observation [1] 1053/8 |
| must [3] 956/2 956/3   |                              | <b>NetJets [1]</b> 976/15 | 945/12 946/3 1001/7        | observe [1] 982/18     |
| 962/4                  | name [7] 990/8 990/10        |                           | 1009/10 1059/4             | obvious [2] 1033/6     |
| mutual [1] 999/8       | 995/3 1087/8 1145/9          | never [19] 940/7 942/9    | 1071/13 1072/6 1084/8      |                        |
| my [144] 933/2 934/10  | 1192/22 1194/7               | 976/13 991/20 992/14      | noted [4] 934/24           | obviously [13] 1039/14 |
| 937/6 937/14 939/21    | named [2] 933/20             | 999/21 1024/17 1050/3     | 1030/21 1103/14            | 1042/23 1044/8 1049/3  |
| 941/3 941/6 941/23     | 1194/12                      | 1050/9 1050/10 1051/2     | 1199/17                    | 1059/16 1061/3 1063/3  |
| 942/11 943/12 955/3    | names [1] 1163/9             | 1052/12 1066/15           | notes [14] 946/18          | 1079/14 1123/1         |
| 964/20 965/4 966/12    | napkin [1] 1151/6            | 1076/2 1076/2 1077/19     | 946/19 947/1 947/2         | 1155/14 1166/15        |
| 966/21 978/1 980/24    | narrow [1] 1026/11           | 1146/22 1147/7 1152/3     | 947/17 947/21 993/18       | 1211/5 1212/14         |
| 983/14 983/18 983/19   | <b>NDA [5]</b> 1006/2 1006/5 | Nevertheless [1]          | 1045/12 1045/16            | occasionally [1]       |
| 984/2 986/8 989/8      | 1006/20 1007/1 1020/5        | 1184/9                    | 1136/22 1136/24            | 1162/7                 |
| 989/17 990/22 991/4    | <b>NDAs [4]</b> 1006/8       | new [15] 928/7 928/23     | 1139/16 1176/5             | Occidental [1] 1149/19 |
| 991/7 992/7 994/9      | 1006/12 1020/1               | 951/13 969/16 981/17      | 1207/23                    | occurred [3] 983/13    |
|                        | 1187/11                      | 982/7 985/5 1101/14       | nothing [8] 1024/19        | 1000/7 1202/5          |
| 994/12 999/15 1003/2   | <b>NEAL [1]</b> 928/19       | 1101/16 1102/5 1102/5     | 1071/23 1086/18            | October [7] 997/24     |
| 1008/2 1010/7 1013/15  | near [6] 1009/16             | 1103/16 1107/11           | 1154/3 1165/8 1167/4       | 1009/9 1009/11         |
| 1013/18 1014/6         | 1010/19 1053/21              | 1107/11 1185/15           | 1192/3 1212/3              | 1010/12 1010/24        |
| 1014/11 1014/23        | 1074/17 1105/20              | news [1] 1178/15          | notice [2] 971/1           | 1013/8 1138/13         |
| 1016/1 1019/5 1019/10  | 1142/6                       | NextEra [8] 968/16        | 1102/23                    | October 16 [1] 1009/11 |
| 1022/12 1023/2         | near-term [1] 1009/16        | 968/19 1017/13 1020/5     | noticeable [1] 1201/9      | October 19 [1] 1010/12 |
| 1023/16 1027/19        | Nebel [1] 1070/5             | 1024/12 1024/16           | noticed [1] 1168/17        | October 26 [1] 1013/8  |
| 1028/20 1030/4 1030/6  | necessarily [1] 1099/2       | 1024/17 1175/12           | notion [6] 991/20          | Oddly [1] 961/16       |
| 1030/11 1030/16        | necessary [2] 1119/10        | nice [2] 962/18 1134/5    | 1017/10 1017/12            | off [17] 947/8 960/22  |
| 1031/4 1033/17 1034/4  | 1213/5                       | Nichols [1] 928/20        | 1020/7 1053/19 1055/3      |                        |
| 1034/10 1035/23        | <b>NED [2]</b> 928/2 1192/10 | nickel [1] 1123/4         | November [13] 1016/7       |                        |
| 1038/16 1041/18        | need [17] 940/24             | night [2] 929/7 1000/18   |                            | 994/15 1011/1 1025/23  |
| 1042/4 1042/24 1048/8  | 946/24 953/23 962/14         | NiSource [10] 980/16      | 1018/4 1018/16             | 1048/19 1059/9         |
| 1050/10 1050/11        |                              |                           |                            |                        |
| 1                      | I .                          | ĺ                         | 1                          | Ī                      |

1085/18 1175/3 1078/21 1101/5 1074/8 1074/18 1095/6 O order [8] 929/18 offhanded [1] 1191/24 929/23 956/3 1015/1 1129/20 1140/18 1108/20 1109/8 1110/2 off... [4] 1126/10 officer [6] 958/22 1060/23 1095/11 1112/18 1113/11 overextended [1] 1167/10 1173/5 960/7 965/24 966/3 1109/23 1114/11 1140/16 1114/2 1115/19 1209/22 1088/2 1088/18 ordered [1] 976/15 overlap [1] 1121/23 1117/20 1189/17 off-shore [1] 1209/22 official [1] 997/5 organization [1] 934/2 overly [1] 1038/19 paragraph 368 [1] offer [99] 934/20 orient [1] 953/21 often [5] 993/4 1001/4 overran [1] 1174/5 949/2 934/24 936/24 937/2 1001/5 1167/23 1193/7 oriented [1] 938/2 overrun [1] 1174/18 paragraph 401 [1] 937/21 939/12 940/18 Oh [12] 982/12 1022/3 **ORRICO [1]** 928/6 overruns [1] 1174/7 965/19 943/16 947/5 948/20 overture [1] 1003/5 1032/15 1036/22 others [8] 1019/14 paragraphs [1] 956/20 950/6 950/7 950/14 1029/20 1055/10 overtures [4] 998/7 1068/16 1072/22 parallel [1] 1009/16 951/9 951/22 952/1 1075/6 1077/19 1074/14 1083/17 1022/15 1022/17 parameters [1] 952/2 952/14 958/4 1080/12 1082/13 1093/3 1139/1 1203/7 1046/12 1175/1 958/7 970/19 970/21 1132/5 1151/15 otherwise [4] 1038/5 paraphrase [2] overview [1] 1097/8 971/18 1000/13 oil [1] 984/22 1039/9 1115/11 1147/8 1038/16 1038/20 overviewing [1] 1002/17 1002/22 ok [3] 943/10 1151/7 ought [2] 1033/10 1096/24 paraphrasing [1] 1024/22 1034/16 1152/15 1067/5 owe [1] 1184/22 1042/15 1041/3 1042/18 1043/3 ourselves [1] 940/24 **old [1]** 983/10 own [1] 976/5 **Pardon [2]** 1071/14 1049/15 1050/7 1052/3 **OLSEN [1]** 928/14 outcome [3] 1082/15 owned [2] 980/23 1130/14 1052/9 1054/1 1057/6 once [9] 983/10 1095/8 1095/15 1212/21 parentheses [1] 1058/20 1058/22 1033/22 1033/24 outline [1] 1035/7 owning [2] 968/14 1117/18 1060/1 1060/24 1034/1 1034/1 1034/8 outlined [4] 1019/4 part [25] 941/7 957/13 969/7 1061/13 1067/13 1038/17 1153/10 977/18 990/7 990/12 1057/23 1108/23 1074/22 1075/15 1167/24 1120/10 990/12 1047/19 1075/16 1076/1 1076/3 ones [6] 986/8 1030/12 outlines [1] 1042/9 **P.A [1]** 928/10 1055/12 1058/13 1076/11 1077/3 1077/8 1041/18 1041/22 outlining [2] 1106/23 **p.m [11]** 949/5 959/9 1060/15 1060/17 1077/18 1078/4 1078/5 1042/2 1118/6 1107/1 970/1 1068/20 1069/2 1065/12 1066/4 1079/3 1079/6 1080/11 1144/2 1145/1 1151/16 ongoing [5] 1033/8 outlook [17] 1090/16 1072/13 1078/21 1081/8 1083/12 1152/7 1153/13 1036/5 1040/12 1090/21 1090/22 1093/10 1099/17 1084/24 1085/18 1214/10 1090/23 1092/6 1094/7 1101/8 1119/20 1042/14 1056/5 1104/11 1105/24 **P.S** [1] 1041/20 onward [1] 1136/10 1094/9 1094/10 1129/14 1129/17 1106/1 1109/5 1109/9 package [3] 1004/23 open [3] 1021/14 1094/18 1097/6 1097/6 1140/18 1142/1 1112/20 1112/23 1033/15 1077/7 1097/21 1098/4 1101/7 1004/23 1078/21 1162/14 1184/21 1113/4 1113/13 1103/18 1103/20 packages [2] 1020/11 operated [1] 987/6 partially [2] 945/13 1113/16 1113/18 1047/22 operating [4] 958/22 1103/22 1149/11 1122/7 1122/19 1123/7 outreach [4] 968/24 960/7 1033/14 1206/20 page 10 [1] 933/19 participant [1] 1182/5 1126/24 1127/3 1127/6 operation [1] 987/10 1019/21 1030/21 page 13 [1] 950/1 participants [5] 1127/8 1127/22 page 15 [1] 1072/10 operational [6] 987/3 1036/24 1141/23 1142/3 1142/5 1127/23 1129/8 page 16 [1] 996/24 1167/22 1174/1 1174/5 outs [3] 1068/14 1142/11 1208/4 1131/23 1132/2 1132/8 page 17 [1] 1074/16 participate [1] 971/2 1190/13 1191/8 1156/5 1158/22 1132/19 1133/1 1133/1 page 18 [1] 1074/17 opine [1] 1090/14 outset [2] 970/24 particular [4] 945/9 1133/5 1142/6 1147/8 page 2 [2] 989/4 989/5 opined [1] 1118/15 1160/19 1011/6 1110/15 1198/9 1147/8 1170/14 outside [5] 934/2 954/5 page 20 [1] 1002/16 particularly [4] 994/3 **opinion [5]** 957/19 1170/24 1173/11 Page 201 [1] 1138/4 956/8 995/15 1182/2 1063/3 1105/22 1028/11 1129/22 1182/13 1182/23 page 202 [1] 1138/5 1158/13 1158/13 1145/17 outstanding [2] 1183/4 1200/15 Page 422 [1] 974/3 parties [10] 978/23 opinions [7] 1068/1 1082/14 1099/24 offer.' [1] 971/7 page 5 [2] 995/6 1193/4 1193/6 1193/8 over [32] 941/7 941/16 979/3 995/15 1022/20 offered [6] 959/24 1193/9 1193/10 954/7 966/5 1001/14 1070/14 1022/21 1024/23 960/8 960/11 960/14 1195/20 1025/3 1034/10 page 7 [1] 933/8 1058/5 1178/6 1178/7 1027/19 1117/13 page 9 [1] 933/14 **opp [1]** 962/15 1038/13 1052/19 1178/12 offering [34] 1028/5 1054/22 1054/23 pages [3] 936/23 opportunities [2] partnering [1] 1017/13 1028/16 1063/21 1018/14 1043/9 1075/4 1099/4 1099/19 995/24 999/8 partnership [4] 987/14 1064/2 1082/23 1083/5 paid [3] 1107/23 1107/5 1114/10 1116/1 1105/7 1105/10 opportunity [15] 933/2 1105/3 1106/5 1111/4 1126/1 1164/20 972/22 994/11 1055/1 1116/18 1124/19 1105/16 1112/9 1114/7 1116/16 1062/3 1074/5 1140/3 1128/4 1129/11 paper [8] 1097/11 partnerships [1] 987/6 1116/24 1117/6 1117/7 1140/11 1140/19 1129/18 1132/15 1097/14 1097/18 parts [1] 1043/22 1117/23 1118/5 1121/8 1097/22 1097/23 1142/9 1142/13 1139/22 1149/21 party [2] 1178/3 1212/6 1123/9 1128/4 1135/10 1142/24 1143/2 1098/5 1099/10 1150/21 1175/24 pass [6] 998/23 999/2 1146/23 1146/23 1150/17 1199/12 1178/21 1186/18 1099/13 1082/16 1099/16 1162/14 1162/21 option [8] 1048/19 1199/16 1205/24 paragraph [25] 949/2 1187/17 1192/1 1162/22 1163/21 965/19 1004/22 1099/2 1107/5 1107/11 1212/20 passed [1] 1039/24 1165/19 1166/16 1041/24 1043/21 1116/1 1116/19 1117/3 over-allotment [6] passive [5] 1164/16 1173/10 1174/22 1044/11 1058/16 1129/19 1107/5 1116/1 1116/18 1164/19 1164/22 1189/2 1201/5 1201/8 1063/19 1063/20 options [3] 988/1 1128/4 1129/11 1165/11 1165/20 offerors [1] 1175/4 1072/12 1072/13 1047/9 1079/20 1129/18 past [2] 935/13 935/23 offers [5] 1023/10 1072/18 1073/19 Orchard [1] 1194/12 overall [5] 977/18 pasted [1] 943/1 1023/18 1023/24

| Ī | Р  | 1058/5 1102/19                           | pipeline [25] 927/3                              | played [2] 1138/6                           | 1078/24 1092/18                                  |
|---|--|--|--|---|--|
|   | path [7] 956/3 956/10                          | 1109/12 1109/21                          | 931/1 955/12 969/1                               | 1158/7                                      | 1097/23 1105/4                                   |
|   | 997/1 1005/14 1026/22                          | 1112/23 1114/1                           | 969/5 981/7 982/4                                | playing [1] 1081/24                         | 1110/19 1124/2                                   |
|   | 1048/24 1068/17                                | 1114/14 1116/20                          | 985/21 988/9 1001/23                             | please [96] 938/6                           | 1125/10 1126/6                                   |
|   | patient [1] 1105/21                            | 1116/21 1117/4 1117/9                    | 1100/14 1134/13                                  | 942/11 965/19 972/13                        | 1131/17 1132/22                                  |
|   | PAUL [1] 1133/19                               | 1117/10 1117/12                          | 1134/17 1141/14                                  | 973/4 978/12 985/15                         | 1133/24 1148/14                                  |
|   | pause [1] 1158/2                               | 1118/17 1118/21                          | 1141/21 1148/5 1155/1                            | 987/17 989/3 990/5                          | 1152/3 1161/15                                   |
|   | pay [19] 1014/23                               | 1119/1 1119/8 1119/15                    | 1158/11 1162/21                                  | 992/8 995/1 995/7                           | 1161/22 1170/1 1176/4                            |
|   | 1067/17 1068/6                                 | 1120/5 1120/6 1120/11                    | 1171/13 1173/10                                  | 997/1 1000/21 1002/6                        | 1186/8 1199/20 1210/5                            |
|   | 1069/20 1070/17                                | 1121/3 1125/12                           | 1174/7 1174/18                                   | 1002/10 1002/16                             | pointed [2] 1153/4                               |
|   | 1113/14 1122/1                                 | 1125/20 1126/4<br>1126/15 1133/2 1197/6  | 1184/13 1191/7                                   | 1003/6 1004/3 1004/7                        | 1201/24  |
|   | 1124/17 1124/21                                | 1197/7 1200/23                           | <b>pipelines [4]</b> 934/23 935/1 1171/19 1173/8 | 1005/8 1005/16<br>1007/11 1008/9            | <b>points [32]</b> 936/24 937/4 982/14 995/10    |
|   | 1124/22 1125/4 1156/4                          | 1208/12 1208/14                          | pitch [2] 1001/21                                | 1007/11 1000/9                              | 996/1 996/15 996/21                              |
|   | 1156/7 1156/7 1158/21                          | 1208/20 1208/22                          | 1002/22  | 1009/10 1003/13                             | 1016/16 1037/22                                  |
|   | 1158/24 1158/24                                | 1208/22 1208/24                          | place [5] 1095/18                                | 1010/18 1013/6 1016/7                       | 1038/2 1038/7 1038/13                            |
|   | 1172/3 1172/8                                  | 1211/12 1211/14                          | 1095/19 1138/10                                  | 1016/10 1018/1                              | 1038/17 1039/2 1039/6                            |
|   | paying [1] 1115/8                              | 1211/20                                  | 1148/6 1196/19                                   | 1018/14 1021/17                             | 1047/13 1047/18                                  |
|   | payment [1] 1191/8                             | perform [1] 1200/14                      | Plaintiff [1] 929/8                              | 1022/6 1023/4 1023/21                       | 1051/9 1051/16 1079/1                            |
|   | payments [1] 1134/16                           | performance [8]                          | plaintiffs [6] 928/10                            | 1034/18 1037/3 1037/8                       | 1136/15 1136/19                                  |
|   | PE [1] 1047/11                                 | 972/10 972/18 976/12                     | 1058/1 1145/6 1192/11                            | 1040/2 1041/9 1044/11                       | 1143/5 1143/7 1143/11                            |
|   | Peak [1] 981/22<br>peer [3] 1199/12            | 1033/17 1033/18                          | 1194/21 1195/7                                   | 1045/10 1045/22                             | 1145/13 1177/10                                  |
|   | 1200/9 1201/10                                 | 1190/13 1191/9                           | plaintiffs' [1] 1049/9                           | 1046/7 1047/1 1051/5                        | 1177/12 1177/14                                  |
|   | pencils [3] 946/23                             | 1199/15                                  | plan [46] 931/3 931/8                            | 1052/6 1057/12                              | 1183/19 1202/23                                  |
|   | 973/14 1167/1                                  | performed [2] 971/20                     | 932/1 932/2 933/6                                | 1058/12 1058/13                             | 1207/22  |
|   | penny [2] 941/22 948/6                         | 971/24                                   | 933/9 934/15 946/18                              | 1059/6 1060/12                              | Poirier [28] 964/19                              |
|   | pens [1] 941/4                                 | perioriling [2]                          | 947/17 956/2 972/11                              | 1061/20 1063/8                              | 973/2 973/23 1014/11                             |
|   | people [14] 957/19                             | 1005/10 1005/11                          | 986/6 986/13 987/20                              | 1064/23 1065/17                             | 1029/4 1029/11                                   |
|   | 984/11 1010/15                                 | perhaps [1] 1141/24                      | 987/20 988/20 989/1                              | 1067/4 1067/7 1067/15                       | 1040/11 1053/2 1066/1                            |
|   | 1037/10 1037/19                                | period [19] 942/1                        | 989/1 991/9 995/9                                | 1069/4 1069/11 1070/3                       | 1106/21 1106/23                                  |
|   | 1055/3 1061/17 1066/1                          | 949/6 964/14 990/24<br>1021/24 1031/6    | 996/14 997/18 997/20<br>1036/8 1046/15 1057/3    | 1070/14 1071/5<br>1077/24 1078/2 1087/9     | 1135/9 1136/11<br>1136/19 1137/23                |
|   | 1136/24 1142/24                                | 1036/19 1045/1 1049/5                    | 1078/10 1082/6 1090/5                            | 1087/16 1092/23                             | 1140/1 1140/17 1143/8                            |
|   | 1167/9 1168/7 1178/18                          | 1055/10 1061/14                          | 1090/14 1092/12                                  | 1093/12 1096/10                             | 1149/5 1150/21                                   |
|   | 1186/3   | 1075/9 1081/4 1206/1                     | 1095/8 1101/14 1102/5                            | 1096/20 1103/24                             | 1160/20 1160/21                                  |
|   | per [57] 936/3 940/16                          | 1206/3 1209/11                           | 1102/12 1102/22                                  | 1108/13 1111/6                              | 1161/8 1168/3 1175/24                            |
|   | 943/16 945/11 947/6                            | 1209/21 1210/5                           | 1103/15 1107/11                                  | 1115/18 1139/17                             | 1180/6 1181/2 1182/12                            |
|   | 947/10 948/14 949/12                           | 1212/21                                  | 1107/21 1110/15                                  | 1145/2 1145/3 1162/15                       | poison [2] 1028/12                               |
|   | 950/8 952/7 952/9                              | periods [2] 1099/8                       | 1112/5 1147/21 1171/6                            | 1162/19 1163/7 1164/4                       | 1083/5   |
|   | 954/22 956/17 956/23<br>958/5 970/19 973/13    | 1199/16                                  | 1171/9 1187/23                                   | 1164/6 1168/5 1184/4                        | policies [1] 1167/8                              |
|   | 1015/13 1024/8                                 | permission [2]                           | 1190/19  | 1185/7 1185/13 1188/7                       | pool [1] 1034/12                                 |
|   | 1046/18 1058/4 1070/6                          | 1133/17 1145/5                           | plane [1] 964/8                                  | 1192/21 1210/12                             | Poor's [4] 1090/21                               |
|   | 1077/3 1083/1 1083/21                          |  | planned [2] 1148/7                               | 1212/1                                      | 1091/18 1094/7                                   |
|   | 1085/18 1086/7                                 | perpetuity [1] 1210/1                    | 1186/9   | plus [3] 1010/5 1081/7                      | 1095/22  |
|   | 1089/19 1089/19                                | person [10] 976/16                       | planner [2] 992/22                               | 1107/4                                      | pop [1] 975/22                                   |
|   | 1093/18 1104/11                                | 976/19 985/24 985/24                     | 1183/11  | point [73] 931/9 935/12                     |  |
|   | 1106/2 1108/22                                 | 1038/17 1050/4 1051/3<br>1083/23 1121/19 | <b>planning [27]</b> 930/17 931/16 985/14 993/13 | 935/13 938/11 945/15<br>945/20 951/3 951/17 | 994/12 1001/23<br>portion [7] 982/16             |
|   | 1108/23 1109/5                                 | 1169/24                                  | 993/13 997/15 1004/11                            | 951/24 957/13 970/15                        | 1109/11 1115/13                                  |
|   | 1109/10 1112/21                                | personal [2] 966/22                      | 1031/10 1033/11                                  | 970/18 978/1 983/22                         | 1117/15 1131/9                                   |
|   | 1113/1 1122/1 1122/7                           | 1158/13                                  | 1033/20 1034/3 1034/7                            | 984/3 984/22 988/21                         | 1131/11 1164/20                                  |
|   | 1123/14 1126/2                                 | personally [4] 972/14                    | 1034/8 1034/12                                   | 989/14 990/17 991/4                         | position [10] 959/3                              |
|   | 1126/23 1127/3 1127/6                          | 977/12 977/19 1184/7                     | 1040/24 1042/8                                   | 994/10 999/6 999/17                         | 973/11 980/18 1045/19                            |
|   | 1127/22 1127/23                                | perspective [2]                          | 1045/13 1047/5 1049/8                            | 1009/4 1011/9 1012/13                       | 1050/11 1050/12                                  |
|   | 1130/8 1131/23 1151/5<br>1156/7 1158/24 1191/1 | 1089/12 1138/17                          | 1089/3 1089/12                                   | 1013/18 1015/22                             | 1088/11 1161/23                                  |
|   | 1203/4 1203/5 1203/6                           | Phillips [3] 987/3                       | 1104/17 1183/22                                  | 1019/13 1021/4                              | 1177/23 1189/3                                   |
|   | 1203/10  | 987/6 987/8                              | 1185/22 1186/8                                   | 1021/22 1025/12                             | <b>positioning [3]</b> 930/24                    |
|   | perceived [1] 1129/18                          | phone [8] 943/2 960/22                   |  | 1026/19 1028/1                              | 1045/23 1053/19                                  |
|   | percent [60] 937/23                            |  |  | 1028/23 1028/24                             | positively [6] 994/21                            |
|   | 948/15 948/16 949/12                           | 1011/21 1020/22                          | 983/5 983/7 991/16                               | 1031/4 1035/16 1037/4                       | 1028/7 1050/2 1050/15                            |
|   | 949/12 951/18 951/23                           | 1081/3                                   | 991/23 995/23 1089/20                            | 1038/14 1042/4                              | 1062/14 1066/12                                  |
|   | 952/9 952/16 954/23                            | phoned [1] 943/5                         | 1183/8 1184/10                                   | 1043/22 1044/24                             | possibility [3] 949/16                           |
|   | 956/18 956/23 958/15                           | phrase [2] 1181/17<br>1181/21            | 1184/15 1186/7<br>  plate [2] 984/17 1141/1      | 1047/10 1048/8 1048/9                       | 949/19 1055/15                                   |
|   | 967/7 967/19 970/7                             | pill [2] 1028/13 1083/5                  | play [1]   1015/1                                | 1054/17 1056/5 1059/5                       | <b>possible [7]</b> 1056/4 1056/5 1114/18 1115/9 |
|   | 978/24 979/5 1011/8                            | pinged [1] 1152/8                        | play [1] 1145/19                                 | 1061/11 1077/2                              | 1115/10 1166/6                                   |
|   | 1028/10 1056/21                                | Pinigou [i]   102/0                      | pidy [i] TITO/TO                                 | 1001/11 10/1/2                              | . 110, 10 1100,0                                 |
|   |  |  |  |   |  |
|   |  |  |  | <u></u>                                     |  |

| _   |  |   |                                     |   |                                     |
|-----|--|---|-------------------------------------|---|-------------------------------------|
|     | Р  | 1207/17                                 | 1152/23 1212/4                      | 1134/7 1165/2 1181/19                           | 1172/14 1174/3                      |
|     |  | prep [1] 1040/20                        | previously [3] 930/2                | prioritize [1] 1014/16                          | proper [1] 946/9                    |
|     | possible [1] 1169/13                         | preparation [1]                         | 1127/24 1211/19                     | private [1] 1039/9                              | proposal [35] 940/4                 |
|     | possibly [2] 1045/3                          | 1045/12                                 | price [97] 936/24 946/9             |   | 940/20 953/7 1015/10                |
|     | 1141/24                                      | preparatory [1]                         | 962/16 962/21 966/9                 | 999/6 1038/20 1050/22                           | 1026/18 1039/19                     |
|     | post [4] 994/16 1101/2                       | 1031/14                                 | 966/14 966/24 968/11                | 1050/23 1100/21                                 | 1052/9 1056/23                      |
|     | 1212/17 1213/2                               | prepare [11] 936/12                     | 971/20 971/24 972/3                 | 1106/10 1197/4 1197/9                           | 1057/14 1059/15                     |
|     | post-closing [2]                             | 937/13 989/11 997/18                    | 972/6 972/18 972/22                 | 1204/17 1209/16                                 | 1064/3 1064/4 1073/10               |
|     | 1212/17 1213/2                               | 1029/12 1035/11                         | 974/13 974/21 975/3                 | problem [7] 960/24                              | 1073/20 1074/6 1075/1               |
|     | post-spin [1] 994/16                         | 1038/6 1041/1 1051/10                   | 975/11 975/14 976/6                 | 979/20 1032/14                                  | 1083/13 1146/22                     |
|     | potential [44] 934/19                        | 1054/12 1195/22                         | 976/12 979/10 996/2                 | 1032/19 1036/5 1151/2                           | 1146/23 1153/20                     |
|     | 934/24 945/8 951/12                          | prepared [24] 937/4                     | 1013/24 1016/21                     | 1166/20   | 1154/4 1154/6 1156/1                |
|     | 963/10 963/19 967/21                         | 973/20 980/4 989/6                      | 1016/23 1017/19                     | problematic [1]                                 | 1156/3 1156/4 1156/11               |
|     | 968/20 968/20 998/17                         | 989/6 995/12 996/18                     | 1024/7 1025/20                      | 1032/11   | 1156/18 1157/20                     |
|     | 1000/10 1006/8 1013/1                        | 1015/6 1029/20                          | 1025/22 1027/2                      | problems [3] 961/1                              | 1158/10 1158/16                     |
|     | 1014/3 1015/6 1018/20                        | 1029/23 1035/14                         | 1027/21 1028/10                     | 1174/5 1174/6                                   | 1158/18 1158/20                     |
|     | 1019/9 1022/20 1025/8                        | 1039/2 1045/12                          | 1046/23 1047/2                      | proceed [9] 1014/19                             | 1181/11 1181/17                     |
|     | 1040/16 1051/13                              | 1062/24 1069/19                         | 1049/14 1050/1                      | 1039/12 1042/10                                 | 1181/22                             |
|     | 1070/8 1073/4 1076/15                        | 1069/24 1070/7                          | 1051/24 1057/4                      | 1044/21 1048/18                                 | proposals [4] 994/19                |
|     | 1082/24 1091/14                              | 1157/15 1158/19                         | 1060/19 1061/2 1061/3               | 1054/16 1055/17                                 | 1006/1 1025/16                      |
|     | 1091/22 1095/9 1101/9                        | 1177/4 1177/15                          | 1061/12 1061/15                     | 1056/9 1065/15                                  | 1036/18                             |
|     | 1109/5 1127/8 1136/5                         | 1188/21 1188/22                         | 1070/19 1076/19                     | Proceedings [1]                                 | proposed [7] 933/9                  |
|     | 1141/13 1141/13                              | 1190/5                                  | 1079/17 1079/21                     | 1214/10   | 940/16 1077/20                      |
|     | 1141/21 1142/3 1146/5                        | preparedness [3]                        | 1085/17 1085/24                     | proceeds [2] 1128/12                            | 1113/19 1113/22                     |
|     | 1156/23 1159/13                              | 994/23 995/3 1004/24                    | 1086/12 1093/18                     | 1189/1  | 1149/21 1152/19                     |
|     | 1180/14 1183/22                              | preparing [9] 936/8                     | 1100/5 1102/23 1105/2               | process [28] 955/23                             | proposition [8]                     |
|     | 1196/15 1196/17                              | 939/16 947/22 977/19                    | 1105/18 1106/5 1106/9               | 956/4 968/3 969/2                               | 1015/21 1017/17                     |
|     | 1202/17                                      | 995/14 1040/15                          | 1107/20 1107/24                     | 972/9 977/2 977/18                              | 1046/12 1046/13                     |
|     | potentially [9] 994/12                       | 1045/16 1073/20                         | 1109/15 1110/20                     | 988/11 998/3 1010/23                            | 1046/14 1057/10                     |
|     | 995/20 1021/18<br>1027/18 1055/4             | 1076/6                                  | 1112/20 1112/24                     | 1011/4 1023/13 1028/2                           | 1057/19 1075/23                     |
|     | 1072/16 1074/4 1142/5                        | presence [1] 1169/15                    | 1114/15 1115/1 1115/2               | 1034/2 1039/15                                  | propositions [2]                    |
|     | 1142/10                                      | present [9] 939/19                      | 1115/2 1119/15 1125/1               | 1040/18 1040/19                                 | 1012/8 1017/18                      |
|     | Pourbaix [8] 958/21                          | 1047/16 1074/22                         | 1128/15 1137/13                     | 1041/7 1043/7 1063/7                            | <b>pros [1]</b> 1044/15             |
|     | 958/22 959/1 959/21                          | 1076/20 1108/16                         | 1137/19 1138/1                      | 1067/2 1077/2 1080/3                            | prospects [1] 984/10                |
|     | 960/6 960/21 961/2                           | 1111/9 1206/7 1209/3                    | 1138/16 1138/19                     | 1081/5 1082/9 1088/12                           | prospectus [2]                      |
|     | 962/12                                       | 1209/3                                  | 1139/7 1145/17 1151/6               | 1187/2 1209/9                                   | 1162/20 1165/9                      |
|     | Power [1] 1161/2                             | presentation [14]                       | 1170/13 1170/20                     | <b>productive [1]</b> 1031/1                    | protections [1] 1153/5              |
|     | PowerPoint [1] 1002/4                        | 932/8 936/20 937/3                      | 1182/6 1182/9 1197/20               | professional [3] 987/1                          | protocol [1] 1065/11                |
|     | practically [1] 1045/4                       | 937/13 1001/19                          | 1197/24 1198/4 1199/1               | 1161/9 1161/12                                  | provide [22] 956/9                  |
|     | practice [2] 1035/10                         | 1001/20 1001/21                         | 1199/9 1199/24 1200/3               |   | 970/14 972/5 972/13                 |
|     | 1039/4                                       | 1002/1 1044/4 1093/9                    | 1201/17 1202/1 1202/7               |   | 996/12 1013/17 1017/6               |
|     | pre [2] 975/8 1208/17                        | 1096/13 1127/14                         | 1202/17 1202/18                     | proffer [1] 1194/21                             | 1020/8 1022/16                      |
|     | pre-tax [1] 1208/17                          | 1129/5 1129/10                          | 1202/23 1202/24                     | proffered [1] 1195/2                            | 1052/23 1090/12                     |
|     | precedents [1] 1103/5                        | presented [11] 1024/9                   | price/break [1]                     | profile [1] 1099/5                              | 1092/14 1142/13                     |
|     | precipice [1] 1070/22                        | 1026/17 1041/3<br>1053/15 1057/6 1076/3 | 1076/19                             | profiles [1] 933/24                             | 1148/19 1158/1                      |
|     | precipitously [1]                            | 1094/4 1096/17 1097/4                   | prices [9] 984/22<br>984/23 1047/10 | <b>program [4]</b> 1091/6 1097/15 1105/6 1105/8 | 1183/19 1185/3<br>  1185/18 1185/21 |
|     | 1014/1                                       | 1127/15 1132/24                         | 1047/14 1085/23                     | progressed [1] 953/20                           | 1193/6 1193/8 1211/8                |
|     | precise [1] 1039/13                          | president [11] 933/21                   | 1124/24 1196/16                     | project [8] 955/14                              | provided [12] 977/19                |
|     | precision [1] 1029/17                        | 980/20 981/1 1087/22                    | 1196/18 1201/10                     | 955/23 971/4 1018/19                            | 1001/22 1020/10                     |
|     | predecessor [1]                              | 1087/23 1087/24                         | pricing [5] 1076/14                 | 1033/12 1095/5                                  | 1039/13 1039/15                     |
|     | 1088/3                                       | 1088/2 1088/14                          | 1108/24 1207/12                     | 1096/12 1112/16                                 | 1039/22 1084/9 1093/9               |
|     | predict [1] 1008/7                           | 1088/17 1088/20                         | 1207/16 1208/13                     | projected [1] 1206/20                           | 1142/9 1183/12                      |
|     | predicted [1] 1008/6                         | 1089/10                                 | primarily [2] 1028/21               | projection [6] 1204/18                          | 1183/21 1187/5                      |
|     | predicting [1] 1008/12                       | press [1] 1079/22                       | 1164/19                             | 1204/19 1204/19                                 | provides [1] 1142/24                |
|     | prediction [1] 1030/22                       | pressure [4] 1025/20                    | primary [3] 1125/7                  | 1205/24 1206/1 1206/3                           | providing [3] 1023/13               |
|     | preempt [1] 1142/10                          | 1025/23 1069/14                         | 1171/8 1182/5                       | projections [5]                                 | 1067/1 1175/13                      |
|     | preferable [2] 1015/17                       | 1174/16                                 | prime [1] 1045/17                   | 1204/22 1204/23                                 | provision [1] 1060/1                |
|     | 1016/4                                       | presumably [1] 943/13                   |                                     | 1204/24 1205/3                                  | provisional [8] 952/14              |
|     | preference [1] 1132/20                       | pretrial [2] 1049/9                     | 939/11 1034/15                      | 1206/12   | 970/21 1056/23 1057/1               |
|     | preferred [1] 970/1<br>preliminary [3] 934/1 | 1058/1                                  | prior [18] 932/24                   | projects [15] 984/14                            | 1057/8 1057/10                      |
|     | 958/6 1070/7                                 | pretty [6] 941/23                       | 934/24 954/6 982/18                 | 990/2 990/20 1017/8                             | 1057/19 1060/24                     |
|     | premium [8] 1013/22                          | 1001/19 1063/9                          | 983/1 983/2 983/3                   | 1017/10 1033/13                                 | provisions [4] 1006/13              |
|     | 1079/2 1091/11                               | 1154/13 1167/8                          | 1010/5 1014/7 1030/16               | 1171/10 1171/11                                 | 1056/22 1057/24                     |
|     | 1106/14 1106/16                              | 1178/19                                 | 1041/19 1058/14                     | 1171/13 1171/16                                 | 1187/11                             |
|     | 1107/23 1207/14                              | previous [3] 1114/2                     | 1110/2 1127/2 1127/5                | 1171/22 1172/1 1172/8                           | <b>proxy [27]</b> 977/1 977/1       |
|     |  |   |                                     |   |                                     |
| - 1 |  | i                                       | i                                   | i   | i                                   |

| Р   | Q  | 1101/16 1102/5                             | reached [14] 963/10                         | 972/19 974/15 975/15                     |
|---|--|--|---|--|
| proxy [25] 977/8                                    | quadrant [1] 1125/19                             | 1206/23 1206/24                            | 963/13 969/13 998/15                        | 993/8 1016/13 1020/17                    |
| 977/12 977/16 977/19                                | quality [1] 1079/20                              | 1207/2 1207/13<br>1207/24 1208/1 1208/1    | 1003/8 1013/14 1014/7<br>1014/23 1019/23    | 1020/24 1027/12<br>1029/4 1046/19        |
| 977/20 978/22 979/3                                 | quantifying [1]                                  | 1208/14 1209/11                            | 1020/23 1036/21                             | 1046/20 1049/20                          |
| 979/7 979/9 1083/17                                 | 1203/19  | 1209/12 1211/12                            | 1040/9 1071/7 1135/24                       | 1052/20 1054/14                          |
| 1159/10 1159/13                                     | quarter [6] 991/1                                | 1211/14                                    | reaching [3] 963/16                         | 1054/20 1056/13                          |
| 1159/21 1160/1 1160/4                               | 1021/2 1026/8 1026/9                             | rated [3] 1011/12                          | 964/24 1084/16                              | 1057/9 1058/24 1065/2                    |
| 1160/7 1186/20                                      | 1186/4 1189/11                                   | 1098/23 1098/23                            | react [3] 1094/3 1112/7                     | 1069/22 1076/7 1076/8                    |
| 1186/22 1187/3<br>1190/16 1190/19                   | quarterly [1] 997/16                             | rather [6] 929/14                          | 1182/15                                     | 1080/8 1083/20                           |
| 1191/4 1199/1 1199/4                                | <b>questions [30]</b> 936/2 987/21 992/9 1028/17 | 1012/6 1034/2 1076/22                      | reacted [3] 954/20                          | 1105/23 1110/22                          |
| 1208/3  | 1032/20 1042/23                                  | 1120/7 1200/15                             | 1032/9 1053/4                               | 1111/15 1133/6                           |
| prudent [1] 1186/18                                 | 1052/8 1058/15                                   | rating [48] 1057/2                         | reaction [7] 1002/24                        | 1135/16 1137/20                          |
| <b>PTO [2]</b> 949/2 965/19                         | 1062/23 1076/5 1076/7                            | 1059/16 1061/10                            | 1027/9 1027/10 1053/9                       | 1146/8 1146/12                           |
| <b>public [8]</b> 981/17                            | 1076/8 1086/17                                   | 1070/22 1090/7<br>1090/10 1090/12          | 1103/15 1123/1<br>1179/20                   | 1148/17 1149/9<br>1149/23 1149/24        |
| 984/16 998/9 1039/9                                 | 1121/12 1133/8 1133/9                            | 1090/10 1090/12                            | read [14] 953/1                             | 1151/11 1157/22                          |
| 1077/13 1165/9 1178/3                               | 1139/12 1159/6                                   | 1091/11 1091/13                            | 1038/22 1049/9                              | 1168/24 1169/2                           |
| 1179/6  | 1160/12 1160/19                                  | 1091/17 1091/21                            | 1058/15 1058/18                             | 1179/12 1180/16                          |
| <b>pull [6]</b> 965/19 966/19 1035/12 1070/2 1158/5 | 1166/13 1175/1 1178/5<br>1178/9 1181/10 1183/6   | 1092/3 1092/13                             | 1072/17 1081/16                             | 1182/10 1186/21                          |
| 1162/16   | 1186/19 1187/21                                  | 1092/15 1092/17                            | 1113/24 1153/12                             | 1190/24                                  |
| pulled [2] 1032/1                                   | 1191/14 1214/3                                   | 1093/9 1093/10 1094/3                      | 1168/7 1168/22                              | receipts [21] 1102/15                    |
| 1197/9  | quick [6] 981/20                                 | 1094/16 1095/8                             | 1176/14 1176/21                             | 1102/17 1103/1 1103/2                    |
| purchase [6] 980/21                                 | 1122/12 1183/6                                   | 1095/16 1096/3 1097/1                      | 1176/21                                     | 1103/5 1103/7 1107/4                     |
| 1025/8 1028/9 1102/23                               | 1186/19 1198/10                                  | 1097/16 1097/17<br>1097/20 1097/20         | reading [3] 1143/10<br>1176/17 1205/5       | 1109/17 1110/16<br>1111/4 1112/9 1113/5  |
| 1107/20 1128/15                                     | 1213/21  | 1097/20 1097/20                            | reads [6] 1058/19                           | 1114/6 1117/5 1118/5                     |
| purchased [1] 980/19                                | quickly [17] 944/23                              | 1098/19 1098/21                            | 1108/21 1109/8 1110/2                       | 1119/1 1120/16                           |
| pure [1] 991/19                                     | 980/15 983/19 983/19                             | 1099/1 1099/18                             | 1112/19 1115/21                             | 1122/22 1123/9 1201/5                    |
| purely [1] 1093/24                                  | 987/23 988/12 989/10<br>994/10 1005/8 1022/19    | 1100/12 1101/13                            | ready [3] 929/3                             | 1201/8                                   |
| purple [1] 1093/20<br>purpose [5] 945/3             | 1051/9 1067/15 1072/7                            | 1102/3 1103/15                             | 1152/13 1196/6                              | receivables [1] 1212/6                   |
| 1052/22 1109/13                                     | 1114/18 1197/10                                  | 1103/18 1103/20                            | real [7] 966/5 981/20                       | receive [6] 995/14                       |
| 1129/16 1159/12                                     | 1201/19 1211/23                                  | 1103/21 1107/8 1113/2                      | 989/10 1122/12                              | 998/11 998/19 1023/17                    |
| purposes [9] 977/1                                  | quieted [1] 953/19                               | 1125/8 1125/16<br>1174/23 1189/7           | 1198/10 1200/12<br>1213/21                  | 1040/13 1110/13 received [23] 938/15     |
| 1167/1 1185/22                                      | quite [5] 1001/5                                 | ratings [8] 1090/16                        | reality [4] 1033/9                          | 938/16 954/14 968/18                     |
| 1203/21 1205/7 1205/8                               | 1059/24 1184/6                                   | 1091/1 1091/4 1092/4                       | 1140/7 1141/3 1178/14                       | 971/18 992/14 994/20                     |
| 1205/10 1210/22<br>1211/10                          | 1202/20 1205/21                                  | 1092/10 1093/8 1125/8                      | realize [1] 1063/5                          | 995/16 998/21 1016/13                    |
| pursue [5] 975/9                                    | <b>quoted [1]</b> 975/8                          | 1208/5                                     | realized [1] 968/13                         | 1019/17 1024/6 1047/8                    |
| 976/10 1097/4 1108/10                               | R  |  |   | 1055/17 1092/16                          |
| 1154/14   | <b>R-1 [1]</b> 1097/21                           | 1125/12 1125/21                            | 1051/7 1051/10                              | 1095/21 1096/8                           |
| pursuing [2] 1073/2                                 | <b>R-2 [1]</b> 1098/4                            | 1126/1 1126/14                             | reason [16] 935/18                          | 1101/13 1116/9                           |
| 1073/15   | radio [1] 1071/23                                | 1197/18 1198/12<br>1198/17                 | 938/14 942/5 961/2<br>961/4 961/18 962/6    | 1123/10 1134/15<br>1175/3 1191/7         |
| pursuit [2] 1082/1                                  | raise [14] 1025/14                               | rationale [1] 1153/4                       | 962/7 985/1 1026/4                          | receiving [2] 972/16                     |
| 1095/11   | 1061/7 1083/21                                   | Raymond [1] 1070/5                         | 1033/6 1059/21 1113/6                       | 1055/15                                  |
| push [1] 1015/3                                     | 1105/12 1105/12<br>1106/10 1116/16               | <b>RBC [2]</b> 1111/3                      | 1120/2 1153/11                              | recent [3] 1042/1                        |
| <b>pushed [2]</b> 1212/20 1213/15                   | 1166/19 1172/7                                   | 1111/12                                    | 1213/18                                     | 1113/13 1171/21                          |
| pushing [2] 970/4                                   | 1172/24 1173/4 1173/7                            | re [4] 927/3 930/2                         | reasonable [6]                              | recently [2] 981/23                      |
| 970/6   | 1191/1 1201/4                                    | 956/9 1150/24                              | 1019/11 1051/20                             | 1172/1                                   |
| put [29] 935/7 936/23                               | raised [4] 988/7 1032/8                          | re-called [1] 930/2                        | 1064/17 1068/8                              | receptive [1] 1109/21                    |
| 941/4 946/23 949/1                                  | 1128/3 1164/14                                   | re-engaging [1] 956/9<br>re-up [1] 1150/24 | 1068/17 1075/14<br>reasonableness [1]       | recess [5] 1003/9<br>1003/10 1068/20     |
| 949/24 973/5 973/14                                 | raises [4] 990/1 998/5                           | reach [20] 968/19                          | 1210/18                                     | 1144/2 1214/9                            |
| 973/15 978/21 980/4                                 | 1167/7 1167/7                                    | 996/22 998/12 998/20                       | reasonably [4] 1028/8                       | recipients [1] 1104/4                    |
| 1015/1 1050/10                                      | raising [1] 1162/23<br>ramping [1] 1107/2        | 1000/1 1001/5 1011/17                      |   | recognize [1] 1162/17                    |
| 1050/11 1052/17<br>1080/20 1089/17                  | ran [3] 967/11 1102/20                           | 1011/19 1014/9                             | reasons [1] 962/8                           | recognized [1]                           |
| 1090/20 1089/17                                     | 1150/10  | 1014/14 1020/14                            | rebound [1] 968/14                          | 1058/19                                  |
| 1101/13 1107/9                                      | range [9] 1016/23                                | 1021/1 1028/19 1029/5                      | recall [67] 930/14                          | recollection [25]                        |
| 1109/20 1150/1 1158/9                               | 1047/2 1088/8 1118/4                             | 1036/13 1048/10                            | 937/12 945/14 945/16                        | 937/14 939/21 941/3                      |
| 1174/16 1185/15                                     | 1132/3 1138/20                                   | 1068/14 1136/4 1153/9<br>1180/14           | 948/23 954/20 962/24<br>963/12 964/4 964/13 | 941/6 944/5 965/4<br>965/6 965/11 992/15 |
| 1196/5 1202/1 1213/23                               | 1143/19 1182/18                                  | reach-out [6] 998/12                       | 964/15 967/22 969/3                         | 994/2 1014/6 1014/11                     |
| puts [3] 1101/10                                    | 1208/7   | 998/20 1000/1 1014/9                       | 969/4 969/8 969/11                          | 1027/19 1028/20                          |
| 1205/22 1206/21                                     | rapid [1] 930/9                                  | 1014/14 1028/19                            | 971/19 971/23 972/5                         | 1030/6 1030/17                           |
| putting [3] 1057/9<br>1145/18 1206/15               | rapidly [1] 968/13<br>rate [15] 935/15           | reach-outs [1] 1068/14                     | 972/6 972/12 972/16                         | 1049/21 1051/8                           |
| 1145/10 1200/13                                     | 100/10   | _ <del></del>                              |   |  |

| R                           | 1194/18 1201/23             | 1079/14                                | 1185/22                     | 1188/8 1191/20          |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|--|-----------------------------|-------------------------|
| -                           | 1203/7 1204/24              | relayed [3] 961/16                     | requesting [1] 1029/5       | retired [1] 982/22      |
| recollection [7]            | referring [14] 962/13       | 1112/24 1115/22                        | requests [1] 1040/16        | retirement [19] 982/24  |
| 1054/21 1059/19             | 997/17 1018/21 1042/2       | relaying [1] 1044/3                    | require [1] 1025/17         | 993/6 993/9 993/11      |
| 1072/20 1078/20             | 1057/16 1104/10             | Reliance [1] 1099/9                    | required [1] 1084/11        | 993/15 994/17 1082/2    |
| 1084/19 1143/21             | 1116/3 1116/4 1148/5        | reliant [2] 1098/8                     | requirement [1]             | 1134/20 1134/21         |
| 1170/8                      | 1183/1 1184/11              | 1105/7                                 | 1040/21                     | 1183/7 1183/16          |
| recommence [1]              | 1184/15 1184/19             |  | :                           | 1183/20 1183/23         |
| 1013/1                      | 1208/12                     | relied [2] 987/13<br>1148/18           | requirements [1]<br>1100/24 |                         |
| recommend [1] 1056/9        |                             |  |                             | 1184/10 1184/16         |
| recommendation [6]          | reiers [3] 997/10           | rely [5] 977/8 1006/15                 | requires [1] 1200/20        | 1184/23 1185/4          |
| 944/11 1010/3 1024/24       | 1046/11 1046/22             | 1137/3 1159/21                         | rescissory [7] 1195/13      | 1185/18 1185/22         |
| 1025/7 1122/6 1122/15       | refinancing [2]             | 1187/13                                | 1199/11 1200/10             | retrospect [1] 1166/23  |
| recommended [3]             | 1098/24 1099/5              | relying [2] 1026/21                    | 1203/14 1203/16             | return [4] 1003/9       |
| 1065/9 1065/15              | reflect [6] 935/21          | 1091/6                                 | 1208/9 1213/23              | 1009/2 1012/10          |
| 1122/16                     | 951/13 957/21 1044/14       | remain [1] 991/3                       | resolve [1] 972/23          | 1054/12                 |
| reconsidered [1]            | 1078/7 1189/6               | remainder [1] 950/9                    | resources [1] 1048/12       | revenue [1] 1100/20     |
| 973/20                      | reflected [6] 956/19        | remained [1] 981/8                     | respect [9] 950/23          | revert [1] 1043/1       |
| record [7] 979/20           | 958/12 1002/20              | remaining [2] 1041/21                  |                             | review [8] 942/3        |
| 980/3 998/23 1087/7         | 1008/15 1075/12             | 1113/1                                 | 1044/2 1075/11              | 955/15 968/9 977/15     |
| 1196/17 1197/16             | 1189/13                     | remains [2] 988/14                     | 1154/20 1166/6 1175/7       | 1150/17 1159/24         |
| 1205/5                      | reflecting [1] 1131/18      | 1188/23                                | respective [1] 954/9        | 1196/16 1197/16         |
| recounted [1] 1043/23       | reflects [5] 946/3          | remarks [3] 1188/21                    | respond [11] 967/10         | reviewed [2] 1108/21    |
| recounting [2] 942/18       | 1059/3 1073/6 1079/2        | 1188/22 1190/5                         | 967/15 970/4 1005/13        | 1113/18                 |
| 1013/13                     | 1079/3                      | remember [6] 932/13                    | 1054/6 1056/18              | revise [1] 1102/23      |
| recounts [1] 943/2          | refresh [5] 964/10          | 965/13 1051/11                         | 1056/19 1104/21             | revised [5] 969/14      |
|                             | 964/23 965/4 975/10         | 1071/19 1085/2 1178/9                  | 1107/15 1152/19             | 970/19 971/18 1084/24   |
| recovered [1] 1173/20       | 1072/19                     | reminding [1] 1040/16                  | 1180/19                     | 1085/18                 |
| recovery [2] 1099/15        | regarding [9] 954/6         | remote [1] 1036/20                     | responded [3] 1054/7        | revising [1] 951/12     |
| 1199/23                     | 1006/16 1019/2 1025/8       | removed [1] 1005/11                    | 1056/20 1156/20             | revive [1] 1055/2       |
| RECROSS [1] 1191/17         | 1051/13 1070/8 1071/4       | renew [1] 1084/11                      | responding [1] 938/23       |                         |
| RECROSS-EXAMINATI           | 1078/19 1131/23             | renewed [1] 1153/15                    | responds [9] 939/5          | 1196/7 1196/11          |
| ON [1] 1191/17              | regardless [6] 1049/13      |  | 943/20 962/17 969/24        | revolver [1] 1167/13    |
| <b>REDIRECT [2]</b> 1082/20 | 1050/1 1051/24 1126/1       | 1014/5                                 | 970/12 976/1 1107/13        | revolving [1] 1189/19   |
| 1187/19                     | 1170/13 1170/19             | repeat [3] 1141/16                     | 1148/10 1150/23             | rich [3] 1002/22 1106/6 |
| reduce [5] 1115/11          | Regina [1] 1087/12          | 1146/11 1160/6                         | response [11] 948/8         | 1106/16                 |
| 1116/18 1130/3 1201/7       | regular [1] 1099/7          | report [3] 1088/16                     | 975/6 1013/18 1013/21       | Rick [7] 992/13 992/18  |
| 1206/18                     | regulated [4] 980/20        | 1195/12 1195/15                        | 1026/16 1084/9              | 1183/10 1185/18         |
| reducing [1] 1212/5         | 981/1 982/1 1099/17         | reported [2] 1073/24                   | 1107/16 1149/21             | 1188/5 1188/8 1191/20   |
| reengage [3] 946/13         | Regulatory [1] 1099/15      |  | 1151/24 1153/2              | Rick Rivera [1]         |
| 1055/3 1082/24              | rehash [1] 1052/11          | REPORTERS [1]                          | 1158/10                     | 1191/20                 |
| reengagement [3]            | reinstate [1] 945/1         | 927/22                                 | responses [1] 1016/11       | 1 1 0 1 1 - 0           |
| 1028/14 1032/6              | reject [3] 951/22 952/3     | reporting [4] 948/5                    |                             | ride [1] 1108/11        |
| 1175/20                     | 952/11                      | 953/17 1115/14                         | 1040/17 1088/6 1088/8       |                         |
| reengaging [1]              | rejected [9] 940/4          | 1153/23                                | 1088/20 1089/1 1102/2       |                         |
| 1036/12                     | 940/11 940/14 940/20        | reports [3] 941/19                     |                             | risk [39] 973/20 1016/4 |
| refer [17] 993/16           | 941/3 953/7 1054/2          | 954/4 1097/8                           | 1163/12 1163/15             | 1025/18 1025/19         |
| 1007/17 1023/21             | 1105/3 1105/24              | represent [1] 1093/17                  | result [6] 1058/22          | 1061/4 1061/9 1073/3    |
| 1034/23 1035/19             | rejection [2] 1054/3        | representation [4]                     | 1099/3 1100/21              | 1074/10 1088/9          |
| 1035/20 1058/17             | 1104/11                     | 937/11 1110/3 1110/8                   | 1101/12 1102/21             | 1098/24 1099/5          |
| 1069/23 1083/23             | relate [1] 1046/10          | 1199/1                                 | 1120/13                     | 1099/15 1099/18         |
| 1134/8 1163/14 1194/6       | related [4] 982/17          | representative [1]                     | resulted [2] 1183/3         | 1099/13 1099/18         |
| 1195/11 1197/5              | 1193/8 1209/17 1212/6       | 1004/20                                | 1205/15                     | 1113/21 1114/4 1114/9   |
| 1203/21 1209/19             |                             |  |                             | 1114/12 1114/4 1114/9   |
| 1212/17                     | related-party [1]<br>1212/6 | representatives [3]<br>1072/14 1110/23 | results [1] 1202/6          | 1114/12 1114/17         |
| reference [17] 932/17       |                             |  | resume [5] 1004/4           |                         |
| 933/24 934/14 968/2         | relates [2] 1168/8          | 1111/18                                | 1068/19 1069/11             | 1117/1 1118/11          |
| 998/4 1005/2 1008/19        | 1203/6                      | represents [1] 1125/19                 |                             | 1120/12 1129/11         |
| 1010/20 1044/11             | relations [2] 1088/10       | Reputation [2] 1099/22                 |                             | 1129/13 1129/18         |
| 1059/10 1060/18             | 1169/10                     | 1099/23                                | 1069/2 1145/1               | 1130/4 1130/8 1130/16   |
| 1066/3 1137/7 1137/11       | relationship [10]           | Reputation/counterpar                  |                             | 1130/20 1176/8 1201/7   |
| 1139/18 1145/16             | 1089/7 1160/19 1161/2       | ty [1] 1099/22                         | retained [1] 1195/6         | 1201/13 1207/13         |
| 1195/15                     | 1161/7 1161/9 1161/13       | request [11] 935/11                    | rethink [1] 1027/18         | 1207/14 1209/11         |
| referred [13] 998/22        | 1162/3 1167/21              | 937/4 937/6 937/7                      | retire [15] 983/2 983/3     | risk-adjusted [1]       |
| 1007/24 1045/11             | 1169/24 1170/2              | 968/5 988/4 1012/24                    | 983/6 983/7 991/23          | 1209/11                 |
| 1100/3 1101/11              | relative [1] 1106/14        | 1029/10 1044/17                        | 1134/24 1183/8 1186/4       | risk-free [1] 1207/13   |
| 1113/23 1114/4              | relatively [4] 1044/23      | 1070/7 1070/15                         | 1186/4 1186/7 1186/9        | risks [5] 932/1 995/24  |
| 1131/15 1194/15             | 1049/5 1074/23              | requested [2] 1054/14                  | 1186/16 1187/23             | 1057/23 1079/18         |
|                             |                             |  |                             |                         |
| Ī                           | ĺ                           |  |                             |                         |

| R  | RYAN [1] 928/18                     | <b>SANBORN [1]</b> 928/7                   | 1171/22                                 | 1102/11 1106/20                               |
|--|-------------------------------------|--|---|---|
| risks [1] 1114/22                          | S                                   | SANBORN-LOWING                             | scenario [25] 1029/18                   | 1108/19 1108/20                               |
| risky [5] 1016/24                          |                                     | <b>[1]</b> 928/7                           | 1064/14 1068/8                          | 1112/18 1113/11                               |
| 1025/24 1057/10                            | Sachs [21] 932/9                    | sand [4] 945/10 945/18                     |   | 1113/23 1115/18                               |
| 1059/5 1075/13                             | 932/12 936/23 937/12                | 946/1 952/7                                | 1093/22 1093/23                         | 1115/19 1115/21                               |
| Rivera [10] 992/13                         | 939/14 944/8 944/14                 | sanity [1] 1210/17                         | 1128/2 1128/20 1186/8                   | 1131/8 1136/9 1150/2                          |
| 992/19 993/18 1183/10                      | 947/3 947/4 972/17                  | <b>SARAH [1]</b> 928/19                    | 1196/22 1197/2 1197/3                   | 1163/6 1168/11                                |
| 1184/1 1185/3 1185/8                       | 996/16 1010/15                      | sat [3] 1106/16                            | 1197/5 1197/6 1197/11                   | 1168/15 1168/16                               |
| 1188/5 1188/7 1191/20                      | 1010/17 1047/21                     | 1108/10 1130/22                            | 1198/9 1201/15                          | 1169/4 1184/5 1189/11                         |
| <b>RMC [1]</b> 970/1                       | 1072/15 1084/16                     | Saturday [1] 1065/10                       | 1201/21 1201/22                         | 1194/11 1195/13                               |
| <b>ROBERT [4]</b> 928/14                   | 1163/8 1164/18<br>1166/17 1177/4    | Saturn's [1] 1068/6                        | 1201/24 1202/15                         | 1199/10 1213/14                               |
| 928/24 930/1 1040/3                        | 1190/16                             | Sauer [1] 1194/15                          | 1203/4 1203/10<br>1203/11               | 1213/16                                       |
| robust [2] 1166/19                         | Sachs' [1] 1078/23                  | Sauer-Danfoss [1]<br>1194/15               |   | secondary [1] 1189/1                          |
| 1188/23                                    | said [75] 935/23 936/3              | SAVITT [1] 928/21                          | scenarios [17] 994/9<br>1029/14 1093/16 | secret [6] 1012/5<br>1021/9 1032/2 1039/6     |
| rocky [1] 1021/9                           | 940/23 943/9 944/14                 | saw [15] 938/18                            | 1094/1 1094/4 1095/10                   | 1049/11 1177/1                                |
| role [17] 980/24 982/17                    | 953/23 970/14 973/19                | 938/24 939/14 952/2                        | 1097/4 1102/4 1123/3                    | Section [2] 1184/4                            |
| 988/23 990/23 1088/1                       | 974/6 983/17 999/11                 | 963/4 997/9 1019/8                         | 1126/13 1183/22                         | 1185/13                                       |
| 1089/11 1089/22                            | 999/24 1008/11 1012/4               | 1032/18 1048/1 1055/7                      | 1186/17 1196/14                         | sector [1] 1199/24                            |
| 1089/24 1089/24                            | 1013/23 1017/5                      | 1073/22 1151/17                            | 1196/15 1196/22                         | securities [5] 1111/3                         |
| 1112/6 1164/23                             | 1017/11 1018/22                     | 1181/13 1181/20                            | 1202/11 1202/13                         | 1111/12 1167/16                               |
| 1164/24 1165/19                            | 1021/10 1021/19                     | 1197/4                                     | schedule [1] 929/20                     | 1169/17 1169/19                               |
| 1175/8 1182/21 1187/1<br>1187/4            | 1032/21 1036/1                      | saying [19] 931/1                          | scheduled [4] 997/4                     | seeing [4] 992/15                             |
| roles [2] 987/3 987/4                      | 1036/10 1042/16                     | 954/17 964/14 970/6                        | 997/13 1041/22                          | 1105/20 1198/5                                |
| rolled [2] 1047/19                         | 1042/17 1043/4                      | 972/12 996/2 1051/1                        | 1095/23                                 | 1199/23                                       |
| 1173/21                                    | 1051/23 1051/23                     | 1054/22 1055/21                            | school [1] 1083/8                       | seemed [6] 1025/24                            |
| rolling [1] 1184/6                         | 1052/12 1052/15                     | 1062/10 1064/1                             | scramble [2] 943/14                     | 1048/8 1048/17                                |
| roof [1] 985/5                             | 1053/1 1053/17 1054/8               | 1118/24 1119/23                            | 944/16                                  | 1064/21 1152/15                               |
| room [2] 931/2                             | 1054/10 1056/4                      | 1120/24 1141/17                            | screen [14] 930/18                      | 1201/11                                       |
| 1175/14                                    | 1062/21 1063/1 1094/6               | 1141/17 1145/8                             | 932/6 932/7 934/8                       | seems [1] 957/21                              |
| Rosen [1] 928/23                           | 1094/8 1094/9 1103/17               | 1157/22 1191/21                            | 935/7 949/24 1053/21                    | seen [5] 993/20 993/23                        |
| roughly [1] 1119/16                        | 1103/19 1103/21                     | says [85] 932/16                           | 1092/21 1094/23                         | 1136/8 1136/23                                |
| round [3] 1078/13                          | 1108/6 1116/13                      | 932/24 933/13 933/18                       | 1134/9 1136/8 1137/3                    | 1188/17                                       |
| 1200/24 1211/1                             | 1116/14 1119/5 1120/8               | 933/22 934/4 934/17                        | 1150/2 1196/5                           | sees [2] 943/22 993/18                        |
| roundly [1] 940/14                         | 1130/6 1135/11<br>  1140/22 1152/14 | 936/13 936/13 936/18                       | script [27] 967/11 967/16 1016/11       | seized [1] 1011/7                             |
| routinely [1] 1193/5                       | 1152/15 1152/15                     | 936/22 938/13 941/20<br>942/9 942/22 943/5 | 1016/14 1029/20                         | selected [3] 1007/8<br>1020/11 1208/11        |
| rubber [1] 1067/23                         | 1153/9 1155/9 1156/15               | 943/9 944/2 945/12                         | 1029/23 1065/1                          | sell [13] 990/20 1100/2                       |
| rubber-stamp [1]                           | 1157/1 1157/1 1171/3                | 945/21 945/24 948/12                       | 1065/19 1071/8                          | 1114/13 1114/17                               |
| 1067/23                                    | 1172/2 1176/22                      | 949/9 952/21 959/11                        | 1149/24 1150/5                          | 1114/21 1115/4 1124/8                         |
| Rule [1] 979/16                            | 1181/13 1189/9                      | 962/12 965/5 966/6                         | 1150/17 1152/19                         | 1137/19 1138/1 1138/9                         |
| Rule 1006 [1] 979/16                       | 1189/13 1189/24                     | 968/7 974/11 975/2                         | 1156/23 1157/1 1157/5                   | 1148/13 1163/19                               |
| rumblings [1] 1028/21                      | 1190/9 1191/20                      | 975/24 990/8 992/16                        | 1157/6 1157/14                          | 1165/22                                       |
| rumor [1] 1076/23                          | 1198/11 1198/12                     | 999/6 1000/9 1004/22                       | 1157/15 1160/5 1160/9                   | selling [6] 1061/11                           |
| run [10] 930/12 931/12 935/15 969/2 1082/8 | 1198/16 1198/20                     | 1013/20 1016/10                            | 1175/24 1176/17                         | 1128/19 1139/1 1148/2                         |
| 1162/4 1183/22 1198/3                      | 1201/6 1205/12 1213/7               | 1016/20 1017/21                            | 1176/24 1177/2                          | 1164/14 1164/20                               |
| 1199/7 1201/10                             | sale [3] 999/18                     | 1018/12 1022/14                            | 1180/23 1181/2                          | send [7] 946/17 1001/7                        |
| run-up [5] 930/12                          | 1093/22 1128/8                      | 1024/6 1041/23 1042/1                      | scripted [2] 1149/21                    | 1004/19 1009/1                                |
| 931/12 1198/3 1199/7                       | sales [9] 1093/21                   | 1043/11 1047/2                             | 1151/24                                 | 1012/23 1101/16                               |
| 1201/10                                    | 1093/24 1103/1                      |  |   | 1153/12                                       |
| runner [2] 1164/2                          | 1123/15 1128/11                     | 1070/6 1073/19 1074/3                      | 957/23 964/6 968/4                      | sending [2] 954/7                             |
| 1165/20                                    | 1128/16 1129/22                     | 1083/19 1086/7 1095/7                      | 1065/9 1127/13                          | 986/9   |
| runners [2] 1163/12                        | 1201/5 1201/8<br>same [29] 931/22   | 1095/15 1097/10                            | 1150/20 1151/16                         | <b>senior [11]</b> 957/11 957/12 958/13 959/2 |
| 1163/14                                    | 939/22 943/19 953/11                | 1102/14 1104/5<br>  1113/12 1117/20        | 1188/7 1189/16<br>scrolling [1] 959/20  | 959/5 961/23 989/16                           |
| running [9] 984/3                          | 953/12 965/20 968/10                | 1123/6 1124/17 1128/9                      |   | 1038/4 1087/23                                |
| 994/9 1079/10 1107/10                      | 973/9 979/19 979/24                 | 1129/13 1132/3 1132/4                      |   | 1147/16 1162/1                                |
| 1123/2 1163/10 1165/2                      | 1005/6 1035/6 1041/20               | 1132/7 1139/19 1146/7                      | 1069/4 1145/2                           | sense [14] 946/6                              |
| 1199/14 1209/23                            | 10/19/2 1076/10                     | 1151/19 1151/23                            | second [43] 932/23                      | 946/11 960/24 991/2                           |
| Russ [14] 957/5 960/22                     | 1083/22 1096/5                      | 1152/5 1152/12 1154/3                      | 989/3 994/14 1002/10                    | 991/7 991/7 993/14                            |
| 961/9 962/13 962/19                        | 1098/21 1129/6                      | 1156/4 1158/21 1169/5                      | 1010/8 1010/20 1024/4                   | 994/6 1012/18 1019/5                          |
| 975/23 1027/22                             | 1145/13 1149/20                     | 1184/6 1184/20                             | 1024/5 1024/5 1026/9                    | 1052/23 1056/12                               |
| 1043/24 1104/4<br>1131/21 1143/12          | 1150/20 1152/18                     | 1184/22 1185/14                            | 1041/24 1048/10                         | 1138/16 1214/5                                |
| 1143/19 1182/7                             | 1201/23 1202/15                     | 1190/18                                    | 1063/19 1063/19                         | sensitive [1] 1048/15                         |
| 1182/23                                    | 1203/11 1211/3                      | scale [6] 931/4 931/5                      | 1063/20 1084/23                         | Sensitivity [1] 937/22                        |
| Russell [1] 1168/17                        | 1211/13 1211/18                     | 931/7 986/3 1025/13                        | 1085/16 1093/23                         | sent [19] 934/6                               |
| 111111111111111111111111111111111111111    |                                     |  |   |   |
|  |                                     |  |   |   |

| S                            | 1168/7                 | 1011/13 1011/15              | side [8] 962/15 978/21  | 1105/6 1110/11          |
|------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
|                              | shake [1] 1170/3       | 1014/22 1019/22              | 984/12 984/13 1093/17   | 1110/16 1130/3          |
| sent [18] 1000/24            | shakes [1] 962/14      | 1064/7 1064/13               | 1162/2 1167/19          | 1207/17 1207/18         |
| 1005/5 1009/10 1012/9        | shale [1] 1171/17      | 1064/13 1179/4               | 1167/20                 | Skagggs [1] 928/24      |
| 1034/20 1041/9 1045/9        | shambles [1] 1179/2    | sheets [1] 931/6             | Sig [22] 932/13 932/18  | Skaggs [32] 929/19      |
| 1057/12 1059/4 1060/4        |                        |                              |                         |                         |
| 1102/8 1102/9 1149/21        | shape [1] 1185/14      | shelf [1] 983/18             | 932/21 932/24 934/6     | 930/1 930/6 938/7       |
| 1150/21 1152/16              | share [81] 939/24      | Shell [1] 1100/11            | 934/9 934/18 942/24     | 940/8 944/7 948/9       |
| 1166/13 1179/18              | 940/5 940/16 943/16    | <b>SHI [1]</b> 928/15        | 944/8 944/10 947/4      | 951/2 960/13 960/15     |
| 1191/19                      | 944/4 945/11 946/2     | shipper [1] 1100/14          | 955/6 955/9 986/14      | 964/7 966/1 975/4       |
|                              | 946/7 947/6 947/10     | shippers [2] 1099/20         | 986/22 988/14 1000/23   | 975/18 978/14 980/12    |
| sentence [13] 1024/4         | 948/14 949/12 950/8    | 1148/6                       | 1001/4 1001/5 1030/6    | 1004/6 1049/10          |
| 1024/5 1024/6 1024/11        | 952/7 952/9 954/22     | shocked [1] 958/17           | 1030/8 1041/11          | 1049/13 1051/6 1053/9   |
| 1025/5 1044/10 1049/9        | 956/18 956/23 958/5    | <b>shop [1]</b> 1032/15      | sign [6] 943/14 944/16  | 1058/2 1069/17          |
| 1058/17 1081/19              | 970/19 973/13 974/20   | shopped [2] 999/17           | 966/4 1101/4 1156/8     | 1082/22 1086/20         |
| 1112/18 1113/23              | 975/5 979/11 1015/13   | 999/21                       | 1159/1                  | 1147/14 1147/20         |
| 1115/21 1117/21              | 1024/8 1041/20         |                              |                         | 1151/19 1152/5 1169/5   |
| <b>sentences [1]</b> 1058/16 |                        | shore [1] 1209/22            | signal [1] 1077/6       |                         |
| separately [4] 1112/2        | 1046/18 1058/4 1077/3  | short [9] 941/20 956/3       | signature [1] 978/19    | 1170/6 1170/12          |
| 1112/3 1210/2 1210/8         | 1083/1 1083/21         | 971/1 1044/23 1054/8         | signed [6] 947/8        | skeptical [1] 1019/4    |
| separation [1] 1184/12       | 1085/19 1086/8         | 1082/5 1098/1 1147/21        | 970/17 976/16 1117/13   |                         |
| <b>September [5]</b> 1008/10 | 1089/19 1089/20        | 1159/2                       | 1153/10 1188/7          | skin [1] 1045/21        |
|                              | 1093/18 1104/11        | <b>short-term [1]</b> 1098/1 | signed-off [1] 947/8    | skip [1] 1024/10        |
| 1008/15 1008/16              | 1106/2 1108/22         | shortfall [2] 1129/21        | significant [1] 1003/5  | skipping [1] 1208/15    |
| 1009/9 1138/13               | 1108/23 1109/5         | 1129/24                      | significantly [1]       | slam [2] 1147/23        |
| September 1 [1]              | 1109/10 1112/13        | shorthand [1] 1023/16        | 1146/18                 | 1148/4                  |
| 1008/10                      | 1112/13 1112/22        | shortly [3] 1027/14          | signify [1] 1169/16     | slam-dunk [1] 1148/4    |
| September 1st [2]            | 1112/24 1113/1         | 1030/17 1063/12              | signing [6] 950/17      | slated [1] 1031/11      |
| 1008/15 1008/16              |                        |                              | 0 0                     |                         |
| Sequencing [1] 990/8         | 1113/19 1113/19        | shot [1] 985/5               | 1086/11 1086/13         | slide [37] 937/20 938/2 |
| serial [1] 1174/14           | 1113/22 1113/22        | should [28] 943/20           | 1100/10 1198/4          | 938/16 939/19 1002/21   |
| serious [21] 966/2           | 1114/1 1114/19         | 967/6 968/9 968/12           | 1198/18                 | 1093/14 1093/15         |
| 1003/3 1044/17               | 1114/23 1115/1 1115/1  | 979/21 988/10 999/6          | silent [1] 1071/24      | 1093/16 1096/21         |
| 1140/23 1143/12              | 1119/9 1122/2 1122/8   | 1014/15 1014/17              | Silverman [1] 1041/11   | 1096/22 1096/24         |
| 1153/20 1154/4 1154/6        | 1123/14 1125/1 1126/2  | 1014/20 1025/2 1054/2        | similar [3] 1021/8      | 1098/9 1108/22          |
|                              | 1126/23 1127/3 1127/6  | 1068/14 1069/5               | 1069/24 1175/11         | 1123/13 1124/16         |
| 1155/24 1156/3               | 1127/22 1127/23        | 1071/15 1104/22              | simple [2] 1209/9       | 1124/18 1124/20         |
| 1156/11 1156/18              | 1130/8 1131/23 1151/5  | 1129/3 1140/19               | 1213/11                 | 1125/2 1125/3 1129/2    |
| 1157/20 1157/24              | 1156/7 1158/24 1184/8  | 1140/21 1140/24              | simplest [2] 1200/22    | 1190/6 1196/1 1196/9    |
| 1177/16 1177/24              | 1191/1 1198/14         | 1141/8 1143/12               | 1203/18                 | 1196/13 1196/24         |
| 1178/1 1178/19               | 1198/21 1203/4 1203/5  | 1168/20 1177/2 1197/3        |                         | 1197/4 1197/8 1201/19   |
| 1181/11 1181/17              |                        |                              | Simplified [1] 985/11   |                         |
| 1181/21                      | 1203/6 1203/10         | 1201/14 1208/16              | simplistic [1] 1119/14  | 1202/1 1208/8 1210/12   |
| seriously [1] 1012/20        | share' [1] 936/3       | 1209/16                      | simply [4] 997/17       | 1210/14 1210/16         |
| serve [3] 982/6 982/9        | shared [4] 991/9       | shouldn't [1] 1053/10        |                         | 1210/23 1211/24         |
| 983/20                       | 991/11 1167/9 1205/9   | <b>show [28]</b> 932/5       | 1200/19                 | 1211/24 1212/2          |
| served [5] 981/16            | shareholder [5] 969/1  | 932/20 935/5 936/15          | since [4] 981/10        | Slide 1 [2] 1196/9      |
|                              | 1036/4 1106/12         | 937/15 944/6 957/2           | 1042/1 1119/12          | 1201/19                 |
| 981/21 981/22 981/23         | 1115/12 1138/17        | 958/18 961/10 963/2          | 1197/21                 | Slide 15 [1] 1098/9     |
| 987/7                        | shareholder-friendly   | 967/24 969/14 973/1          | single [2] 1179/3       | Slide 18 [1] 1096/21    |
| service [4] 1090/12          | <b>[1]</b> 1036/4      | 973/3 974/2 997/23           | 1208/5                  | Slide 4 [1] 1210/14     |
| 1093/10 1099/18              | shareholders [9]       | 1068/4 1068/5 1083/15        | singles [1] 1171/24     | Slide 8 [1] 1093/14     |
| 1171/15                      | 968/16 977/2 977/7     | 1084/22 1136/7               | sister [1] 1149/17      | slides [10] 938/15      |
| services [5] 1090/20         | 1000/13 1082/15        | 1136/22 1136/23              | sit [8] 976/19 982/8    | 938/16 938/18 939/2     |
| 1095/9 1095/16 1107/8        |                        |                              |                         |                         |
| 1183/12                      | 1159/13 1159/18        | 1138/3 1147/12 1149/3        | 999/7 1000/9 1001/17    | 939/16 1097/9 1136/18   |
| session [6] 1004/16          | 1159/20 1200/22        | 1151/12 1190/11              | 1030/8 1106/8 1114/14   | 1195/22 1196/2 1196/5   |
| 1004/23 1040/24              | shares [17] 950/15     | <b>showed [6]</b> 930/16     | sit-down [1] 1030/8     | slightly [1] 1126/5     |
| 1043/16 1047/6 1069/1        | 976/22 1063/21 1064/2  | 957/15 1034/24 1084/5        | sitdown [1] 1001/16     | slip [1] 980/5          |
| set [4] 1133/15              | 1091/12 1103/8         | 1084/7 1084/21               | sitting [7] 942/13      | slipped [1] 1078/24     |
|                              | 1109/11 1109/21        | <b>showing [5]</b> 1093/15   | 965/12 966/7 966/22     | slow [3] 1015/1         |
| 1197/15 1198/17              | 1114/12 1114/17        | 1096/23 1127/21              | 976/4 1085/13 1196/2    | 1120/19 1143/23         |
| 1198/17                      | 1115/4 1115/9 1164/15  | 1198/2 1210/16               | situation [7] 994/9     | small [1] 1128/11       |
| setting [4] 1004/11          | 1165/22 1165/22        | <b>shown [1]</b> 1093/19     | 1072/20 1140/12         | smaller [2] 1115/24     |
| 1004/15 1120/20              | 1202/8 1202/24         | shows [4] 1068/12            | 1141/4 1142/22 1143/1   | 1134/7                  |
| 1197/18                      | sharing [2] 1006/6     | 1093/16 1123/13              | 1174/13                 | smartest [1] 985/24     |
| settled [2] 964/22           |                        |                              |                         |                         |
| 1149/8                       | 1008/6                 | 1125/23                      | situations [1] 1142/23  | Smith [81] 928/24       |
| several [10] 934/21          | she [3] 954/10 954/11  | shut [3] 1104/20             | six [5] 931/19 931/20   | 929/21 938/24 939/4     |
| 934/24 981/16 987/24         | 1104/18                | 1104/22 1173/2               | 1010/24 1030/18         | 939/5 941/14 953/10     |
| 1006/8 1006/10 1008/1        | sheet [12] 931/7 980/5 | shy [1] 1032/18              | 1043/23                 | 953/11 953/16 954/3     |
| 1014/20 1054/23              | 1000/12 1011/12        | sic [1] 1044/6               | size [8] 1091/5 1092/11 | 954/4 955/21 964/2      |
|                              |                        |                              |                         |                         |
|                              | ĺ                      | İ                            | İ                       | Ī                       |

|   | T                                   |   |  | T                                   |
|---|-------------------------------------|---|--|-------------------------------------|
| S   | 1012/6 1076/22                      | 966/3 1020/17 1067/17                                 |  |                                     |
| Smith [68] 964/7                                      | sort [29] 976/20 988/24             |   | star [1] 997/21                              | 942/24 944/22 946/22                |
| 964/8 964/8 964/11                                    | 989/15 999/5 1011/16                | 1070/17 1074/21                                       | Stargatt [1] 928/13                          | 960/23 970/20 973/12                |
| 964/11 964/18 965/2                                   | 1017/15 1032/16                     | 1084/15   | staring [1] 1036/2                           | 1011/11 1027/15                     |
| 965/9 965/21 966/1                                    | 1035/6 1047/17 1049/2               | Spectra/Capricorn [1] 1070/9                          | stars [1] 997/23                             | 1027/15 1028/21<br>1028/22 1028/23  |
| 969/18 969/23 970/12                                  | 1050/11 1050/12<br>  1051/20 1055/5 |   | start [17] 968/9 980/14<br>1025/14 1058/14   | 1028/22 1028/23                     |
| 974/14 974/19 975/22                                  | 1055/16 1055/19                     | <b>speed [1]</b> 943/21 <b>spend [3]</b> 987/1 1046/2 |  | 1042/15 1053/18                     |
| 988/15 1002/7 1006/23                                 | 1057/10 1079/2 1096/5               | 1066/9  | 1127/4 1132/14                               | 1059/24 1064/1                      |
| 1014/10 1014/12                                       | 1119/13 1138/22                     | spending [1] 982/20                                   | 1168/12 1168/15                              | 1077/18 1135/11                     |
| 1018/3 1029/5 1037/18                                 | 1170/4 1172/1 1175/14               | spent [2] 935/23 987/1                                | 1176/13 1188/22                              | 1135/17 1153/1                      |
| 1038/10 1038/12                                       | 1178/21 1201/19                     | spin [17] 982/3 982/18                                | 1196/7 1196/22                               | 1173/20                             |
| 1038/17 1040/3 1040/6                                 | 1203/15 1205/17                     | 982/19 983/1 983/2                                    | 1206/16 1212/2                               | Stipulated [1] 965/23               |
| 1040/11 1049/10                                       | 1205/19                             | 983/4 983/5 983/11                                    | 1212/11                                      | stock [64] 947/3 950/9              |
| 1049/13 1050/16                                       | sorts [3] 988/2 1047/23             |   | started [7] 954/5                            | 950/16 953/18 957/4                 |
| 1050/20 1050/24                                       | 1051/19                             | 994/16 998/8 999/4                                    | 1012/14 1069/7                               | 958/6 968/11 968/15                 |
| 1051/23 1052/21<br>1053/1 1053/6 1054/12              | sought [1] 1203/16                  | 1005/11 1034/2 1171/7                                 | 1087/18 1087/19                              | 969/7 969/9 971/20                  |
| 1058/3 1065/12  | sound [1] 1190/19                   | spin-off [2] 983/1                                    | 1119/14 1189/12                              | 971/24 972/3 972/6                  |
| 1065/12 1080/6  | source [2] 1201/2                   | 983/5   | starting [3] 998/7                           | 972/9 972/10 972/18                 |
| 1081/17 1081/20                                       | 1201/2                              | spinning [3] 994/4                                    | 1012/11 1035/15                              | 973/21 974/13 975/3                 |
| 1083/17 1083/22                                       | SourceHOV [1]                       | 994/15 1045/2   | starts [6] 1043/9                            | 975/11 975/14 976/6                 |
| 1083/23 1133/15                                       | 1194/18                             | spinoff [3] 982/6                                     | 1043/15 1072/10                              | 976/12 979/10 981/17                |
| 1133/19 1134/3  | sources [2] 1108/23                 | 1172/13 1172/23                                       | 1074/16 1106/22                              | 996/2 1011/8 1015/17                |
| 1136/10 1143/9  | 1201/1                              | spiral [2] 978/4 978/5                                | 1115/19                                      | 1017/19 1025/20                     |
| 1145/12 1149/21                                       | <b>space [3]</b> 1199/13            | <b>spoke [8]</b> 944/8 961/19                         |  | 1046/23 1060/18                     |
| 1151/18 1152/12                                       | 1201/11 1208/5                      | 1027/12 1055/14                                       | 1038/16                                      | 1061/2 1061/3 1061/15               |
| 1152/24 1160/13                                       | span [1] 989/21                     | 1151/19 1152/14                                       | stated [4] 966/1 1031/1                      |                                     |
| 1160/16 1160/18                                       | speak [3] 938/17                    | 1153/24 1188/13                                       | 1126/7 1197/20                               | 1078/5 1085/17                      |
| 1169/5 1170/12  | 1009/22 1151/10                     | spoken [1] 1007/21                                    | statement [5] 939/3                          | 1086/12 1119/18                     |
| 1177/20 1181/6  | speaking [2] 1032/18 1205/7         | <b>sponsor [1]</b> 1169/23 <b>spot [3]</b> 1088/24    | 948/17 981/20 1062/18<br>1074/19             | 1130/2 1131/13<br>  1131/13 1162/21 |
| 1187/22 1192/5  | specific [5] 993/6                  | 1107/16 1108/6  | statements [2]                               | 1164/21 1174/16                     |
| Smith's [1] 995/4                                     | 993/8 1021/20 1033/3                | spring [2] 1173/16                                    | 1071/18 1204/15                              | 1197/7 1197/14                      |
| sniff [1] 1152/16                                     | 1199/22                             | 1190/20   | States [2] 1097/16                           | 1197/14 1197/18                     |
| soft [2] 1019/21                                      | specifically [6] 970/9              | <b>spun [5]</b> 931/19 981/5                          | 1100/20                                      | 1197/23 1198/4 1198/6               |
| 1027/17   | 993/15 1089/14 1090/9               | 983/15 984/7 1172/11                                  | stating [1] 1154/11                          | 1199/8 1199/15                      |
| sold [1] 1128/23                                      | 1112/19 1210/21                     | stability [1] 989/17                                  | statistics [1] 1189/10                       | 1199/24 1200/5                      |
| soliciting [2] 1036/18 1068/2                         | <b>specifics [1]</b> 975/15         | stabilize [1] 1025/22                                 | status [1] 1023/9                            | 1200/13 1201/10                     |
|   | Spectra [60] 963/10                 | stable [10] 1090/21                                   | stay [1] 1067/6                              | 1201/17 1202/18                     |
| <b>solvency [1]</b> 1193/9 <b>somebody [2]</b> 1031/3 | 963/16 964/24 965/14                | 1090/22 1090/23                                       | staying [3] 993/19                           | stock' [1] 1058/5                   |
| 1062/20   | 966/2 966/8 966/13                  | 1092/5 1094/10 1097/6                                 | 1088/19 1113/10                              | stockholder [2] 967/20              |
| somehow [3] 1017/13                                   | 966/23 967/10 967/14                | 1097/21 1098/3  | step [3] 952/6 1013/3                        | 1186/22                             |
| 1055/13 1056/14                                       | 967/16 968/15 968/19                | 1103/18 1103/20                                       | 1140/24                                      | stockholders [1]                    |
| someone [3] 1011/15                                   | 998/20 999/2 1000/16                | stacks [1] 1094/16                                    | <b>STEPHEN [4]</b> 928/9                     | 1119/19                             |
| 1028/9 1151/5   | 1005/22 1020/14                     | staff [3] 1175/12                                     | 928/24 1037/18                               | stood [4] 1012/22                   |
| something [30] 941/9                                  | 1022/23 1022/24                     | 1175/12 1175/13                                       | 1133/19                                      | 1117/22 1118/6                      |
| 973/1 974/2 994/7                                     | 1024/14 1024/17                     | stage [4] 1004/11<br>1040/18 1040/18                  | steps [2] 1205/18<br>1206/9                  | 1118/13                             |
| 1017/2 1019/23  | 1036/14 1063/11<br>1063/16 1063/24  | 1040/18 1040/18                                       | : -  | <b>stop [3]</b> 941/4 1101/9 1214/6 |
| 1021/17 1021/19                                       | 1064/16 1064/19                     | stamp [1] 1067/23                                     | <b>Steve [37]</b> 938/24 939/4 941/14 953/10 | stopped [1] 1035/23                 |
| 1021/20 1021/20                                       | 1066/22 1067/19                     | stand [7] 969/20 978/6                                | 955/19 963/22 964/2                          | story [1] 1113/13                   |
| 1027/16 1033/22                                       | 1067/21 1068/1                      | 978/7 986/16 1009/21                                  | 964/8 964/8 964/11                           | STOTTMANN [1]                       |
| 1034/7 1043/7 1056/8                                  | 1068/15 1070/9                      | 1087/1 1214/8   | 965/2 965/9 965/21                           | 928/18                              |
| 1056/15 1062/21                                       | 1070/18 1070/21                     | stand-alone [4] 978/6                                 | 969/18 970/12 974/14                         | straight [7] 941/22                 |
| 1063/1 1064/21 1074/2                                 | 1071/4 1071/8 1071/8                | 978/7 986/16 1009/21                                  | 974/18 975/22 988/14                         | 944/14 948/7 975/19                 |
| 1078/17 1085/23                                       | 1071/11 1071/24                     | Standard [4] 1090/21                                  | 995/3 1014/10 1014/12                        |                                     |
| 1094/15 1110/17                                       | 1072/1 1072/16                      | 1091/18 1094/7  | 1018/3 1018/10 1029/5                        |                                     |
| 1135/14 1140/24<br>1141/8 1146/2 1158/1               | 1072/20 1073/3                      | 1095/22   | 1038/10 1040/11                              | 975/19                              |
| 1174/7  | 1073/11 1073/15                     | standby [1] 1152/6                                    | 1050/16 1050/20                              | straight-up [1] 1016/2              |
| sometime [1] 1176/16                                  | 1073/19 1074/6                      | standpoint [6] 1088/22                                |  | straightforward [5]                 |
| sometimes [1] 1142/23                                 | 1074/24 1075/5                      | 1092/8 1097/24  | 1052/21 1065/12                              | 941/23 1007/9 1016/20               |
| somewhat [3] 1083/5                                   | 10/5/11 1084/3 1084/5               | 1120/20 1120/21                                       | 1083/16 1083/22                              | 1039/7 1039/10                      |
| 1083/7 1199/23  | 1084/7 1135/24                      | 1199/24   | 1133/15 1177/20                              | strange [1] 999/3                   |
| soon [5] 939/6 1007/1                                 | 1156/24 1157/19                     | standstill [5] 1006/13                                | stick [2] 1147/22                            | strategic [18] 930/24               |
| 1019/12 1045/3 1152/1                                 | 1158/9 1180/16                      | 1006/21 1032/7  | 1148/4                                       | 968/9 996/6 1004/11                 |
| sooner [3] 943/23                                     | Spectra's [9] 965/24                | 1077/14 1187/11                                       | sticks [1] 1147/23                           | 1010/9 1022/15                      |
|   |                                     |   |  |                                     |
|   | l                                   | NOEDY COURT REPORT                                    | <u>L</u> _                                   |                                     |

| S                            | subsequent [4] 994/19       | support [6] 943/23          | 1188/16 1202/22        | 1190/15                   |
|------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------|
|                              | 1115/22 1116/3              | 990/1 1112/12 1112/12       | 1212/19                | talks [2] 1048/20         |
| strategic [12]               | 1132/23                     | 1116/24 1133/5              |                        | 1189/16                   |
| 1031/10 1031/23              |                             |                             | taken [4] 1003/10      |                           |
| 1033/5 1034/3 1034/11        | subsequently [1]            | supported [4] 976/6         | 1068/20 1144/2         | target [7] 994/16         |
|                              | 1118/8                      | 1113/17 1116/1 1161/3       | 1196/19                | 1125/20 1126/8            |
| 1035/18 1042/8               | substance [2] 999/10        | supportive [2] 934/13       | takes [3] 1062/8       | 1183/20 1185/3            |
| 1045/19 1045/23              |                             |                             |                        |                           |
| 1047/11 1049/8 1177/1        | 1000/14                     | 1155/11                     | 1180/4 1180/11         | 1185/15 1185/18           |
| stream [1] 1209/23           | substantive [2]             | suppose [1] 1142/14         | takes' [1] 961/16      | targeted [1] 1125/11      |
|                              | 1000/18 1081/11             | supposed [2] 1095/22        | takes.' [1] 1062/6     | tasked [2] 951/5 965/8    |
| streams [4] 995/9            | subtract [3] 1202/23        | 1177/8                      | taking [7] 947/3 952/6 | <b>Taurus [7]</b> 953/18  |
| 996/11 996/14 1076/18        |                             |                             |                        |                           |
| Street [7] 927/10            | 1212/12 1213/16             | sure [45] 929/22 941/2      | 1012/7 1065/12         | 955/18 958/3 961/17       |
| 927/23 1063/13               | subtracting [1] 1202/4      | 944/19 945/19 949/9         | 1116/24 1202/3 1212/4  | 1084/24 1143/12           |
|                              | successful [2] 983/15       | 952/24 954/24 957/12        | talent [1] 1034/11     | 1143/15                   |
| 1179/12 1179/13              | 1082/8                      | 959/3 962/10 966/15         | talk [51] 934/5 943/8  | <b>Taurus' [6]</b> 955/20 |
| 1179/20 1180/13              |                             |                             |                        | 955/20 955/21 956/2       |
| strength [2] 1019/22         | succession [19]             | 969/24 970/12 971/23        | 945/3 967/20 968/20    |                           |
| 1148/14                      | 931/15 932/1 932/2          | 972/14 980/1 983/15         | 969/12 969/13 971/3    | 956/8 1057/18             |
|                              | 933/2 933/6 933/9           | 989/23 1022/8 1032/15       | 976/24 981/9 982/24    | tax [9] 993/13 1088/9     |
| stressed [3] 1015/23         | 933/20 934/14 985/14        | 1035/13 1035/13             | 985/13 994/22 998/6    | 1208/17 1208/18           |
| 1015/24 1189/12              |                             |                             |                        | 1208/19 1208/20           |
| stretch [1] 1064/22          | 986/6 986/13 986/17         | 1052/15 1057/3              | 998/24 999/4 999/7     |                           |
| strike [2] 1055/5            | 987/24 989/1 991/9          | 1064/21 1065/19             | 999/23 1000/10         | 1209/17 1209/22           |
|                              | 991/16 1033/11              | 1066/16 1077/15             | 1005/21 1028/14        | 1210/5                    |
| 1161/7                       | 1034/12 1036/8              | 1085/22 1088/23             | 1047/5 1053/15 1112/1  | tay-effected [1]          |
| strikes [1] 1006/20          |                             | 1100/14 1119/3              |                        |                           |
| <b>Strip [1]</b> 1194/8      | such [8] 984/9 984/10       |                             | 1122/12 1130/24        | 1208/18                   |
| stripped [1] 1210/2          | 997/10 1064/22 1074/5       | 1138/12 1146/12             | 1135/4 1136/2 1142/2   | tax-related [1] 1209/17   |
|                              | 1157/20 1193/5              | 1151/15 1178/24             | 1151/8 1152/24 1154/5  | <b>Taylor [2]</b> 928/13  |
| strong [12] 931/4            | 1206/17                     | 1194/6 1196/13 1197/3       | 1155/23 1156/23        | 1041/10                   |
| 931/6 931/7 1000/12          |                             | 1205/21 1207/10             | 1159/9 1162/13         | TC [6] 928/17 1081/17     |
| 1021/1 1048/9 1063/5         | Sucharow [3] 928/3          |                             |                        |                           |
| 1074/22 1100/11              | 1121/18 1192/10             | 1208/11 1210/16             | 1169/21 1171/5         | 1094/1 1199/8 1200/13     |
|                              | suggest [5] 954/16          | 1212/2 1213/5               | 1175/19 1178/17        | 1211/1                    |
| 1179/4 1189/5 1190/7         | 954/21 975/7 976/23         | surfaced [1] 941/11         | 1179/11 1181/5 1181/5  | TC's [1] 1125/19          |
| strongest [2] 1011/13        | 1213/17                     | surprised [2] 970/5         | 1181/6 1182/22         | TD [2] 1111/3 1111/12     |
| 1147/20                      |                             |                             |                        |                           |
| strongly [6] 940/12          | <b>suggested</b> [10] 937/9 | 1038/18                     | 1188/11 1202/10        | TD Securities [2]         |
| 968/8 986/15 988/10          | 937/9 940/12 954/7          | sustain [1] 1061/13         | 1207/8 1207/14 1209/1  | 1111/3 1111/12            |
|                              | 954/24 969/6 988/6          | switch [1] 929/18           | 1209/4                 | team [31] 932/2 935/9     |
| 1033/10 1053/4               | 1016/11 1028/23             | switching [1] 1209/2        | talked [18] 942/10     | 935/19 935/22 936/11      |
| structure [8] 951/13         |                             |                             |                        |                           |
| 1018/20 1139/20              | 1035/8                      | synched [1] 1043/12         | 953/18 959/11 959/14   | 936/20 936/23 942/18      |
| 1140/14 1200/5 1200/6        | suggesting [2] 968/3        | syndicate [3] 1118/8        | 985/14 1005/1 1012/1   | 957/3 957/8 957/13        |
|                              | 1190/16                     | 1163/19 1165/6              | 1029/14 1036/8         | 961/13 961/15 961/16      |
| 1200/12 1200/20              | suggestion [1] 1013/2       | syndication [1]             | 1069/19 1075/21        | 962/1 972/2 972/15        |
| structures [1] 1200/16       |                             |                             |                        |                           |
| struggled [1] 1106/7         | suggestions [1]             | 1118/12                     | 1084/3 1085/1 1140/22  |                           |
| struggling [3] 1140/8        | 934/21                      | <b>synergies [3]</b> 959/19 | 1142/4 1148/24 1160/5  | 1006/19 1006/22           |
|                              | suggests [1] 1068/9         | 1107/2 1108/2               | 1180/23                | 1007/8 1032/1 1032/1      |
| 1141/8 1142/5                | <b>Suisse [2]</b> 1163/8    | system [2] 1165/23          | talking [56] 932/21    | 1062/5 1065/14            |
| stub [1] 1198/21             |                             |                             |                        |                           |
| stuck [2] 944/4 944/10       | 1164/19                     | 1171/18                     | 935/22 939/15 941/8    | 1077/12 1092/8            |
| study [2] 995/22             | Suite [1] 927/23            | T                           | 946/21 954/18 960/18   | 1101/13 1177/5            |
|                              | <b>SULLIVAN [8]</b> 928/2   | <u> </u>                    | 961/9 961/13 962/1     | team's [1] 1033/18        |
| 995/22                       | 1006/18 1031/24             | table [1] 1076/11           | 968/2 968/4 975/11     | teams [3] 954/9           |
| stuff [2] 932/15             | 1065/5 1072/15              | tabled [1] 991/13           | 986/9 986/17 1012/20   | 1031/23 1076/13           |
| 1138/13                      |                             |                             |                        |                           |
| <b>sub [4]</b> 1107/3 1117/5 | 1121/18 1166/18             | take [45] 936/2 947/5       | 1016/15 1021/2         | Teleconference [2]        |
|                              | 1187/1                      | 953/9 963/14 964/17         | 1035/22 1037/22        | 945/2 971/2               |
| 1118/5 1119/1                | Sullivan                    | 970/22 973/20 982/5         | 1038/2 1038/7 1038/13  | telephone [1] 1021/5      |
| subject [8] 956/1            | considerations [1]          | 984/1 1013/3 1025/19        | 1038/16 1039/2 1039/6  | tell [52] 940/24 947/5    |
| 1029/7 1084/18 1086/4        |                             |                             |                        |                           |
| 1112/20 1114/21              | 1072/15                     | 1025/23 1029/21             | 1054/24 1067/24        | 953/6 974/4 976/9         |
|                              | sum [2] 1081/19             | 1042/20 1042/24             | 1073/14 1083/17        | 983/8 988/19 990/16       |
| 1118/11 1151/4               | 1206/21                     | 1045/1 1055/18              | 1096/6 1122/16         | 991/22 992/1 992/4        |
| subjects [1] 1195/2          | summarize [3] 985/7         | 1055/19 1063/23             | 1135/12 1135/18        | 994/1 995/10 1000/4       |
| submission [1] 958/4         |                             |                             |                        |                           |
| <b>submitted [2]</b> 1073/10 | 1081/22 1201/20             | 1063/24 1069/5              | 1136/14 1136/19        | 1005/8 1009/18            |
|                              | summarized [1]              | 1069/10 1080/10             | 1141/11 1141/12        | 1011/20 1011/23           |
| 1073/11                      | 1097/9                      | 1090/2 1092/19              | 1142/18 1143/5 1143/7  | 1019/1 1024/15            |
| subscription [18]            |                             | 1092/21 1094/11             | 1143/11 1145/13        | 1032/24 1035/19           |
| 1102/15 1102/17              | summary [4] 979/16          |                             |                        |                           |
| 1103/1 1103/2 1103/4         | 1051/22 1080/18             | 1095/4 1095/18              | 1148/3 1153/18         | 1044/1 1044/12            |
|                              | 1213/22                     | 1101/19 1104/1 1104/2       | 1153/19 1153/21        | 1049/24 1050/5            |
| 1103/7 1109/17               | summer [2] 1173/18          | 1106/18 1107/14             | 1172/13 1177/10        | 1050/13 1051/10           |
| 1110/15 1111/4 1112/9        | 1190/20                     | 1109/7 1114/11 1115/7       | 1177/12 1177/14        |                           |
| 1110/4 1114/6 1100/16        |                             |                             | 1 11///14 11///14      | 1062/7 1062/16 1063/3     |
| 1113/4 1114/6 1120/16        |                             |                             |                        |                           |
| 1113/4 1114/6 1120/16        | Sunday [2] 941/17           | 1118/10 1143/24             | 1177/20 1189/9         | 1066/10 1070/16           |
| 1120/23 1122/22              |                             |                             |                        |                           |
|                              | Sunday [2] 941/17           | 1118/10 1143/24             | 1177/20 1189/9         | 1066/10 1070/16           |

| Т                             | test [2] 968/9 972/23                       | 1164/24 1165/22                                | threats [1] 1148/1                         | tipped [1] 1025/13                         |
|-------------------------------|---|--|--|--|
| tell [17] 1078/22             | testified [16] 930/2                        | 1165/23 1170/1                                 | three [19] 941/21 991/5                    |  |
| 1079/9 1096/22                | 973/2 973/9 988/13                          | 1192/12 1200/5                                 | 993/5 997/16 1005/4                        | 1124/16 1124/20                            |
| 1116/12 1140/18               | 1049/19 1087/4 1131/4                       | 1211/21  | 1005/9 1017/15                             | titled [4] 1045/22                         |
| 1162/19 1165/18               | 1133/20 1170/7                              | then-vice [1] 1089/10                          | 1030/15 1030/17                            | 1096/12 1098/10                            |
| 1170/18 1170/22               | 1192/17 1193/18                             | thereabouts [1]                                | 1041/10 1041/17                            | 1208/9                                     |
| 1177/19 1180/2 1180/6         | 1194/1 1194/9 1194/13                       | 1135/13  | 1041/21 1042/3 1065/7                      | today [19] 929/7                           |
| 1180/9 1181/2 1182/17         | 1194/16 1194/19                             | thereafter [2] 1027/14                         | 1091/19 1092/6 1093/9                      | 929/18 934/10 937/2                        |
| 1182/22 1186/13               | testifies [1] 974/3                         | 1030/17  | 1097/3 1212/22                             | 942/13 965/13 966/7                        |
| telling [14] 931/23           | testify [4] 942/19                          | Therefore [1] 931/8                            | three-way [1] 1017/15                      | 966/22 976/4 982/15                        |
| 944/8 958/1 964/7             | 986/22 1082/22                              | they'll [2] 941/21 948/6                       |  | 987/22 1038/23<br>1082/23 1085/13          |
| 964/20 969/4 994/2            | 1187/22                                     | <b>they're [14]</b> 960/18 976/2 1044/8 1053/2 | 1174/23                                    |  |
| 1013/12 1094/17               | testifying [1] 1193/7                       | 1068/10 1100/12                                | through [63] 932/15<br>933/5 962/18 966/20 | 1104/19 1168/21<br>  1181/20 1195/23       |
| 1132/13 1132/17               | testimony [9] 973/3<br>974/8 1028/16 1134/7 | 1114/20 1114/21                                | 973/5 974/3 977/3                          | 1212/23                                    |
| 1140/2 1147/19                | 1175/2 1181/20                              | 1116/24 1124/1                                 | 993/19 1012/8 1014/9                       | Today's [1] 955/18                         |
| 1150/24                       | 1187/10 1195/23                             | 1136/14 1140/16                                | 1029/14 1029/18                            | together [12] 936/6                        |
| ten [3] 1018/4 1193/24        | 1196/17                                     | 1151/6 1211/7                                  | 1030/12 1030/12                            | 936/23 978/23 979/4                        |
| 1206/1                        | testing [1] 1210/22                         | thing [14] 970/1 994/13                        |  | 1017/15 1032/1                             |
| tenable [1] 1068/12           | text [14] 953/9 954/14                      | 994/14 999/5 1026/2                            | 1042/18 1043/9                             | 1035/12 1081/20                            |
| tend [4] 985/24 1027/4        | 955/3 958/20 959/20                         | 1105/22 1138/22                                | 1044/18 1046/14                            | 1101/14 1112/1 1112/3                      |
| 1038/5 1038/6                 | 960/17 962/11 964/18                        | 1166/22 1170/4 1172/1                          | 1049/2 1049/12 1057/1                      | 1158/9                                     |
| tends [1] 966/3               | 969/14 969/18 974/18                        | 1173/23 1175/15                                | 1063/10 1067/1                             | told [28] 952/8 960/7                      |
| tenor [2] 1141/5<br>1141/11   | 1149/4 1151/12                              | 1200/7 1202/15                                 | 1072/18 1090/4                             | 961/14 971/12 976/1                        |
| tense [1] 1053/18             | 1153/12                                     | things [20] 935/14                             | 1092/17 1095/19                            | 1012/1 1022/24                             |
|                               | textbook [1] 934/11                         | 969/21 970/15 997/6                            | 1098/12 1099/11                            | 1026/18 1027/13                            |
| tentativeness [1]<br>1057/24  | texted [1] 1152/12                          | 1008/12 1014/20                                | 1099/16 1105/15                            | 1062/5 1118/13 1120/3                      |
| Teresa [1] 1041/10            | texting [1] 1153/22                         | 1015/19 1016/2                                 | 1110/20 1123/14                            | 1133/4 1135/17                             |
| term [25] 935/14              | <b>TFers [1]</b> 976/2                      | 1034/13 1039/5                                 | 1125/12 1128/3                             | 1140/13 1140/17                            |
| 968/12 1009/16                | thank [23] 929/2 929/2                      | 1051/12 1051/17                                | 1129/21 1134/12                            | 1153/6 1154/8 1154/17                      |
| 1014/24 1026/20               | 953/15 971/1 978/13                         | 1051/19 1100/9                                 | 1138/5 1138/13                             | 1155/9 1155/17                             |
| 1066/7 1089/1 1089/3          | 980/8 1004/2 1010/1                         | 1102/18 1112/6 1170/4                          | 1146/18 1158/6                             | 1180/10 1182/3                             |
| 1098/1 1098/24                | 1035/5 1082/18                              | 1187/6 1190/21 1199/7                          | 1165/22 1166/10                            | 1182/18 1186/10                            |
| 1100/10 1105/20               | 1086/16 1086/20                             | thinking [15] 933/2                            | 1166/12 1170/11                            | 1186/11 1186/12                            |
| 1125/21 1125/24               | 1086/22 1121/14                             | 983/8 983/14 984/2                             | 1172/16 1173/4                             | 1186/12                                    |
| 1142/6 1143/15                | 1133/11 1133/22                             | 1011/10 1012/7                                 | 1176/17 1197/10                            | tolls [1] 1099/17                          |
| 1147/21 1147/22               | 1160/13 1187/21                             | 1029/18 1046/15                                | 1201/4 1202/11                             | Tom [1] 1000/1                             |
| 1205/8 1207/23                | 1192/5 1192/7 1195/3                        | 1134/19 1134/20                                | 1202/11 1202/13                            | tomorrow [9] 929/8<br>929/11 943/13 956/11 |
| 1207/24 1208/1 1208/3         | 1214/1 1214/8                               | 1156/2 1168/21 1177/8<br>1200/7 1201/16        | 1202/14 1203/16<br>1204/5 1205/17          | 959/16 975/9 1016/12                       |
| 1209/12 1211/11               | thanks [4] 934/9<br>948/10 1121/5 1188/8    | third [11] 959/12                              | 1205/19 1208/10                            | 1017/22 1214/6                             |
| terminal [13] 1206/4          | their [63] 952/8 954/5                      | 978/14 1022/22 1046/8                          | 1209/23 1211/24                            | tone [2] 941/23 1152/3                     |
| 1206/6 1209/4 1209/5          | 954/7 958/15 960/24                         | 1063/20 1124/2 1178/3                          |  | tongue [1] 1191/23                         |
| 1209/6 1209/8 1209/10         | 970/20 972/3 972/10                         | 1178/6 1178/7 1178/12                          | 972/9 1022/4 1075/9                        | tonight [1] 943/21                         |
| 1209/14 1209/21               | 975/3 982/3 982/4                           | 1188/20  | 1080/3 1081/4                              | tonight to [1] 943/21                      |
| 1210/5 1210/10 1211/9         | 983/20 997/20 998/21                        | thirds [1] 1071/14                             | <b>Thursday [1]</b> 927/11                 | too [4] 938/6 1016/23                      |
| 1211/10                       | 1023/3 1026/19                              | this [521]                                     | tied [1] 989/24                            | 1025/24 1128/10                            |
| terminate [1] 1025/7          | 1027/14 1039/17                             | <b>THOMAS</b> [1] 928/6                        | ties [1] 1079/15                           | took [10] 942/3 951/1                      |
| terminated [2] 1008/20 1009/6 | 1039/17 1047/22                             | thorough [2] 969/20                            | tilted [1] 1081/24                         | 1069/18 1095/19                            |
| terminating [1]               | 1058/1 1059/16                              | 1167/8   | <b>Tim [6]</b> 943/1 944/7                 | 1117/4 1136/11                             |
| 1026/13                       | 1061/13 1062/3                              | thoroughly [4] 996/5                           | 948/9 948/9 1147/14                        | 1136/15 1171/17                            |
| termination [5] 950/10        | 1064/12 1070/21                             | 1045/6 1072/21 1075/6                          | 1147/16                                    | 1200/22 1208/2                             |
| 950/21 950/23 950/24          | 1073/12 1076/3                              | though [5] 984/19                              | timeline [3] 963/5                         | top [32] 933/24 950/21                     |
| 951/5                         | 1077/21 1078/10                             | 1029/3 1073/8 1126/8                           | 963/9 1014/6                               | 955/5 968/1 985/16                         |
| terms [14] 1042/20            | 1093/10 1100/5                              | 1201/12  | timely [3] 1021/20                         | 995/8 1005/18 1007/13                      |
| 1044/23 1099/3 1104/7         | 1100/14 1100/14                             | thought [20] 1003/2                            | 1074/22 1075/1                             | 1011/11 1013/7 1016/8                      |
| 1143/13 1163/3                | 1101/17 1103/10                             | 1015/23 1019/6                                 | times [13] 934/24                          | 1022/14 1030/4                             |
| 1167/10 1187/6 1200/5         | 1105/4 1105/6 1105/8                        | 1027/11 1033/17                                | 990/18 993/5 997/16                        | 1037/12 1037/15                            |
| 1200/12 1200/22               | 1105/15 1105/15                             | 1044/17 1048/12<br>1105/21 1106/6              | 1008/1 1065/7 1136/9                       | 1040/2 1058/13                             |
| 1203/18 1211/16               | 1105/17 1105/19<br>1110/12 1110/14          | 1109/16 1119/7 1120/4                          | 1161/11 1161/14<br>1193/21 1193/22         | 1058/16 1060/15<br>1060/17 1065/24         |
| 1211/17                       | 1112/5 1117/3 1117/22                       | 1120/5 1134/23 1138/2                          | 1193/21 1193/22                            | 1066/4 1069/9 1070/4                       |
| territory [1] 1171/15         | 1117/23 1118/5                              | 1176/6 1177/4 1177/5                           | timing [3] 953/24                          | 1083/16 1125/19                            |
| Terry [4] 1101/20             | 1118/13 1120/20                             | 1186/17 1198/24                                | 970/10 989/24                              | 1137/7 1150/4 1163/9                       |
| 1101/22 1101/23               | 1120/21 1132/20                             | thoughts [3] 994/18                            | Timothy [3] 1192/11                        | 1168/7 1168/16 1184/6                      |
| 1101/24                       | 1153/10 1163/9                              | 1019/6 1055/16                                 | 1192/16 1192/22                            | top-flight [1] 1069/9                      |
| terse [1] 1054/8              |   |  |  | , 5  |
|                               |   |  |  |  |

| _   | 1165/5 1165/10 1166/7   | 1105/0 1105/11  | tue m d [4] 1101/F   | ultimately [OE1 OE1/4  |
|---|---|---|--|--|
| <u>T</u>  | 1165/5 1165/10 1166/7<br>1166/24 1169/13  | 1125/9 1125/11<br>1125/24 1126/18   | trend [1] 1101/5<br>trends [1] 1098/14   | ultimately [25] 951/4<br>962/22 982/6 1006/7   |
| topic [2] 1072/22   | 1193/4 1196/15  | 1126/23 1127/2 1127/5   | Trevor [1] 1111/11   | 1029/19 1030/7   |
| 1084/21   | 1196/18 1196/18   | 1127/22 1127/23   | trial [14] 927/18 966/19   |  |
| topics [2] 1005/24  | 1197/24 1202/5 1202/6   | 1128/2 1128/6 1128/19   | 967/3 973/2 973/7  | 1044/20 1052/24  |
| 1033/1<br><b>Toronto [1]</b> 959/23   | 1202/7 1202/17  | 1129/7 1129/16  | 973/9 986/23 1052/21   | 1056/19 1076/18  |
| total [4] 1030/18   | 1202/24   | 1132/13 1132/17   | 1052/22 1183/11  | 1082/8 1106/11   |
| 1112/23 1188/23   | transactional [2]   | 1132/17 1140/2 1140/4   | 1193/24 1194/10  | 1114/14 1114/19  |
| 1193/22   | 985/23 1038/5   | 1140/18 1141/6  | 1194/13 1194/19  | 1115/2 1115/3 1115/6   |
| totally [2] 984/24  | transactions [5] 986/3  | 1142/10 1143/3  | tried [1] 1047/22  | 1117/2 1117/3 1117/13  |
| 1148/11   | 1116/19 1193/9  | 1143/16 1146/4 1146/9   |  | 1121/4 1198/8 1198/21  |
| touch [5] 1000/19   | 1193/10 1200/17   | 1146/12 1146/17   | true [15] 936/5 963/22   | umbrella [1] 981/2   |
| 1033/13 1037/6  | <b>TransCanada [194]</b> 934/19 936/1 939/12  | 1146/22 1147/7<br>1150/11 1150/14   | 964/1 964/14 965/15<br>996/1 996/2 1058/10   | unable [1] 1104/6  |
| 1161/18 1162/11   | 940/4 940/15 940/22   | 1150/11 1150/14   | 1062/21 1082/2 1084/4  | unacceptable [2]<br>951/1 1182/19  |
| touched [1] 1014/11   | 943/8 948/14 949/11   | 1155/2 1155/15  | 1085/10 1086/15  | unanimous [4]  |
| touchstone [1] 996/9  | 949/17 950/9 950/13   | 1157/16 1168/1  | 1145/18 1190/22  | 1137/12 1137/24  |
| tough [2] 1141/4  | 950/16 951/3 951/17   | 1169/13 1170/11   | truncate [1] 1099/4  | 1138/9 1139/4  |
| 1178/8  | 952/8 958/14 958/23   | 1175/5 1175/7 1175/20   |  | Unbelievable [1] 957/6   |
| toward [3] 945/10<br>946/1 951/11   | 962/20 966/9 966/10   | 1178/20 1179/3 1181/7   | truthful [8] 956/13  | under [19] 933/11  |
| towards [10] 938/22   | 966/14 966/16 966/24  | 1182/6 1182/9 1197/17   | 1154/19 1156/17  | 949/6 976/5 979/15   |
| 963/4 963/9 965/1   | 967/6 967/12 968/8  | 1197/24 1198/4  | 1189/8 1189/14   | 981/2 996/14 1064/14   |
| 967/18 970/7 978/24   | 968/15 969/5 969/7  | 1199/22 1200/3  | 1189/24 1190/8 1191/2  | 1065/9 1068/7 1102/11  |
| 979/4 1081/24 1095/5  | 969/13 970/19 971/6   | 1200/14 1201/17   | try [9] 965/14 1025/22   | 1112/15 1126/2 1126/4  |
| town [1] 1080/6   | 972/10 972/18 972/21  | 1205/1 1205/3 1210/20   | 1045/2 1048/10   | 1126/12 1160/23  |
| track [7] 983/19  | 973/12 973/24 974/20<br>975/11 976/6 976/10   | 1211/2 1211/13<br>1211/21 1212/7  | 1056/24 1059/14<br>1079/23 1079/24   | 1197/1 1201/15<br>1201/20 1201/22  |
| 1009/20 1010/4 1010/6   | 991/22 1006/9 1014/7  | 1211/21 1212/7  | 1115/3   | underlined [2] 1095/5  |
| 1011/9 1015/12  | 1014/14 1014/17   | TransCanada's [35]  | trying [13] 957/5  | 1112/16  |
| 1022/15   | 1014/23 1015/1  | 939/23 945/4 950/6  | 984/16 1012/18 1020/6  | underneath [5] 934/17  |
| tracking [1] 1059/11  | 1019/17 1020/2  | 950/6 951/9 951/14  | 1027/17 1038/20  | 935/12 935/23 1018/6   |
| tracks [4] 1009/16  | 1023/10 1023/18   | 951/22 953/7 960/6  | 1042/18 1043/7   | 1095/7   |
| 1009/18 1010/3<br>1015/11   | 1024/1 1024/7 1026/13   | 971/19 971/24 972/6   | 1080/10 1114/20  | understand [11] 929/9  |
| traction [1] 1017/7   | 1027/8 1027/24  | 974/13 976/5 976/11   | 1115/8 1173/24   | 931/9 996/5 1036/3   |
| trading [2] 939/6   | 1028/15 1028/18   | 979/10 992/4 1042/8   | 1177/19  | 1077/15 1126/9   |
| 1114/15   | 1028/22 1030/21   | 1058/20 1060/18   | Tuesday [2] 943/14   | 1164/10 1170/16  |
| transact [3] 1027/1   | 1031/17 1032/7  | 1061/15 1076/18   | 1096/1   | 1184/14 1200/17  |
| 1047/3 1068/7   | 1034/16 1036/13   | 1078/7 1088/13  | Tunnell [1] 928/20   | 1205/8   |
| transaction [84] 931/9  | 1037/1 1037/6 1039/12<br>1040/14 1041/6 1042/6  | 1090/19 1104/11<br>1105/24 1109/4   | turned [3] 983/12<br>1135/2 1186/2   | understanding [21]<br>955/24 983/23 996/22   |
| 945/5 950/11 951/12   | 1040/14 1041/0 1042/0   | 1103/24 1103/4  |  |  |
| 1 0E7/04 0E0/40 000/44  | 1045/17 1048/9  | 1112/24 1113/13   |  |  |
| 957/24 958/10 963/11  | 1045/17 1048/9<br>1049/12 1050/13   | 1112/24 1113/13<br>1122/17 1125/4   | Twenty [1] 976/21  | 1039/16 1044/22  |
| 963/19 965/8 967/7  | 1049/12 1050/13   | 1122/17 1125/4  | Twenty [1] 976/21<br>Twenty-five [1] 976/21  | 1039/16 1044/22<br>1052/19 1056/16   |
| 963/19 965/8 967/7<br>967/21 968/21 973/22  |   |   | Twenty [1] 976/21<br>Twenty-five [1] 976/21<br>twice [1] 1034/1  | 1039/16 1044/22  |
| 963/19 965/8 967/7<br>967/21 968/21 973/22<br>974/5 976/11 976/20   | 1049/12 1050/13<br>1051/14 1052/13  | 1122/17 1125/4<br>1125/20 1130/2 1166/5<br><b>TransCanada-specific</b><br>[1] 1199/22   | Twenty [1] 976/21<br>Twenty-five [1] 976/21<br>twice [1] 1034/1<br>two-minute [1] 999/9<br>two-thirds [1] 1071/14  | 1039/16 1044/22<br>1052/19 1056/16<br>1059/10 1059/13  |
| 963/19 965/8 967/7<br>967/21 968/21 973/22<br>974/5 976/11 976/20<br>977/5 977/10 1012/20   | 1049/12 1050/13<br>1051/14 1052/13<br>1053/8 1053/12<br>1054/13 1055/21<br>1056/2 1056/18   | 1122/17 1125/4<br>1125/20 1130/2 1166/5<br><b>TransCanada-specific</b><br>[1] 1199/22<br><b>transcript</b> [5] 927/18   | Twenty [1] 976/21<br>Twenty-five [1] 976/21<br>twice [1] 1034/1<br>two-minute [1] 999/9<br>two-thirds [1] 1071/14<br>type [3] 1001/3   | 1039/16 1044/22<br>1052/19 1056/16<br>1059/10 1059/13<br>1059/23 1076/19<br>1119/14 1138/7<br>1138/24 1139/4 1151/9  |
| 963/19 965/8 967/7<br>967/21 968/21 973/22<br>974/5 976/11 976/20<br>977/5 977/10 1012/20<br>1015/20 1016/22  | 1049/12 1050/13<br>1051/14 1052/13<br>1053/8 1053/12<br>1054/13 1055/21<br>1056/2 1056/18<br>1056/19 1058/3   | 1122/17 1125/4<br>1125/20 1130/2 1166/5<br><b>TransCanada-specific</b><br>[1] 1199/22<br><b>transcript</b> [5] 927/18<br>966/19 974/10 1188/17  | Twenty [1] 976/21<br>Twenty-five [1] 976/21<br>twice [1] 1034/1<br>two-minute [1] 999/9<br>two-thirds [1] 1071/14<br>type [3] 1001/3<br>1089/15 1148/19  | 1039/16 1044/22<br>1052/19 1056/16<br>1059/10 1059/13<br>1059/23 1076/19<br>1119/14 1138/7<br>1138/24 1139/4 1151/9<br>1155/24 1164/24   |
| 963/19 965/8 967/7<br>967/21 968/21 973/22<br>974/5 976/11 976/20<br>977/5 977/10 1012/20<br>1015/20 1016/22<br>1025/9 1031/12 1060/8   | 1049/12 1050/13<br>1051/14 1052/13<br>1053/8 1053/12<br>1054/13 1055/21<br>1056/2 1056/18<br>1056/19 1058/3<br>1058/23 1062/17  | 1122/17 1125/4<br>1125/20 1130/2 1166/5<br><b>TransCanada-specific</b><br>[1] 1199/22<br><b>transcript</b> [5] 927/18<br>966/19 974/10 1188/17<br>1189/14   | Twenty [1] 976/21<br>Twenty-five [1] 976/21<br>twice [1] 1034/1<br>two-minute [1] 999/9<br>two-thirds [1] 1071/14<br>type [3] 1001/3<br>1089/15 1148/19<br>types [2] 1051/12   | 1039/16 1044/22<br>1052/19 1056/16<br>1059/10 1059/13<br>1059/23 1076/19<br>1119/14 1138/7<br>1138/24 1139/4 1151/9<br>1155/24 1164/24<br>1183/5 1205/4 1209/24  |
| 963/19 965/8 967/7<br>967/21 968/21 973/22<br>974/5 976/11 976/20<br>977/5 977/10 1012/20<br>1015/20 1016/22  | 1049/12 1050/13<br>1051/14 1052/13<br>1053/8 1053/12<br>1054/13 1055/21<br>1056/2 1056/18<br>1056/19 1058/3<br>1058/23 1062/17<br>1065/21 1073/4  | 1122/17 1125/4<br>1125/20 1130/2 1166/5<br><b>TransCanada-specific</b><br>[1] 1199/22<br><b>transcript</b> [5] 927/18<br>966/19 974/10 1188/17<br>1189/14<br><b>transcripts</b> [1] 1205/5  | Twenty [1] 976/21<br>Twenty-five [1] 976/21<br>twice [1] 1034/1<br>two-minute [1] 999/9<br>two-thirds [1] 1071/14<br>type [3] 1001/3<br>1089/15 1148/19<br>types [2] 1051/12<br>1051/17  | 1039/16 1044/22<br>1052/19 1056/16<br>1059/10 1059/13<br>1059/23 1076/19<br>1119/14 1138/7<br>1138/24 1139/4 1151/9<br>1155/24 1164/24<br>1183/5 1205/4 1209/24<br>understood [16]   |
| 963/19 965/8 967/7<br>967/21 968/21 973/22<br>974/5 976/11 976/20<br>977/5 977/10 1012/20<br>1015/20 1016/22<br>1025/9 1031/12 1060/8<br>1060/9 1061/9 1063/6   | 1049/12 1050/13<br>1051/14 1052/13<br>1053/8 1053/12<br>1054/13 1055/21<br>1056/2 1056/18<br>1056/19 1058/3<br>1058/23 1062/17<br>1065/21 1073/4<br>1073/11 1075/17   | 1122/17 1125/4<br>1125/20 1130/2 1166/5<br><b>TransCanada-specific</b><br>[1] 1199/22<br><b>transcript</b> [5] 927/18<br>966/19 974/10 1188/17<br>1189/14<br><b>transcripts</b> [1] 1205/5<br><b>transfer</b> [4] 1099/19   | Twenty [1] 976/21<br>Twenty-five [1] 976/21<br>twice [1] 1034/1<br>two-minute [1] 999/9<br>two-thirds [1] 1071/14<br>type [3] 1001/3<br>1089/15 1148/19<br>types [2] 1051/12<br>1051/17<br>typical [5] 1004/18   | 1039/16 1044/22<br>1052/19 1056/16<br>1059/10 1059/13<br>1059/23 1076/19<br>1119/14 1138/7<br>1138/24 1139/4 1151/9<br>1155/24 1164/24<br>1183/5 1205/4 1209/24<br><b>understood [16]</b><br>956/22 958/14 959/4   |
| 963/19 965/8 967/7<br>967/21 968/21 973/22<br>974/5 976/11 976/20<br>977/5 977/10 1012/20<br>1015/20 1016/22<br>1025/9 1031/12 1060/8<br>1060/9 1061/9 1063/6<br>1064/15 1070/9<br>1070/20 1073/4<br>1076/16 1089/16  | 1049/12 1050/13<br>1051/14 1052/13<br>1053/8 1053/12<br>1054/13 1055/21<br>1056/2 1056/18<br>1056/19 1058/3<br>1058/23 1062/17<br>1065/21 1073/4<br>1073/11 1075/17<br>1075/20 1077/3 1077/6  | 1122/17 1125/4<br>1125/20 1130/2 1166/5<br><b>TransCanada-specific</b><br>[1] 1199/22<br><b>transcript</b> [5] 927/18<br>966/19 974/10 1188/17<br>1189/14<br><b>transcripts</b> [1] 1205/5<br><b>transfer</b> [4] 1099/19<br>1139/22 1140/15  | Twenty [1] 976/21 Twenty-five [1] 976/21 twice [1] 1034/1 two-minute [1] 999/9 two-thirds [1] 1071/14 type [3] 1001/3 1089/15 1148/19 types [2] 1051/12 1051/17 typical [5] 1004/18 1023/12 1034/12  | 1039/16 1044/22<br>1052/19 1056/16<br>1059/10 1059/13<br>1059/23 1076/19<br>1119/14 1138/7<br>1138/24 1139/4 1151/9<br>1155/24 1164/24<br>1183/5 1205/4 1209/24<br><b>understood [16]</b><br>956/22 958/14 959/4<br>977/1 977/7 980/7  |
| 963/19 965/8 967/7<br>967/21 968/21 973/22<br>974/5 976/11 976/20<br>977/5 977/10 1012/20<br>1015/20 1016/22<br>1025/9 1031/12 1060/8<br>1060/9 1061/9 1063/6<br>1064/15 1070/9<br>1070/20 1073/4<br>1076/16 1089/16<br>1092/11 1092/15   | 1049/12 1050/13<br>1051/14 1052/13<br>1053/8 1053/12<br>1054/13 1055/21<br>1056/2 1056/18<br>1056/19 1058/3<br>1058/23 1062/17<br>1065/21 1073/4<br>1073/11 1075/17<br>1075/20 1077/3 1077/6<br>1081/24 1084/6  | 1122/17 1125/4<br>1125/20 1130/2 1166/5<br><b>TransCanada-specific</b><br>[1] 1199/22<br><b>transcript</b> [5] 927/18<br>966/19 974/10 1188/17<br>1189/14<br><b>transcripts</b> [1] 1205/5<br><b>transfer</b> [4] 1099/19<br>1139/22 1140/15<br>1142/18   | Twenty [1] 976/21 Twenty-five [1] 976/21 twice [1] 1034/1 two-minute [1] 999/9 two-thirds [1] 1071/14 type [3] 1001/3 1089/15 1148/19 types [2] 1051/12 1051/17 typical [5] 1004/18 1023/12 1034/12 1039/4 1205/22   | 1039/16 1044/22<br>1052/19 1056/16<br>1059/10 1059/13<br>1059/23 1076/19<br>1119/14 1138/7<br>1138/24 1139/4 1151/9<br>1155/24 1164/24<br>1183/5 1205/4 1209/24<br><b>understood [16]</b><br>956/22 958/14 959/4<br>977/1 977/7 980/7<br>989/23 1044/16  |
| 963/19 965/8 967/7<br>967/21 968/21 973/22<br>974/5 976/11 976/20<br>977/5 977/10 1012/20<br>1015/20 1016/22<br>1025/9 1031/12 1060/8<br>1060/9 1061/9 1063/6<br>1064/15 1070/9<br>1070/20 1073/4<br>1076/16 1089/16<br>1092/11 1092/15<br>1094/2 1101/14 1103/6  | 1049/12 1050/13<br>1051/14 1052/13<br>1053/8 1053/12<br>1054/13 1055/21<br>1056/2 1056/18<br>1056/19 1058/3<br>1058/23 1062/17<br>1065/21 1073/4<br>1073/11 1075/17<br>1075/20 1077/3 1077/6<br>1081/24 1084/6<br>1084/12 1086/12   | 1122/17 1125/4<br>1125/20 1130/2 1166/5<br><b>TransCanada-specific</b><br>[1] 1199/22<br><b>transcript</b> [5] 927/18<br>966/19 974/10 1188/17<br>1189/14<br><b>transcripts</b> [1] 1205/5<br><b>transfer</b> [4] 1099/19<br>1139/22 1140/15<br>1142/18<br><b>transferred</b> [1]   | Twenty [1] 976/21 Twenty-five [1] 976/21 twice [1] 1034/1 two-minute [1] 999/9 two-thirds [1] 1071/14 type [3] 1001/3 1089/15 1148/19 types [2] 1051/12 1051/17 typical [5] 1004/18 1023/12 1034/12 1039/4 1205/22 typically [7] 983/20  | 1039/16 1044/22<br>1052/19 1056/16<br>1059/10 1059/13<br>1059/23 1076/19<br>1119/14 1138/7<br>1138/24 1139/4 1151/9<br>1155/24 1164/24<br>1183/5 1205/4 1209/24<br><b>understood [16]</b><br>956/22 958/14 959/4<br>977/1 977/7 980/7<br>989/23 1044/16<br>1048/15 1053/6  |
| 963/19 965/8 967/7<br>967/21 968/21 973/22<br>974/5 976/11 976/20<br>977/5 977/10 1012/20<br>1015/20 1016/22<br>1025/9 1031/12 1060/8<br>1060/9 1061/9 1063/6<br>1064/15 1070/9<br>1070/20 1073/4<br>1076/16 1089/16<br>1092/11 1092/15<br>1094/2 1101/14 1103/6<br>1103/6 1103/9 1103/12   | 1049/12 1050/13<br>1051/14 1052/13<br>1053/8 1053/12<br>1054/13 1055/21<br>1056/2 1056/18<br>1056/19 1058/3<br>1058/23 1062/17<br>1065/21 1073/4<br>1073/11 1075/17<br>1075/20 1077/3 1077/6<br>1081/24 1084/6<br>1084/12 1086/12<br>1087/8 1087/18 1088/7  | 1122/17 1125/4<br>1125/20 1130/2 1166/5<br><b>TransCanada-specific</b> [1] 1199/22<br><b>transcript</b> [5] 927/18<br>966/19 974/10 1188/17<br>1189/14<br><b>transcripts</b> [1] 1205/5<br><b>transfer</b> [4] 1099/19<br>1139/22 1140/15<br>1142/18<br><b>transferred</b> [1]<br>1114/10   | Twenty [1] 976/21 Twenty-five [1] 976/21 twice [1] 1034/1 two-minute [1] 999/9 two-thirds [1] 1071/14 type [3] 1001/3 1089/15 1148/19 types [2] 1051/12 1051/17 typical [5] 1004/18 1023/12 1034/12 1039/4 1205/22 typically [7] 983/20 1001/7 1016/15   | 1039/16 1044/22<br>1052/19 1056/16<br>1059/10 1059/13<br>1059/23 1076/19<br>1119/14 1138/7<br>1138/24 1139/4 1151/9<br>1155/24 1164/24<br>1183/5 1205/4 1209/24<br>understood [16]<br>956/22 958/14 959/4<br>977/1 977/7 980/7<br>989/23 1044/16<br>1048/15 1053/6<br>1119/23 1148/15  |
| 963/19 965/8 967/7<br>967/21 968/21 973/22<br>974/5 976/11 976/20<br>977/5 977/10 1012/20<br>1015/20 1016/22<br>1025/9 1031/12 1060/8<br>1060/9 1061/9 1063/6<br>1064/15 1070/9<br>1070/20 1073/4<br>1076/16 1089/16<br>1092/11 1092/15<br>1094/2 1101/14 1103/6<br>1103/6 1103/9 1103/12<br>1110/12 1110/13  | 1049/12 1050/13<br>1051/14 1052/13<br>1053/8 1053/12<br>1054/13 1055/21<br>1056/2 1056/18<br>1056/19 1058/3<br>1058/23 1062/17<br>1065/21 1073/4<br>1073/11 1075/17<br>1075/20 1077/3 1077/6<br>1081/24 1084/6<br>1084/12 1086/12   | 1122/17 1125/4<br>1125/20 1130/2 1166/5<br><b>TransCanada-specific</b><br>[1] 1199/22<br><b>transcript</b> [5] 927/18<br>966/19 974/10 1188/17<br>1189/14<br><b>transcripts</b> [1] 1205/5<br><b>transfer</b> [4] 1099/19<br>1139/22 1140/15<br>1142/18<br><b>transferred</b> [1]   | Twenty [1] 976/21 Twenty-five [1] 976/21 twice [1] 1034/1 two-minute [1] 999/9 two-thirds [1] 1071/14 type [3] 1001/3 1089/15 1148/19 types [2] 1051/12 1051/17 typical [5] 1004/18 1023/12 1034/12 1039/4 1205/22 typically [7] 983/20  | 1039/16 1044/22<br>1052/19 1056/16<br>1059/10 1059/13<br>1059/23 1076/19<br>1119/14 1138/7<br>1138/24 1139/4 1151/9<br>1155/24 1164/24<br>1183/5 1205/4 1209/24<br><b>understood [16]</b><br>956/22 958/14 959/4<br>977/1 977/7 980/7<br>989/23 1044/16<br>1048/15 1053/6  |
| 963/19 965/8 967/7<br>967/21 968/21 973/22<br>974/5 976/11 976/20<br>977/5 977/10 1012/20<br>1015/20 1016/22<br>1025/9 1031/12 1060/8<br>1060/9 1061/9 1063/6<br>1064/15 1070/9<br>1070/20 1073/4<br>1076/16 1089/16<br>1092/11 1092/15<br>1094/2 1101/14 1103/6<br>1103/6 1103/9 1103/12<br>1110/12 1110/13<br>1112/8 1114/13  | 1049/12 1050/13<br>1051/14 1052/13<br>1053/8 1053/12<br>1054/13 1055/21<br>1056/2 1056/18<br>1056/19 1058/3<br>1058/23 1062/17<br>1065/21 1073/4<br>1073/11 1075/17<br>1075/20 1077/3 1077/6<br>1081/24 1084/6<br>1084/12 1086/12<br>1087/8 1087/18 1088/7<br>1088/11 1089/6  | 1122/17 1125/4<br>1125/20 1130/2 1166/5<br><b>TransCanada-specific</b> [1] 1199/22<br><b>transcript</b> [5] 927/18<br>966/19 974/10 1188/17<br>1189/14<br><b>transcripts</b> [1] 1205/5<br><b>transfer</b> [4] 1099/19<br>1139/22 1140/15<br>1142/18<br><b>transferred</b> [1]<br>1114/10<br><b>transition</b> [6] 983/24   | Twenty [1] 976/21 Twenty-five [1] 976/21 twice [1] 1034/1 two-minute [1] 999/9 two-thirds [1] 1071/14 type [3] 1001/3 1089/15 1148/19 types [2] 1051/12 1051/17 typical [5] 1004/18 1023/12 1034/12 1039/4 1205/22 typically [7] 983/20 1001/7 1016/15 1029/21 1034/4 1116/19 1186/3   | 1039/16 1044/22<br>1052/19 1056/16<br>1059/10 1059/13<br>1059/23 1076/19<br>1119/14 1138/7<br>1138/24 1139/4 1151/9<br>1155/24 1164/24<br>1183/5 1205/4 1209/24<br><b>understood [16]</b><br>956/22 958/14 959/4<br>977/1 977/7 980/7<br>989/23 1044/16<br>1048/15 1053/6<br>1119/23 1148/15<br>1150/8 1150/12<br>1159/12 1159/20  |
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| 963/19 965/8 967/7<br>967/21 968/21 973/22<br>974/5 976/11 976/20<br>977/5 977/10 1012/20<br>1015/20 1016/22<br>1025/9 1031/12 1060/8<br>1060/9 1061/9 1063/6<br>1064/15 1070/9<br>1070/20 1073/4<br>1076/16 1089/16<br>1092/11 1092/15<br>1094/2 1101/14 1103/6<br>1103/6 1103/9 1103/12<br>1110/12 1110/13<br>1112/8 1114/13<br>1115/10 1118/3 1119/3<br>1119/4 1120/1 1120/4   | 1049/12 1050/13<br>1051/14 1052/13<br>1053/8 1053/12<br>1054/13 1055/21<br>1056/2 1056/18<br>1056/19 1058/3<br>1058/23 1062/17<br>1065/21 1073/4<br>1073/11 1075/17<br>1075/20 1077/3 1077/6<br>1081/24 1084/6<br>1084/12 1086/12<br>1087/8 1087/18 1088/7<br>1088/11 1089/6<br>1089/11 1090/18<br>1090/24 1091/13<br>1092/2 1094/4 1095/1<br>1106/1 1106/4 1108/15   | 1122/17 1125/4 1125/20 1130/2 1166/5 <b>TransCanada-specific</b> [1] 1199/22 <b>transcript</b> [5] 927/18 966/19 974/10 1188/17 1189/14 <b>transcripts</b> [1] 1205/5 <b>transfer</b> [4] 1099/19 1139/22 1140/15 1142/18 <b>transferred</b> [1] 1114/10 <b>transition</b> [6] 983/24 988/22 988/22 988/24 989/15 990/19 <b>translates</b> [1] 1211/4 <b>TRAVIS</b> [1] 927/13  | Twenty [1] 976/21 Twenty-five [1] 976/21 twice [1] 1034/1 two-minute [1] 999/9 two-thirds [1] 1071/14 type [3] 1001/3 1089/15 1148/19 types [2] 1051/12 1051/17 typical [5] 1004/18 1023/12 1034/12 1039/4 1205/22 typically [7] 983/20 1001/7 1016/15 1029/21 1034/4 1116/19 1186/3  U U.S [5] 987/10 1060/20   | 1039/16 1044/22<br>1052/19 1056/16<br>1059/10 1059/13<br>1059/23 1076/19<br>1119/14 1138/7<br>1138/24 1139/4 1151/9<br>1155/24 1164/24<br>1183/5 1205/4 1209/24<br>understood [16]<br>956/22 958/14 959/4<br>977/1 977/7 980/7<br>989/23 1044/16<br>1048/15 1053/6<br>1119/23 1148/15<br>1150/8 1150/12<br>1159/12 1159/20<br>undertaking [2] 984/13<br>989/22<br>underway [1] 989/21  |
| 963/19 965/8 967/7<br>967/21 968/21 973/22<br>974/5 976/11 976/20<br>977/5 977/10 1012/20<br>1015/20 1016/22<br>1025/9 1031/12 1060/8<br>1060/9 1061/9 1063/6<br>1064/15 1070/9<br>1070/20 1073/4<br>1076/16 1089/16<br>1092/11 1092/15<br>1094/2 1101/14 1103/6<br>1103/6 1103/9 1103/12<br>1110/12 1110/13<br>1112/8 1114/13<br>1115/10 1118/3 1119/3   | 1049/12 1050/13<br>1051/14 1052/13<br>1053/8 1053/12<br>1054/13 1055/21<br>1056/2 1056/18<br>1056/19 1058/3<br>1058/23 1062/17<br>1065/21 1073/4<br>1073/11 1075/17<br>1075/20 1077/3 1077/6<br>1081/24 1084/6<br>1084/12 1086/12<br>1087/8 1087/18 1088/7<br>1088/11 1099/6<br>1089/11 1090/18<br>1090/24 1091/13<br>1092/2 1094/4 1095/1<br>1106/1 1106/4 1108/15<br>1109/11 1111/8   | 1122/17 1125/4 1125/20 1130/2 1166/5 <b>TransCanada-specific</b> [1] 1199/22 <b>transcript</b> [5] 927/18 966/19 974/10 1188/17 1189/14 <b>transcripts</b> [1] 1205/5 <b>transfer</b> [4] 1099/19 1139/22 1140/15 1142/18 <b>transferred</b> [1] 1114/10 <b>transition</b> [6] 983/24 988/22 988/22 988/24 989/15 990/19 <b>translates</b> [1] 1211/4 <b>TRAVIS</b> [1] 927/13 <b>treasurer</b> [5] 1087/23   | Twenty [1] 976/21 Twenty-five [1] 976/21 twice [1] 1034/1 two-minute [1] 999/9 two-thirds [1] 1071/14 type [3] 1001/3 1089/15 1148/19 types [2] 1051/12 1051/17 typical [5] 1004/18 1023/12 1034/12 1039/4 1205/22 typically [7] 983/20 1001/7 1016/15 1029/21 1034/4 1116/19 1186/3  U U.S [5] 987/10 1060/20 1100/18 1100/19   | 1039/16 1044/22<br>1052/19 1056/16<br>1059/10 1059/13<br>1059/23 1076/19<br>1119/14 1138/7<br>1138/24 1139/4 1151/9<br>1155/24 1164/24<br>1183/5 1205/4 1209/24<br>understood [16]<br>956/22 958/14 959/4<br>977/1 977/7 980/7<br>989/23 1044/16<br>1048/15 1053/6<br>1119/23 1148/15<br>1150/8 1150/12<br>1159/12 1159/20<br>undertaking [2] 984/13<br>989/22<br>underway [1] 989/21<br>underwrite [2] 1118/7   |
| 963/19 965/8 967/7<br>967/21 968/21 973/22<br>974/5 976/11 976/20<br>977/5 977/10 1012/20<br>1015/20 1016/22<br>1025/9 1031/12 1060/8<br>1060/9 1061/9 1063/6<br>1064/15 1070/9<br>1070/20 1073/4<br>1076/16 1089/16<br>1092/11 1092/15<br>1094/2 1101/14 1103/6<br>1103/6 1103/9 1103/12<br>1110/12 1110/13<br>1112/8 1114/13<br>1115/10 1118/3 1119/3<br>1119/4 1120/1 1120/4<br>1120/15 1122/21  | 1049/12 1050/13<br>1051/14 1052/13<br>1053/8 1053/12<br>1054/13 1055/21<br>1056/2 1056/18<br>1056/19 1058/3<br>1058/23 1062/17<br>1065/21 1073/4<br>1073/11 1075/17<br>1075/20 1077/3 1077/6<br>1081/24 1084/6<br>1084/12 1086/12<br>1087/8 1087/18 1088/7<br>1088/11 1089/6<br>1089/11 1090/18<br>1090/24 1091/13<br>1092/2 1094/4 1095/1<br>1106/1 1106/4 1108/15<br>1109/11 1111/8<br>1112/21 1112/22  | 1122/17 1125/4 1125/20 1130/2 1166/5 <b>TransCanada-specific</b> [1] 1199/22 <b>transcript [5]</b> 927/18 966/19 974/10 1188/17 1189/14 <b>transcripts [1]</b> 1205/5 <b>transfer [4]</b> 1099/19 1139/22 1140/15 1142/18 <b>transferred [1]</b> 1114/10 <b>transition [6]</b> 983/24 988/22 988/22 988/24 989/15 990/19 <b>translates [1]</b> 1211/4 <b>TRAVIS [1]</b> 927/13 <b>treasurer [5]</b> 1087/23 1088/15 1088/21   | Twenty [1] 976/21 Twenty-five [1] 976/21 twice [1] 1034/1 two-minute [1] 999/9 two-thirds [1] 1071/14 type [3] 1001/3 1089/15 1148/19 types [2] 1051/12 1051/17 typical [5] 1004/18 1023/12 1034/12 1039/4 1205/22 typically [7] 983/20 1001/7 1016/15 1029/21 1034/4 1116/19 1186/3  U U.S [5] 987/10 1060/20 1100/18 1100/19 1198/7  | 1039/16 1044/22<br>1052/19 1056/16<br>1059/10 1059/13<br>1059/23 1076/19<br>1119/14 1138/7<br>1138/24 1139/4 1151/9<br>1155/24 1164/24<br>1183/5 1205/4 1209/24<br>understood [16]<br>956/22 958/14 959/4<br>977/1 977/7 980/7<br>989/23 1044/16<br>1048/15 1053/6<br>1119/23 1148/15<br>1150/8 1150/12<br>1159/12 1159/20<br>undertaking [2] 984/13<br>989/22<br>underway [1] 989/21<br>underwrite [2] 1118/7<br>1164/13  |
| 963/19 965/8 967/7<br>967/21 968/21 973/22<br>974/5 976/11 976/20<br>977/5 977/10 1012/20<br>1015/20 1016/22<br>1025/9 1031/12 1060/8<br>1060/9 1061/9 1063/6<br>1064/15 1070/9<br>1070/20 1073/4<br>1076/16 1089/16<br>1092/11 1092/15<br>1094/2 1101/14 1103/6<br>1103/6 1103/9 1103/12<br>1110/12 1110/13<br>1112/8 1114/13<br>1115/10 1118/3 1119/3<br>1119/4 1120/1 1120/4<br>1120/15 1122/21<br>1123/10 1124/12   | 1049/12 1050/13<br>1051/14 1052/13<br>1053/8 1053/12<br>1054/13 1055/21<br>1056/2 1056/18<br>1056/19 1058/3<br>1058/23 1062/17<br>1065/21 1073/4<br>1073/11 1075/17<br>1075/20 1077/3 1077/6<br>1081/24 1084/6<br>1084/12 1086/12<br>1087/8 1087/18 1088/7<br>1088/11 1089/6<br>1089/11 1090/18<br>1090/24 1091/13<br>1092/2 1094/4 1095/1<br>1106/1 1106/4 1108/15<br>1109/11 1111/8<br>1112/21 1112/22<br>1119/17 1122/1 1122/5   | 1122/17 1125/4 1125/20 1130/2 1166/5 <b>TransCanada-specific</b> [1] 1199/22 <b>transcript [5]</b> 927/18 966/19 974/10 1188/17 1189/14 <b>transcripts [1]</b> 1205/5 <b>transfer [4]</b> 1099/19 1139/22 1140/15 1142/18 <b>transferred [1]</b> 1114/10 <b>transition [6]</b> 983/24 988/22 988/22 988/24 989/15 990/19 <b>translates [1]</b> 1211/4 <b>TRAVIS [1]</b> 927/13 <b>treasurer [5]</b> 1087/23 1088/15 1088/21 1089/11 1161/1                            | Twenty [1] 976/21 Twenty-five [1] 976/21 twice [1] 1034/1 two-minute [1] 999/9 two-thirds [1] 1071/14 type [3] 1001/3 1089/15 1148/19 types [2] 1051/12 1051/17 typical [5] 1004/18 1023/12 1034/12 1039/4 1205/22 typically [7] 983/20 1001/7 1016/15 1029/21 1034/4 1116/19 1186/3  U U.S [5] 987/10 1060/20 1100/18 1100/19 1198/7 Uh [2] 942/12 990/6  | 1039/16 1044/22<br>1052/19 1056/16<br>1059/10 1059/13<br>1059/23 1076/19<br>1119/14 1138/7<br>1138/24 1139/4 1151/9<br>1155/24 1164/24<br>1183/5 1205/4 1209/24<br>understood [16]<br>956/22 958/14 959/4<br>977/1 977/7 980/7<br>989/23 1044/16<br>1048/15 1053/6<br>1119/23 1148/15<br>1150/8 1150/12<br>1159/12 1159/20<br>undertaking [2] 984/13<br>989/22<br>underway [1] 989/21<br>underwrite [2] 1118/7<br>1164/13<br>underwriter [2]                     |
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| 963/19 965/8 967/7<br>967/21 968/21 973/22<br>974/5 976/11 976/20<br>977/5 977/10 1012/20<br>1015/20 1016/22<br>1025/9 1031/12 1060/8<br>1060/9 1061/9 1063/6<br>1064/15 1070/9<br>1070/20 1073/4<br>1076/16 1089/16<br>1092/11 1092/15<br>1094/2 1101/14 1103/6<br>1103/6 1103/9 1103/12<br>1110/12 1110/13<br>1112/8 1114/13<br>1115/10 1118/3 1119/3<br>1119/4 1120/1 1120/4<br>1120/15 1122/21<br>1132/14 1132/18<br>1134/17 1139/7 1146/5<br>1154/15 1155/1<br>1159/14 1159/22                     | 1049/12 1050/13<br>1051/14 1052/13<br>1053/8 1053/12<br>1054/13 1055/21<br>1056/2 1056/18<br>1056/19 1058/3<br>1058/23 1062/17<br>1065/21 1073/4<br>1073/11 1075/17<br>1075/20 1077/3 1077/6<br>1081/24 1084/6<br>1084/12 1086/12<br>1087/8 1087/18 1088/7<br>1088/11 1089/6<br>1089/11 1090/18<br>1090/24 1091/13<br>1092/2 1094/4 1095/1<br>1106/1 1106/4 1108/15<br>1109/11 1111/8<br>1112/21 1112/22<br>1119/17 1122/1 1122/5<br>1122/6 1122/17<br>1122/18 1124/3 1124/8                    | 1122/17 1125/4 1125/20 1130/2 1166/5  TransCanada-specific [1] 1199/22 transcript [5] 927/18 966/19 974/10 1188/17 1189/14 transcripts [1] 1205/5 transfer [4] 1099/19 1139/22 1140/15 1142/18 transferred [1] 1114/10 transition [6] 983/24 988/22 988/22 988/24 989/15 990/19 translates [1] 1211/4 TRAVIS [1] 927/13 treasurer [5] 1087/23 1088/15 1088/21 1089/11 1161/1 treasury [4] 1088/9 1088/22 1097/24  | Twenty [1] 976/21 Twenty-five [1] 976/21 twice [1] 1034/1 two-minute [1] 999/9 two-thirds [1] 1071/14 type [3] 1001/3 1089/15 1148/19 types [2] 1051/12 1051/17 typical [5] 1004/18 1023/12 1034/12 1039/4 1205/22 typically [7] 983/20 1001/7 1016/15 1029/21 1034/4 1116/19 1186/3  U U.S [5] 987/10 1060/20 1100/18 1100/19 1198/7 Uh [2] 942/12 990/6 Uh-huh [2] 942/12 990/6                      | 1039/16 1044/22<br>1052/19 1056/16<br>1059/10 1059/13<br>1059/23 1076/19<br>1119/14 1138/7<br>1138/24 1139/4 1151/9<br>1155/24 1164/24<br>1183/5 1205/4 1209/24<br>understood [16]<br>956/22 958/14 959/4<br>977/1 977/7 980/7<br>989/23 1044/16<br>1048/15 1053/6<br>1119/23 1148/15<br>1150/8 1150/12<br>1159/12 1159/20<br>undertaking [2] 984/13<br>989/22<br>underway [1] 989/21<br>underwrite [2] 1118/7<br>1164/13<br>underwriters [16]                   |
| 963/19 965/8 967/7<br>967/21 968/21 973/22<br>974/5 976/11 976/20<br>977/5 977/10 1012/20<br>1015/20 1016/22<br>1025/9 1031/12 1060/8<br>1060/9 1061/9 1063/6<br>1064/15 1070/9<br>1070/20 1073/4<br>1076/16 1089/16<br>1092/11 1092/15<br>1094/2 1101/14 1103/6<br>1103/6 1103/9 1103/12<br>1110/12 1110/13<br>1112/8 1114/13<br>1115/10 1118/3 1119/3<br>1119/4 1120/1 1120/4<br>1120/15 1122/21<br>1123/10 1124/12<br>1132/14 1132/18<br>1134/17 1139/7 1146/5<br>1159/14 1159/22<br>1163/16 1164/13 | 1049/12 1050/13<br>1051/14 1052/13<br>1053/8 1053/12<br>1054/13 1055/21<br>1056/2 1056/18<br>1056/19 1058/3<br>1058/23 1062/17<br>1065/21 1073/4<br>1073/11 1075/17<br>1075/20 1077/3 1077/6<br>1081/24 1084/6<br>1084/12 1086/12<br>1087/8 1087/18 1088/7<br>1088/11 1089/6<br>1089/11 1090/18<br>1090/24 1091/13<br>1092/2 1094/4 1095/1<br>1106/1 1106/4 1108/15<br>1109/11 1111/8<br>1112/21 1112/22<br>1119/17 1122/1 1122/5<br>1122/6 1122/17<br>1122/18 1124/3 1124/8<br>1124/17 1124/18 | 1122/17 1125/4 1125/20 1130/2 1166/5  TransCanada-specific [1] 1199/22 transcript [5] 927/18 966/19 974/10 1188/17 1189/14 transcripts [1] 1205/5 transfer [4] 1099/19 1139/22 1140/15 1142/18 transferred [1] 1114/10 transition [6] 983/24 988/22 988/22 988/24 989/15 990/19 translates [1] 1211/4 TRAVIS [1] 927/13 treasurer [5] 1087/23 1088/15 1088/21 1089/11 1161/1 treasury [4] 1088/9 1088/22 1097/24 1161/4   | Twenty [1] 976/21 Twenty-five [1] 976/21 twice [1] 1034/1 two-minute [1] 999/9 two-thirds [1] 1071/14 type [3] 1001/3 1089/15 1148/19 types [2] 1051/12 1051/17 typical [5] 1004/18 1023/12 1034/12 1039/4 1205/22 typically [7] 983/20 1001/7 1016/15 1029/21 1034/4 1116/19 1186/3  U U.S [5] 987/10 1060/20 1100/18 1100/19 1198/7 Uh [2] 942/12 990/6 Uh-huh [2] 942/12                            | 1039/16 1044/22<br>1052/19 1056/16<br>1059/10 1059/13<br>1059/23 1076/19<br>1119/14 1138/7<br>1138/24 1139/4 1151/9<br>1155/24 1164/24<br>1183/5 1205/4 1209/24<br>understood [16]<br>956/22 958/14 959/4<br>977/1 977/7 980/7<br>989/23 1044/16<br>1048/15 1053/6<br>1119/23 1148/15<br>1150/8 1150/12<br>1159/12 1159/20<br>undertaking [2] 984/13<br>989/22<br>underway [1] 989/21<br>underwrite [2] 1118/7<br>1164/13<br>underwriters [16]<br>1110/20 1113/7 |
| 963/19 965/8 967/7<br>967/21 968/21 973/22<br>974/5 976/11 976/20<br>977/5 977/10 1012/20<br>1015/20 1016/22<br>1025/9 1031/12 1060/8<br>1060/9 1061/9 1063/6<br>1064/15 1070/9<br>1070/20 1073/4<br>1076/16 1089/16<br>1092/11 1092/15<br>1094/2 1101/14 1103/6<br>1103/6 1103/9 1103/12<br>1110/12 1110/13<br>1112/8 1114/13<br>1115/10 1118/3 1119/3<br>1119/4 1120/1 1120/4<br>1120/15 1122/21<br>1132/14 1132/18<br>1134/17 1139/7 1146/5<br>1154/15 1155/1<br>1159/14 1159/22                     | 1049/12 1050/13<br>1051/14 1052/13<br>1053/8 1053/12<br>1054/13 1055/21<br>1056/2 1056/18<br>1056/19 1058/3<br>1058/23 1062/17<br>1065/21 1073/4<br>1073/11 1075/17<br>1075/20 1077/3 1077/6<br>1081/24 1084/6<br>1084/12 1086/12<br>1087/8 1087/18 1088/7<br>1088/11 1089/6<br>1089/11 1090/18<br>1090/24 1091/13<br>1092/2 1094/4 1095/1<br>1106/1 1106/4 1108/15<br>1109/11 1111/8<br>1112/21 1112/22<br>1119/17 1122/1 1122/5<br>1122/6 1122/17<br>1122/18 1124/3 1124/8                    | 1122/17 1125/4 1125/20 1130/2 1166/5  TransCanada-specific [1] 1199/22 transcript [5] 927/18 966/19 974/10 1188/17 1189/14 transcripts [1] 1205/5 transfer [4] 1099/19 1139/22 1140/15 1142/18 transferred [1] 1114/10 transition [6] 983/24 988/22 988/22 988/24 989/15 990/19 translates [1] 1211/4 TRAVIS [1] 927/13 treasurer [5] 1087/23 1088/15 1088/21 1089/11 1161/1 treasury [4] 1088/9 1088/22 1097/24  | Twenty [1] 976/21 Twenty-five [1] 976/21 twice [1] 1034/1 two-minute [1] 999/9 two-thirds [1] 1071/14 type [3] 1001/3 1089/15 1148/19 types [2] 1051/12 1051/17 typical [5] 1004/18 1023/12 1034/12 1039/4 1205/22 typically [7] 983/20 1001/7 1016/15 1029/21 1034/4 1116/19 1186/3  U U.S [5] 987/10 1060/20 1100/18 1100/19 1198/7 Uh [2] 942/12 990/6 Uh-huh [2] 942/12 990/6 ultimate [2] 1070/11 | 1039/16 1044/22<br>1052/19 1056/16<br>1059/10 1059/13<br>1059/23 1076/19<br>1119/14 1138/7<br>1138/24 1139/4 1151/9<br>1155/24 1164/24<br>1183/5 1205/4 1209/24<br>understood [16]<br>956/22 958/14 959/4<br>977/1 977/7 980/7<br>989/23 1044/16<br>1048/15 1053/6<br>1119/23 1148/15<br>1150/8 1150/12<br>1159/12 1159/20<br>undertaking [2] 984/13<br>989/22<br>underway [1] 989/21<br>underwriter [2] 1118/7<br>1164/13<br>underwriters [16]                  |

| U                              | 1046/13 1168/1 1172/5  | 1212/3 1212/4 1212/8                        | 1065/20                       | 1016/24 1017/15                         |
|--------------------------------|------------------------|---|-------------------------------|---|
|                                | 1198/22 1200/2         | 1212/8 1212/10                              | virtually [4] 1020/10         | 1027/17 1032/6 1036/4                   |
| underwriters [12]              | 1201/16 1204/11        | 1212/12 1212/12                             | 1039/8 1061/19                | 1039/8 1044/21                          |
| 1116/5 1131/5 1131/16          | 1207/3 1207/3 1207/11  | 1212/14 1213/16                             | 1064/14                       | 1045/15 1048/18                         |
| 1132/22 1133/4 1164/9          | 1207/15                |   | visit [1] 1149/17             | 1061/24 1067/5 1071/7                   |
| 1164/11 1164/12                |                        | valued [4] 950/16                           |                               | 1071/15 1075/4 1079/3                   |
| 1164/17 1164/20                | used [18] 1026/20      | 1199/4 1210/2 1213/13                       | volatile [1] 988/8            |   |
| 1164/22 1165/12                | 1078/18 1156/23        | values [2] 995/22                           | VOLUME [1] 927/18             | 1085/14 1085/15                         |
| underwriters' [1]              | 1157/6 1160/9 1172/7   | 1212/15                                     | vote [4] 977/9 1067/12        | 1097/19 1103/3                          |
| 1113/3                         | 1183/22 1196/14        | valuing [2] 1124/3                          | 1159/22 1186/23               | 1105/18 1120/14                         |
| Underwriting [1]               | 1199/9 1204/2 1204/23  | 1204/1                                      | <b>VP [1]</b> 1088/24         | 1134/20 1149/7                          |
| 1164/8                         | 1205/3 1205/6 1205/9   | van [2] 928/5 1145/5                        | vs [2] 931/3 931/4            | 1155/15 1155/20                         |
| underwritten [2]               | 1209/7 1211/11         | van Kwawegen [1]                            | W                             | 1156/5 1158/22 1160/3                   |
| 1117/23 1121/8                 | 1211/14 1211/21        | 1145/5                                      |                               | 1167/12 1167/13                         |
| unequivocal [1]                | uses [1] 1066/5        | VARALLO [1] 928/4                           | WACC [4] 1207/7               | 1171/15 1173/7                          |
| 1027/3                         | using [11] 967/12      | variable [1] 985/6                          | 1208/9 1209/12                | 1173/15 1177/7                          |
| unflappable [1]                | 972/21 1093/13 1124/6  | various [7] 1085/17                         | 1211/19                       | 1180/19 1190/18                         |
| 1062/15                        | 1126/18 1197/23        | 1085/18 1085/22                             | Wachtell [1] 928/23           | 1198/6 1200/17                          |
| unfold [1] 1038/8              | 1203/22 1206/7         | 1124/23 1124/24                             | wagons [1] 1153/8             | 1206/14                                 |
| unfolded [1] 934/10            | 1208/17 1210/18        | 1125/4 1183/19                              | wait [2] 1104/22              | ways [1] 1081/21                        |
| unhappy [3] 1053/7             | 1210/24                | vehicle [1] 1172/7                          | 1105/21                       | we'd [12] 943/13                        |
| 1053/18 1100/1                 | usually [1] 1038/16    | vein [1] 1021/8                             | Waive [1] 1187/12             | 944/16 1076/20 1094/6                   |
| unidentified [1] 1029/7        | Utica [1] 1171/17      | ventilated [1] 1075/6                       | <b>walk [7]</b> 933/5 1098/12 | 1094/8 1094/9 1098/8                    |
|                                | utilities [3] 980/20   | venture [1] 1029/16                         | 1185/14 1197/9                | 1099/11 1100/21                         |
| <b>unique [2]</b> 984/9 1103/2 | 981/2 981/8            | verbal [2] 958/4                            | 1205/19 1208/10               | 1100/22 1103/19                         |
|                                | utility [2] 982/1      | 1002/19                                     | 1211/24                       | 1103/21                                 |
| unit [3] 1204/16               | 1017/14                | verge [2] 1021/18                           | Wall [5] 1063/12              | we'll [17] 933/5 935/6                  |
| 1204/20 1205/16                | utilized [1] 1207/1    | 1068/10                                     | 1179/12 1179/13               | 938/3 964/5 987/18                      |
| United [2] 1097/15             | l————                  | vernacular [1] 1035/24                      | 1179/20 1180/13               | 999/1 1003/8 1003/9                     |
| 1100/20                        | V                      | version [3] 939/19                          | walled [1] 1167/10            | 1038/23 1068/19                         |
| University [4] 1087/12         | vacation [7] 963/23    | 957/15 1207/16                              | wanted [48] 929/22            | 1081/13 1133/15                         |
| 1087/14 1193/16                | 964/2 964/12 965/2     | versus [7] 1000/18                          | 933/1 946/5 946/10            | 1133/17 1133/24                         |
| 1193/17                        | 965/10 969/23 1149/16  | 1014/16 1046/18                             | 970/13 970/14 976/10          | 1144/1 1145/12 1214/6                   |
| unless [1] 1085/23             | valuation [19] 1089/18 |   | 976/19 988/1 996/4            | we've [17] 929/14                       |
| unlike [1] 1147/22             | 1091/11 1113/20        | 1147/21 1200/4                              | 996/20 1019/2 1021/14         | 943/10 986/22 1003/7                    |
| unlikely [1] 1075/13           | 1114/4 1115/6 1130/23  | Vet [1] 931/8                               | 1032/16 1033/13               | 1028/16 1029/9 1036/8                   |
| unrelated [1] 1124/12          | 1193/3 1193/6 1193/8   | vetted [3] 1065/4                           | 1033/16 1035/8                | 1046/4 1069/8 1070/7                    |
| unusual [1] 1000/8             | 1193/19 1194/22        | 1074/12 1074/13                             | 1035/13 1047/5                | 1080/20 1147/22                         |
| unwavering [1] 1189/6          | 1203/22 1204/7 1204/8  | vetting [2] 1079/19                         | 1049/13 1050/1                | 1175/2 1175/21                          |
| <b>upcoming [2]</b> 1004/11    | 1205/14 1210/19        | 1080/4                                      | 1051/23 1056/23               | 1180/23 1183/10                         |
| 1004/16                        | 1211/2 1211/2 1213/14  | via [1] 1081/3                              | 1071/15 1076/21               | 1188/17                                 |
| update [18] 969/20             | valuations [2] 1123/18 | via [1] 1061/3                              | 1079/17 1108/2                |   |
| 970/14 995/3 997/10            | 1123/23                | vice [10] 927/13                            | 1110/10 1110/14               | weak [1] 1074/23                        |
| 997/16 997/18 997/20           | value [65] 950/7       | 1087/21 1087/22                             | 1120/21 1135/12               | weaker [1] 1064/13 weeds [2] 1068/5     |
| 997/24 1000/24                 | 950/11 968/12 995/9    |   | 1135/18 1136/1 1153/3         | 1070/16                                 |
| 1013/11 1022/17                | 995/21 996/1 996/3     | 1087/24 1088/2<br>1088/14 1088/17           | 1153/6 1154/11                |   |
| 1023/9 1023/12                 | 996/5 996/14 997/8     |   | 1154/14 1154/18               | week [11] 935/23<br>941/7 982/10 982/16 |
| 1041/13 1041/15                | 997/20 1000/13         | 1088/20 1089/10<br>1162/1                   | 1154/20 1155/9                | 982/20 1025/4 1041/22                   |
| 1060/7 1060/22                 | 1026/19 1042/15        | video [4] 1138/6                            | 1155/13 1155/14               | 1154/12 1155/13                         |
| 1152/13                        | 1047/13 1078/4         | 1139/10 1158/7 1159/4                       | 1155/17 1155/23               | 1158/9 1158/16                          |
| updated [1] 1039/14            | 1078/12 1078/19        |   | 1170/12 1170/19               |   |
| updates [6] 997/9              | 1078/23 1079/4 1082/1  | <b>view [26]</b> 945/15 989/17 994/5 995/19 | 1176/4 1211/8                 | weekend [5] 941/7<br>941/16 1052/20     |
| 997/12 1004/19 1022/4          | 1083/18 1119/16        |   | wanting [2] 962/14            | 1054/23 1095/24                         |
| 1033/12 1080/21                | 1123/21 1138/17        | 996/1 996/21 1010/7<br>1013/18 1015/16      | 1028/9                        | weeks [9] 1011/1                        |
| upper [1] 1068/10              | 1138/21 1190/22        |   | wants [2] 969/19              |   |
| <b>Upping [1]</b> 1107/3       | 1197/20 1198/9         | 1015/18 1026/19                             | 1069/9                        | 1026/6 1030/13                          |
| <b>upside [3]</b> 931/3 931/4  | 1198/21 1199/18        | 1031/4 1036/17 1039/5<br>1047/10 1047/13    | Ward [1] 968/5                | 1039/24 1058/23                         |
| 935/14                         | 1200/23 1200/23        | 1048/8 1079/1 1105/14                       |                               | 1059/11 1081/6                          |
| urged [1] 1023/3               | 1200/23 1200/23        |   | wasting [1] 1177/6            | 1157/21 1158/16                         |
| urgency [1] 1026/4             | 1204/3 1205/16         | 1106/4 1137/12                              | watching [2] 975/3            | weighted [5] 1206/7                     |
| <b>US\$25.25 [1]</b> 1108/22   |                        | 1137/17 1137/24                             |                               | 1207/3 1208/21                          |
| <b>US\$26 [2]</b> 1108/23      | 1205/22 1206/4 1206/6  | 1157/19 1176/5 1213/9                       | 975/16                        | 1208/23 1211/20                         |
| 1112/21                        | 1206/7 1209/3 1209/4   | viewed [1] 1201/6                           | waterfront [3] 986/8          | weighting [1] 1207/4                    |
| <b>US\$26.00 [1]</b> 1109/10   | 1209/4 1209/5 1209/6   | viewing [1] 1200/9                          | 1036/10 1036/10               | WEINBERGER [2]                          |
| <b>US\$3.0 [1]</b> 1102/14     | 1209/9 1209/14         | views [3] 1110/10                           | way [49] 931/14 964/20        |   |
| use [18] 946/18 947/17         | 1210/10 1210/15        | 1110/12 1110/14                             | 965/21 979/2 979/8            | welcome [5] 929/1                       |
| 966/8 966/13 966/23            | 1210/24 1211/5 1211/9  | vigilant [1] 989/16                         | 980/4 985/19 1008/4           | 1012/8 1069/3 1069/17                   |
| 1039/8 1039/17                 | 1211/11 1211/16        | violate [2] 1032/7                          | 1016/22 1016/24               | 1133/21                                 |
|                                |                        |   |                               |   |
|                                |                        |   |                               |   |

|  | T   |  | I  | I                       |
|--|---|--|--|-------------------------|
| W  | 1082/13 1082/14   | 1193/1 1193/3  | 1081/20 1089/2 1102/2  | vet [6] 943/16 944/16   |
|  | 1083/2 1084/4 1084/7  | WILLIAM [2] 928/18   | 1150/5 1167/17   | 960/10 1003/4 1007/21   |
| Wells [37] 943/3   |   |  |  |                         |
| 943/24 947/5 956/21  | 1084/8 1084/14  | 928/21   | 1206/21  | 1056/17                 |
|  | 1091/21 1099/24   | Williams [2] 927/9   | works [4] 929/24 970/2   | vield [1] 1207/23       |
| 957/3 957/8 957/11   | 1100/3 1100/7 1100/9  | 927/22   | 1097/19 1163/17  | yields [1] 1208/3       |
| 957/13 957/14 957/19   |   |  |  |                         |
| 957/20 958/1 958/2   | 1103/6 1105/1 1125/8  | willing [7] 951/3  | world [3] 984/19   | YOCH [2] 928/12         |
| 958/9 961/12 1049/24   | 1126/6 1126/7 1131/12   | 951/17 1048/11 1049/5  | 984/21 986/2   | 1087/8                  |
|  | 1132/21 1134/16   | 1056/15 1118/10  | worried [2] 929/13   | York [3] 928/7 928/23   |
| 1050/4 1050/5 1061/21  | 1137/16 1139/24   | 1120/19  | 962/19   | 981/17                  |
| 1150/22 1151/9   |   |  |  | '                       |
| 1151/23 1152/14  | 1142/2 1142/17 1148/3   | <b>willingness</b> [1] 1113/4  | worries [1] 116//11  | you'd [3] 1092/21       |
|  | 1149/8 1150/10  | <b>Wilmington [2]</b> 927/10   | worry [1] 1154/8   | 1094/17 1107/14         |
| 1164/1 1165/15   | 1153/21 1154/17   | 927/23   | worse [3] 1011/6   | you'll [5] 955/5 957/23 |
| 1165/19 1166/1 1166/5  |   |  |  |                         |
| 1167/12 1167/15  | 1155/8 1156/2 1156/12   |  | 1011/7 1200/14   | 997/21 1041/17          |
| 1168/9 1169/18   | 1156/17 1157/9 1157/9   | 1140/4 1140/10 1141/2  | worth [6] 968/10   | 1102/23                 |
|  | 1157/12 1158/18   | 1142/10  | 1047/10 1048/13  | you-all [2] 1069/5      |
| 1169/23 1169/24  | 1159/21 1160/21   |  | 1073/3 1169/20   | 1120/22                 |
| 1170/18 1170/22  |   | wise [2] 1064/10   |  |                         |
| 1179/17  | 1161/19 1161/21   | 1174/23  | 1171/10  | <b>Young [1]</b> 928/13 |
|  | 1162/5 1162/10 1165/4   | withdrew [1] 1052/14   | wouldn't [9] 970/5   | Your Honor [2]          |
| went [27] 959/17 977/3   | 1172/11 1174/18   | within [6] 954/9 963/1   | 1001/8 1017/6 1047/7   | 1191/16 1192/10         |
| 1017/3 1024/19   |   |  |  |                         |
| 1029/17 1035/21  | 1176/17 1176/24   | 1032/3 1074/11   | 1062/22 1068/12  | yourself [4] 946/17     |
|  | 1179/5 1179/21  | 1137/18 1208/7   | 1119/8 1129/19 1210/9  | 982/21 1072/17          |
| 1038/10 1042/17  | 1181/19 1181/24   | without [9] 1068/4   | wow [2] 959/17 982/12  |                         |
| 1049/1 1052/13   |   |  |  |                         |
| 1053/16 1083/8 1085/5  | 1182/12 1182/24   | 1074/5 1120/5 1120/6   | write [6] 932/12 936/14  | Z                       |
| 1087/19 1098/3   | 1184/15 1184/20   | 1146/24 1147/9 1189/4  | 939/7 954/17 961/3   |                         |
|  | 1188/6 1189/8 1189/13   | 1213/8 1213/19   | 1151/5   | zero [2] 1029/1         |
| 1102/21 1118/14  |   |  |  | 1116/20                 |
| 1129/21 1132/21  | 1189/24 1190/8 1191/2   |  | writes [1] 1104/18   |                         |
| 1146/18 1149/9   | 1191/6 1191/19  | 929/13 929/18 1082/16  | writing [8] 955/9 961/8  |                         |
|  | 1199/14 1200/21   | 1086/23 1133/13  | 961/13 989/8 1057/9  | <b>zoom [1]</b> 947/14  |
| 1149/18 1152/14  | 1206/15 1213/18   | 1133/15 1187/18  | 1107/18 1176/5   |                         |
| 1172/22 1177/7   |   |  |  |                         |
| 1179/22 1196/11  | whenever [1] 1196/5   | 1192/1 1192/8 1192/12  | 1176/21  |                         |
|  | whether [40] 938/17   | WITNESSES [1]  | written [19] 951/20  |                         |
| weren't [7] 1031/11  | 945/14 946/6 946/11   | 1215/2   | 960/16 1012/24 1075/1  |                         |
| 1032/18 1033/7   | 977/4 978/22 979/3  |  | 1084/8 1131/17   |                         |
| 1036/17 1140/11  |   | woefully [1] 1138/14   |  |                         |
| 1162/8 1175/16   | 979/9 999/7 1003/4  | won't [2] 939/6 943/23   | 1153/20 1154/4 1154/6  |                         |
|  | 1010/8 1012/19  | word [1] 1163/22   | 1155/24 1156/3   |                         |
| what's [14] 939/9  | 1014/15 1014/17   | worded [1] 1190/19   | 1156/11 1156/18  |                         |
| 972/20 995/11 1011/2   |   |  |  |                         |
| 1012/17 1059/10  | 1015/16 1020/24   | words [12] 1017/9  | 1157/14 1157/20  |                         |
| 1072/11 1092/14  | 1027/12 1039/18   | 1052/17 1052/18  | 1158/10 1181/11  |                         |
|  | 1043/6 1054/14 1055/4   | 1052/19 1055/18  | 1181/17 1181/22  |                         |
| 1098/4 1107/4 1138/15  | 1064/10 1067/12   | 1057/19 1057/20  | wrote [9] 935/2 935/16   |                         |
| 1139/6 1200/10   |   |  |  |                         |
| 1210/13  | 1068/14 1076/5  | 1066/5 1066/13 1078/8  |  |                         |
| whatever [8] 1017/9  | 1079/11 1090/15   | 1132/9 1184/17   | 956/5 957/8 1154/17  |                         |
| _ = =  | 1105/24 1106/1  |  |  |                         |
| 1029/16 1059/21  |   | work [33] 944/12   |  |                         |
| 1 1060/0 1156/7 1150/04  |   | work [33] 944/12   | 1188/9   |                         |
| 1062/8 1156/7 1158/24  | 1112/12 1120/1  | 959/19 966/5 981/12  | 1188/9   |                         |
|  | 1112/12 1120/1<br>1120/20 1126/1  | 959/19 966/5 981/12<br>981/13 981/15 981/16  | 1188/9<br><b>X</b>   |                         |
| 1180/3 1180/10   | 1112/12 1120/1  | 959/19 966/5 981/12<br>981/13 981/15 981/16  | 1188/9   |                         |
| 1180/3 1180/10 whatsoever [3] 983/3  | 1112/12 1120/1<br>1120/20 1126/1<br>1126/13 1133/3 1138/9   | 959/19 966/5 981/12<br>981/13 981/15 981/16<br>981/19 982/11 982/20  | 1188/9<br><b>X</b>   |                         |
| 1180/3 1180/10   | 1112/12 1120/1<br>1120/20 1126/1<br>1126/13 1133/3 1138/9<br>1160/4 1174/9 1177/19  | 959/19 966/5 981/12<br>981/13 981/15 981/16<br>981/19 982/11 982/20<br>983/16 995/9 996/11   | 1188/9<br>X<br>X5 [3] 969/17 974/17<br>979/14  |                         |
| 1180/3 1180/10<br>whatsoever [3] 983/3<br>1012/19 1013/3   | 1112/12 1120/1<br>1120/20 1126/1<br>1126/13 1133/3 1138/9<br>1160/4 1174/9 1177/19<br>1200/2  | 959/19 966/5 981/12<br>981/13 981/15 981/16<br>981/19 982/11 982/20<br>983/16 995/9 996/11<br>996/14 1005/12   | 1188/9<br>X<br>X5 [3] 969/17 974/17<br>979/14  |                         |
| 1180/3 1180/10<br>whatsoever [3] 983/3<br>1012/19 1013/3<br>wheel [1] 1045/2   | 1112/12 1120/1<br>1120/20 1126/1<br>1126/13 1133/3 1138/9<br>1160/4 1174/9 1177/19  | 959/19 966/5 981/12<br>981/13 981/15 981/16<br>981/19 982/11 982/20<br>983/16 995/9 996/11   | 1188/9<br>X<br>X5 [3] 969/17 974/17<br>979/14<br>Y   |                         |
| 1180/3 1180/10<br>whatsoever [3] 983/3<br>1012/19 1013/3<br>wheel [1] 1045/2<br>wheel-spinning [1]   | 1112/12 1120/1<br>1120/20 1126/1<br>1126/13 1133/3 1138/9<br>1160/4 1174/9 1177/19<br>1200/2<br>while [9] 980/23 982/2  | 959/19 966/5 981/12<br>981/13 981/15 981/16<br>981/19 982/11 982/20<br>983/16 995/9 996/11<br>996/14 1005/12<br>1009/16 1025/18  | 1188/9<br>X<br>X5 [3] 969/17 974/17<br>979/14  |                         |
| 1180/3 1180/10<br>whatsoever [3] 983/3<br>1012/19 1013/3<br>wheel [1] 1045/2<br>wheel-spinning [1]<br>1045/2   | 1112/12 1120/1<br>1120/20 1126/1<br>1126/13 1133/3 1138/9<br>1160/4 1174/9 1177/19<br>1200/2<br>while [9] 980/23 982/2<br>1014/23 1076/18   | 959/19 966/5 981/12<br>981/13 981/15 981/16<br>981/19 982/11 982/20<br>983/16 995/9 996/11<br>996/14 1005/12<br>1009/16 1025/18<br>1031/13 1031/14   | X<br>X5 [3] 969/17 974/17<br>979/14<br>YAVITZ [1] 928/21   |                         |
| 1180/3 1180/10<br>whatsoever [3] 983/3<br>1012/19 1013/3<br>wheel [1] 1045/2<br>wheel-spinning [1]<br>1045/2   | 1112/12 1120/1<br>1120/20 1126/1<br>1126/13 1133/3 1138/9<br>1160/4 1174/9 1177/19<br>1200/2<br>while [9] 980/23 982/2<br>1014/23 1076/18<br>1107/16 1137/22  | 959/19 966/5 981/12<br>981/13 981/15 981/16<br>981/19 982/11 982/20<br>983/16 995/9 996/11<br>996/14 1005/12<br>1009/16 1025/18<br>1031/13 1031/14<br>1041/1 1042/18   | 1188/9  X  X5 [3] 969/17 974/17 979/14  Y  YAVITZ [1] 928/21 YeahI [2] 959/11  |                         |
| 1180/3 1180/10<br>whatsoever [3] 983/3<br>1012/19 1013/3<br>wheel [1] 1045/2<br>wheel-spinning [1]<br>1045/2<br>when [108] 943/10  | 1112/12 1120/1<br>1120/20 1126/1<br>1126/13 1133/3 1138/9<br>1160/4 1174/9 1177/19<br>1200/2<br>while [9] 980/23 982/2<br>1014/23 1076/18<br>1107/16 1137/22<br>1150/17 1152/9  | 959/19 966/5 981/12<br>981/13 981/15 981/16<br>981/19 982/11 982/20<br>983/16 995/9 996/11<br>996/14 1005/12<br>1009/16 1025/18<br>1031/13 1031/14<br>1041/1 1042/18<br>1056/24 1059/24  | 1188/9  X  X5 [3] 969/17 974/17 979/14  Y  YAVITZ [1] 928/21 YeahI [2] 959/11 959/14   |                         |
| 1180/3 1180/10<br>whatsoever [3] 983/3<br>1012/19 1013/3<br>wheel [1] 1045/2<br>wheel-spinning [1]<br>1045/2<br>when [108] 943/10<br>947/21 948/8 949/11   | 1112/12 1120/1<br>1120/20 1126/1<br>1126/13 1133/3 1138/9<br>1160/4 1174/9 1177/19<br>1200/2<br>while [9] 980/23 982/2<br>1014/23 1076/18<br>1107/16 1137/22  | 959/19 966/5 981/12<br>981/13 981/15 981/16<br>981/19 982/11 982/20<br>983/16 995/9 996/11<br>996/14 1005/12<br>1009/16 1025/18<br>1031/13 1031/14<br>1041/1 1042/18   | 1188/9  X  X5 [3] 969/17 974/17 979/14  Y  YAVITZ [1] 928/21 YeahI [2] 959/11  |                         |
| 1180/3 1180/10<br>whatsoever [3] 983/3<br>1012/19 1013/3<br>wheel [1] 1045/2<br>wheel-spinning [1]<br>1045/2<br>when [108] 943/10<br>947/21 948/8 949/11<br>956/13 964/21 969/13   | 1112/12 1120/1<br>1120/20 1126/1<br>1126/13 1133/3 1138/9<br>1160/4 1174/9 1177/19<br>1200/2<br>while [9] 980/23 982/2<br>1014/23 1076/18<br>1107/16 1137/22<br>1150/17 1152/9<br>1201/23   | 959/19 966/5 981/12<br>981/13 981/15 981/16<br>981/19 982/11 982/20<br>983/16 995/9 996/11<br>996/14 1005/12<br>1009/16 1025/18<br>1031/13 1031/14<br>1041/1 1042/18<br>1056/24 1059/24<br>1076/14 1076/17   | 1188/9  X  X5 [3] 969/17 974/17 979/14  Y  YAVITZ [1] 928/21 YeahI [2] 959/11 959/14   |                         |
| 1180/3 1180/10<br>whatsoever [3] 983/3<br>1012/19 1013/3<br>wheel [1] 1045/2<br>wheel-spinning [1]<br>1045/2<br>when [108] 943/10<br>947/21 948/8 949/11<br>956/13 964/21 969/13<br>971/11 971/18 973/6  | 1112/12 1120/1<br>1120/20 1126/1<br>1126/13 1133/3 1138/9<br>1160/4 1174/9 1177/19<br>1200/2<br>while [9] 980/23 982/2<br>1014/23 1076/18<br>1107/16 1137/22<br>1150/17 1152/9<br>1201/23<br>white [1] 1108/11  | 959/19 966/5 981/12<br>981/13 981/15 981/16<br>981/19 982/11 982/20<br>983/16 995/9 996/11<br>996/14 1005/12<br>1009/16 1025/18<br>1031/13 1031/14<br>1041/1 1042/18<br>1056/24 1059/24<br>1076/14 1076/17<br>1082/7 1087/17 1090/4  | 1188/9  X  X5 [3] 969/17 974/17 979/14  Y  YAVITZ [1] 928/21 YeahI [2] 959/11 959/14 year-end [6] 937/22 938/12 1026/10  |                         |
| 1180/3 1180/10<br>whatsoever [3] 983/3<br>1012/19 1013/3<br>wheel [1] 1045/2<br>wheel-spinning [1]<br>1045/2<br>when [108] 943/10<br>947/21 948/8 949/11<br>956/13 964/21 969/13   | 1112/12 1120/1<br>1120/20 1126/1<br>1126/13 1133/3 1138/9<br>1160/4 1174/9 1177/19<br>1200/2<br>while [9] 980/23 982/2<br>1014/23 1076/18<br>1107/16 1137/22<br>1150/17 1152/9<br>1201/23<br>white [1] 1108/11<br>white-knuckle [1]   | 959/19 966/5 981/12<br>981/13 981/15 981/16<br>981/19 982/11 982/20<br>983/16 995/9 996/11<br>996/14 1005/12<br>1009/16 1025/18<br>1031/13 1031/14<br>1041/1 1042/18<br>1056/24 1059/24<br>1076/14 1076/17<br>1082/7 1087/17 1090/4<br>1182/20 1182/24   | 1188/9  X  X5 [3] 969/17 974/17 979/14  Y  YAVITZ [1] 928/21 YeahI [2] 959/11 959/14 year-end [6] 937/22 938/12 1026/10 1210/20 1211/13  |                         |
| 1180/3 1180/10<br>whatsoever [3] 983/3<br>1012/19 1013/3<br>wheel [1] 1045/2<br>wheel-spinning [1]<br>1045/2<br>when [108] 943/10<br>947/21 948/8 949/11<br>956/13 964/21 969/13<br>971/11 971/18 973/6<br>977/8 977/22 980/19   | 1112/12 1120/1<br>1120/20 1126/1<br>1126/13 1133/3 1138/9<br>1160/4 1174/9 1177/19<br>1200/2<br>while [9] 980/23 982/2<br>1014/23 1076/18<br>1107/16 1137/22<br>1150/17 1152/9<br>1201/23<br>white [1] 1108/11<br>white-knuckle [1]<br>1108/11  | 959/19 966/5 981/12<br>981/13 981/15 981/16<br>981/19 982/11 982/20<br>983/16 995/9 996/11<br>996/14 1005/12<br>1009/16 1025/18<br>1031/13 1031/14<br>1041/1 1042/18<br>1056/24 1059/24<br>1076/14 1076/17<br>1082/7 1087/17 1090/4  | 1188/9  X  X5 [3] 969/17 974/17 979/14  Y  YAVITZ [1] 928/21 YeahI [2] 959/11 959/14 year-end [6] 937/22 938/12 1026/10 1210/20 1211/13 1213/10  |                         |
| 1180/3 1180/10<br>whatsoever [3] 983/3<br>1012/19 1013/3<br>wheel [1] 1045/2<br>wheel-spinning [1]<br>1045/2<br>when [108] 943/10<br>947/21 948/8 949/11<br>956/13 964/21 969/13<br>971/11 971/18 973/6<br>977/8 977/22 980/19<br>981/4 983/13 984/7   | 1112/12 1120/1<br>1120/20 1126/1<br>1126/13 1133/3 1138/9<br>1160/4 1174/9 1177/19<br>1200/2<br>while [9] 980/23 982/2<br>1014/23 1076/18<br>1107/16 1137/22<br>1150/17 1152/9<br>1201/23<br>white [1] 1108/11<br>white-knuckle [1]<br>1108/11  | 959/19 966/5 981/12<br>981/13 981/15 981/16<br>981/19 982/11 982/20<br>983/16 995/9 996/11<br>996/14 1005/12<br>1009/16 1025/18<br>1031/13 1031/14<br>1041/1 1042/18<br>1056/24 1059/24<br>1076/14 1076/17<br>1082/7 1087/17 1090/4<br>1182/20 1182/24   | 1188/9  X  X5 [3] 969/17 974/17 979/14  Y  YAVITZ [1] 928/21 YeahI [2] 959/11 959/14 year-end [6] 937/22 938/12 1026/10 1210/20 1211/13  |                         |
| 1180/3 1180/10 whatsoever [3] 983/3 1012/19 1013/3 wheel [1] 1045/2 wheel-spinning [1] 1045/2 when [108] 943/10 947/21 948/8 949/11 956/13 964/21 969/13 971/11 971/18 973/6 977/8 977/22 980/19 981/4 983/13 984/7 988/7 990/20 997/3   | 1112/12 1120/1 1120/20 1126/1 1126/13 1133/3 1138/9 1160/4 1174/9 1177/19 1200/2 while [9] 980/23 982/2 1014/23 1076/18 1107/16 1137/22 1150/17 1152/9 1201/23 white [1] 1108/11 white-knuckle [1] 1108/11 Who's [1] 1104/15  | 959/19 966/5 981/12<br>981/13 981/15 981/16<br>981/19 982/11 982/20<br>983/16 995/9 996/11<br>996/14 1005/12<br>1009/16 1025/18<br>1031/13 1031/14<br>1041/1 1042/18<br>1056/24 1059/24<br>1076/14 1076/17<br>1082/7 1087/17 1090/4<br>1182/20 1182/24<br>1189/11 1193/7<br>1199/11  | 1188/9  X  X5 [3] 969/17 974/17 979/14  Y  YAVITZ [1] 928/21 YeahI [2] 959/11 959/14 year-end [6] 937/22 938/12 1026/10 1210/20 1211/13 1213/10 years [13] 935/14  |                         |
| 1180/3 1180/10<br>whatsoever [3] 983/3<br>1012/19 1013/3<br>wheel [1] 1045/2<br>wheel-spinning [1]<br>1045/2<br>when [108] 943/10<br>947/21 948/8 949/11<br>956/13 964/21 969/13<br>971/11 971/18 973/6<br>977/8 977/22 980/19<br>981/4 983/13 984/7   | 1112/12 1120/1 1120/20 1126/1 1126/13 1133/3 1138/9 1160/4 1174/9 1177/19 1200/2 while [9] 980/23 982/2 1014/23 1076/18 1107/16 1137/22 1150/17 1152/9 1201/23 white [1] 1108/11 white-knuckle [1] 1108/11 Who's [1] 1104/15 whoa [2] 954/18  | 959/19 966/5 981/12<br>981/13 981/15 981/16<br>981/19 982/11 982/20<br>983/16 995/9 996/11<br>996/14 1005/12<br>1009/16 1025/18<br>1031/13 1031/14<br>1041/1 1042/18<br>1056/24 1059/24<br>1076/14 1076/17<br>1082/7 1087/17 1090/4<br>1182/20 1182/24<br>1189/11 1193/7<br>1199/11<br>worked [5] 980/16   | 1188/9  X  X5 [3] 969/17 974/17 979/14  Y  YAVITZ [1] 928/21 YeahI [2] 959/11 959/14 year-end [6] 937/22 938/12 1026/10 1210/20 1211/13 1213/10 years [13] 935/14 983/10 983/16 989/22   |                         |
| 1180/3 1180/10 whatsoever [3] 983/3 1012/19 1013/3 wheel [1] 1045/2 wheel-spinning [1] 1045/2 when [108] 943/10 947/21 948/8 949/11 956/13 964/21 969/13 971/11 971/18 973/6 977/8 977/22 980/19 981/4 983/13 984/7 988/7 990/20 997/3 998/3 998/8 998/9   | 1112/12 1120/1 1120/20 1126/1 1126/13 1133/3 1138/9 1160/4 1174/9 1177/19 1200/2 while [9] 980/23 982/2 1014/23 1076/18 1107/16 1137/22 1150/17 1152/9 1201/23 white [1] 1108/11 white-knuckle [1] 1108/11 Who's [1] 1104/15 whoa [2] 954/18 954/18   | 959/19 966/5 981/12<br>981/13 981/15 981/16<br>981/19 982/11 982/20<br>983/16 995/9 996/11<br>996/14 1005/12<br>1009/16 1025/18<br>1031/13 1031/14<br>1041/1 1042/18<br>1056/24 1059/24<br>1076/14 1076/17<br>1082/7 1087/17 1090/4<br>1182/20 1182/24<br>1189/11 1193/7<br>1199/11<br>worked [5] 980/16<br>1050/20 1050/21  | X X5 [3] 969/17 974/17 979/14 Y YAVITZ [1] 928/21 YeahI [2] 959/11 959/14 year-end [6] 937/22 938/12 1026/10 1210/20 1211/13 1213/10 years [13] 935/14 983/10 983/16 989/22 991/6 1099/3 1100/9  |                         |
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| 1180/3 1180/10 whatsoever [3] 983/3 1012/19 1013/3 wheel [1] 1045/2 wheel-spinning [1] 1045/2 when [108] 943/10 947/21 948/8 949/11 956/13 964/21 969/13 971/11 971/18 973/6 977/8 977/22 980/19 981/4 983/13 984/7 988/7 990/20 997/3 998/3 998/8 998/9 1017/18 1018/22 1019/3 1019/8 1026/17   | 1112/12 1120/1 1120/20 1126/1 1126/13 1133/3 1138/9 1160/4 1174/9 1177/19 1200/2 while [9] 980/23 982/2 1014/23 1076/18 1107/16 1137/22 1150/17 1152/9 1201/23 white [1] 1108/11 white-knuckle [1] 1108/11 Who's [1] 1104/15 whoa [2] 954/18 954/18 whoever [1] 1170/1  | 959/19 966/5 981/12<br>981/13 981/15 981/16<br>981/19 982/11 982/20<br>983/16 995/9 996/11<br>996/14 1005/12<br>1009/16 1025/18<br>1031/13 1031/14<br>1041/1 1042/18<br>1056/24 1059/24<br>1076/14 1076/17<br>1082/7 1087/17 1090/4<br>1182/20 1182/24<br>1189/11 1193/7<br>1199/11<br>worked [5] 980/16<br>1050/20 1050/21<br>1110/19 1136/24   | X X5 [3] 969/17 974/17 979/14 Y YAVITZ [1] 928/21 YeahI [2] 959/11 959/14 year-end [6] 937/22 938/12 1026/10 1210/20 1211/13 1213/10 years [13] 935/14 983/10 983/16 989/22 991/6 1099/3 1100/9  |                         |
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